# AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [2011] 6 S.C.R. 403
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2011-05-11
- **Bench:** G. S. Singhvi, Ashok Kumar Ganguly
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/amar-singh-v-union-of-india-ors-27827
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
A
B
0. 19, r. 3 CPC and 0. 11 of Supreme Court Rules -
c
Affidavits in support of petitions - Affirming of contents of the
petition in the affidavits - Disclosure of source of information
in an affidavit - Significance of - Explained - HELD: In the
instant writ petition, the petitioner approached the Court in a
I
casual manner - The affidavit filed by him in support of the 0
petition, relying on which the Court issued notice, was not at
all modelled either on 0. 19 r. 3 CPC or 0. 11 of Supreme
Court Rules - If the rules of affirming the affida.vits were
followed, it would have been difficult for the petitioner to file
the petition and so much of judicial time would have been E;
saved - Perfunctory and slipshod affidavits which are not
consistent either with 0. 19, r. 3 CPC or with 0. 11, rr. 5 and
13 of Supreme Court Rules, should not be entertained by the
Court -
Registry of the. Court.directed to scrutinize affidavits
in all petitions/applications strictly - Supreme Court Rules,
1966 - 0. 11 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32.
PLEADINGS:
F
Inconsistent stands by writ petitioner - HELD: A litigant
who comes to Court and invokes its writ jurisdiction must G
come with clean hands - He cannot prevaricate and take
inconsistent positions - It is one of the fundamental principles
of jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and
candour in their pleadings and especially when it contains a
403
H
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A prayer for injunction, which is an equitable remedy and must
be governed by principles of 'uberrima fide' - Equity -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32.
B
CONSTITUTION OF /NOIA, 1950:
Articles 32and 21 - Writ petition alleging infringement of
right of privacy of the petitioner stating that his telephone
conversations were being intercepted at the behest of the
Government- HELD: The petitioner invoked the extraordinary
writ jurisdiction of the Court without filing a proper affidavit -
C The nature of challenge in the petition is very serious as he
is alleging an attempt by the government of intercepting his
phone for extraneous considerations -
It is, therefore,
imperative that before m<Jking such an a/legation the
petitioner should be careful, circumspeCt and should file a ·
D proper affidavit in support of the averments in the petition -
This is the primary duty of a petitioner, who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 32 - Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 - Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
E
Article 32 - Writ petition - Conduct of petitioner - Writ
petition filed alleging interception of his telephone
conversations by the Government agencies at the behest of
the political party in power - A/legations directly and indirectly
made in the writ petition against the said political party
F impleading it as one of the respondents -Interim injunction
passed by Court - Later, it was brought before the Court that
the order intercepting the phone calls were fabricated and a
criminal case had already been registered against accused
persons - Affidavit filed by the petitioner seeking to withdraw
the a/legations against the said political party - HELD: The
G main case of the petitioner is based on his a/legations against
the said political party - Petitioner has been shifting his stand
to suit his convenience - The instant writ petition is an attempt
by the petitioner to mislead the Court on the basis of frivolous
a/legations and by suppressing material facts - The so-called
H legal questions on tapping of telephone cannot be gone into
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
405
on the basis of a petition which is so weak in its foundation -
A
No case of tapping of telephone has been made out against
the statutory authorities in view of the criminal case, which is
going on, and the petitioner's stand that he is satisfied with
the investigation in that case - Besides, the petitioner in fifing
the writ petition largely relied upon the inf

## Text

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[2011] 6 S.C.R. 403
AMAR SINGH
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Writ petition (Civil) No. 39 of 2006)
MAY 11, 2011
[G. S. SINGHVI AND ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.)
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
A
B
0. 19, r. 3 CPC and 0. 11 of Supreme Court Rules -
c
Affidavits in support of petitions - Affirming of contents of the
petition in the affidavits - Disclosure of source of information
in an affidavit - Significance of - Explained - HELD: In the
instant writ petition, the petitioner approached the Court in a
I
casual manner - The affidavit filed by him in support of the 0
petition, relying on which the Court issued notice, was not at
all modelled either on 0. 19 r. 3 CPC or 0. 11 of Supreme
Court Rules - If the rules of affirming the affida.vits were
followed, it would have been difficult for the petitioner to file
the petition and so much of judicial time would have been E;
saved - Perfunctory and slipshod affidavits which are not
consistent either with 0. 19, r. 3 CPC or with 0. 11, rr. 5 and
13 of Supreme Court Rules, should not be entertained by the
Court -
Registry of the. Court.directed to scrutinize affidavits
in all petitions/applications strictly - Supreme Court Rules,
1966 - 0. 11 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32.
PLEADINGS:
F
Inconsistent stands by writ petitioner - HELD: A litigant
who comes to Court and invokes its writ jurisdiction must G
come with clean hands - He cannot prevaricate and take
inconsistent positions - It is one of the fundamental principles
of jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and
candour in their pleadings and especially when it contains a
403
H
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A prayer for injunction, which is an equitable remedy and must
be governed by principles of 'uberrima fide' - Equity -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32.
B
CONSTITUTION OF /NOIA, 1950:
Articles 32and 21 - Writ petition alleging infringement of
right of privacy of the petitioner stating that his telephone
conversations were being intercepted at the behest of the
Government- HELD: The petitioner invoked the extraordinary
writ jurisdiction of the Court without filing a proper affidavit -
C The nature of challenge in the petition is very serious as he
is alleging an attempt by the government of intercepting his
phone for extraneous considerations -
It is, therefore,
imperative that before m<Jking such an a/legation the
petitioner should be careful, circumspeCt and should file a ·
D proper affidavit in support of the averments in the petition -
This is the primary duty of a petitioner, who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 32 - Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 - Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
E
Article 32 - Writ petition - Conduct of petitioner - Writ
petition filed alleging interception of his telephone
conversations by the Government agencies at the behest of
the political party in power - A/legations directly and indirectly
made in the writ petition against the said political party
F impleading it as one of the respondents -Interim injunction
passed by Court - Later, it was brought before the Court that
the order intercepting the phone calls were fabricated and a
criminal case had already been registered against accused
persons - Affidavit filed by the petitioner seeking to withdraw
the a/legations against the said political party - HELD: The
G main case of the petitioner is based on his a/legations against
the said political party - Petitioner has been shifting his stand
to suit his convenience - The instant writ petition is an attempt
by the petitioner to mislead the Court on the basis of frivolous
a/legations and by suppressing material facts - The so-called
H legal questions on tapping of telephone cannot be gone into
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
405
on the basis of a petition which is so weak in its foundation -
A
No case of tapping of telephone has been made out against
the statutory authorities in view of the criminal case, which is
going on, and the petitioner's stand that he is satisfied with
the investigation in that case - Besides, the petitioner in fifing
the writ petition largely relied upon the information received
B
from an accused in the criminal case.
Article 32 - Writ petition - Suppression of material fact
- Effect of - Writ petition alleging tapping of telephone of writ
petitioner-The communications on the basis of which the C
interception was alleged and which were received from the
accused and were made annexures in the writ petition, found
to be forged and criminal case initiated in which petitioner's
statement uls 161 CrPC was recorded - This fact not stated
in the writ petition - HELD: A statement uls 161 is certainly
material fact in a police investigation in connection with an
D
FIR - The investigation is to find out the genuineness of those
very documents on the basis of which the writ petition was
moved - In· that factual context, total suppression in the writ
petition of the fact that the petitioner gave as. 161 stater;nent
in that investigation is suppression of a very material faCt -A
E
litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or .Who
touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, Is not
entitled to any relief, interim or final - The instant writ petition
is an attempt by the petitioner to mislead the Court on the
basis of frivolous allegations and by suppression of material
F
facts - Administration of justice - Conduct of litigant - Relief.
TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885:
s.5 - Interception of telephone conversations - Duty of
service provider - HELD: Though the service provider is to
G
give assistance, as per request, to the law enforcement
agencies and has to act on an urgent basis and in public
interest, at the same time, he is equally duty bound to
immediately verify the authenticity of such communication if
on a reasonable reading of the same, it appears to any H
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A person, acting bona fide, that such communication, with
innumerable mistakes, falls clearly short of the tenor of a
genuine official communication - In the instant case, the
service provider has failed in discharging the said duty -
Central Government must, therefore, frame certain statutory
B guidelines in this regard to prevent interception of telephone
conversations on unauthorised communications -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32.
The instant writ petition was filed by the petitioner
alleging that on a request made on 22.10.2005 from the
C office of the Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), New
Delhi to Nodal Officer, Reliance lnfocom Ltd (respondent
no. 8), the conversations of the petitioner on phone were
intercepted; that the said request was subsequently
authorised by an order dated 9.11.2005 from the Principal
D Secretary (Home), Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi; that the petitioner had learnt that the
government of India and the Government of NCT of Delhi
were pressurised by respondent no.7, namely, Indian
National Congress for intercepting, monitoring and
E recording his telephone conversations; that there were
similar cases of interception of phone conversations of
other people, including some of country's leading political
figures who were using the services provided by
respondent no. 8; that the action of the respondents
F amounted to infringing to his fundamental right of
privacy. He, therefore, prayed that the order for
interceptions be declared as unconstitutional and,
therefore, void; and that damages be awarded to him. It
was further prayed that all the service providers including
G respondent no. 8 along with others impleaded in the
petition be directed to disclose all relevant details with
respect to the directions of interception issued to them
by the authorities and the Court may lay down guidelines
on interception of phone conversations in addition to
H those laid down in the case of People's Union for Civil
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
407
Liberties. The Union of India and the Government of NCT A
of Delhi denied the allegations. Their case was that the
orders dated 22.10.2005 and 9.11.2005 purporting to have
been issued by the authorities concerned were fabricated
with forged signatures and were not genuine; that a
criminal case in that respect had already been initiated
B
and pursuant to the inquiry an FIR under various sections
of the Penal Code and the Telegraph Act had been
registered on 30.12.2005 and in its investigation the
petitioner's statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. was also recorded;
that pursuant to the investigation charges were framed c
by the competent court againstfour accused including
one 'AS'.
Dismissing the writ petition, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The petitioner approached the Court in a D
casual manner. The affidavit filed by the petitioner in
support of his petition, and relying on which this Court
issued notice on 24.1.2006, is not at all modelled either
on 0.19, r.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 or 0.11
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. [Para 11) (421-G-H;
E
422-A]
State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, 1952 SCR
674 = AIR 1952 SC 317; Barium Chemicals Limited and
another v. Company Law Board and others, 1966 SCR 311 =
AIR 1967 SC 295; and A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India
F
and another, 1970 (3) SCR 121 = AIR 1970 SC 652 - relied
on
Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar ((1910) Indian Law
Reporter 37 Calcutta 259 -referred to.
G
1.2. In the case of Virendra Kumar Sak/echa*, this
Court held that non-disclosure of source of information
in an affidavit will indicate that the petitioner did not come
forward with the source of information at the first
H
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2011] 6 S.C.R.
A opportunity. The purpose of disclosing such source is to
give the other side notice of the same and also to give it
an opportunity to test the veracity and genuineness of
the source of information. The absence of such
disclosure in the instant case, in the affidavit, which was
B filed along with the petition, raises a prima facie
impression that the writ petition was based on unreliable
facts. In case of Mis Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar**, a three
Judge Bench of this Court in dealing with petitions under
Article 32 of the Constitution held that under 0.19, r.3 of
c the Code it was incumbent upon the deponent to disclose
the nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient
particulars. In a case where allegations in the petition are
not affirmed, it cannot be treated as supported by an
affidavit as required by law. [Para 19-20) [425-G-H; 426D A-E]
*Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan and others, 1972
(3) SCR 955 = (1972) 1 SCC 826; and **Mis Sukhwinder Pal
Bipan Kumar and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1982
( 2) SCR 31 = (1982) 1 SCC 31; and Smt. Savitramma v.
E Cicil Naronha and another, 1988 Suppl. SCR 561 = AIR
1988 sec 1987 - relied on.
1.3. In the instant case, the petitioner invoked the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article
F 32, without filing a proper affidavit as required in terms
of 0.19, r.3 CPC. Besides, the nature of the challenge in
his petition is very serious in the sense that he Is alleging
an attempt by the government of intercepting his phone
and he is further alleging that in making this attempt the
G government is acting on extraneous considerations, and
is virtually acting in furtherance of the design of the
ruling party. It is, therefore, imperative that before making
such an allegation the petitioner should be careful,
circumspect and file a proper affidavit in support of his
averments in the petition. This is the primary duty of a
H petitioner who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
409
this Court under Article 32. It is very disturbing to find that A
on the basis of such improper and slipshod affidavit,
notice was issued on the petition, and subsequently a·
detailed interim order was passed on 22.1.2006, which
continued for about four years and is continuing on date.
[Para 24-27] [427-E-H; 428-A-F]
B
1.4. It is made clear that, perfunctory and slipshod
affidavits which are not consistent either with 0. 19, r.3
CPC or with 0.11, rr. 5 and 13 of the Supreme Court Rules
should not be entertained by this Court. [Para 65] [441C
D]
1.5. In fact three Constitution Bench judgments of
this Court in Purushottam Jog Naik, Barium Chemicals
Ltd. and A.K.K. Nambiar and judgments in several other
cases point out the importance of filing affidavits D
following the discipline of the provision in the Code and
the said rules. These rules, reiterated by this Court time
and again, are aimed at protecting the Court against
frivolous litigation and must not be diluted or ignored.
However, in practice they are frequently flouted by the
E
litigants and often ignored by the Registry of this Court.
The instant petition is an illustration of the same. If the
rules for affirming the affidavit were followed, it would
have been difficult for the petitioner to file this petition and
so much of judicial time would have been saved. This
F
case is not isolated instance. [Para 66-67] [441-D-G]
1.6. This Court, therefore, directs that the Registry
must strictly scrutinize all the affidavits, all petitions and
applications and will reject or note as defective all those
which are not consistent with the mandate of 0. 19, r.3
G
CPC and 0.11, r.5 and 13 of the Supreme Court Rules.
[Para 68] [441-H; 442-A]
2. When in the course of hearing, it was pointed out
by this Court on 2.2.2011 that the affidavit filed by the
H
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A petitioner is perfunctory, defective and not in accordance
with the mandate of law, the petitioner filed a detailed
affidavit. It appears from the said affidavit that the main
documents on which the writ petition is based, are
Annexures A and B, the orders dated 22.10.2005 and
B 9.11.2005 respectively, which were obtained by the
petitioner from one 'AS', who was arrested in the criminal
case. It also appears that petitioner's averments In
paragraphs 2(v), 2(vii), 2(viil) and 2(ix) are based on
information derived from the same accused and that a
c part of the information relating to the averments in para
5 of the writ petition was also obtained from the same
accused. The petitioner, therefore, in filing the writ petition
under Article 32, largely relied on information received
from an accused in a criminal case. [Para 29) [428-H; 429D A-CJ
3.1. It is true that License Condition No. 42 which
provides that service provider is to give assistance, as
per request, to the Law Enforcement Agencies and any
violation of the said condition may lead to imposition of
E a heavy penalty on the service provider; and further that
the service provider has to act on an urgent basis and
has to act in public interest, at the same time, he is equally
duty bound to immediately verify the authenticity of such
communication if on a reasonable reading of the same,
F it appears to any person, acting bona fide, that such
communication, with innumerable mistakes, falls clearly
short of the tenor of a genuine official communication. In
the .instant case, any reasonable person or a reasonable
body of persons or an institution which is discharging
G public duty as a service provider, before acting on
communications dated 22.10.2005 and 9.11.2005,
particularly, the order like the one dated 9.11.2005, would
at least carefully read its contents. Even from a casual
reading of the purported communication dated 9.11.2005,
H containing so many gross mistakes, one would
I
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
· 411
reasonably be suspicious of the authenticity of its text.
A
Therefore, the explanation of the service provider is not
acceptable. If the service provider could have shown,
which it has not done in the present case, that it had tried
to ascertain from the author of the communication, its
genuineness, but had not received any response or that
B
the authority had accepted the communication as
genuine, the service provider's duty would have been
over. But the mere stand that there is no provision under
the rule to do so is a lame excuse, especially having
regard to the public element involved in the working of c
the service provider and the consequential effect it has
on the fundamental right of the person concerned. In
view of the public nature of the function of a service
provider, it is inherent in its duty to act carefully and with
a sense of responsibility. This Court is thus constrained
0
to observe that in discharging the said duty, respondent
No. 8, the service provider, has failed. [Para 33, 37 to 40)
[431-G-H; 432-A; F-H; 433-C-G]
3.2. The Central Government must, therefore, frame
certain statutory guidelines in this regard to prevent
E
interception of telephone conversation on unauthorised
communication, as has been done in this case. [Para 41)
[434-B]
4.1. A litigant who comes to Court and invokes its writ
F
jurisdiction must come with clean hands. He cannot
prevaricate and take inconsistent positions. It is one of
the fundamental principles of jurisprudence that litigants
must observe total clarity and candour in their pleadings
and especially when it contains a prayer for injunction. G
A prayer for injunction, which is an equitable remedy,
must be governed by principles of 'uberrima tides'. At the
time of filing the writ petition, the petitioner impleaded the
Indian National Congress as respondent No.7 and also
made direct allegations against it in paras 2(1 ), 2(10), 2(11)
H
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 6 S.C.R.
A and 2(12). In paras 2(12) and 5 of the writ petition, there
are indirect references to the said respondent. In the
various grounds taken in support of the petition,
allegations have been specifically made against
respondent no. 7. Even though in the order of this Court
B dated 27 .2.2006, there is an observation that respondent
No. 7 has been impleaded unnecessarily, the said
respondent has not been deleted and in the amended
cause title also, respondent No. 7 remains impleaded.
The averments against the said respondent were not
c withdrawn by the petitioner. [Para 42, 43, 50 and 58] [434C-E; 436-G-H;439-B]
Hari Narain v. Badri Das - 1964 SCR 203 =AIR 1963
SC 1558, Welcome Hotel and others v. State of A.P. and
others - 1983 (3) SCR 674 = (1983) 4 SCC 575, G.
D Narayanaswamy Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and another v.
Government of Karnatka and anot.'1er- 1991 ( 2 ) SCR 563 =
JT 1991(3) SC 12: (1991) 3 SCC 261, S.P. Chenga/varaya
Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and others
- 1993 ( 3 ) Suppl. SCR 422 = JT 1993 (6) SC 331: (1994)
E 1 SCC 1, A. V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Government of
A.P. and others- 2007 (3) SCR 603 = JT 2007 (4) SC 186:
(2007) 4 SCC 221, Prestige Lights Limited v. SB/ -
2007 (9)
SCR 112 = JT 2007(10) SC 218: (2007) 8 sec 449, Sunil
Poddar and others v. Union Bank of India - 2008 (1)
F
SCR 261
= JT 2008(1) SC 308: (2008) 2 sec 326,
KO.Sharma v. SAIL and others - 2008 (10) SCR 454 = JT
2008 (8) SC 57: (2008) 12 SCC 481, G. Jayashree and
others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and others - 2008 (17 )
SCR 1454 =
JT 2009(2) SC 71 : (2009) 3 sec 141, Dalip
G Singh v. State of U.P. and others - 2009 (16) SCR 111 =
JT 2009 (15) sc 201: (2010) 2 sec 114 - Relied on
Da/g/ish v. Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238; Castelli v. Cook
1849 (7) Hare, 89,94; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers
& Company 55 L.T. 802,803; and R. v. Kensington Income
H Tax Commissioner 1917 (1) K.B. 486 - referred to.
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
413
4.2. However, the affidavit of the petitioner filed in
A
February, 2011, completely knocks the bottom out of the
petitioner's case, inasmuch as by the said affidavit the
petitioner seeks to withdraw all averments, allegations
and contentions against respondent no. 7. The main case
of the petitioner is based on his allegations against B
respondent no.7. The burden of the song in the writ
petition is that respondent no. 7, acting out of a political
vendetta and exercising its influence on Delhi Police
administration caused interception of the telephone lines
of various political leaders of the opposition including c
that of the petitioner. The subsequent affidavit also
acknowledges that the petitioner is satisfied with the
investigation by the Delhi Police in connection with the
forgery alleged to have been committed, namely, the
fabrication of orders on the basis of which the phone 0
lines of the petitioner were tapped. The petitioner also
makes a statement that the accused 'AS' edited and
tampered some of the conversations of the petitioner.
Further, when the writ petitioner filed the petition on
21.1.2006, he was aware that an investigation that was
going on by the Delhi Police in connection of the forgery
E
of Annexures A and B. Even then he filed the petition with
those annexures and without a proper affidavit. When the
petitioner filed a detailed affidavit in support of his writ
petition, pursuant to the order of this Court, the petitioner
admitted that he relied on the information from the same
F
'AS', and the main annexures to the petition, namely,
Annexures A and B were received by him from the same
accused 'AS'. Paragraphs 2 (2), 2 (3), 2 (4) and 2 (6) are
based on the information received from 'AS'. But he did
not say all these in his affidavit when he filed the writ G
petition on 21.1.2006.ln 2006, the gravamen of the
petitioner's grievances was against respondent no. 7,
and the basis of his petition was the information that he
derived from the accused 'AS'. On the basis of such a
H
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A petition, he invoked the jurisdiction of this Court and an
interim order was issued in his favour, which is still
continuing. Now when the matter has come up for
contested hearing, he suddenly withdraws his allegations
against respondent no. 7 and feels satisfied with the
B investigation of the Police in connection with the case of
forgery and also states that the same 'AS' "edited and
tampered certain conversations of the petitioner". Thus,
the petitioner has been shifting his stand to suit his
convenience. [Para 46-49) [435-E-H; 436-A-C-E]
c
4.3. Besides, in the writ petition which was filed on
21.1.2006, there is no mention of the fact that the
petitioner gave a statement u/s. 161, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 in connection with the investigation
arising out of FIR lodged on 30.12.2005. From the records
D of the case it appears that the petitioner gave s.161
statements on 13.1.2006. In the writ petition there is a
complete suppression of the fact. A statement u/s. 161 is
certainly a material fact in a police investigation in
connection with an FIR. The investigation is to find out
E the genuineness of those very documents on the basis
of which the writ petition was moved. In that factual
context, total suppression in the writ petition of the fact
that the petitioner gave a s.161 statement in that
investigation is, suppression of a very material fact. [Para
F 51) [437-A-C; 435-E-H; 436-A-F]
4.4. It is now well established that a litigant, who
attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches
the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not
G entitled to any relief, interim or final. The instant writ
petition is an attempt by the petitioner to mislead the
Court on the basis of frivolous allegations and by
suppression of material facts. In view of such incorrect
presentation of facts, this Court had issued notice and
H
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
415
also subsequently passed. the injunction order which is
A
still continuing. [Para 60, 61 to 63] [440-D-G]
Dalip Singh V; State of U.P. and others - 2009 (16)
SCR 111 = JT 2009 (15) SC 201: (2010) 2 SCC 114 - relied
on
B
4.5. It is, therefore, clear that writ petition is frivolous
and is speculative in character~ This Court is of the
opinion that the so called legal questions on tapping of
telephone cannot be gone into on the basis of a petition
which is so weak in its foundation. No case of tapping
C
of telephone has been made out against the statutory
authorities in view of the criminal case which is going on
and especially in view of the petitioner's stand that he is.
satisfied with the investigation in that case. The petitioner
has withdrawn its case against the respondent No.7. In
D
that view of the matter, it is made clear that the petitioner,
if so advised, may proceed against the service provider,
respondent No.8, before the appropriate forum, in
accordance with law, and this Court does not make any
observation on the merits of the case in the event the
E
petitioner initiates any proceeding against respondent
No.8. [Para 52 and 64] [437-D-E; 441-A-C]
People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India
and Another 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 321 = (1997) 1 SCC
301-Cited.
Case Law Reference:
1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 321
cited
Para 1
(1910) Indian Law Reporter
referred to Para 15
37 Calcutta 259
1952 SCR 674
Relied on Para 16
1966 SCR311
relied on
Para 17
F
G
H
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A
1970 (3) SCR 121
relied on
Para 18
1972 (3) SCR 955
relied on
Para 19
1982 (2) SCR 31
relied on
Para 20
B
1988 Suppl. SCR 561
relied on
Para 21
2 Mac. & G. 231,238
referred to Para 54
1849 (7) Hare, 89, 94
referred to Para 55
55 L.T. 802,803
referred to Para 56
c
1917 (1) K.B. 486
referred to Para 57
1964 SCR 203
relied on
Para 59
1983 (3) SCR 67 4
relied on
Para 59
D
1991 (2) SCR 563
relied on
Para 59
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422
relied on
Para 59
2007 (3) SCR 603
relied on
Para 59
E
2007 (9) SCR 112
relied on
Para 59
2008 (1) SCR 261
relied on
Para 59
2008 (10) SCR 454
relied on
Para 59
F
2008 (17) SCR 1454
relied on
Para 59
2009 (16) SCR 111
relied on
Para 59
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.
G
Writ Petition (Civil) No.39 of 2006.
Indira Jaising, ASG, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Pravin Parekh, J.S.
Attri, Harish Chander, C.S. Vaidyanathan, Anoop G.
H
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
417
Choudhari, Ram Jethmalani, Ajay Kumar Jha, Pradeep Rai,
A
Shashank Kunwar, Shweta Sharma, (for Parekh & Co.), Sonam
Anand, Aditya Sharma, Mukesh Verma, A.K. Sharma, Supriya
. Jain, Manjul Bajpai, Ankur Saigal, Bina Gupta, Abhay Anand
Jena, Rishi Malhotra, Mrinmayee Sahu, Equity Lex Associates,
Nikhil Nayyar, TVS Raghavendra Sreyas, Swapnil Verma,
B
Prashant Bhushan, Pranav Sachdeva, Manali Singhal, Santosh
Sachin, Abhijat P. Medh, Vivek Kishore, Ruchi Gour Narula,
S.R. Setia, Vivek Verma, Sushma Suri, Gyan Shyam Vasisht,
Rajiv Mehta, Navin Chawla Gaurav Kaushik, E.C. Agrawala,
Sunita Hazarika, Nidhi, Madhu Sikri Saket Sikri for the c
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GANGULY, J. 1. In this writ petition, filed under Article 32,
the petitioner is seeking to protect his fundamental right to
D
privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of\ India. The
petitioner's case is that on the basis of his inforr~ation from
various sources, he had learnt that the Government of India and
the Government of National Capital Region of Delhi, being
pressurised by the respondent No.7, had been intercepting the
E
petitioner's conversation on phone, monitoring them and
recording them. The petitioner had been availing of the
telephone services of Mis Reliance lnfocom Ltd., impleaded
herein as respondent no.8. He further referred to similar cases
of interception of phone conversations of other people, including
F
some of the country's leading political figures, who were using
services provided by M/s Reliance lnfocom Ltd: and other
service providers. Such interception of conversation, according
to the petitioner, amounts to intrusion on the privacy of the
affected people, and is motivated by political ill will and has been
G
directed only towards those who are not aligned with the
political party in power at the Centre. He submitted that this
infringement of his .funefamental rights was symptomatic of the
erosion of the democratic values in the country. He prayed that
the Court may declare the orders for interception
H
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A unconstitutional and therefore void, and initiate a judicial inquiry
into the issuance and execution of these orders, and prayed
that damages be awarded to him. It was further prayed that all
the telecom service providers including M/s. Reliance lnfocom,
along with all the others who had been impleaded, be directed
B to disclose all the relevant details with respect to the directions
of interception issued to them by the authorities, and this Court
may lay down guidelines on interception of phone conversations
in addition to the ones laid down by this Court in its judgment
in People's Union for Civl1 Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India
C and Another ( 1997) 1 SCC 301.
2. The petitioner's case is that a request dated 22nd
October, 2005 was issued from the office of the Joint
Commissioner of Police (Crime), New Delhi to the Nodal
Officer, Reliance lnfocom Ltd., Delhi, for the interception of all
D the calls made from or to the telephone numbers of the
petitioner. This request was subsequently followed by an order
dated 9th November, 2005, from the Principal Secretary
(Home), Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi,
authorising the said request. The case of respondent no. 8 is
E that the said orders were acted upon by it, and the petitioner's
conversations were intercepted. However, the Union of India,
and the National Capital Territory of Delhi denied the
allegations. They submitted that said orders annexed to the
petition, purporting to be issued by the Joint Commissioner of
F Police, (Crime), New Delhi, and the Principal Secretary
(Home), Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi are ·
fabricated with forged signatures and they are not genuine.
Alleging forgery, a criminal case in that respect had already
been initiated.
G
H
3. In the course of the hearing, by filing an interlocutory
application (no.2 of 2006) the petitioner submitted that the
recordings of the said conversations had been made available
to some journalists/news agencies. In view of these
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
419
[ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
submissions, this Court directed the electronic and the print
A
media not to publish any part of the said conversations, vide
Court's order dated 27th February, 2006.
4. Various applications for intervention were preferred,
especially by civil society groups. These applications were
8
allowed. The interveners argued that the conversations by the
petitioner were mostly made in his capacity as a public
functionary and, therefore, were public in nature, and the
citizens of the country have a right to know their contents under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. A prayer was therefore
C
made by them to vacate the order of injunction.
5. In this matter pursuant to the direction of this Court, a
detailed affidavit has been filed by one R. Chopra, Joint
Secretary (Home Department) of the Government of National
Capital Territory of Delhi, in which it has been clearly stated that
D
the Principal Secretary (Home) in the Government of National
Capital Territory of Delhi, is authorised by the Lieutenant
Governor of Delhi to exercise powers to order interception of
phone conversation for a period specified in such orders in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of Indian Telegraph
E
Act, 1885 (the said Act). Froin the order of authorisation dated
10th December, 1997, it appears that the same was issued
pursuant to the judgment of this Court dated 18th December,
1996 in People's Union for Civil Liberties (supra) and also
Section 5 (2) read with the Government of India, States Ministry
F
Notification No. 104-J, dated 24th October, 1950.
6. In the said affidavit it has been clearly stated by the
deponent that no request for interception is examined by the
Home Department unless it is accompanied by a confirmation
that the same has the prior approval of the Commissioner of G
Police, Delhi. It was clarified that no Joint Commissioner of
Police or police officer of any other rank can directly request
for an interception, without first obtaining a prior approval of the
Commissioner of Police. It was also clarified that no phone
interception order is suo motu issued by the Principal Secretary
H
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A (Home) without a request from the Government agency. Majority
of interception requests, received by the Principal Secretary
(Home), are from Delhi Police.
7. In respect of the petitioner's telephone no. (011
8 39565414), the deponent specifically stated that no order for
interception of the said number was ever issued either on 9th
November, 2005, or earlier, or for that matter, even later. The
categorical denial in this respect in the said affidavit is set out
below.
c
D
E
F
(v) ... This categorical denial is being submitted after careful
scrutiny of all the relevant records. Also it is respectfully
stated on the basis of careful scrutiny of records, that no
request for interception of the petitioner's telephone
number 011 39565414 was received by the Principal
Secretary (Home)/respondent no. 4 from any Police Officer
or for that matter any agency, governmental I police or
otherwise.
(vi) In view of this, the order bearinp no. F. 5/1462/2004 -
HG dated 9.11.2005, a copy of which is appended to the
writ petition at page 28 as Annexure B, and having an
endorsement No. F. 5/1462/2004 - HG/7162 of the same
date, and purportedly issued under the signature of the then
Principal Secretary (Home), is forged and fabricated
document.
8. An affidavit has also been filed on behalf of Union of
India by one Mr. J.P.S. Verma, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
home affairs, North Block, New Delhi, in which reference was
made to certain orders passed by this Court in this petition, and
G thereafter, reference was also made to the judgment of this
Court in People's Union for Civil Liberties (supra), and the
various provisions of Indian Telegraph Act. The Central
Government made it very clear that it was fully aware of the
sensitivity relating to the conversations on telephone, and the
H privacy rights thereon. Reference was also made to
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
421
[ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
technological measures to avoid unauthorised interceptions and
A
the changed security scenario.
9; In this matter an additional affidavit has been filed by
Shri Alok Kumar, Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Headquarters. In that affidavit it has been stated, that on inquiry
8
by the Additional Police Commissioner (Crimes), it was
discovered that the purported order of Joint Commissioner of
Police (Crime) and Principal Secretary (Home) on the basis
of which interceptions were alleged by the petitioner were
forged documents.
c
'
10. Consequent on the same report, an FIR No.152/2005.
had been lodged under Sections 419, 420 468, 471 and 1208
of l.P.C., read with Sections 20, 21 and 26 of the Indian
Telegraph Act, on 30th December, 2005. In the said
investigation the statement of the petitioner was also recorded
D I
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. In a subsequent affidavit filed
by Mangesh Kashyap, Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Headquarters on 8th February, 2011, it has been stated by the
deponent that the Final Report in connection with the said
investigation was filed before the competent Court on 15th
E
February, 2006 and the charges were framed on 6th February,
2010. Four accused persons in the said case were charged
under Section 1208 read with Sections 420 and 471 of 1.P.C.
and Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act. In addition,
Bhupender Singh had been charged under Section 201, l.P.C.
F
and Anurag Singh was charged under Section 419, l.P.C. The
trial in the said case has commenced and one witness, Shri
Ranjit. Narain the then Joint Commissioner of Police was
examined.
11. Here we may point out the casual manner in which the
G
petitioner approached the Court. The affidavit filed by the
petitioner in support of his petition, and relying on which this
Court issued notice on 24th January, 2006, is not at all
modelled either on order XIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
H
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 6 S.C.R.
A Procedure, or Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The
relevant portion of the petitioner's affidavit runs as under:
B
c
D
E
"1.
That I am the Petitioner in the above Writ Petition
and am conversant with the facts and
circumstances of the case. As such, I am
competent to swear this affidavit.
2.
That I have read the contents of paras 1 to 9 on
pages 1 to 24 of the accompanying Writ Petition
and have understood the same. I state that what is
stated therein is true to my knowledge and belief.
3.
That I have read the accompanying List of Dates
and Events from pages B to D and have understood
the same. I state that what is stated therein, is true
to my knowledge and belief."
12. The provision of Order XIX of Code of Civil Procedure,
deals with affidavit. Rule 3 (1) of Order XIX which deals with
matters to which the affidavit shall be confined provides as
follows:
"Matters to which affidavits shall be confined. - (1)
affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent
is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on
interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief
F
may be admitted; provided that the grounds thereof are
stated."
13. Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 deals with
affidavits. Rule 5 of Order XI is a virtual replica of Order XIX
G Rule 3 (1). Order XI Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules is
therefore set out:
H
"Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent
is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on
interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief
AMAR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
423
[ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
may be admitted, provided that the grounds thereof are
A
stated."
14. In this connection Rule 13 of Order XI of the aforesaid
Rules are also relevant and is set out below:
"13. In this Order, 'affidavit' includes a petition or other
B
document required to be sworn or verified; and 'sworn'
includes affirmed. In the verification of petitions, pleadings
or other proceedings, statements based on personal
knowledge shall be distinguished from statements based
on information and belief. In the case of statements based
C
on information, the deponent shall disclose the source of
this information."
15. The importance of affidavits strictly conforming to the
requirements of Order XIX Rule 3 of the Code has been laid
D
down by the Calcutta High Court as early as in 1910 in the case
of Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar [(1910) Indian Law
Reporter 37 Calcutta 259]. An erudite Bench, comprising Chief
Justice Lawrence H. Jenkins and Woodroffe, J. laid down:
"We desire to impress on those who propose to rely on
E
affidavits that, in future, the provisions of Order XIX, Rule
3, must be strictly observed, and every affidavit should
clearly express how much is a statement of the deponent's
knowledge and how much is a statement of his belief, and
the grounds of belief must be stated with sufficient
F
particularity to enable the Court to judge whether it would
be sage to act on the deponent's belief."
16. This position was subsequently affirmed by Constitution
Bench of this Court in State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog
G
Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317. Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court,
held:
·
"We wish, however, to observe that the verification of the
affidavits produced here is defective. The body of the
affidavit discloses that certain matters were known to the
H
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 6 S.C.R.
A
Secretary who made the affidavit personally. The
verification however states that everything was true to the
best of his information and belief. We point this out as
slipshod verifications of this type might well in a given case
lead to a rejection of the affidavit. Verification should
B
invariably be modelled on the lines of Order 19, Rule 3, of
the Civil Procedure Code, whether the Code applies in
terms or not.