# AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC - **Citation:** [1980] 3 S.C.R. 1159 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1980-05-09 - **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 1543 of 1977 - **Bench:** Y. V. CliANDRACHUD, P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. KRlsHNA IYBR, B· V. D. Tulzapurkar, A. P. Sen - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ambika-prasad-mishra-etc-v-state-of-u-p-and-ors-etc-7956 - **Pages:** 22 ## Headnote Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960-Con.rtitutional Validity-Jlalue of stare decisi.f.-vis-a-vis judicial review. Dismissing !he appeals and the Writ Petitions, the Court· HEID : ( 1) .-It is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vit.al issues deteind by the brooding interest of forensic blow-up. This, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of Stare action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, or the basic direction of th'e nation itoelf is in peril of a shake up. The decision in Kesavananda Bharati's case, therefore. upholding the vir'es of Article 3 lA in unequivocal terms binds the conrt on the simple score of stare decisi~ and the constitutional ground of Article 141 •. Further, fatal flaws silenced by ea.rlier rulings cannot survive after d'eath because a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argu'ed, inad&- quately considered and fallaciously reasoned". And none of the..., misfortunes can be imputed to Bharati's case. [1164 C-0, 1165 C-DJ (2). The sweep of Article 3 lA is wide and indubitably em bra= legislation on land ceilings. Equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of ownership by imposition of oeiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverre plaaning and strategies a.re covered by the armour of Article 3 IA. Article 3 IA repulses, therefore, all invasions on ceiling legislation armed with Articles 14, 19 and 31. [1165 D-B, 1166 D-B] Raniit Singh and Ors. v. State of Puniab and Ors. [1965] I S.C.R. 82, State of '- Kera/a and Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (W...Wng) Co. Ltd. ' Etc. [1974) I S.C.R. 671, reiterated. (3). The decision in Maneka Gandhfs case is no universal nostrum or curoall. Nor can it be applicable to the land reform law which is in another donmin o· E F of comtitutional jurisprudence and quite apart from personal liberty in Article 21. G· To contend that land reform law, if unreasonable violates Article 21 as expanllYcly constnled in Maneka Gantlhf• case is incorrect. [1168 E-OJ (4). Sectitective net the present Act and, broadly speaking, the antiseptic effect of that Article is sufficient to immunise the Act against invalidation to the extent stated therein. The extreme argument that Art. 31 A itself is void as violative of the basic ·structure of the ~onstitution 1)as been negatived by my learned brother, Bhagwati, J. in a kindred group of cases of Andhra Pradesh. The amulet of Art. 31A is, therefore, potent, so far as it goes, but beyond its ambit it is still possible, as counsel have endeavoured to . , A ll c D E F G II B c D E F G H 1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 s .. C.R. spin out some sound argument to nullify· one section or the other. Surely, the legislature cannot run amok in the blind belief that Art. 31A is omnipotent. We will examine the alleged infirmities in due course. It is significant that even apart from the many decisions upholding Art. 31A, Golak Nath's case(') decided by a Bench of 11 Judges, while holding that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act exceeded the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based on the doctrine of prospective over-rnling. The result, for our, purpose, is that even Golak Nath's case has held Art. 31A valid The note struck by later cases. reversing Golaknath does not militate against the vires of Art. 31A. Suffice it to say that in the Kesavananda Bharti's case(') Article 31A was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid. But, after listening to the marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13 Judges Bench cf this Court upheld the vires of Article 3 lA in unequivocal terms. That decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the' constitutional ground of Art. 1.41. · Every now discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. In thls view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with hlgh-presswe advocacy, cannot persuade us to re-open, what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemri preposion by the epic Fundamental Rights case. From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.' 31A: has stood judicial scrutiny although, as s~ earlier, we do not base the conclusion on Art. 31A. Even so, it is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season beciime it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrathe action on vital issues deterred by the brooding threat of forensic blowup. Thls, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisatioll. of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, qr the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shakeup. It is surely wrong to prove Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court right when he said(6). (1) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 762. (2) [19731 Supp. SCR. !. (3) AIR 1952 SC 252. (4) Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. [1973]' 1. S.C.R., 356. (5) Kera/av. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (W•g) Co. Ltd. etc. [1974] I SCR. (6) Smith v. All wright 321 US 649, 669 and 670 (1944). I • " I • ... • ' AMBIKA PRASAD v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, l.) 1165 "The reason for my concern is that the imtant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this day and train only ...... It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thcmght and purpose, this Court which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and fiows of opinion. should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions". It is wise to remember that fatal fiaws silenced by earlier rulings 'Cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned". (1) And none of these misfo'rtunes can be imputed to Bharti:s case (supra). For these reasoos, we proceed to consider the contentions of counsel on the clear assumption that Art. 31A is good. Its sweep is wide and indubitably embraces legislation on land ceilings. Long years ago, in ,Ranjh v. State,(') a Constitution Bench, speaking through Hidayatullall, J., dwelt oa the wide amplitude of Art. 3 lA, referred to Precedents of this Court on agrarian reform vis a vis Art. 3 lA and concluded that equitable clistribution of lands, annihilatign of monopoly of ownership by imposition of ceiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverse planning and strategies are covered by the armour of Art. 3 lA. We may qnote a part : The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other, but envisages also the raising of econ<>- mic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, talll!ing grounds etc. which (sic) enure for the benefit of rural population must be considered to be an essential part of the redistribution of holdings ,and open lands to which no objection is apparently taken. If agrarian reforms are to succeed, more distribu- (1) Salmond 'Jurisprudence' p. 21S(llth edition). (2) (1965]1 SCR 82. A B c D F G R A B c D E F G H 1166 ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. tion of lands to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village: panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than, individual owners of small portions of lands. Further the village panch:ayat is an authority for purposes of part Ill as was conceded before us and it has the protection of Art. 31 A because of this character even if the taking over of Sham/at deb amounts to acquisition . . . . . . . The setting of a body or agricultural artisans (such as the village caJ11"lller, the village blacksmith, the village tanner, ferrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc.) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of hpldings, fixing of ceiling on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.(') This review has been reinforced by the later pronouncement of a Constitution Bench in the Gwalior Rayon Case,(') emphatically expressing support for the conceptual sweep of agrarian reform vis-a-vis Art. 3 lA. ~e proposition, therefore, is invuln:erable that Art. 31A repulses all invasion on "ceiling legislation" (armed with Arts. 14, 19 and 31). The· professed goal of the legislation is to maximise surplus lands for working out distributive justice and rural dev- vent activities which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such actions. When the alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date. fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition. Otherwise, all the Jaruis would have been transferred ancl little would have been left by way of surplus. Let us read the text of s.5 ( 6) which is alleged to be bad ~ing overinclusive or otherwise anomalous. The argument, rather hard to follow and too subtle for the pragmatic of. agrarian law, may be clearer when the provision is unfurled. Section 5 ( 6) runs thus: Tu determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-- holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth A B c day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have D been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply ·to : (a) a transfer in favour of any person(including Government) referred to in sub-section(2); (b) a transfer proved to ·the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a beiiami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other mem- . bers of the family. -' There is no blanket ban here but only qualified invalidation of certain sinister assignments etc. Counsel weaves gossamer webs which break on mere judicial touch when he argues that transfer 'in good F faith and for adequate consideration' have been unconstitutionally exG empted. The bizarre submission is that 'adequate consideration' is an arl!itrary test. We reject it without more discussion. . The second limb of ·the submission is that while s. (6) ilirects the authority to ignore certain transfers it does not void it. The further spin-off adroitly presented by counsel is that the provision violates the second proviso to Art. 31. It is a little too baffling to follow and we disH ~iss the submislrlon as hollow. The provision in s.5 ( 6), when read Jn the light of the Provisos, is fair and valid .. 1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R. A Couusel's further argument is to quote his own words that "the B c D E F impugned provisions do not establish a reasonable ·procedure" because: "The expression 'in good faith' is over-inclusive and takes within its sweep situations which are not only very different but which may not have any nexus or legitimate relationship with the objects and purposes of the ceiling law ..... " We are hardly impressed by it and find no substance on it. There is no question of morality or constitutionality even if the clause may be a little over-drawn. On the contrary, it is legislative folly not to preserve, by appropriate preventives and enacted contraceptives, the 'surplus' reservoir of land without seepage or spill-over. It is legal engineering, not moral abandonment. Indeed, the higher morality or social legitimacy of the law requires a wise legislature to prescribe transfers, lest the surplus pool be drained off by a rush of transactions. Maybe, individual hardship may happen, very sad in some instances. But every great cause claims human martyrs ! Poor consolation for the victim but yet a necessary step if the large owners are not to play the vanishing trick or resort to manipulated alienations ! After all, this ban comes into force only on a well-recognised date, not from an arbitrary retro-active past. We cannot discover anything which is morally wrong or constitutionally anathematic in such an embargo. Article 19(1) (f) is not absolute in operation and is subject, under Art.19(6), to reasonable · restrictions such as the one contained in s.5 ( 6). We do not th.ink there is merit in the triple submissions spun by Shri Mridul. Even on the merits, the transfers have been right! y ignored, the vendees who are the grandsons have been held to be not bona fide transferees for adequate consideration; and the findings are of fact and concurrent. We over-rule the grounds of grievance as unsustainable. In sum, without reliance on Art. 31A, Shri Mridul's contention• can G be dismissed as without merit. We will now consider the mini-arguments of the other counselsome of them do merit serious consideration by the court - and even where direct relief does not flow from the judicial process, State action to avoid anomalies may well be called ·for in the light of genuine H hardships. Shri Veda Vyas, appearing in W.P. No. 228 of 1979 and SLP No. 2599 of 1978, pleaded powerfully for gender justice and sex I 11 i AMBIKA PRASAD v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer,!.) 1171 equity because, according to his reading, the Act had a built-in masculine bias in the definition of 'family unit' and allocation of ceiling on holdings, and therefore, perpetrated unconstitutional discrimination. Indeed, his case illU.Strated the anti-woman stance of the statute, he claimed. The submission is simple, the inference is inevitable but the invalidati6n does not follow even if Art. 31A is not pressed into service to silence Art. 14. We will formulate the objections and examine their merits from the constitutional perspective. Maybe, there is force in the broad generalisation that, notwithstanding all the boasts about the legendary glory of Indian womanhood in the days of yore and' the equal status and even martial valour of heroines in Indian history, our culture has sufiered a traumatic distortion, not merely due to feudalism and medievalism, but also due to British imperialism. Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the country decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf. Our legal culture and Corpus juris, partly a heritage of the past, do contain strands of discriminatiou to set right which a oommissiou elaborately conducted enquiries and ·made a valuable report to the Central Government. Shri Veda Vyas may lie right in making sweeping submissions only to this limited extent but when we reach the concrete statutory situation and tackle the specific provisions in the Act, his argumen~ misses the mark. A better appreciation of his contenti.on must be preceded by excerption of two definitions and consideration of the concepts they embody. Section 3(7) defines 'family' thus : 'family' in relation to a tenure-holder, means himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters J ; This.definition is incomplete without contextually readings. 5(3) and A c I> E F G so we quote the provision which, in the view of Shri Veda Vyas, R enwombs the vice of discrimination against women. Sec.5(3) (a) & (b) & Explanation : A B c D F 11 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [;1980] 3 s.c.R. Sec. 5 (3) : Subject to the provisions of sub-sections ( 4), (5)" (6) and (7) the ceiling area for purposes of subsection (1 ) shall be (a) In the case of a tenure-holder having a family of not more than five members, 7.30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of his family) plus two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the land held by him aggregates to two hectares, for each of bis adult sons, who are either not themselves tenure holders or who hold less than two hectares of iirigated land, subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land; (b) in the case of a tenure-holder having family of more than five members, 7 .30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of bis family) , besides, each of the members exceeding five and for each of his adult sons who are not themselves tenureholders or who held less than two hectares of irrigated land, two additional hectares of irrigated land, or such additional land which together with, the land held by such adult son aggregates to two he<;tare~. subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land. Explanation : The expression 'adult son' in clause (a) and (b) includes au adult sou who is dead and has left surviving behind him minor sons or miuor daughters (other than married daughters) who are not themselves tenure holders or who hold land less than two hectares of irrigated land; The anti-female kink is patent in that the very definition of family discloses prejudice against the weaker sex by excluding adult daughters without providing for any addition to the ceiling on their account. In G the case of an adult son, s. 5(3)(a) of the Act provides for the addition of two hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holder's) sons where the family has a strength of less than five. Section 5(3)(b) similarly provides for two additional hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holder's) adult sons where the strength of the family is more tha.n 5. It must be remembered that this addition is H on account of the fact that there are adult sons, even though they are not tenure holders or held less than two hectares or none. This Fevilege of adding to the total extent that the family of a tenure I ' • • • AMBIKA PRASAD v. U.P. STATE (KriShna Iyer,!.) 1173 hoilder may keep is denied to an adult daughter, even though unmarried, A and, therefore, dependent on the family for that a married son stands . on a different footing from a married daughter, what justice is there in baring a dependent unmarried daughter in the cold? Assuming without admitting, Shri Veda Vyas further urges that having regard to the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and the increasing prevalence of unmarried adult daughters in families these days, the discrim,ination B. is not theoretical but real because no minor girl can now. marry. Another similar invidious provision is the definition of tenure-- holder. Ceiling on heldings is fixed with reference to tenure-holders. We wonder whether the Commission on the Status of Women or the Central Government or the State Governments have considered this aspect of sex discrimination in most land reforms laws, but undoubtedly the State should be fair especially to the weaker sex. Adult damsels should not be left in distress by progressive legislations geared to land reforms. This criticism may have bearing on the ethos of the community and the attitude of the legislators, but we are concerned with the constitutionality of the provision. Maybe, in this age of nuclear families and sex equal human rights it is illiberal and contrary to tbe zeit geist to hark back to history's dark pages nostalgically and disguise it as the Indian way of life with a view to deprive Wl:mlen of their undeniable half. Arts.