# Amir Singh v. Ram Sin1h

- **Citation:** [1963] 3 S.C.R. 884
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 436 to 438 of 1961
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. G.Ajendr.Ag.Adk.Ar, K. N. W.Anchoo, c. D.AS GUFTA, J. C. Sh.Ah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/amir-singh-v-ram-sin1h-2687
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Prt·•mption-Amenrling legislatio11 creating new right• and
providing rlecreea not to be passer! inconsistent with the new lawRetrospective
operation-Effect on pending appeal-Punjab
Pre-emption Acl, 1913 (Punj. of 1913), as amended by Punjab
Act 10 of 1960, ss.15(1);c) cl. 4, 31.
The properties in suit had been sold by A to the
appellants
on May
31;
1956,
but
the respondents
as the
owners of
certain
agricultural
1and
in
th~
patti claimed that they had a right of pre-emption under s. 15
(c) (ii) and (iii) of the Pnujab Pre-emption Act, 1913.
In the
suit instituted by the respondents for
this purpose the
appellant• resisted the claim on the ground that the vendees
from A had transferred by exchanges some of the items out of
the lands purchased by them and that as a result of the said
exchanges the appellants themselves had beeome entitled to
pre.empt the said sales under the same statutory provision.
The suit
was, however, decreed by the trial court and
the decision
was
confirmed
by
the
High
Court
of
Punjab.
The
appellants
obtained
special
leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court and during the pendency of
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
885
the appeal the Act was amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960,
by which, inter alia, (1) els. (ii) and (iii) of s. 15 (c) of the
original Act were deleted, (2) cl.4 of s. 15 (l)(e) pr'.>vided
that the right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land
and village immoveable property shall vest in the tenants who
held under tenancy of the vendors or anyone of them the ]and
or property sold or a part thereof, and (3) s. 31 provided that
no court shall pass a decree in a suit for pre-emption whether
instituted before or after the commencement of the amending
Act of 1960 which was inconsistent with the provisions of the
said Act.
In view of the new provisions introduced by the
amending act the responndents raised a new contention that
they were tenants who held under tenancy of the vendor
of the lands in
question and, as
such, they
were
entitled to the right of pre-emption under cl.4 of s.15 (l)(c)
of the Act, as amended, even if it be held that the right to
claim pre-emption under els. (ii) and (iii) of s.15 (c) of
the unamended Act was taken away retrospectively by the
amending Act. The appellants pleaded that even assuming
that cl.4 of s.15 (l)(c) was applicable, the respondents could
not get a decree on the bas sis of the new right of pre-emption
inasmuch as they had no such right on the date on which
the suit was filed or when the sales were effected.
Held, that ( 1) the provisions of s.31 of the Punjab Pre·
emption Act, 1913, as amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960, are
retrospective in operation and, therefore, the decree passed in
favour of the respondents by the trial court and affirmed by
the High Court under the unamended section could not be
sustained.
Ram Sarup v.Munshi-[1963] 3 S.C.R. 858 followed.
(2} The retrospective operation of s.31 necessarily involves
effec, being given to the substantive provisions of amended
s.15 retrospectively, and hence the rights which the respondents
now claim under the amended provisions must be deemed to
have v~sted in them at the relevant time, with the result that
they are entitled, on remand, to ask for a decree passed on the
basis of the said rights.

## Text

1962
RamSatup
••
Muna/ii
A,1Jrangar J.
1962
0&tobe1" 4.
884
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
the circumstances that the appellant has succeeded
only by virtue of subsequent legislation, we direct
that there shall be no order as to costs in the
appeal.
•
Appeals Nos. 139, I 47 and
214 dismissed.
~ppeal No. 510 al/c11.·(d.
AMIR SINGH AND ANOTHER
v.
RAM SINGH AND OTHERS
(And connected appeals)
(B. P. SINHA., c. J., P. B. G.AJENDR.AG.ADK.AR,
K. N. W.ANCHOO, K, c. D.AS GUFTA
and J. C. SH.AH, JJ.)
Prt·•mption-Amenrling legislatio11 creating new right• and
providing rlecreea not to be passer! inconsistent with the new lawRetrospective
operation-Effect on pending appeal-Punjab
Pre-emption Acl, 1913 (Punj. of 1913), as amended by Punjab
Act 10 of 1960, ss.15(1);c) cl. 4, 31.
The properties in suit had been sold by A to the
appellants
on May
31;
1956,
but
the respondents
as the
owners of
certain
agricultural
1and
in
th~
patti claimed that they had a right of pre-emption under s. 15
(c) (ii) and (iii) of the Pnujab Pre-emption Act, 1913.
In the
suit instituted by the respondents for
this purpose the
appellant• resisted the claim on the ground that the vendees
from A had transferred by exchanges some of the items out of
the lands purchased by them and that as a result of the said
exchanges the appellants themselves had beeome entitled to
pre.empt the said sales under the same statutory provision.
The suit
was, however, decreed by the trial court and
the decision
was
confirmed
by
the
High
Court
of
Punjab.
The
appellants
obtained
special
leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court and during the pendency of
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
885
the appeal the Act was amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960,
by which, inter alia, (1) els. (ii) and (iii) of s. 15 (c) of the
original Act were deleted, (2) cl.4 of s. 15 (l)(e) pr'.>vided
that the right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land
and village immoveable property shall vest in the tenants who
held under tenancy of the vendors or anyone of them the ]and
or property sold or a part thereof, and (3) s. 31 provided that
no court shall pass a decree in a suit for pre-emption whether
instituted before or after the commencement of the amending
Act of 1960 which was inconsistent with the provisions of the
said Act.
In view of the new provisions introduced by the
amending act the responndents raised a new contention that
they were tenants who held under tenancy of the vendor
of the lands in
question and, as
such, they
were
entitled to the right of pre-emption under cl.4 of s.15 (l)(c)
of the Act, as amended, even if it be held that the right to
claim pre-emption under els. (ii) and (iii) of s.15 (c) of
the unamended Act was taken away retrospectively by the
amending Act. The appellants pleaded that even assuming
that cl.4 of s.15 (l)(c) was applicable, the respondents could
not get a decree on the bas sis of the new right of pre-emption
inasmuch as they had no such right on the date on which
the suit was filed or when the sales were effected.
Held, that ( 1) the provisions of s.31 of the Punjab Pre·
emption Act, 1913, as amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960, are
retrospective in operation and, therefore, the decree passed in
favour of the respondents by the trial court and affirmed by
the High Court under the unamended section could not be
sustained.
Ram Sarup v.Munshi-[1963] 3 S.C.R. 858 followed.
(2} The retrospective operation of s.31 necessarily involves
effec, being given to the substantive provisions of amended
s.15 retrospectively, and hence the rights which the respondents
now claim under the amended provisions must be deemed to
have v~sted in them at the relevant time, with the result that
they are entitled, on remand, to ask for a decree passed on the
basis of the said rights.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 436 to 438 of 1961.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated December 9, 1959, of the Punjab
J9dJ ---
Amor Singh
v.
Ram Singh
1962
Amir Singh
v.
Ram Sin1h
886
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 407, 408
and 409 of 195~.
Achhru Ram and B. D. Jain, for the appellants.
Gian Singh Vohra, for the respondents.
1962. October 4. The Judgement of the Court
was delivered by
Co.fendragaakorJ.
GAJENDR.AGADKAR, J.-What is the fffcct of
the retrospective operation of s. 31 introduced by
the Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1960
( X: of 1960) in the parent Act of Pre-emption
(No. 1 of 1913). 'lhat i8 the short question which
arises for our decibion in these three appeals which
have been ordered to bA consolidated for the purpose of hearing by this Court. The8e appeals arise
from three pre-emption suits in1tituted by the respondents against the respective appellants.
The
respondents' caie was that the properties in snit
had been sold by Aftab Hai on May :n, 1956, for
Rs. 10,000/- to the appellants and it is these sales
which they wanted to pre-empt.
They alleged that
they are the owners of agricultural land in Patti
Aulakh and Patti Bode, in Mauza Mara.bar Kalan,
and as sach, they had the statutory right to claim
pre-emption, under s. l.5(c) (ii) and (iii).
The appellants resisted this claim on the ground that the
respective vendees from Aftab Rai had transferred
by exchanges about 2 kenals out of the lands purchased by them and as a result of the said exchanges the appellants had themselves become entitled
to pre-empt the said sales under the same statutory
provision.
Since the appellants had
acquired
equal status with the respondents who claimed to be
the
pre-emptors, their claim
for pre-emption
cannot be sustained. That, in brief, was the nature
of the contest between the parties.
3 S.Cl.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS]
887
The trial Court held that the exohanges on
which the appellants relied had not been proved
and so, it gave effect to the respondents' right to
pre-empt under s. 15(c) (ii) & (iii). The appellants
took the metter before the Addl. District Judge in
appeal. The lower appellate Court was pleased to
admit additional evidence under 0.41, r. 27,
of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the
exchanges in question had in fact been proved and
were, in law, valid. It, therefore came to the conclusion that the appellants acquired equal status
with the respondents and so, the respondent2'
claim for pre emption must fail. That is why the
appeals preferred by the appellants were allowed
and the respondents' suits were dismissed.
The dispute wae then taken up before the
High Court of Punjab by the respondents by second
appeals. Mahitjan, J., who heard these appeals
held that the property acquired by exchange in lieu
of the part of the property purchased by the
vendees did not give the appellants a right to preempt. He referred to the fact that exchange of
lands was sometimes recognised as conferring on
the party the right to pre-empt, but that was where
the land exchanged did not form part of the land
sold and pre-empted. In the result, the High Court
held that the plea made by the appellants was not
well-founded in law and so, the respondents were
entitled to pre-empt. As a result of this finding,
the decrees passed by the lower appellate Court
were reversed and the respondents' suits were
decreed. The appellants then moved the Division
Bench by Letters Patent appeals, but these appeals
were dismissed. It is against the decrees thus
passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent
appeals that the appellants have come to this Court
by special leave.
We have already noticed that both the appellants and the respondents are claiming a right to
1962
.hnir Singh
v.
Ram Singh
Gajend!'agadkar J,
1962
Amir81'ngh
••
Ram Sin1h
Gaj1ndragadlc«r J.
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
pre-empt under s.
15(c) (ii) and (iii) of the
Parent Act of 1913.
On February 4, 1960, the
amending Act No. 10 of 1960
was
passed .
Section 4 of
the amending Act has substitituted a new s.15 of the old s. 15 after making
substantial changes· in
the
provisions of the
earlier section. Clauses (ii) and (iii) of the original
s.15(c) have been deleted, with tho result that the
claims for pre-emption made both by the appellants
and the respondent. have ceased to be recognised
by the amended provisions. The appellants oontend
that sinco the respondt1nts have got a decree for
pre-emption in their favour on the provisions of the
unamended s.15, that decree can no longer be sustained because of the provisions of s.31 of the amen·
ding Act. Section 31 provides that no Court shall
pass a decree in a suit for pre-emption whether
instituted before or after the commencement of the
Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1959(1960)
which is inconsistent with the provisions of the said
Aot.
In support of his argument that s.31 being
retrospective in operation the respondents' title to
claim pre-emption can no longer be entertained.
Mr. Achhru Ram for the appellants has invited our
attention to a recent decision of this Court in the
case of Ram Sarup v. Mushi (1) pronounced on
August 30, 1962. In that case, Ayyangar, J., who
spoke for the Constitution Bench
considered
the question about the
retrospective
operation of s. 31
and has
observed
that
the
said
prov1s10n
is
retrospective
and
that
the language used in the said section is "plain the
comprehensive so as to require an appellate Court
to give effect to the substantive provisions of the
amending Aot whether the appeal before it is one
against a decree granting pre-emption or one refus·
ing that relief." It was no doubt urged before the
Court in that case that·the words used in s. 31 did
11i [1963J 3 s.c.a. 858.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
889
not justify the application of the amended provi·
,>
sions to proceedings pending before the appellate
Court; the said words showed that the said provisions could be invoked only in cases which were
pending before the trial Court. This contention
was rejected and so, it must be taken to be settled
that the provisions of s. 31 are retrospective and
can be relied upon by the appellants in their present
-, _ appeals before this Court.
This position would undoubtedly have helped
the appellants but for another complication which
has been introduced by the relevant provisions of
the amended s. 15 enacted by the amending Act.
We have already noticed that some persons whose
_ --f
right to pre-empt was recognised by the corresponding provisions of the parent Act, have been omitted
by the amended section. 'fhe amended section has
also introduced another class of persons on whom
the right to claim pre-emption has been conferred.
These persons are the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors the land or property sold or a
part thereof. This class of tenants bas been introduce<'! in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of amended s. 15.
Clause four ofs. 15(1) (c) provides that the right
of pre-emption in respect of agriculiural land and
village immovable property shall vest in the tenants
who hold under tenancy of the vendors or any one
of them the land or property sold or a part thereof.
Similar provisions are made in clauses (a) & (b) of
the said section. For the respondents Mr. Vohra
,
contends that they are the tenants who hold under
tenancy of the vendor the la.nds in question and
as such, they are now clothed with the right to
claim pre-emption. In other words, the respondent's
argument is that though the right to pre-empt which
they possessed under clauses (ii) and (iii) of the un-
• J. amended s. 15( c) of the parent Act have been taken
a way retrospectively by the amending Act, they
have been clothed with the same right by virtue of
1962
Amir Sinzh
'·
Ram Singh
Gaj•ndragadka, J.
1962
Amir Singh
v.
Ram Singh
Ga}tndragadkaf' J.
890
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
the fact that they fall under the fourth clause of
the amended s. 15 (I) (c) and the conferment of this
right like the destruction of their right under the
deleted provisions of the unamended section must
operate retrospectively. He, therefore, suggests
that the respondents ought to be given an opportunity to prove their case under the fourth clause of
s. 15(c) as amended. In this connection, he has
referred us to the fact that this plea has been specifically taken by the respondents in their statement
of the case before this Court. It is on this plea
that the question about the effect of the retrospective operation of s. 31 arises.
Mr. Achhru Ram contends that though s. 31 is
retrospective and in that sense the rights to preempt which vested in the respondents at the time
when thev instituted the present suits have been
retrospectively taken away from them, it cannot
be said that the right to pre-empt to which the
respondents lay claim in the present appeals has
been retrospectively created. His argument is that
by the amending Act, the Legislature has no doubt
provided that cert!tin classes of persons who were
entitled to pre-empt under th!l old Act should not
be given that right and the extinction of the said
right should operate retrospectively, but that cannot
be said to be the policy of the legislature in rega.rd
to the rights which have been created for the first
time by the amending Act.
The argument thus presented may prima facie
appear to be attractive; but a close examination of
the words used in s. 31 shows that it is not we!lfounded.
Section 31, in substance, requirt>s the
appellate Court to pass a decree in a pre-emption
matter which is not inconsistent with the provisions
of the amending Act. In the present appeals, if we
were to uphold the respondents' right to claim preemption on the ~ treni:;th of the provisions of s. 15( c)
3 S.C,R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
as they stood. prior to the amendment, that would
be inconsistent with the provisions of the amending
Act, and so, the change made by the amending Act
has to be given effect to and the right which once
vested in the respondents must be deemed to have
been retrospectively taken away from them. On
this point there ie no dispute. Would it make any
difference in lhe legal position when we are dealing
with rights which are created for the first time by
the amending Act on the date when this Court will
pass a decree in the present appeals? If the rights
created in favour of the tenants are not recognised
and a decree is passed ignoring the said rights, that
decree would be inconsistent wjth the relevant
provisions of the amending Act, and s. 31 has
clearly enjoined that no Court shall pass a decree
which is inconsistent with the provisions of the
amending Act.
The position, therefore, appears
to be clear that when a. decree is passed in a pre-emption matter pending before the appellate Court, that
Court must refuse to recognise the dght to preempt which was recognised by the unamended Act
but has been dropped by the amending Act just as
much as it must recognise rights which were not
recognised by the unamended Act but have bePn
created by the amending Act. The retrospective
operatfon of s.31 necessarily involves effect being
given to the substantive provisions of s. 15 retrospectively and that will apply as much to the
extinction of the old rights as to the creation of new
ones. The retrospective operation of s. 15 which is
consequential on the retrospective operation of s.31
is not affected by the fact that the right of pre-emption prescribed by s. 15 is referred to as a right
which 11h&ll vest in the persons 11pecified in subsections (a,), ( b) and ( c) of s. 15( 1 ).
It is,
however, urged that the law of preemption requires that the pre-emptor must possess
the right to pre-empt at the date of the sale, at the
•
1962
Amir Stnih
v.
Ram Sin:h
Gajmdro:adkar J.
1962
Amtr Singh
v.
Ram Singh
Gojendragadkar J
892
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
date of the suit and at the date of the decree.
This
position cannot be disputed. But when it is suggested that the respondents cannot claim that they
had the right when they brought the present suitor when the sales were effected, the argument ignores the true effect of the retrospective operation of
s. 31 and s_ 15. If the inevitable consequence of the
retrospective operation of s.31 is to make the substantive provisions of s. 15 also retrospective, it
follows that by fiction introduced by the retrospective operation, the rights which the respondents
claim under the amended provisions of s. 15 must
be deemed to have vested in them at the relevant
time. If the relevant provisions are made retrospective by the legislature, the retrospective operation
must be given full effect to, and that meets the
argument that the right to pre-empt did not exist in
the raspondents at the time when the sale transactions in question took place.
Therefore, we are
satisfied that the respondents are entitled to claim
that they should be given an opportunity to prove
their case that as tenants of the lands in suit they
have a right to claim pre-emption. Incidentally,
when the respondents filed the present suits, they
had a right to pre-empt under the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood at that time; by the
amendment, that right has been taken away, but
instead they claim another right by virtue of their
status as tenants of the lands, and this right is, by
the retrospective operation of s. 31, available to
them. We muet accordingly set aside the decrees
passed by the High Court and send the matters
bitck to the trial Court with a direction that it
should allow -the re11pondents an opportunity to
amend their claims by putting forth their right to
ask for pre-emption as tenants under the amended
provision of s. 15. After the amendments are thus
made, the appellants should be given an opportunity
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
893
to file their written statements and then appropriate
issues should be framed and the suits tried and
disposed of in the light of the findings on those
Issues in accordance with law.
Under the unusual
circumstances in which the litigation has thus secured a further lease of life, we dire1Jt that the costs
incurred so far should be borne by the parties.
Appeal allowed.
Oases remitted
GURSAHAI SAIGAL
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB
(J. L. KAPUR, A.'_K. SARKAR and
M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Income Tax-Advance payment-Oonstruction of enactmeut-Rule-Penaltg in addition to liability-Indian Income·
tax Act, 1922 (II of 1922), a.ISA, Sub-sa.(2),(3),(6),(8),(9).
By Sub-s.(8) of s.ISA. "where on making the regular
assesment, the Income-tax Officer finds that no payment of
the tax has been made in accordance with the foregoing
provisions of this section, interest calculated in the manner
laid down in sub-section ( 6) shall be added to the tax as
determined on the basis of the regular assessment". Sub.
section (6l of s.18A provided, "where in any year an assessee
has paid tax under .. sub-section(3) on the basis of his own
estimate, and the tax so paid is Jess than eighty percent or
the tax determined on the basis of regular assessment ...
simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from
the first day of January in the financial year in which the
tax was paid up to the date of the said regular assessment
shall be payable by the assessee upon the amount by which
the tax so paid falls short of the said eighty per cent."
The assessee should have under sub-s.(3) of s.18A made
an estimate 0f his income and paid tax according to it but
he did neither. He was thereupon charged with interest
under sub-s.(8) of s.18A.
He contended that interest could
1961
Amir Singh
••
Ram Singh
11Jlll!