# AMIRE'.DDI RAJAGOPALA RAO AND OTHERS v. AMIREDDI SITHARAMAMMA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 122
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-02-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1963
- **Bench:** K. SUBBA RAo, Raghubar Dayal, J. R. MuDHOLKAR. R. s. BACHA· B WA!f, V. Ramaswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/amire-ddi-rajagopala-rao-and-others-v-amireddi-sitharamamma-and-others-3381
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Hindu Law-Married Brahmin woman becomina. concubine of
Sudra male-having children-Their rights of maintenance-Whether
such rights affected by the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956.
The first respondent S, a Brahrnin woman married to R, during
the lifetime of her husband became the permanently kept concubine
of L, a sudra by caste. The other thre~ respondents were the sons
of S & L. After L's death, in a suit filed by the respondent against
L's brother and their sons (the appellants here), the sub-judge, by
a decree dated September 20, 1954, awarded maintenance to the respondents during their life-time out of the estate of L and this award
was upheld on appeal by the High Court. During the pendency oi
the appeal before the High Court, the Hindu Adoptions and Main·
tenance Act of 1956 came into force and upon a contentoon being
raised before it, the High Court held that the relevant provisions of
tne new Act did not have retrospective effect so as to adversely
affect the rights of maintenance available to the. respondents under
the Hindu Law before the Act came into force.
In appeal before the Supreme Court, it was contended on b~half
of the appellants (1), that the respondents were not entitled to claim
any maintenance from the estate of L under the Hindu Law in
torce before the 1956 Act because· (a) the first respondent was not
a Dasi and the other three respondents were not Dasiputraa of L;
(b) the husband of the first respondent having been alive, her con·
nection with L was adulterous and she could not therefore be entitled
to maintenance as an Avaruddha Stree and (c) the first respondent
being a Brahmin adulteress and L being a Sudra. the connection was
Prwti!oma and illegal. (2) That in any event, by virtue of s. 4 of the
1956 Act, the Hindu Law prior to that Act cease<l to have effect with
respect to matters for which provision was made in the Act and that
provision for maintenance, etc. had in fact been made in sections 21
and 22 of the Act.
HELD: (1) The respondents were entitled to maintenance during
their lives out of the estate of L under the Hindu Law as it stood
before the 1956 Act came into force. [127 Dl
a
D
•
r
G
(a) It was well recognised that
independently of the express
texts of the Mitakshara, whereby, in the case of Sudras the Dasiputra
was entitled to a share od' the inheritance, the illegitimate son of a H
Sudra was entitled to maintenance out of his father's estate though
his mother was not a Dasi in the strict sense and though he was the
result of a casual or adulterous relationship. f125 Cl
Mitakshara Ch. I, S. 12 V. 1, 2 and 3 referred to; Case law
reviewed.
(b) Under Mitakshar.. law, a married woman who left her husband and lived with her paramour as his permanently kept mis.tress
could claim the status of an Avaruddha Stree by remaii).ing faithful
'
RAJAGUPALA V, SITHARAMAMM.A (Bachawat, J.)
123
A
to her paramour, even though the connection was adulterous, and
she was entitled to maintenance from the estate of the paramour
so long as she preserved sexual fidelity to him. (125 H, 126 BJ
Akku Prah!ad v. Ganesh Prah!ad LL.R. [19451 Born. 216 affirmed
Case law reviewed.
(c) A Brahmin concubine in the exclusive and continuous keep.
ing of a Sudra until his death was entitled to claim maintenance.
'B
[127 BJ

## Text

122
AMIRE'.DDI RAJAGOPALA RAO AND OTHERS
v.
AMIREDDI SITHARAMAMMA AND OTHERS
February 18, 1965
[K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. R. MuDHOLKAR. R. s. BACHA·
B
WA!f AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J
Hindu Law-Married Brahmin woman becomina. concubine of
Sudra male-having children-Their rights of maintenance-Whether
such rights affected by the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956.
The first respondent S, a Brahrnin woman married to R, during
the lifetime of her husband became the permanently kept concubine
of L, a sudra by caste. The other thre~ respondents were the sons
of S & L. After L's death, in a suit filed by the respondent against
L's brother and their sons (the appellants here), the sub-judge, by
a decree dated September 20, 1954, awarded maintenance to the respondents during their life-time out of the estate of L and this award
was upheld on appeal by the High Court. During the pendency oi
the appeal before the High Court, the Hindu Adoptions and Main·
tenance Act of 1956 came into force and upon a contentoon being
raised before it, the High Court held that the relevant provisions of
tne new Act did not have retrospective effect so as to adversely
affect the rights of maintenance available to the. respondents under
the Hindu Law before the Act came into force.
In appeal before the Supreme Court, it was contended on b~half
of the appellants (1), that the respondents were not entitled to claim
any maintenance from the estate of L under the Hindu Law in
torce before the 1956 Act because· (a) the first respondent was not
a Dasi and the other three respondents were not Dasiputraa of L;
(b) the husband of the first respondent having been alive, her con·
nection with L was adulterous and she could not therefore be entitled
to maintenance as an Avaruddha Stree and (c) the first respondent
being a Brahmin adulteress and L being a Sudra. the connection was
Prwti!oma and illegal. (2) That in any event, by virtue of s. 4 of the
1956 Act, the Hindu Law prior to that Act cease<l to have effect with
respect to matters for which provision was made in the Act and that
provision for maintenance, etc. had in fact been made in sections 21
and 22 of the Act.
HELD: (1) The respondents were entitled to maintenance during
their lives out of the estate of L under the Hindu Law as it stood
before the 1956 Act came into force. [127 Dl
a
D
•
r
G
(a) It was well recognised that
independently of the express
texts of the Mitakshara, whereby, in the case of Sudras the Dasiputra
was entitled to a share od' the inheritance, the illegitimate son of a H
Sudra was entitled to maintenance out of his father's estate though
his mother was not a Dasi in the strict sense and though he was the
result of a casual or adulterous relationship. f125 Cl
Mitakshara Ch. I, S. 12 V. 1, 2 and 3 referred to; Case law
reviewed.
(b) Under Mitakshar.. law, a married woman who left her husband and lived with her paramour as his permanently kept mis.tress
could claim the status of an Avaruddha Stree by remaii).ing faithful
'
RAJAGUPALA V, SITHARAMAMM.A (Bachawat, J.)
123
A
to her paramour, even though the connection was adulterous, and
she was entitled to maintenance from the estate of the paramour
so long as she preserved sexual fidelity to him. (125 H, 126 BJ
Akku Prah!ad v. Ganesh Prah!ad LL.R. [19451 Born. 216 affirmed
Case law reviewed.
(c) A Brahmin concubine in the exclusive and continuous keep.
ing of a Sudra until his death was entitled to claim maintenance.
'B
[127 BJ
Case law referred to.
(2) Seciions 21 and 22 are in terms prospective and these sections
read with section 4 did not destroy or ~ect the right of maintenance of the respondents which vested in them on the death of L
and before the commencement of the 1956 Act. [126 F; 129 AJ
Cl
S. Kameshwaramma v. Subramanyam A.LR. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 269; distinguished.
CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 434 of
1963.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 22, 1960, of•
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 709 of 1954.
D
A. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam,
for the appellants.
M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered ·by
Bachawat, J. The first respondent, Seetharamamma, is a
B Brahmin woman. She was married to one Ramakrishnayya. During
the life-time of her husband she became the concubine of one
Lingayya, a Sudra by caste. From 1938 until the death of Lingayya
in February, 1948, she was· the permanently kept concubine of
Lingayya, and lived with him. During this period and thereafter,
F she preserved sexual fidelity to Lingayya. The second, third and
fourth respondents are the sons of the first respondent by Lingayya.
The husband of the first respondent is still alive. The appellants
are the brothers and brothers' sons of Lingayya. Lingay}UI was
separate in estate from his brothers and brothers' sons. The parties
are residents of Choragudi, Bapatla, now in Andhra Pradesh and
G
go.v~rned by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. In the plaint, as
on~mally filed, the respondents claimed that they were exclusively
entitl~d to the estate left by Lingayya. The Subordinate Judge and
the High Court found that as the lirst respondent was and continued
to .be a marr!ed woman while she lived with Lingayya and bore him
ch~dren, she was not the lawfully wedded wife of Lingayya and the
B
ch1l~ren born of the union w~re not his.legitimate sons, nor were they
Df!S~putras ~nd. as such entitled to his properties. The suit was
ongmally d1sm1ssed by the Subordinate Judge, but on appeal, the
Hig~ Coui;i gave the respondents leave to amend the plaint by
makmg suitable averments for the award of maintenance and
remanded the suit for trial on the question of maintenan~. At
the subsequent trial on the amended plaint, the Subordinate Judge
decreed the respondents' claim for maintenance and consequential
12 l
8UPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1965) 3 S.C.R.
reliefs and awarded to them maintenance during their lifetime A.
out of the estate of Lingayya. The Subordinate Judge passed his
decree on September 20, 1954. During the pendency of the appeal
preferrd by the appellants before the High Court, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the
A~t) came into force. The main controversies in the appeal before
the High Court were (1) whether the provisions of the Act are
B
retrospective; and (2) whether a married woman who left her husband and lived with another as his permanently kept mistress could
be regarded as an Avaruddha Strce. In view of the importance of
these questions, the appeal was referred to a Full Bench of the
Hicrh Court. On the first question, the High Court held that the
rel~vant provisions of the Act applied only to the estates of Hindus
C
dying after the commencement of the Act, and that the right of
the respondents to maintenance during. their lifetime under the
Hindu law in force at the time of the death of Lingayya was not
atfecied by the Act. On the second question, the High Court held
1hat the first respondent was an·Avaruddha Stree of Lingayya, and
was entitled to maintenance from his estate, though her husband
D.
was alive and the coqnection with Lingayya was adulterous. The
High Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge with regard to the
quantum of maintenance.
.
On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that the respondents are not entitled to claim any maintenance from the estate E
of Lingayya under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the commencement of the Act, because (a) the first respondent is not a
DaYi and the second, third and fourth respondents are not Dasipufras of Lingayya, and this point is concluded by the previous
judgment of the High Court, Which has now become final between
the parties; (b) the husband of the first husband was and is
F
still alive, and the connection of the first respondent with Lingayya
was adulterous during the period of tier intimacy with Lingayya
and while she bore him children; (c) the first respondent being a
Brahmin adulteress and Lingayya being a Sudra, the connection
wqs Prafi/oma and illegal.
Now, .under the Hindu law as it stood before the commenceG
ment of the Act, the claim of a Dasiputra or the son of a Dasi. that
is, a Hindu concubine in the continuous and exclusive keeping of
the father rested on the express texts of the Mitakshara, Ch. I, s. 12,
V. I, 2 and 3. In the case of Sudras, the Dasipufra was entitled to a
share of the inheritance, and this share was given to him not merely
in lieu of maintenance but in recognition of his status as a son,
H
see Gur Narain Das and another v. Gur Taha/ Das and others(').
But the illegitimate son of a Sudra by his concubine was not entitled to a share of the inheritance if he were the offspring of an
Incestuous connection, see Dafti Parisi Nayudu v. Daffi Banl!aru
Nayudu('), or if at the time of his conception, the connection was
('I [l 9•12] S.C.R. 869, SW.
(2) [1869] 4 Madras Hi~h Court Reports. 204,
BAJAGOPALA v. SITHABAMAMMA (Bachawat, J.)
125
A adulterous, see Rahi and others v. Govind Valad Teja('), Narayan
Bharthi v. Laving Bharthi and others('), Tukaram v. Dinnkar(').
Such an illegimate son could not claim the status of a member
of his father's family and could not get a share of the inheritance
as a Dasiputra under the express text of the Mitakshara. For the
reason, the previous judgment of the High Court rightly held that
B the second, third and fourth respondents were not Dasiputras of
Lingayya, and could no1 claim the inheritance. But the point whether
they are entilled to maintenance out of the estate of Lingayya
is not concluded by the previous judgment. It is well recognised
\hat independently of the express texts of the Mitakshara, Ch. I
s. 12, V. 3, the illegitimate son of a Sudra was entitled to main0
tenance out of his father's estate, though his mother was not a Dasi
in the strict sense artd though he was the result of a casual or
adulterous intercourse. It was not essential to his title to maintenance that he should have been born in the house of his father or
of a concubine possessing the peculiar status therein. See: Muttusawmy Jagavera Yettappa Naicker v. Vencataswara Yettayya(').
D The illegitimate son of a Sudra was entitled to maintenance out of
his father's estate, though at the time of his conception his mother
was a married woman, her husband was alive and her connection
with the putative father was adulterous, see
Rahi v. Govind('),
Viraramuthi Udayan v. Singaravelu('), Subramania
Mudaly v.
Valu('). According to the Mitakshara school of law, the illegitiJi:
mate son a Sudra was entitled to maintenance from his father's
estate during his lifetime. Under the Hindu law, as it stood prior
to the commencement of the Act, the first, second and third respondents were, therefore, entitled to maintenance during their lifetime, out of the estate of Lingayya.
i'
The claim of an A varuddha Stree or woman kept in concubinage for maintenance for her lifetime against the estate of her
paramour rested on the express text of Mitakshara, Ch. 2, s. I,
Vs. 27 and 28 read with V. 7. In Bai Nagubai v. Bai Monghibai('),
where the man and th~ woman were Hindus and the paramour
was governed by the law of the Mayuka, Lord Darling said:-
G
"providing the concubinage be permanent, until the
death of the paramour, and sexual fidelity to him be preserved, the right to maintenance is established; although
the concubine be not kept in the family house of the
deceased."
R
The Jaw of the Mitakshara is in agreement with ihe law of the
Mayuka on this point. In the instant case, the first respondent
(1; llSi51 LL.~. l Hom. !li
(') [l8ii.-;] T.L.R. 2 Hn'"· I-io.
(') [l\J::l] :i;l R.L.H. 2.:;t1.
1'1 [lSu'J 12 !ILL\. 2 ·~. 221.
(li) \ 1877] T.L. L{. 111'! H1.: 01\.
(') [1911] I.L.ll :1.i :\[:uL !iS.
(') f1021ij T.J,.H ,i'I ltnn. n11.i,61+, (P.C'.).
J2G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(i965j 3 S.C.R.
being continuously and exclusively in the keeping cf Lingayya
A
until his death for about IO years, the concubinage has been found
to be permanent. She observed sexual fidelity to Lingayya during
n1s Jilet1me, ami after his death has continued to preserve her
qualified chastity. In Akku Prathad v. Ganesh Pralhad('), a Full
Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a married woman who
left her husband and lived with her paramour as his permanently B
.k:ept mistress could claim the status of an Avaruddha Stree by
remaining faithful to her paramour, though the connection was
adulterous, and was entitled to maintenance from the estate of the
paramour so long as she preserved her sexual fidelity to him. This
Full ·Bench decision overruled the decision in Anandilal
Hhagchand v. Chandrabai(') and followed the earlier decisions in
C
Khemkore v. Umiashankar("), and Bingareddi v. Lakshmawar').
The decision in Akku Pra/had v. Ganesh Pra!had(') has been the
subject of strong criticism in Mayne's Hindu law and Usage, I Ith
Edn., Art. 683, p. 816 edited by Sri N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar and
in a learned article in (1946) I M.L.J., Noles of Indian cases, p. I, D
but the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the instant
case found themselves in complete agreement with the Bombay
decision. We are of the opinion that the Bombay decision lays
down'the correct Jaw.
Avaruddha Stree, as understood by Vijnaneswara, mcludes a
Swairini or adulteress kept in concubinage. While dealing with the
E
assets of a deceased Hindu not liable to partition, Mitakshara, Ch. I,
s. 4, V. 22, he says, "Swairini and others who are Avaruddha by
the father, though even in number, should not be divided among
the sons". Colebrooke's translation of. the passage is as follows:
.. But women (adulteresses and others) kept in concubinage bv the
father must not be shared by the sons, though equal in number".
In his commentary on Yajnavalkya's Verse 290 in VyavahGra
Adhyaya, Ch. 24 on Stree Sangrahana, Vijnaneswara, citing Manu,
explains Swairini as a woman who abandons her own husband
and goes to another man of her own Varna out of love for him.
Thus, a Swairini and other adulteress kept in concubinage could
claim the status of an Avaruddha Stree. The connection was no
doubt immoral, but concubinage itself is immoral; yet it was recognised by law for the purpose of founding a claim for maintenance
by her and her illegitimate sons. The paramour may be punishable
for the offence of adultery, but the concubine is not punishable
as abettor of the offence.
A concubine was not disqualified from claiming maintenance
by reason of the fact that she was a Brahmin. The claim of a concubine who was a respectable woman of the Brahm in caste and
(1 ) l.L.H. fl!J45I h 1111. 216.
(2 / [H,241I.L.P~4R B"m. 203.
( 3) fl8/:l] lfJ B•n11hav High Court Rep~ris. 381.
'J [1901] J.J,..R. 26 Born. 163.
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
RAJ,i.r;oPALA V. SITHARAMAMMA (Ba.cluiwat, J.)
127
her illegitimate sons for maintenance was allowed in Hargol'ind
Kuari v. Dharam Singh('). No doubt, a Pratilo111a connection is
denounced by the Smriti-writers and the Commentators. and
before the Hindu Marriages Validity Act, 1949 (Act XXI of 1949)
Pratiloma marriages between a Sudra male and a Brahmin female
were declared invalid in Bai Kashi" v. Jamnadas(') and in Ramchandra Doddappa v. Hanamnaik Dodnaik('), but even those cases
recognis~ that a Brahmin concubine in the exclusive and continu0us
keeping of
a Sudra until his death was entitled to claim
maintenance. We express no opinion on the question whether a
Pratiloma marriage was valid under the old Hindu Jaw, but we are
satisfied that the claim of the respondents for maintenance cannot
he defeated on the ground that the first respondent was a Brahmin
and her paramour was a Sudra.
We are satisfied that the respondents were entitled to maintenance during their lives out of the estate of Lingayya under the
Hindu law as it stood in 1948, when Lingayya died, in December 1949, when the suit was instituted and also in 1954, when the
suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge. The question is
whether this right is taken away by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
Act,
1956,
which
came
into
forc.'l
during
the
pendency of the appeal to the High Court. The Act is intended to
amend and co~ify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance
among Hindus. Section 4 of the Act is as fclJows:
"4. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Jaw or any
custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately
before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have
effect with respect to any matter for which provision is
made in this Act;
(b) any other law in for~e immediately before the commencement of this Act shitll cease to apply to Hindus in
•o far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act."
G Section 21 defines "dependants" as meaning certain relatives of
the deceased, and under sub-cl (viii), includes "his or her minor
illegitim11te son, so long as he remains a minor''. A concubine is
not one of the persons within the definition of "dependants" given
ins. 21, and an illegitimate son is not a dependant when he ceases
to be a minor. Section 22 reads thus:
H
'"22. (!) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) the
heirs of a deceased Hindu are bound to maintai; the
dependants of the deceased out of the estate inherited by
them from the deceased.
·
('I [J8R+] ! J,.R. fi ..Ill.
0 2·1.
(ll) rJPl:?] J.t Bnn1. I~. P. .. 'il7.
r:s) rl!l"~fJl)LL.R. fir) Il'Hl'. 'i:'i.
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.R,
(2) Where a dependant has not obtained, by testamenA
tary or intestate success'on, any share in the estate of a
Hindu dying after the commencement of this Act, the
dependant shall be entitled, subject to the provision of
this Act, to maintenance from those who take the estate.
(3) The liability of each of the persoμs who takes the
B
estate shall be in proportion to the value of the share or
part of the estate taken by him or her.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(2) or sub-section (3), no person who is himself or herself
a dependant shall be liable to contribute to the maintenC
(2) or sub-section (3), no person who is himself or herself
the value of which is, or would, if the liability to contribute were enforced, become less than what would be
awarded to him or her by way of maintenance under this
Act."
Sub-section (1) of s. 22 imposes upon the heirs of a deceased Hindu
the liability to maintain the dependants of the deceased defined
D
in s. 21 out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. but
this liability is subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2), under which
only a dependant who )las not obtained by testamentary or intesE
tate succession, any share in the estate of a Hindu dying after the
commencement of the Act ts entitled, subject to the provisions
of the Act, to maintenance. Specific provision is thus made in s. 22
with regard to maintenance of the dependants defined in s. 21 out
of the estate of the deceased Hindu, and in view of s. 4, the Hindu
law in force immediately. before the commencement of the Act
ceases to have effect after the commencement of the Act with resF
pect to matters for which provision is so made. In terms, ss. 21
and 22 are prospective. Where the Act is intended to be retrospective, it expressly says so. Thus, s. 18 provides for maintenance
of a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of the Act, by her husband, s. 19 provides for the maintenG
ance of a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of the Act, by her father-in-law, after the death of her
husband, and s. 25 provides for alteration of the amount of maintenance whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement
either before er after the commencement of the Act. Now, before
the Act came into force, rights of maintenance out of the estate of u
a Hindu dying before the commencement of the Act were acquired, and the corresponding liability to pay the maintenance was
incurred unde~ the Hindu law in force at the time of his death. It
is a well-recognised rule that a statute should be interpreted, if
possible, so as to respect vested rights. See Craies on Statute Law,
6th Edn. (1963), p. 397. We think that ss. 21 and 22 read with s. 4
do not destroy or affect any right of maintenance out of the estate
•
RA.TAGOPALa v. S!THARAMAMMA (Bach-~wat, J.)
129
A of a deceased Hindu vested on his death before the commencement of the Act under the Hindu law in force at the time of his
death.
B
0
D
E
F
G
B
On the death of Lingayya, the first respondent as his concubine and the second, third and fourth respondents as her illegitimate sons had a vested right of maintenance during their lives
oul of the estate of Lingayya. This right and the corresponding
liability of the appellants to pay maintenance are not affected by
ss. 21 and 22 of the Act. The continuing claim of the respondents
during their lifetime springs (out of the original right vested in
them on the death of Lingayya and is not founded on any right
arising after the commencement of the Act.
In S. Kameswaramma v. Subramanyam('), the plaintiff's hus·
band had died in the year 1916, and the plaintiff had entered intc
a compromise in 1924 fixing her maintenance at Rs. 240 per yea1
and providing that the rate of maintenance shall not be increased
or reduced. The question arose whether, in spite of this agreement,
the plaintiff could claim increased maintenance in view of s. 25
of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. It was held
that, in spite of the aforesaid term of the compromise, s)ie was
entitled to claim increased maintenance under s. 25. This conclusion follows from the plain words of s. 25, under which the amount
of maintenance, whether fixed by decree or agreement either
before or affer the commencement of the Act, may be altered
subsequently. The decision was therefore, plainly right. No doubt,
there are broad observations in that case to the effect that the
right to maintenance is a recurring right and the liability to maintenance after the Act came into force is imposed by s. 22, and
there is no reason fo exclude widows of persons who died before
the Act from the operation of s. 22. Those observations were not
necessary for the purpose of that case, because the widow in that
case was clearly entitled to maintenance from the estate of her
deceased husband dying in 1916 under the Hindu law, as it stood
then, independently of ss. 21 and 22 of the Act, and in spite of
the comyromise fixing the maintenance before the commencement
of the Act, the widow could in view of s. 25 claim alteration of
the amount of the maintenance. The decision cannot be regarded
as an authority for the proposition that ss. 21 and 22 of the Act
affect rights already vested before the commencement of the Act.
We. therefore, hold that the claim of the respondents to main
tenance for their lives is not affected by the Act.
We see no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of
the Courts below with regard to the quantum of maintenance.
In the result, the appeal is dismis<ed with costs.
'
Appeal dismissed.