# Amjad Khan v. The State

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 572
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sastri C.J, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjee, DAs, Chandrasekhara Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/amjad-khan-v-the-state-51
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Constitution of India. 1950, Arts. 19(l)(g), 32-U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, ss. 293(1), 298(2) (g)(d)-Municipal byc-lawsBye-law imposing fee for carrying on wholesale trade in vegetables
and fruits within
municipal
area-Validity-Restraint
on fundamental right to carry on trade-Licence and tqx, difference.
There is a difference between a tax like the income-tax and a
licence fee for
carrying on an
occupation,
trade or business.
A
licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the
licensee but also operates
as a restriction
on
his
fundamental
. '
l
-
-
•
f
'
)
-
...
S.C.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
right to carry on his business.·
Therefore· if the imposition of a
19'2:
licence fee
is without authority of law it can
be challenged by
way of an application under Art., 32.
Mohammal
Yasin
Under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution a citizen has the right
v.
to carry
on any occupation, trade or business
and
the
only The Town Area
restriction on this unfettered right is the authority of the State
Committtl!,
to make a
law relating to the carrying on of such occupation,
/alalabad
trade or business as mentioned in cl. ( 6) of that article as ~mendand An~tlJer,
ed by the
Constitution
(First Amendment)
Act, 1951. If therefore a licence fee imposed for carrying on an occupation, trade
or business cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law, no
question of its
reasonableness can
arise,
for
an illegal
impost
must at all times be an
unreasonable restriction
and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation,
trade or business under Art. 19( 1) (g), and such infringement can
properly be made the subject matter of a challenge under Art. 32
of the Constitution.
Bye-law No. 1 of the Bye-laws of the Town Area Committee of
Jalalabad
(in the
United Provinces)
provided
that no
person
shall sell or purchase any vegetables or fruit
within the prescribed limits of the Town Area Committee by
wholesale or auction,
without paying the fees
fixed by these bye-laws to the licensee
appointed by the Town Magistrate.
Bye-law No. 4(b) provided
that any person can sell in wholesale at any place in the town
area provided he pays
the prescribed fees to the licensee.
A
person who had been carrying on the business of wholesale dealer
in vegetables and fruits in his own shop at Jalalabad for a period
e>f seven years
applied for protection under Art. 32 contending
tl\.at these bye-laws infringed his fundamental right to carry on
his trade guaranteed by Art. 19( I) (g) and were therefore void.
Held, thats. 293(1) and s. 298(2) (J) (d) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, as amended at the time they were extended to
the town areas in the United Provinces did not empower the
Town Area Committee to make any bye-law authorising
it
to
charge any fees otherwise than. for the use and occupation of any
property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town
Area
Committee including any
public street.
The bye-laws in
question which imposed a charge on the wholesale dealer in the
shape of the prescribed fee, irrespective of any use or occupation
by him of
immovable property
vested in or entrusted to the
management of the Town Are;t Committee inch;ding any public
street, are obviously ultra vires the powers of the Committee and,
therefore, the bye-laws cannot be said
to constitute a valid law·
which alone may, under Art. 19( 6) of the Constitution, impose
ai restriction on the right , conferred by Art. 19(1) (g). In the·
absence of any valid law authorising it, such illegal imposition
must
undoubtedly
operate
as
an
illegal
restraint
and
must
i~fringe the unfettered right of the
wholesale
dealer to carry oIJ&
.,
.
1952
Mohammad
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
his occupation, trade or hu!;iness which is guaranteed to him by
Art. 19 (1) (g) of our Constitution.
Yasin
Kairana ·case
[1950] S.C.R. 566 and Ramji Lal v. !ncome-ta1t
v.
Officer, Mohindargarh [ 1951] S.C.R. 127 distinguished.
The Town Ar<a
..
Committee
ORIGINAL

## Text

1952
Amjad Khan
v.
The State.
Boil /,
1952
Feb. 27.
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
on the doors were not the isolated acts of a few
scattered individuals. It was the mob that was doing
it .and in the High Court's words,
"The very fact that in the town of Katni two shots
should have struck four Sindhis and none else shows
that the rival community was on the move in that
area."
In our opinion, the appellant did not use
than was necessary. Indeed, the
firing,
acting as
a deterrent, spurred them on
ransacked and looted the place.
more force
far from
and they
We have confined our attention to the right of private defence of the person though in this case the
question about the defence of property happens to be
bound up with it.
The appeal is allowed. The convictions and sentences are set aside and the appellant will be released.
Agent for the appellant: 0. P. Verma.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
MOHAMMAD YASIN
v.
THE TOWN AREA COMMITTEE,
JALALABAD AND ANOTHER.
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEE, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. )
Constitution of India. 1950, Arts. 19(l)(g), 32-U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, ss. 293(1), 298(2) (g)(d)-Municipal byc-lawsBye-law imposing fee for carrying on wholesale trade in vegetables
and fruits within
municipal
area-Validity-Restraint
on fundamental right to carry on trade-Licence and tqx, difference.
There is a difference between a tax like the income-tax and a
licence fee for
carrying on an
occupation,
trade or business.
A
licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the
licensee but also operates
as a restriction
on
his
fundamental
. '
l
-
-
•
f
'
)
-
...
S.C.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
right to carry on his business.·
Therefore· if the imposition of a
19'2:
licence fee
is without authority of law it can
be challenged by
way of an application under Art., 32.
Mohammal
Yasin
Under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution a citizen has the right
v.
to carry
on any occupation, trade or business
and
the
only The Town Area
restriction on this unfettered right is the authority of the State
Committtl!,
to make a
law relating to the carrying on of such occupation,
/alalabad
trade or business as mentioned in cl. ( 6) of that article as ~mendand An~tlJer,
ed by the
Constitution
(First Amendment)
Act, 1951. If therefore a licence fee imposed for carrying on an occupation, trade
or business cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law, no
question of its
reasonableness can
arise,
for
an illegal
impost
must at all times be an
unreasonable restriction
and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation,
trade or business under Art. 19( 1) (g), and such infringement can
properly be made the subject matter of a challenge under Art. 32
of the Constitution.
Bye-law No. 1 of the Bye-laws of the Town Area Committee of
Jalalabad
(in the
United Provinces)
provided
that no
person
shall sell or purchase any vegetables or fruit
within the prescribed limits of the Town Area Committee by
wholesale or auction,
without paying the fees
fixed by these bye-laws to the licensee
appointed by the Town Magistrate.
Bye-law No. 4(b) provided
that any person can sell in wholesale at any place in the town
area provided he pays
the prescribed fees to the licensee.
A
person who had been carrying on the business of wholesale dealer
in vegetables and fruits in his own shop at Jalalabad for a period
e>f seven years
applied for protection under Art. 32 contending
tl\.at these bye-laws infringed his fundamental right to carry on
his trade guaranteed by Art. 19( I) (g) and were therefore void.
Held, thats. 293(1) and s. 298(2) (J) (d) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, as amended at the time they were extended to
the town areas in the United Provinces did not empower the
Town Area Committee to make any bye-law authorising
it
to
charge any fees otherwise than. for the use and occupation of any
property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town
Area
Committee including any
public street.
The bye-laws in
question which imposed a charge on the wholesale dealer in the
shape of the prescribed fee, irrespective of any use or occupation
by him of
immovable property
vested in or entrusted to the
management of the Town Are;t Committee inch;ding any public
street, are obviously ultra vires the powers of the Committee and,
therefore, the bye-laws cannot be said
to constitute a valid law·
which alone may, under Art. 19( 6) of the Constitution, impose
ai restriction on the right , conferred by Art. 19(1) (g). In the·
absence of any valid law authorising it, such illegal imposition
must
undoubtedly
operate
as
an
illegal
restraint
and
must
i~fringe the unfettered right of the
wholesale
dealer to carry oIJ&
.,
.
1952
Mohammad
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
his occupation, trade or hu!;iness which is guaranteed to him by
Art. 19 (1) (g) of our Constitution.
Yasin
Kairana ·case
[1950] S.C.R. 566 and Ramji Lal v. !ncome-ta1t
v.
Officer, Mohindargarh [ 1951] S.C.R. 127 distinguished.
The Town Ar<a
..
Committee
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION : Petition No. 132 of 1951.
/a/a/abad'
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ
•nd Anoth<r,
in the nature of mandamus. The material facts are
Das/.
set out in the judgment.
Nuruddin Ahmad for the petitioner.
K. N. Aggarwal for .the respondents.
1952. February 27; The Judgment of
the Court
-
was delivered by
DAs J.-This i& an application under article 32 of
the Constitution made by Mohammad Yasin for the
protection of his fundamental right of carrying on his
business which, according to him, is being infringed
by the respondent.
The case sought to be made out in the petition may
be shortly stated as follows:-
The petitioner is a whole11ale dealer in fresh vegetables
and fruits at 1alalabad in the district of
Muzaffarnagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh and
claims to have been carrying on such business for the
last 7 years or so at his shop situated in the town of
Jalalabad. The vegetable and fruit growers used to
bring their goods to the town and get them auctioned
through any of ,the vegetable dealers of their choice '
who used to charge one anna in the rupee as and by
way
of
commission.
The
respondent
Committee
which is a Town Area Committee has framed certain
bye-laws under which all right and power to levy oc
collect commission on sale or purchase of vegetables
and fruits within the limits of the town v~t in the
respondent Committee or any other agency appointed
by the Committee and no one except the respondent
Committee is authorised to deal in wholesale vegetables and fruits and collect the commission thereof in
any · place and in any event. The respondent committee has by auction given the contract for sale of
-
•
f.
-
-
,
..
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
vegetables and fruits and for collecting the commis-
-sion for the current year to the respondent
Bishambcr
who, it is alleged, has never dealt in vegetables and
·fruits. The respondent Committee has not set up any
market nor has it framed any bye-laws for issue of
licences to the vegetable and fruit
merchants. The
bye-laws also provide for prosecution for the breach of
any of the provisions of these bye-laws.
Although,
in
ierms, there is no absolute prohibition against carrying on business as wholesale dealer in vegetables and
fruits,
the result of the bye-laws requiring the wholesale dealers to pay the prescribed fee of one anna in
the rupee to the contractor who holds the monopoly is,
in effect, to bring about a total prohibition of the
business of the wholesale dealers in vegetables and
'fruits. The petitioner contends that by granting a
monopoly of the right to do wholesale business in
vegetables and friuts to the respondent Bishambcr the
. .respondent Committee has in effect totally prevented
the petitioner from carrying on his business and has
'thereby
infringed
his
fundamental
right
under
article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.
In the alternative, .the petitioner contends that the respondent
Committee has no legal authority to impose a tax of
the kind it has sought to do, that the imposition of a
tax calculated at one anna in the rupee is in the nature
.of a sale-tax and cannot be regarded as a licence fee
. and such unauthorised impost constitutes an illegal res-
.traint on his fundamental right under article 19 (1) (g).
The notice of motion has been served Oil the rea-
·pondent Committee as welll as on respondent Bish-
.amber.
The
respondents
have
entered
appearance
and filed an affidavit in opposition to the present
:application affirmed by their agent on record.
Para-
~graph 4 of that affidavit is as follows:-
"4. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the petition arc
wrong and misleading and do not convey the correct
l<lea. If the bye-laws are read from beginning to end,
<the correct position is that the Town Aiea. Committee
!has lawfully impooed certain taxes on the purchase
1952
Mohammad
Yasin
v.
The Town Are11
Committee,
/11Wabatl
11nd Another.
Das /.
1952
Mohammad
YaSin
v.
The Town Area
Committee,
falalabad
and Another.
Das J.
576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
and sale of fruits and vegetables within the ambit of
the Town Area; and instead of collecting the aforesaid
taxes departmentally the Committee finds it more convenient and less expensive to auction the 'right to collect the taxes' and give the contract to the highest
bidder or whomsoever it thinks fit and proper. There is
absolutely no restriction on anybody who wants to purchase or anybody who wants to ~ell; only he must pay
the prescribed tax to the Town Area Committee through
the Contractor.
The market is open, and writ large
throughout the territory of the Town Area Committee
and anybody can purchase from anybody and anybody
can sell to anybody, without any control or intervention
by the Contractor, whose position is simply that of a taxcollector on behalf of the Town Area Committee. Instead
of getting the pay, he gets the profits, if any, and
runs the risk of incurring losses if his gross realisations
are less than what he paid. This is clearly the position, and it is submitted, there is nothing wrong with
it legally and no interference of the petitioner's rights.'"
The petitioner has to his petition annexed copies of
a set of bye-laws dated June 24, 1942, and a copy
of a resolution of the respondent Committee dated
March 16, 1950,
recommending the addition of several
bye-laws to the previous bye-laws. At the hearing . of
the petition before us it was agreed by and between·
counsel on both sides that the petition has to be disposed of on the basis of the bye-laws of 1942 only
and learned counsel for the respondent Committee has.
produced
the original bye-laws of
1942
before us ..
Bye-law · 1 only provides that no person shall sell or-
. purchase any vegetable or fruit within the prescribed
limits of the Town Area Committee, Jalalabad, by
wholesale or auction, without paying the fee fixed
under ,the51e
li~e-Laws to the li,censee appointed by the
Town
Magistrate. Bye-law
4 (b)
expressly
provides
that any person can sell in wholesale at any place in
the Town Area provided he pays the prescribed fees.
to the licensee. It is,
therefore,
clear that these bye--
laws do not, in terms,
prohibit anybody from dealing~ ·
. in veget!ables and fruits as alleged by the petitioner:
. \
-
..
•
f,
-
...
•
s.c.R~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
and in this respect they materially differ from the
bye-laws which this Court had to consider in the
Kairana case(1)
which consequently does not govern
this case.
Learned counsel,
however,
contends-and we think
with considerable force
and cogency-that although,
in form, there is no prohibition against carrying on any
wholesale business by anybody, in effect and in substance the bye-laws have brought about a total stoppage
of the wholesale dealers' business in a commercial sense.
The wholesale dealers, who will have to pay the prescribed fee ,to the contractor appointed by auction, will
necessarily have to charge the growers of vegetables
and fruits something over and above the prescribed fee
so as to keep a margin of profit for themselves but in
such circumstances no grower of vegetables and fruits
will have his produce sold to or auctioned by the wholesale dealers at a higher rate of commission but all
of them will flock to the contractor who will only
charge them the prescribed commission. On the other
hand, if the wholesale dealers charge the growers of
vegetables and fruits only the commission prescribed by the bye-laws they will have to make over
the whole of it to the contractor without
keeping
any profit themselves. In other words, the wholesale
dealers
will
be
converted
into
mere
tax
collectors for the contractor or the
r~pondent Committee without any remuneration from either of them.
In effect, therefore, the bye-laws, it is said, have
brought about a total prohibition of the business of
the wholesale dealers in a commercial sense and from
a p_ractical point of view. We are not of opinion that
this contention is unsound or untenable.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, does
not leave the matter there. He goes further and urges
that the respondent Comm~~tee has no legaL authority
to impose this fee of one anna in the rupee on the
value of goods sold or auctioned and that such imposition is in the nature of a sale tax rather than a licence
fee.
(') {1950] S.C.R. 566.
1952
Mohammad
Yasin
v.
The Town Ared
Committee,
/alalabad
and Another.
Das/.
1952
Mohammad
Yasin
v.
0'1.'he Town Area
Committee,
falalabad
·end Another.
Das./.
578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Learned counsel for the respondent in reply takes a
preliminary objection to
this line of argument. He
points out that as the levying of a tax without authority of law is specifically prohibited under article 265
of the Constitution, article 31(1) must be construed
as referring to deprivation of property otherwise than
by levying of a tax and that levying of a tax in contravention of article 265 does not amount to a breach of
a fundamental right. He contends, on the authority of
'the decision of this Court in Ramjilal v. Income-tax
Officer, Mohindargarh('), that while an illegal imposition of tax may be challenged in a properly constituted suit, it cannot be questioned by an application
under article 32. This argument overlooks the difference between a tax like the income-tax and a licence
tee for carrying on a business. A licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee
but also operates as a restriction on his right to
carry on his business, for without payment of such
fee the business cannot be carried on at all. This
aspect of the matter was not Ta\ised or oonsidered
in the case relied on by the learned counsel, and
that case, ,therefore, has no application to .the facts
of this case.
Under article 19(1) (g) the citizen has
the right
to
carry on any
occupation,
trade or
business which right under that clause is apparently
to be unfettered. The only restriction to this unfettered right is the authority of the State to make a
law relating to the carrying on of such occupation,
trade or business as mentioned in clause ( 6) of that
article :as amended by the Const~tu~on (Fi.t\st Amendment) Act, 1951. If therefore, the licence fee cannot
be justified on the basis of any valid law no question
of its reasonableness can arise, for an illegal impost
must at all times be an unreasonable restriction and
will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry
on his occupation, trade or business under article 19
(1) (g) and such infringement can properly be made
the subject-matter of a challenge under article 32 of
the Constitution.
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 127
. .,
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
Learned counsd for the respondents
then refers. us
1952
Mohammaa:
Yasin
v.
to the U.P. Town Areas Act (No. II of 1914) which
governs
the
respondent
Committee.
Section 14
of
this Act requires the Committee to annually determine
and report to the District
Mag~trate the amount
required to be raised in any town area for the purposes
The Town Are1i
Committee,
/alalabad
of this Act and provides that the amount so determined shall be raised by the imposition of a taX to be
assessed on the occupiers of houses or lands within
the limits of the town area according either to their
general circumstances or to the annual rental value of
the houses or lands so occupied by them as the Committee may determine. There were, at the time when
the
bye-laws
of the
respondent
Committee
were
framed, five provisps to this section none of which
authorised the imposition of any tax on any business
and, therefore, they have no bearing on the question
now
under consideration. Learned counsel for the
respondents, however, draws our attention to section
38 of the Act which authorises the Provincial Government by notification in the Official Gazette to extend
to all or any or any part of any town area any enactment for the time being in force in any municipality in.
the United Provinces and to declare its extension to.
be
~ubject to such restria11ions and modifications, if
any, as it thinks fit. Then he proceeds to draw oiir
attention to Notification No. 397/XI-871-E, dated the
6th February, 1929, whereby in supersession of all·
previous notifica,tions,
the Provincial Government,
in
exercise of the powers conferred by section 38(1) of the
United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914, extended the
provisions of sections 293(1) and 298(2) (J) (d) of the
United Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1916) to,
all the town area in the United Provinces. in the
modified form set forth therein. The original bye-laws
produced by learned counsel purport, however, to,
have been framed by the respondent Committee under·
sections 298 (2) (F) (a) and 294 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1916). We have not
been referred to any notification whereby: section 2941
ond Another •.
Das/.
1952
Mohammad
Yasin
v.
The Town At-ea
Committee,
/alalabad
,and Another.
])as].
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
of the United Provinces Municipalities Act was extended to the respondent Committee. It appears,
however,
that the bye-laws of the respondent Committee were
revised in September 1942 and were then said to have
~en made under section 298 (2) (J) (d). It will have,
therefore, to be seen whether these bye-laws come
within the purview of section 298 (2) (J) ( d) as modified in their application to the respondent Committee.
It_}:\'ill be noticed that under section 298 (2) (J) ( d)
as modified as aforesaid the respondent
Committee is
authorised only to make bye-laws fixing any charges
or fees or any scale of charges or fees to be paid under
section 293(1) and prescribing the .times at which such
charges -0r fees shall be payable and designating the
persons authorised to receive payment thereof. Section
293 ( 1 ), as modified, authorises the respondent Committee to charge fees to be fixed by bye-laws or by·
public auction or by agreement for the use or occupation ( etherwise than under a lease)
of any immovable
property vested in, or entrusted to the management
-0f the T-0wn Area Committee, including any public
street or place of which it allows the use or occupation
whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise.
·Bye-law 1 of the respondent Committee to which a
reference has already been made forbids a person from
1using any land within the limits of the town area for
the sale or purchase of fruits and vegetables without
-paying
the prescribed fee.
Bye-law 4 (b), however,
allows any person to sell in wholesale at any place in
the town area, provided he pay~ the prescribed fees to
·the licensee. Th'8C bye-laws do not purport to fix a
fee for the use or occupation of any immovable pr<>
perty vested in or entrusted to the management of
the Town Area Committee including any public street
-0r place of which it allows the use or occupation
whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise .
. Sections 293(1)
and 298(2) (J) (d) of the United
Province
~Ml!lnicipalities Act, 1916, as amended at the
time they .were extended to the town areas in the
United Provinces do not empower the Town Area
Committet .t::> make any bye-law authorising it to
-
..
-
-
..
' --
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
'charge any fees otherwise than for the use or occupation of any property vested in or entrusted to the
management of the Town Area Committee including
.any public street. Therefore,
the
bye-laws
prima
facie go much beyond the powers conferred on the
respondent
Committee
by
the
sections
mentioned
above and the petitioner complains agairu,t the enforcement of these bye-laws against him as he carries
on business in his own shop and not in or on any
immoveable property vested in the Town Area Committee or entrusted
to
their management. Learned
counsel for the respondent Committee, however,
urges
that the growers of vegetables and fruits come on foot
or in carts or on horses along the public street and
stand outside the petitioner's shop and for such use
of the public street the respondent Committee is well
within its powers to charge the fees. From the way
the case was formulated by the learned counsel, it is
quite clear that if anybody uses the public street it is
the growers of vegetables and fruits who come to the
petitioner's shop
to get their produce
auctioned by
the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be charged
with fees for use of the public street by those persons.
In our opinion, the bye-laws which imp~ a charge
on the wholesale dealer in the shape of the prescribed
fee, irrespective of any use or oc.cupation by him of
immoveable property vested in or entrusted to the
management of the Town Area Committee including
any; public street, are obviously ultra vires the powers
of the respondent Committee and, therefore, the byeIaws cannot be said to constitute a valid law which
alone may, under article 19(16) of the Constitution,
im~e a restriction on the right conferred by article
19(·1) (g). In the absence of any valid law authorising
it,
such illegal imposition must undoubtedly
operate
as an illegal restraint and must infringe the unfettered
right of the wholesale dealer to carry on his occupation, trade or business which is guaranteed to him by
article 19(1) (g) of our Constitution.
75
1952
A{ohammad
Yasin
v.
The Town Arca
Committee,
Jalalabad
and Another.
Das/.
1952
Mollammtul
Yasin
v.
The To""' Area
Committee.
/altdtlbail
v .. 1.
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19521'
In this view of the matter the petitioner is entitled,
to a suitable order for protection of his fundamental
right. The prayer in the petition, however, has been,
expressed in language much too wide and cannot be
granted in that form. The proper order would be to·
direct the respondent Committee not to prohibit the
petitioner from carrying on the business of a wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits within the limits·
of the Jalalabad Town Area Committee until proper
and valid bye-laws are framed and tl1ereafter except
in accordance with a licence to be obtained by
the·
petitioner under the b)ie-laws to be so framed. The· .
respondent Committee will pay tlie costs of thj.g application to the petitioner.
Agent for the petitioner: Nan nit Lal.
Agent for the respondent: P. C. Aggarwal-
·~
'
GIPN-S3--6 S.C. India/71-12-10-72-700.
.,