# ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE

- **Citation:** 2023 INSC 632
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-07-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023
- **Bench:** B. R. Gavai, J. B. Pardiwala
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/anbazhagan-v-the-state-represented-by-the-inspector-of-police-36547
- **Pages:** 42

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - Alteration of conviction from s. 304-I to
s.304-II of IPC - Single injury - Prosecution case that appellant
and deceased picked up verbal altercation in regard to the pathway
and the appellant had inflicted one blow with a "Hoe"-a
agricultural/gardening tool on the head of the victim-deceased as
a result of which the victim fell unconscious and later died - Trial
Court held appellant guilty for the offence of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder u/s. 304-I of the IPC and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years - High
Court dismissed the appeal affirming the conviction of the appellant
u/s. 304-I of the IPC - On appeal, held: The difference between the
two parts of s. 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime
of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit
of one of the exceptions to s.300 of the IPC, while under the second
part, the crime of murder is never established at all - Therefore, for
the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable
under the second part of s.304 of the IPC, the accused need not
bring his case within one of the exceptions to s.300 of the IPC -
Looking at the overall evidence on record, it is difficult to come to
the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with
the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such bodily injury as
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death - The
weapon of offence in the instant case was a common agriculture
tool not a weed axe - The appellant could only be attributed with
the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was likely
to cause the death - It is in such circumstances, the case on hand
does not fall within clause thirdly of s.300 of the IPC - In view of
the principles of law, the conviction of the appellant u/s. 304 Part I
of the IPC is altered to one u/s. 304 Part II of the IPC - For the
altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years.
[2023] 10 S.C.R. 1091 : 2023 INSC 632
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Penal Code, 1860 - ss.299, 300 and 304 Part-II - Single
injury - In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury
is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances
justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he
only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty
knowledge, and the offence would be one u/s. 304 Part II of the
IPC.
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304 Part-I - Applicability of - Section
304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases: (i) when
the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300,
but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when
the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is
generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the
case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii)
when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue
but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause
death.
Penal Code, 1860 - Intention to kill - Intention to kill is not
the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder - The
intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause
of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder
if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury
or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the
injury or injuries.
Penal Code, 1860 - s.299 and s.300 - discussed.
Criminal Law - Intent an

## Text

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ANBAZHAGAN
v.
THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023)
JULY 20, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - Alteration of conviction from s. 304-I to
s.304-II of IPC - Single injury - Prosecution case that appellant
and deceased picked up verbal altercation in regard to the pathway
and the appellant had inflicted one blow with a "Hoe"-a
agricultural/gardening tool on the head of the victim-deceased as
a result of which the victim fell unconscious and later died - Trial
Court held appellant guilty for the offence of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder u/s. 304-I of the IPC and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years - High
Court dismissed the appeal affirming the conviction of the appellant
u/s. 304-I of the IPC - On appeal, held: The difference between the
two parts of s. 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime
of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit
of one of the exceptions to s.300 of the IPC, while under the second
part, the crime of murder is never established at all - Therefore, for
the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable
under the second part of s.304 of the IPC, the accused need not
bring his case within one of the exceptions to s.300 of the IPC -
Looking at the overall evidence on record, it is difficult to come to
the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with
the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such bodily injury as
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death - The
weapon of offence in the instant case was a common agriculture
tool not a weed axe - The appellant could only be attributed with
the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was likely
to cause the death - It is in such circumstances, the case on hand
does not fall within clause thirdly of s.300 of the IPC - In view of
the principles of law, the conviction of the appellant u/s. 304 Part I
of the IPC is altered to one u/s. 304 Part II of the IPC - For the
altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years.
[2023] 10 S.C.R. 1091 : 2023 INSC 632
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Penal Code, 1860 - ss.299, 300 and 304 Part-II - Single
injury - In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury
is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances
justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he
only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty
knowledge, and the offence would be one u/s. 304 Part II of the
IPC.
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304 Part-I - Applicability of - Section
304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases: (i) when
the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300,
but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when
the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is
generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the
case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii)
when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue
but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause
death.
Penal Code, 1860 - Intention to kill - Intention to kill is not
the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder - The
intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause
of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder
if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury
or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the
injury or injuries.
Penal Code, 1860 - s.299 and s.300 - discussed.
Criminal Law - Intent and knowledge - discussed.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Few important principles of law may be summed
up thus:-
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what
offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true
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test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in
doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is
described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act
will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To
illustrate : 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his
revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing
him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding
that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though
only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of
murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking
another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A'
while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest
of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and
runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found
to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There
may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the
particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was
objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section
300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder
although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused
may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the
act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken
out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any
one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the
event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence
would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within
Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such
as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It
would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such
as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the
intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd
or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not
any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation
also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence
under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of
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Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section
304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person
falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as
described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the
first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause,
it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect,
therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is
'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there
is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury
was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of
Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence
would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes
of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the
clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions
to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher
degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower
degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury
'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2)
of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the
knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to
cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished
from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or
greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will
'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to
place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether
the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to
cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299
of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be
carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section
302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,
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the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those
not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not
murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to
Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five
exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence
on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law
to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of
the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails
to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses
of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of
murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section
299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens
rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant
must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This
ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably,
it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved
circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard
to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent
of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner
of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the
attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a
culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or
injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death
also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually
been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to
be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in
the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can
be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the
death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the
victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or
not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts
of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had
the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily
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injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single
injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely
falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of
the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had
guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single
injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done
without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead
to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would
be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. [Para 60][1127-H;
1128-A-H; 1129-A-H; 1130-A-H; 1131-A-D]
2. Looking at the overall evidence on record, it is difficult
to come to the conclusion that when the appellant struck the
deceased with the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such
bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The weapon of offence in the present case is a
common agriculture tool. If a man is hit with a weed axe on the
head with sufficient force, it is bound to cause, as here, death. It
is true that the injuries shown in the post mortem report are
fracture of the parietal bone as well as the temporal bone. The
deceased died on account of the cerebral compression i.e. internal
head injuries. However, the moot question is - whether that by
itself is sufficient to draw an inference that the appellant intended
to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death. This
Court is of the view that the appellant could only be attributed
with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was
likely to cause the death. It is in such circumstances that this
Court inclined to take the view that the case on hand does
not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC.
[Para 62][1131-G-H; 1132-A-B]
Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1984 SC 759: [1984]
2 SCC 133; Chamru, Son of Budhwa v. State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 652; Willie (William) Slaney v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 116: [1955]
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SCR 1140; Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4
SCC 245; Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC
342; Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1990) Supp SCC
291; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC
444 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633 - relied on.
Basdev v. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956]
SCR 363; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382 : [1977] 1 SCR 601; Virsa
Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 : [1958]
SCR 1495; Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3
SCC 616 : [1981] 3 SCR 839; Jawahar Lal v. State of
Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 159; Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa
[(2000) 9 SCC 1 : [2000] 2 SCR 1088; Jai Prakash v.
State (Delhi Admin.) (1991) 2 SCC 32 : [1991] 1 SCR
202; Anda v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 SC 148;
State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC
382 : [1977] 1 SCR 601; Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab
AIR 1964 SC 986 : [1964] SCR 916; Phulia Tudu v.
State of Bihar (2007) 14 SCC 588 : [2007] 9 SCR 997;
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874 :
[1966] Suppl. SCR 230; Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State
of U.P. (2007) 14 SCC 660 : [2007] 13 SCR 727 -
referred to.
Bhagwant v. Kedari I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202; In re
Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi AIR 1960 AP 141;
Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan AIR 1916 Bom 191
- referred to.
Reg. v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 COX CC 55 - referred
to.
Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page
31; Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at
page 41 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1964] SCR 916
referred to
Para 22
[1956] SCR 363
referred to
Para 23
[1977] 1 SCR 601
referred to
Para 34
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
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[1958] SCR 1495
referred to
Para 36
[2007] 9 SCR 997
referred to
Para 36
[1966] Suppl. SCR 230
referred to
Para 40
[1981] 3 SCR 839
referred to
Para 45
(1983) 4 SCC 159
referred to
Para 47
[2000] 2 SCR 1088
referred to
para 48
[1991] 1 SCR 202
referred to
Para 49
AIR 1966 SC 148
referred to
Para 51
[2007] 13 SCR 727
referred to
Para 53
[1977] 1 SCR 601
referred to
Para 53
[1984] 2 SCC 133
relied on
Para 54
AIR 1954 SC 652
relied on
Para 55
[1955] SCR 1140
relied on
Para 55
(1981) 4 SCC 245
referred to
Para 56
(1983) 2 SCC 342
relied on
Para 57
(1990) Supp SCC 291
relied on
Para 58
[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633
relied on
Para 59
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2043 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 193 of 2019.
S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., M. P. Parthiban, Ms. Priyaranjani
Nagamuthu, R. Sudhakaran, Ms. Shalini Mishra, G. R. Vikash, Bilal
Mansoor, T. Hari Haran Sudhan, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Vaidehi Rastogi, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J. B. PARDIWALA, J. :
1. Leave granted.
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2. This appeal is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed
against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Madras dated 04.04.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 2019 by
which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein
thereby affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Namakkal in Sessions Case
No. 41 of 2017.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the appellant herein
and his father were put on trial in the Court of the Additional Sessions
Judge, Namakkal in Sessions Case No. 41 of 2017 for the offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (for short, 'IPC'). The Trial Court held the appellant herein guilty
for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of 10 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in
default of payment of the amount of fine, further rigorous imprisonment
of one year. The co-accused i.e. father of the appellant herein came to
be acquitted by the Trial Court.
4. The appellant herein being dissatisfied with the judgment and
order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court went in appeal
before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal affirming
the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence punishable under
Section 304 Part I of the IPC.
5. At the outset, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant herein, submitted that he is not pressing this
appeal on merits. He submitted that his only endeavour is to persuade
this Court to alter the conviction of the appellant from the offence
punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of
the IPC and reduce the sentence accordingly.
FACTUAL MATRIX
6. It appears from the evidence on record that the appellant is an
agriculturist. He owns agriculture land in a village by name
Sirukinathupalayam situated in Tamil Nadu. The deceased namely
Balasubramaniam was also an agriculturist and had his own agriculture
land adjacent to the agriculture land of the appellant herein. There was
a pathway leading to the agriculture land of the appellant over which the
deceased had some issues. At the time of the incident, the appellant had
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
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cultivated Cassava plants (Tapoica) which was ready for harvesting.
On 25.10.2015 at around 7 am, the appellant and his father were harvesting
the crop and had also arranged for a lorry for transporting the same
from their field. At around 11 am, the deceased came at the place of the
incident and threatened the driver of the lorry saying he should not drive
his lorry through the pathway leading to the agriculture field of the
appellant. At that point of time, the appellant and his father were in their
field. The appellant is said to have asked the driver of the lorry to move
the lorry to his field to load the crop. This was questioned by the deceased
which resulted in a quarrel. It is the case of the prosecution that after
verbal altercation between the appellant and the deceased for quite some
time, the appellant is alleged to have picked up a "Hoe" (Kalaikottu - in
Tamil, a gardening tool with a small metal blade attached with a wooden
handle used mainly for weeding) & inflicted a single blow on the head of
the deceased as a result of which the deceased fell unconscious and
later died in the hospital.
7. The FIR was lodged on 25.10.2015 at 19.30 Hrs. On completion
of the investigation, police filed charge sheet for the offence of murder.
The case was committed to the Court of Sessions as the offence was
exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. The Additional Sessions Judge,
Namakkal vide order dated 06.09.2017 framed the following charge:-
 "Whereas the deceased Balasubramaniam has been living
with his wife Baby and family members at Sevalkattu Moolai
near Government High School in Pandamangalam; that the
Al is the son of A2; that both the accused were living in
Poosaripalayam; in Sirukinatrypalayan: both the accused and
the deceased Balasubramaniarn had their agricultural lands
adjacent to each other's lands; that there was a pathway
between both these lands and that there has been a prior
enmity for a longtime regarding the ownership of that pathway
between both parties. On 25.10.2015 at 07.30 hrs Al and A2
were loading tapioca cultivated and harvested in their lands
on to a lorry owned by one Mr. Palanival, having the
registration number TN 33 AF 3114 by parking that lorry on
the disputed pathway. At that time the deceased
Balasubramaniam came there and told them that the lorry
could not be led in and blocked it. Then A2 yelled at the
deceased Balasubramaniam saying "You do not have a
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pathway here. You may bring anyone you want" and then Al
and A2 pushed the deceased Balasubramaniam down and
with an intention to murder him Al had hit the head of the
deceased Balasubramaniam with a "weed removing axe"
(Kalaikothi) while A2 was pelting stones at him whereby the
deceased Balasubramaniam sustained grievous injuries on
his head. Balasubramaniam was immediately carried to the
Government Hospital in Velur, then taken to Government
Hospital in Namakkal where he did not respond to treatment
and was declared dead at 05.20 pm. Therefore you the accused
have committed an offense punishable under 302 IPC and
which can be tried by this court.
I hereby issue an order that both of you Al and A2 should
be tried by this court for the commission of the above offense."
8. The appellant and the co-accused (father of the appellant)
pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge and claimed to be tried. It
appears that the prosecution examined many witnesses. However, PW
8 - Chidambaram and PW 9 - Jeeva are the main witnesses being the
eye witnesses to the occurrence. Both the eye witnesses have deposed
that on the date of the incident the appellant herein and the deceased
picked up verbal altercation in regard to the pathway and the appellant is
said to have inflicted one blow with the weapon of offence as enumerated
above on the head of the deceased leading to his death.
ORAL EVIDENCE
9. PW-8 namely Chidambaram in his examination in chief has
deposed as under:-
"I am now residing in Indira Nagar, Thaathaiyangar Patti. I
am working as Lorry Driver. I know the present accused.
About 3 years back I took my lorry to Anbazhagan's field in
Poosari Palayam for transporting harvest of tapioca.
Subramani, Veerasamy, Raja Manikkam and Jeeva
accompanied me. While Subramani, Veerasamy, Raja
Manikkam and Jeeva were harvesting the tubers of tapioca
the person belonging to the adjacent field told us that the
lorry should not move any further since he the accused have
a dispute regarding the pathway in which the lorry was on. I
climbed into my lorry. At that time the accused Anbazhagan
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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was plucking tapioca in his field. He then asked me to bring
the lorry near his field. I told him about what the neighbor
told me. But as I took my lorry ahead a verbal fight broke out
between Anbazhagan and the neighbor. Then A2 came to that
place. She was yelling too. With the axe M.O.1 in his right
hand, A1 Anbazhagan hit the neighbor on his head. The
neighbor suffered injuries on his mouth."
10. PW-9 namely Jeeva in his examination in chief has deposed
as under:-
 "I am now residing in Indira Nagar, Thaathaiyangar Patti. I
I am a coolie. I know the accused present here. I went to
pluck tapioca tubers in the garden of the accused Anbazhagan
along with Chidambaram, Subramani, Veerasamy, Raja
Manikkam between 07.30 & 08.00 am on 25.10.2015 at
Poosari Palayam. We went inside the field with Anbazhagan
to gather the tubers. When we were clearing the plants after
gathering the tubers Chidambaram drove the lorry inside the
field. Immediately the deceased Balasubramaniam came
inside. He was shouting at the driver and asked him as to
who gave him the authority to enter inside. He told this to
Anbazhagan. The deceased Balasubramaniam was standing
on the road. Both the accused present there were gathering
tapioca. Incidentally the accused and the deceased started
getting into a verbal quarrel. We are securing the plucked
tubers. The fight became bigger. Hearing the louder sound
we all came over to the road where the verbal fight was going
on. At that time the accused hit the deceased at his head with
the wedding axe causing injury. He fell down immediately."
11. PW-18 Dr. Anbumalar in her examination in chief has state as
under:-
"I am currently working as a Senior Doctor in Namakkal
Government District Head Hospital. On 26.10.2015, while I
was on duty then the body of one Balasubramaniam (57 years
old) was brought by one Arunagiri, Head constable for postmortem examination with permission letter and accordingly
on 26.10.2015 at 2.15 PM, the post- mortem was performed.
The details of the post- mortem examination are as follows -
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External injuries respectively,
There was bleeding from the ear and nose, above the left eye
brow 3×2 cm cut injury. A cut injury measuring 4 × 2 cm was
found on the left forehead. The front skull bone was fractured
on both sides (Both parietal bone).
Internal Inspection DetailsThe skull bone was broken and the inner lining was torn.
Left Side Temporal Bone 7.5 cm. was broken. There was a
blood clot at the base of the skull. The inside of the sprout
was red. Navicular bone was correct. Left ribs 3 and 4 were
fractured."
12. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record and more particularly having regard to the genesis
of the occurrence; the manner of assault and the nature of the weapon,
took the view that the case was not one of murder punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC but could be said one of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and
accordingly sentenced the appellant herein.
13. The High Court also came to the conclusion that the Trial
Court was right in holding the appellant herein guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC.
14. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here
before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
15. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant herein submitted that considering the manner in which the
incident had occurred and the role attributed to the appellant, the conviction
deserves to be altered from Section 304 Part I of the IPC to one under
Section 304 Part II of the IPC. According to the learned senior counsel,
the case does not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. All
that can be attributed to the appellant is 'knowledge' and 'not intention'.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
STATE
16. Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent State on the other hand, submitted that the Trial Court as
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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well as the High Court rightly held the appellant herein guilty of the
offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. According to
the learned counsel, the case is not one falling within the ambit of Section
304 Part II of the IPC. He would submit that the case falls within clause
thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. He submitted that exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC is attracted and therefore, the courts rightly
convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304
Part I of the IPC.
ANALYSIS
17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant
herein for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC
should be further altered to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
18. We have given more than a fair idea as regards the genesis of
the occurrence and the role attributed to the appellant herein. Dr.
Karthikeyan (PW-15) was examined by the prosecution in his capacity
as the Medical Officer who performed the post mortem of the deceased.
In the post mortem report, the doctor has noted three injuries, (i) cut
injury over 4 x 2 cm on the left eye, (ii) cut injury 4 x 3 cm on the left
forehead, and (iii) 4 x 2 cm contusion around the left eye. The cause of
death assigned in the post mortem report appears to be shock and
haemorrhage due to head injury.
19. As the only argument canvassed before us is that the case
does not travel beyond culpable homicide as the same falls within the
third part of Section 299 of the IPC, the accused could only be said to
have knowledge that he is likely by his act to cause death and not the
intention to kill the deceased, we must explain the fine distinction between
the terms 'intent' and 'knowledge'.
INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE :-
20. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim.
The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man.
21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely
proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred
from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res
gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or
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occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by
direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances
of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the
intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:-
1. The nature of the weapon used.
2. The place where the injuries were inflicted.
3. The nature of the injuries caused.
4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.
22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC
986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word
'intent'. The relevant observations are made by referring to the
observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari,
I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:-
"The word "intent" by its etymology, seems to have
metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies "aim" and thus
connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen
perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but
rather connotes the one object for which the effort is madeand thus has reference to what has been called the dominant
motive, without which, the action would not have been taken."
 (Emphasis supplied)
23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488,
at page 490, the following observations have been made by
Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:-
"6. ...Of course, we have to distinguish between motive,
intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts
a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness
of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and
knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing
more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge.
The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no
doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
different things. Even in some English decisions, the three
ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain
amount of confusion."
(Emphasis supplied)
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made
by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have
been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage,
as they are very illuminating:-
"The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to
whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look
into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given
time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does
or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide
you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and
one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a
man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The
consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt
of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew
to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off, without
intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the
party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such
an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not
be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have
been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one;
but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by
intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent
charged?"
 (Emphasis supplied)
25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision
and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different
terminologies 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which
is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that
his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that 'intent' and
'knowledge' cannot be equated with each other. They connote different
things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that
from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that
'intent' and 'knowledge' are the same. 'Knowledge' will be only one of
the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or
inferring the requisite intent.
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26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960
AP 141, also the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'intention' is aptly
explained. It is as under:-
"Knowledge and intention must not be confused.
17. ... Every person is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his act until the contrary is
proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a
decision, as to an offender's intention to inquire what the
- natural and probable consequences of his acts would
be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person,
sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted
them could be presumed to have intended those natural
and probable consequences. His offence would fall under
the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C.
18. ... A man's intention has to be inferred from what he
does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the
intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is
less grave. The degree of guilt depends upon intention and
the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts
proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in
an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, but which the - offender
knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge
throws light upon his intention.
19. ...Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge,
that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death.
Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts
to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to
bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately
inflicted is more than merely 'likely to cause death' but
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
the higher degree of guilt is presumed." (Emphasis supplied)
It has been further observed therein as under:-
"26. ...Where the evidence does not disclose that there was
any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was
clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
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were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty
under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention
that in order to bring the case under the second part of
sec. 304, I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the
exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable." (Emphasis
supplied)
27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and
murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or
knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act
which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of
culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the
IPC designedly used the two words 'intention' and 'knowledge', and it
must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between
these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may
result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that
such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is
not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he
"must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences
would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1
at page 40).
28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge
that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act
is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should
ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain
consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean
that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention.
Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the
consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a
particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages
from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal
Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:-
"To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired
objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is
used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees
but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........
It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is
also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction,
and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express
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purpose is directed......... Again, a man cannot intend to do a
thing unless he desires to do it."
(Emphasis supplied)
29.