# AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 396
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-09-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1957
- **Bench:** S.R. Das C.J, Venkatarama Ayyar, B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A. Sarkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/and-others-v-the-state-of-andhra-pradesh-1469
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Sessions Tria/-Co1111nitment proceeding instituted 011 Police
report-Proeedure. if makes for inequality before law-Code of
Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) as amended by tire Code of
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (26 of 1955), ss., 207,
207A-Constitutin of India, Art. 14.
The point in controversy in this appeal was whether ss. 207
and 207 A inserted into the Code of Crimninal Procedure by the
amending Act 26 of 1955, violated the provision of Art. 14 of the
Constitution and were, therefore, invalid in law.
The appellants
were committed for trial to the Court of Session by the inquiring
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
Magistrate in a proceeding instituted against them on a Police
1957
report and he. followed the procedure laid down in s, 207 A of the
Macher/a
Code as reqmred by s. 207 of the Code. The appellants moved Ha11umantlia Rm··
the High Court for quashing the · order of commitment on the
and others
ground that the provisions of s. 207A introduced discrimination
v.
as against accused persons again&t whom proceedings were Arn;,, si;te ;11
instituted on Police report and were unconstitutional in character.
/1
ra ra es
The High Court held against them. The contention was reiterated
in this Court and it was sought to be made out that the provisions
of s. 207 A of the Code in comparison and contrast to other
provisions of Ch. XVlil of the Code, prescribed a less advantageous
procedure for the accused persons in a proceeding started on
Police report than the procedure prescribed for other cases in the
suocceding sections of the chapter.
lle/d, that ss. 207 and 207 A
of the Code were not
discriminatory and did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution
and their constitutional validity was beyond question.
Although there can be no doubt that the impugned sections
introduced substantial difference in the procedure relating to
commitment proceedings applicable .to the two classes of cases, they
did not in any way affect the procedure at the· trial, and the true
test of the constitutional validity of the classification they made,
wa' whether it was reasonable and pertinent to the object the
Legislature had in view, namely, a speedy trial of offences with
the least possible delay.
So .iudged there could be no doubt that the Legislature in
prescribing the two different procedures at th<l commitment stage,
one for proceedings instituted on Police report and the other for
those that were not, had acted on a consideration that was
reasonable and connected with the object it had in view.
Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar, (1955) S.C.R. 1045,
applied.
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925, Chiranjit
Lal Chmrdhuri v. The Union ~f India, (1950) S.C.R. 869, The State
of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, (1951) S.C.R. 682, The State of West
Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) S.C.R. 284, Kathi RaningRawat v: The State of Saurashtra, (1952) S.C.R. 435, Lachmandas
Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay, (1952, S.C.R. 710, Qasim
Razvi v.
The State of Hyderabad, (1953) S.C.R. 581, Habeeb
Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad, (1953) S.C.R. 661 and The
State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, (1953) S.C.R. 254, referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 57 of 1957 and Cirminal Misc. Petition
No. 294 of 1957.
Appeal from the
judgment and order dated
September 28, 1956, of the former Andhra High Court
at Guntur in Criminal Revision Case No. 241 of 1956.
1957
Macherla
Hanumantha Rao
and 01her1
v.
Th< State of
Andhra Pradesh
Sinha
J.
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
T. V.
Sarma, K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhury and
T. S.
Venkataraman, for the appellants.
T. V.
R.
Tatachari and T. M. Sen,
for the
respondent.
C. K.
Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India and
T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India).
1957. September 17. The following Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SINHA
J.-The only
question that arises for
determination in this appeal on a certific~te granted
by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad,
under Art

## Text

396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
1957
his appointement under a Committee which is a
Maulana Abdul statutory body and such appointment cannot be called
Shakur
an appointment by or under the control of the GovernRikhahc1and and ment of India nor is hi~ salary paid out of the revenues
Another
of the Government but out of the funds of Durgah
Kapur 1.
Endowment. In the. circumstances the majority of
the Tribunal has erred in holding that the appellant
held an office of profit under the Government and the
opinion of the Chairman to the contrary lays down the
correct position.
1957
')eptember 17.
In view of this finding in regard to the office of
profit under the Government, it is not necessary to go
into the question whether there were
any "thrown
away" votes or whether the respondent has been
rightly declared to have been elected.
We are of the opinion that the election of the
appellant has been wrongly set aside and we would
allow the appeal and set aside the order of the majority
of the Tribunal. The appellant will have his costs
in this court as also before the Tribunal.
Appeal al/01red.
MACHERLA HANUMANTHA RAO
AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
(with connected petition)
(S.R. DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B.P. SINHA,
J.L. KAPUR and A. SARKAR JJ.)
Sessions Tria/-Co1111nitment proceeding instituted 011 Police
report-Proeedure. if makes for inequality before law-Code of
Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) as amended by tire Code of
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (26 of 1955), ss., 207,
207A-Constitutin of India, Art. 14.
The point in controversy in this appeal was whether ss. 207
and 207 A inserted into the Code of Crimninal Procedure by the
amending Act 26 of 1955, violated the provision of Art. 14 of the
Constitution and were, therefore, invalid in law.
The appellants
were committed for trial to the Court of Session by the inquiring
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
Magistrate in a proceeding instituted against them on a Police
1957
report and he. followed the procedure laid down in s, 207 A of the
Macher/a
Code as reqmred by s. 207 of the Code. The appellants moved Ha11umantlia Rm··
the High Court for quashing the · order of commitment on the
and others
ground that the provisions of s. 207A introduced discrimination
v.
as against accused persons again&t whom proceedings were Arn;,, si;te ;11
instituted on Police report and were unconstitutional in character.
/1
ra ra es
The High Court held against them. The contention was reiterated
in this Court and it was sought to be made out that the provisions
of s. 207 A of the Code in comparison and contrast to other
provisions of Ch. XVlil of the Code, prescribed a less advantageous
procedure for the accused persons in a proceeding started on
Police report than the procedure prescribed for other cases in the
suocceding sections of the chapter.
lle/d, that ss. 207 and 207 A
of the Code were not
discriminatory and did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution
and their constitutional validity was beyond question.
Although there can be no doubt that the impugned sections
introduced substantial difference in the procedure relating to
commitment proceedings applicable .to the two classes of cases, they
did not in any way affect the procedure at the· trial, and the true
test of the constitutional validity of the classification they made,
wa' whether it was reasonable and pertinent to the object the
Legislature had in view, namely, a speedy trial of offences with
the least possible delay.
So .iudged there could be no doubt that the Legislature in
prescribing the two different procedures at th<l commitment stage,
one for proceedings instituted on Police report and the other for
those that were not, had acted on a consideration that was
reasonable and connected with the object it had in view.
Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar, (1955) S.C.R. 1045,
applied.
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925, Chiranjit
Lal Chmrdhuri v. The Union ~f India, (1950) S.C.R. 869, The State
of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, (1951) S.C.R. 682, The State of West
Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) S.C.R. 284, Kathi RaningRawat v: The State of Saurashtra, (1952) S.C.R. 435, Lachmandas
Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay, (1952, S.C.R. 710, Qasim
Razvi v.
The State of Hyderabad, (1953) S.C.R. 581, Habeeb
Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad, (1953) S.C.R. 661 and The
State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, (1953) S.C.R. 254, referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 57 of 1957 and Cirminal Misc. Petition
No. 294 of 1957.
Appeal from the
judgment and order dated
September 28, 1956, of the former Andhra High Court
at Guntur in Criminal Revision Case No. 241 of 1956.
1957
Macherla
Hanumantha Rao
and 01her1
v.
Th< State of
Andhra Pradesh
Sinha
J.
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
T. V.
Sarma, K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhury and
T. S.
Venkataraman, for the appellants.
T. V.
R.
Tatachari and T. M. Sen,
for the
respondent.
C. K.
Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India and
T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India).
1957. September 17. The following Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SINHA
J.-The only
question that arises for
determination in this appeal on a certific~te granted
by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad,
under Art.
134 (I) (c) of the Constitution, is the
constitutionality of the provisions of ss. 207 and 207A,
Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as
the Code), which, read together, were introduced into
the Code by Act XXVI of 1955. The 26
appellants
have been committed to the Court of Session, Guntur
Division, to take their trial for offences punishable
under ss. 147, 148, 323, 324 and 302, read with ss. 34
and 149,
Indian Penal Code. They impleaded the
State of Andhra Pradesh as the sole respondent. The
Union
of India has been allowed to intervene on an
application made in that behalf in view of the fact
that the provisions of the Central Act have been
impugned as unconstitutional.
For the purposes of this appeal, it is only necessary
to state the following relevant facts. The local police
took cognizance of a serious occurrence of rioting with
murder on December 22, 1955. The local police
investigated the case,
and after
recording such
evidence as it could collect in respect of the occurrence,
submitted a charge-sheet under the aforesaid sections
of the Indian Penal Code, to the magistrate having
jurisdiction to entertain the case. The
magistrate,
following the procedure laid down in s. 207 A of the
Code committed the persons shown in the chargesheet as the accused persons, to take their trial before
the Court of Session. A number of applications in
revision, under ss. 435 and 439 of the Code, were made
on behalf of the accused persons, to the High Court of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
Andhra Pradesh, to quash the order of commitment,
1957
chiefly on the ground that the said order having been
Macherla
passed under the provisions of s. 207 A of the Code, Hanumantha Rao
wa!: void, as those provisions were unconstitutional
and
0
:~ers
for the reason that they introduced discirmination as
Th~ State of
against accused persons in respect of whom a police
A.ndhra Pradesh
charge-sheet had been submitted.
The revisional
Sinha J.
applications were heard b~ Krishna Rao
J. who
dismissed them, holding that the provisions impugned
were · not unconstitutional and that, therefore, the
order of commitment was valid in law. The appellants
applied for and obtained the necessary certificate
under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution that the case
was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
The arguments addressed to the High Court have
been repeated in this Court and are to the effect that
ss. 207 and 207 A, as they now stand, provide for two
separate procedures in the committing court, namely,
(1) in respect of a case instituted on a police report
for which the procedure specified in s. 207 A is prescribed, and (2) in respect of any other proceeding,
the procedure laid down in other provisions of Chapter
XVIII is prescribed. The argument is that a comparison and contrast of the two different procedures
prescribed in respect of the two classes of cases, when
examined in their details, show that the procedure in
respect of a case instituted on a police report is less
advantageous to the accused than the other procedure.
Thus, it is further argued in the sections following
s. 207 A in Chapter XVIII of the Code, the accused
have been granted facilities which are not available to
them in the procedure laid down in s. 207 A. By way
of illustration, it was urged that under s. 208(3), it is
open to an accused person to apply to the magistrate
to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness or the production of any document, but sub-s.(2)
of s. 207 A, which corresponds to the provisions of s.
208 (3), speaks only of the prosecution and not of the
accused. Again, it is p_ointed out that sub-s.
(4) of
s. 207 A, makes reference only to the prosecution
evidence, whereas the corresponding s. 208 (1) makes
reference to the evidence that may be produced in
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
1957
support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accu ed.
Macherla
Similarly, it has been pointed out that there are no
Hanumantha Rao provisions in s.
207 A corresponding to
those of
and ~ihm
s. 209 (2), and s. 213 (2), empowering the magistrate to
T':;, Stat• ;t1 discharge the accused; nor is there any provision in
An ra Pra cs' the impugned s. 207 A corresponding to s. 215 relating
Sinha 1.
to quashing of commitments. Further, it was pointed
out that whereas s. 209 (1) contains the words "not
sufficient grounds for committing the accused person",
sub-s.(6) of s. 207A has the words "no grounds for
committing the accused". It has further been argued
that in the new procedure adopted in the impugned
s. 207A, the accused person has been deprived of the
benefits under ss. 162 and 215 of the Code, and under
ss. 27, 101 to 106 and 114-ill. (g) of the Evidence Act.
It has, thus,
been sought to be made out that the
procedure laid down in s. 207A in the matter of
commitment is less advantageous to the accused
persons than the one prescribed in the succeeding
sections of Chapter XVIII.
We shall assume for the purpose of examining the
constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the
amended Code that there are differences in the two
kinds of procedure envisaged in Chapter XVIII of
the Code, relating to commitment proceedings, but it
is by no means clear that the changes introduced by
the amending Act XXVI of 1955 are always to the
disadvantage or prejudice of an accused person. It is
a well-known fact that the amending Act aforesaid
introduced changes into the old Code with a view to
simplifying and expediting procedure relating to trial
of offences and to inquiries preceding such trials. It
has also to be remembered that the Code has always
prescribed different procedures for trial of offences
varying with the gravity of the offences charged, or
with the power of the court before which an accused
person is placed on trial. Generally speaking, minor
offences have been made triable summarily, or the
same accused person in respect of an offence triable
summarily, may be so tried by a magistrate specially
empowered in that behalf, or may be tried according
to the ordinary procedure by a magistrate not so
S.C.R. SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
401
empowered. Less serious offences are triable by
1957
magistrates and more serious offences are triable by a
Macherta
Court of Session or by a High Court after there has Hanumantha Ra.-.
b
1. .
.
.
d ·
.
.
b
and Others
een a pre 1mmary mqmry an mvest1gation y a
v.
police officer, or an inquiry by a magistrate, coml~ sr}!e g1 h
monly described as commitment proceedings, or, after
n Ira
ra es
inquiry by a Civil or Revenue Court, in connection
Sinha J.
with certain specified
offences committed in the
course of or in relation to judicial proceedings or in
respect of proceedings affecting the administration of
justice. The Code has
further classified offences
triable by magistrates of any class or by magistrates of
higher classes. There is, again, a cross-division . of
cases into warrant cases and summons cases. With
reference to the powers of police officers, offences have
been classified as cognizable offences and non-cognizable offences. Thus, the principle of classification of
offences and of different categories of cases relating to
the trial of offences is a well-established rule of criminal procedure. It is true that for the first time, the
impugned sections have prescribed two different
procedures in respect of commitment proceedings as
already indicated, but we have to remember that
there is absolutely no difference in the procedure at
the trial in contra-distinction to the procedure relating
to the enquiry leading up to commitment of an accused
person to a Court of Session or a High Court in cases
triable exclusively by such a Court. It must also be
remembered
that every case involving a serious
offence comes under the category of 'cognizable case'
in respect of which a police officer may arrest a person
named as an accused person without warrant and
investigate the case without any order of a magistrate
in that behalf. Hence, ordinarily speaking, as soon
as information of the commission of a cognizable
offence has been laid before a police officer in-charge
of a police station, it becomes his duty to record the
first information; and even in the absence of such a
first information if such an officer receives information leading to a suspicion that a cognizable offence
has been committed, he has to investigate the case
and take all steps necessary for the apprehension and
M2SC/61-7
402
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
[1958]
19s1
arrest of the persons alleged to have been concerned
Macherla
with the crime.
Even in cases which are not, in the
Hanumantha Rao first i_nstance, of cognizable nature, it becomes the duty
and e.thers
of a police officer to investigate such a case if he is so
The State of ordered by a competent magistrate, taking cognizance
Andhra Pradesh of the offence under s. 190 of the Code. In all such
Sinha J.
cases, it becomes the duty of a police officer in-charge
of a police station, or of a superior officer if deputed
to investigate a case, to follow the procedure laid down
in Chapter XIV of the Code. Under s. 169 of the
Code, if, as a result of the investigation under Chapter
XIV, the police officer making the investigation, comes
to the conclusion that there is no sufficient evidence or
reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forward-
'
ing of the accused to a magistrate, he has to release
the accused person if in custody. If, on the other
hand, on such an investigation, it appears to the
investigating officer that there is. sufficient evidence or
reasonable ground of suspicion, it becomes his duty to
forward the accused to a competent magistrate to try
the accused or to commit him for trial. Section 173
of the Code requires the investigation to be concluded
without any unnecessary delay and the submission of
a report containing the result of the investigation, to
a competent magistrate. After the submission of the
police report, the police officer in-charge of a police
station, before the commencement of the inquiry or
trial by a magistrate, has to furnish to the accused, free
of cost, a copy of the report aforesaid, of the first
information report
and of all other documents or
relevant extracts thereof, on which prosecution proposes to rely, including statements and confessions, if
any, recorded under s. 164, and the statements recorded under 3ub-s. 3 of s. 161, of all persons whom the
prosecution proposes to examine as witnesses.
On receipt of the police report and the documents
aforesaid, under s. 173 of the Code, the magistrate
concerned has to make up his mind whether the case
has to be tried by him or by some other competent
magistrate or by a Court of Session or a High Court.
If the magistrate finds that the case is triable exclusively by a Court of Session or a High Court, he has
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
403
to follow the new procedure laid down in s. 207 A.
1957
At the commencement of the inquiry before the magisMacherla
trate, when the accused appears before him, the Hanumantha Rao
magistrate has to satisfy himself that the documents
and ~thers
referred to in s. 173 have been furnished to the
Tlte srate 01
accused and to have them furnished if the police officer Andhra Pradesh
has not done his duty.
The magistrate then has to
Sinha J.
record the evidence of such witnesses as figure as eyewitnesses to the occurrence, and are produced before
him. He has also the power, in the interest of justice,
to record such other evidence of the prosecution as he
may think necessary, but he is not obliged to record
any evidence. Without recording any evidence but
after considering all the documents referred to in
s.
173 and after examining the accused person _and
after hearing the parties, it is open to the magistrate
to discharge the accused person after recording his
reasons that no ground for committing the accused
for trial has been made out, unless he decides to try
the accused himself or to send him for trial by another
magistrate. If, on the other hand, he finds that the
accused should be committed for trial, is required
to frame a charge disclosing the offence with which the
accused is charged. The accused is then required to
submit a list of persons whom he wishes to be summoned, to give evidence at his trial. After all this;
the case is placed before the Court of Session or the
High Court for trial in accordance with the procedure
laid down by the Code.
·
But if the investigating police officer, instead of
submitting a charge-sheet as required by s. 173, submits what is popularly called the "final report" to the
effect that there was no evidence in support of the
prosecution case and that it was not a fit case for a
trial either by a magistrate or by a Court of Session or .
High Court, the matter may not end there. It is open
to the first informant or any other person interested
in prosecuting the accused persgn, to make a regular
petition of complaint before a competent magistrate
under s. 190 of the Code. The magistrate; upon taking
cognizance under that section, may start an inquiry
of his own, notwithstandirtg the fact that the police
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1958]
1957
has refused to prosecute the case. The magistrate, in
Mocher/a
a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session or by a
Han"",]'7}t, Rao High Court, has to follow the procedure laid down in
an /
rs
s. 208 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVIII. The-
]:/dir~''ffr~afsh m~dgistrate . natl.lrballyth has to1
i;nake a rdecordh of hthe
ev1 ence given
y
e comp amant an
sue
ot er
Sinha J.
witnesses as may have been produced in support of the
prosecution or on behalf of the accused if the accused
chooses to adduce any
evidence at that
stage.
Ordinarily, an accused person does not choose to do
so for the fear that he
might disclose his defence
too early. After recording the evidence adduced on
behalf of the prosecution as also on behalf of the
accused, if adduced, and examining the accused for the
purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him, the magistrate
may either discharge the accused person if he finds
that there is no sufficient ground for committil'\g him
for trial after recording his reason, or direct him
to be tried by himself or some other magistrate.
The order of discharge may be made by the magistrate
even at an earlier stage if he records the reasons for
considering the charge to be groundless, or, he may
commit the accused for trial after framing a charge
declaring the offence with which the accused has been
charged. It is also open to an accused person, if the
magistrate in his discretion allows him to do so, to
examine more witnesses. If after examining those
additional witnesses, the magistrate is satisfied that
there are no sufficient grounds for committing the
accused, he may cancel the charge and di;charge the
accused.
It will, thus, be seen that where the magistrate
conducts commitment proceeding as on a complaint,
the accused has the advantage of three stages at which
he may be .discharged. It has, therefore, been contended on behalf of the appellants that the procedure
under s. 207 A is less advantageous to the accused than
the other procedure. The answer to this contention is
that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has proceeded on
the basis that it is primarily the function of the State
through its police officers who are charged with the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
duty of preventing the commission of crime and of
1957
bringing offenders. to justice, to prosecute ciriminals or
MacJiert•·
alleged criminals in serious cases, that is to say, cases Ha1111ma1111ia Rao
involving not only personal injury to the complainant
mid ~.titers
but also public peace and order. Such police officers
The siate of1
have been enjoined by law to see to it that all persons Andhra Prades
1
alleged to have been concerned in a crime of that
Sinha J.
character, should be speedily brought to justice.
Chapter XIV of the Code, as stated above, lays down
the procedure which police officers have to follow.
Hence, the Code has provided that all casess involving
public peace and order, should be investigated by
public. servants who are expected to be vigilant in
bringing all offenders to justice without any avoidable
delay. If the police have not thought it necessary
or feasible to do so after following the procedure
laid down in Chapter XIV, the private party may
figure before the magistrate as complainant. The
magistrate has got, therefore, to be more vigilant in
seeing that private vendetta and considerations other
than those of vindicating justice, are not allowed to
interfere with the administration of public justice.
Hence, the procedure laid down in section 208 and
the sections following that section, naturally gives
greater facilities to persons accused of an offence, to
vindicate their character.
As indicated above, there is no doubt that there are
material differences in the two procedures relating to
commitment according as the case lias been investigated by a competent police officer who has submitted
a charge-sheet and a report under section 173 of the
Code, or, a competent magistrate has taken cognizance
of an offence on a complaint. In the latter case, the
procedure before the committing magistrate is more
elaborate. But is it always to the advantage of an
accused person that there should be an elaborate
procedure before such a magistrate and not a summary
one? It is the avowed policy of the Legislature and
there can be no doubt that it is in the general interest
of administration of justice, that crimes should be
investigated and criminals brought to justice as
expeditiously as circumstances of the case would
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
19s1
permit. That must also be in the interest of an
Macherla
accused person himself if he claims not to be guilty of
Ha'::lO'l~,:·• any1
offiffiencde.
Gen1
edrablly ~peakingd, ~herefo
1
re, . onlyha
v.
rea
o en er wou
e mtereste m pro ongmg t e
,{~Z St'Jf• ;th inquiry or trial so as to postpone the day of judgment.
n ra '
0
"
If a person has been falsely or wrongly accused of an
Sinha J.
offence, .it is in his interest that he should get himself
declared innocent by a competent court as early as
possible. In view of these considerations, there cannot
be the least doubt
that the Legislature has been
well advised to amend the procedure
relating to
commitment proceedings in cases which have been
investigated by a competent police
officer. The
Legislature has rightly retained the old elaborate
procedure only in those cases which have not been
investigated by such a public officer, or, after investigation, have been declared not to be fit to be proceeded
with in public interest.
Having found that there are substantial differences
introduced by the impugned provisions, we have to
consider the question of the constitutionality of those
provisions. At the threshold, it is pertinent to observe
that these provisions have not in any way affected
the procedure at the trial.
After a case has been
committed to a Court of Session, the procedure for the
trial of offences in either <;lass of cases, remains the
same. Hence, all those cases which came up to this
Court in which it \vas laid down that the law introduced substantial changes in the procedure at the
trial to the disadvantage of an accused person, have
absolutely no relevance to the present case. The main
attack on the constitutionality of those provisions is
based on Art. 14 of the Constitution.
This Court had
to consider the provisions of that article in a series of
cases, namely,
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India.('),
The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (2), The State of
West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (')i Kathi Raning
Rawat v. The· State of Saurashtra ( ), Lachmandas
(1) [19SoJ S.C.R. 86g.
(2) [1951] S.C.R. filb.
(3) [1952] S.C.R. 284.
(4) [1952] S.C.R. 435.
S.C.R.
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
407
Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay (1), Qasim
1957
Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad(2) Habeeb Mohamad v.
Macht!f!la
T.A~e .bst
8
a~e ohif ({!) yderabad (3), The State· of Punjab v. Ha":/ut<J':her1:°"
~ ~ .
~
·
The State of
which were all referred to in the case of Bhudhan ChouAndhra Pradesh
dhry v. The State of Bihar (5), which is the nearest case
Sinha J.
to the case now before us, with this distinction that in
that case, there was a difference at the trial stage itself.
In that case, the same accused person in respect of the
same offence,
could be tried under section 30 of the
Code by a magistrate empowered under that section,
and by a Court of Session, if the offence happened to
have taken place in a jurisdiction to which section 30
had not been applied. In that case, this Court upheld
the constitutibnality of that section of the Code, and
repelled the contention that the provisions of that
section infringed the fundamental right to equality
guaranteed by art. 14 of the Constitution. · In tAe
course of his judgment, Das J. (as he then was) made
the following observations which apply to the case in
hand with full force :
" ........ It is now well-established that whlle
article 14 forbids class legislation, if does not forbid
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
In order, however, to pass the test of permissible
classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,
(I) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out
of the group and (II) that that differentia must have a
Tational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the statute in question. The classification may be
founded on different basis; namely, geographical, or
according to objects or occupations or the like. What
is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the
basis of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is
also
well-established by the
decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
(2) [19531 S.C.R. 581.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 661.
(4) [1953] s.c.R. 25.j.
(5) [1955] 1 s.c·R. 1045, 1049.
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
l957
discrimination not only by a substantive law but also
Macherla
by a law of procedure."
Hanumantha Rao
.
·
·
aiul Others
The later case bt:fore this Court dealmg with the
The ;,~,e 01
question of discrimination in respect of provisions of
Andhra Pradesh the Code is the one reported in Matajog Dobey v. H.C.
s;nha J.
Bhari(1). In that case, the constitutionality of section 197 of the Code, was questioned. The contention
raised in that case was that the section vested
arbitrary power in the Government to
grant or
withhold sanction which could be withheld or granted
at the sweet will of the Executive. This Court overruled that contention and held that a discretionary
power is not necessarily discriminatory.
Applying the principles laid down by this Court to
the case in hand to judge whether or not there has been
objectionable discrimination, there could not be the
least doubt that the Legislature has provided for a
clear classification between the two kinds of proceedings
at the commitment stage based upon a very
relevant consideration, namely, whether or not there
has been a previous inquiry by a responsible public
servant whose duty it is to discover crime and to
bring
criminals to speedy justice. This
basis of
classification is clearly connected with the underlying
principle of administration of justice that an alleged
criminal should be placed on his trial as soon after the
commission of the crime as circumstances of the case
woi;ld permit. This classification cannot be said to
be unreasonable and not to have any relation to the
object of the legislation, namely, a more speedy trial
of offences without any avoidable delay.
For the reasons given above, it must be held that
there is no discrimination and that the provisions of
Art. 14 of the Constitution have not been contravened:
The provisions of the Code, impugned in this case,
must, therefore, be held to be constitutional. The
appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
(<) [r~ssl 2 s.c.R. 925.