# ANIL RAI v. STATE OF BIHAR

- **Citation:** [2001] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 298
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2001-08-06
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 1998
- **Bench:** K.T. Thomas, R.P. Sethi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/anil-rai-v-state-of-bihar-18074
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Constitution of India-Articles 21, 141 and 142-Delay in pronouncement
of Judgments by High Court-Practice deprecated-Guidelines/or expeditious
C pronouncement of Judgments laid down-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973S.353 (/).
Criminal Procedure Code-S.157FIR-Promptly recorded and investigation started-Delay in sending
D the copy to the area Magistrate-Held, does not vitiate the prosecution caseDoubting the authenticity of FIR-Not every delay but only extraordinary and
unexplained delay-Delay immaterial if prosecution gives cogent and
reasonable explanation for such delay.
E
F
Evidence Act 1872 :
Witnesses-Testimony of-Name of PWs not mentioned in the FIRReliability of-Held, the purpose of FIR is to set the criminal law into motion
and does not require the details or names of all the witnesses-Thus, merely
because names of some of the PWs had not been mentioned in the FIR, their
testimony does become unreliable.
Witnesses-Inimical witnesses-Reliability of-Held, cannot be discarded
merely on the ground of enmity which is otherwise convincing and consistent,
particularly if he enmity is proved to be the motive for the commission of
crime.
G
Hostile witness-Witness declared hostile for not mentioning the name
H
of one of the accused-Held, does not completely efface the evidence of such
witness-If his testimony is corroborated by other reliable evidence, conviction
can be based thereupon.
Penal Code-S, 3021149-Applicability of-Murder-Common object~
298
ANIL RA! v. STA TE OF BIHAR
299 ~
No proof that there was· unlawful assembly to cause the death of deceased A
persons-Held, sharing of common object and participation in the occurrence
by each one of the accused has to be positively proved Held, on facts conviction
and sentence under S. 3021149 cannot be sustained.
Appellants alongwith five others were prosecuted for offences under
S. 302 r/w S. 149 IPC and under S. 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution B
case was that appellants along with others formed an unlawful assembly in
furtherance of the common object of committing the murder of 'L' and 'C' .
On the date of occurrence while 'L' was returning home, accused persons
caught hold of him. On hearing the noise, family members of 'L' viz. 'C',
PWs I, 3, 5 and 6 rushed to the spot. When 'L' succeeded in extricating C
himself and tried to run away, Al shot at him with his rifle. The moment 'C'
reached the place of occurrence, A2 shot at him with his gun. Both 'L' and
'C' died on the spot. Accused were arrested and charge-sheet was filed against
them. Trial Court convicted Al and A2 under S. 302 and rest of the accused
under S 302 r/w S. 149 IPC. Trial court also convicted all the accused under
S. 27 of the Arms Act. On appea~ High Court confirmed the conviction and D
sentence of Al to A7 and acquitted AS and A9 for offences under S-302 r/w
S. 149 IPC. SLP filed by A7 was dismissed by this court on account of his
failure to produce proof of surrender. However, subsequently it was brought
to the notice of this court that said accused had surrendered and was confined
in jail. In the meantime Al and A6 died. Aggrieved by their conviction and E
sentence A2 to AS have.filed the present appeals. In the present appeals, High
Court after completion of arguments pronounced the judgment only after two
years that too only when one of the judges concerned had reached the date
of his superannuation.
On behalf of appellants it was contended that as the witnesses relied F
upon by the courts were inimical towards the accused persons, their testimony
could not be relied upon without corroboration in material particulars; that
there was delay in sending the copy of FIR to Area Magistrate; PW6 cannot
be held to be an eye-witness as she has not seen the occurrence; that as the
names of PWsl and 5 were not mentioned in the FIR, no reliance can be
placed upon their testimony; and that since PW 12 was declared as hostile G
witness and in his deposition he did not name A2, A2 was entitled to acquittal.
Disposing o

## Text

_Characters 0–39,781 of 77,276. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39781 for what follows._

A
ANIL RAI
v.
STATE OF BIHAR
AUGUST 6, 2001
B
[K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]
Constitution of India-Articles 21, 141 and 142-Delay in pronouncement
of Judgments by High Court-Practice deprecated-Guidelines/or expeditious
C pronouncement of Judgments laid down-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973S.353 (/).
Criminal Procedure Code-S.157FIR-Promptly recorded and investigation started-Delay in sending
D the copy to the area Magistrate-Held, does not vitiate the prosecution caseDoubting the authenticity of FIR-Not every delay but only extraordinary and
unexplained delay-Delay immaterial if prosecution gives cogent and
reasonable explanation for such delay.
E
F
Evidence Act 1872 :
Witnesses-Testimony of-Name of PWs not mentioned in the FIRReliability of-Held, the purpose of FIR is to set the criminal law into motion
and does not require the details or names of all the witnesses-Thus, merely
because names of some of the PWs had not been mentioned in the FIR, their
testimony does become unreliable.
Witnesses-Inimical witnesses-Reliability of-Held, cannot be discarded
merely on the ground of enmity which is otherwise convincing and consistent,
particularly if he enmity is proved to be the motive for the commission of
crime.
G
Hostile witness-Witness declared hostile for not mentioning the name
H
of one of the accused-Held, does not completely efface the evidence of such
witness-If his testimony is corroborated by other reliable evidence, conviction
can be based thereupon.
Penal Code-S, 3021149-Applicability of-Murder-Common object~
298
ANIL RA! v. STA TE OF BIHAR
299 ~
No proof that there was· unlawful assembly to cause the death of deceased A
persons-Held, sharing of common object and participation in the occurrence
by each one of the accused has to be positively proved Held, on facts conviction
and sentence under S. 3021149 cannot be sustained.
Appellants alongwith five others were prosecuted for offences under
S. 302 r/w S. 149 IPC and under S. 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution B
case was that appellants along with others formed an unlawful assembly in
furtherance of the common object of committing the murder of 'L' and 'C' .
On the date of occurrence while 'L' was returning home, accused persons
caught hold of him. On hearing the noise, family members of 'L' viz. 'C',
PWs I, 3, 5 and 6 rushed to the spot. When 'L' succeeded in extricating C
himself and tried to run away, Al shot at him with his rifle. The moment 'C'
reached the place of occurrence, A2 shot at him with his gun. Both 'L' and
'C' died on the spot. Accused were arrested and charge-sheet was filed against
them. Trial Court convicted Al and A2 under S. 302 and rest of the accused
under S 302 r/w S. 149 IPC. Trial court also convicted all the accused under
S. 27 of the Arms Act. On appea~ High Court confirmed the conviction and D
sentence of Al to A7 and acquitted AS and A9 for offences under S-302 r/w
S. 149 IPC. SLP filed by A7 was dismissed by this court on account of his
failure to produce proof of surrender. However, subsequently it was brought
to the notice of this court that said accused had surrendered and was confined
in jail. In the meantime Al and A6 died. Aggrieved by their conviction and E
sentence A2 to AS have.filed the present appeals. In the present appeals, High
Court after completion of arguments pronounced the judgment only after two
years that too only when one of the judges concerned had reached the date
of his superannuation.
On behalf of appellants it was contended that as the witnesses relied F
upon by the courts were inimical towards the accused persons, their testimony
could not be relied upon without corroboration in material particulars; that
there was delay in sending the copy of FIR to Area Magistrate; PW6 cannot
be held to be an eye-witness as she has not seen the occurrence; that as the
names of PWsl and 5 were not mentioned in the FIR, no reliance can be
placed upon their testimony; and that since PW 12 was declared as hostile G
witness and in his deposition he did not name A2, A2 was entitled to acquittal.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD : (Per Sethi, J)
1.1. Justice should not only be done but should also appear to have been H
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A done. Similarly whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is
even worst than that. The inordinate, unexplained and negligent delav in
pronouncing the judgment is alleged to have actually negatived the right of
appeal conferred upon the convicts under the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Such a delay is not only against the provisions of law
B but in fact infringes the right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Any procedure or course of action which does not
ensure a reasonable quick adjudication had been termed to be unjust. Such
a course is stated to be contrary to the maxim "Actus Cariac Neminem
Gadavi", that an act of the court shall prejudice none. The prevalence of such
a practice and horrible situation in some of the High Courts in the country
C has necessitated the desirability of considering the effect of such delay on the
rights of the litigant public. Delay in disposal of an appeal on account of
inadequate number of judges, insufficiency of infrastructure, strike of lawyers
and the circumstances attributable to the State is understandable but once
the entire process of participation in justice delivery system is over and only
thing to be done is the pronouncement of judgment, no excuse can be found
D to further delay for adjudication of the rights of the parties, particularly when
it affects any of their rights conferred by the Constitution under Part-III.
1306-F, C, D, E,; 307-A, Bf
Bhagwan Das Fateh Chand Daswani v. HP.A. International and Ors.,
E 1200012 SCC 13; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 11980)
1SCC81; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1199211SCC225; Kartar Singh v. State
of Punjab, [19941 3 SCC 569; Raj Dea Sharma v. State of Bihar, [1998) 7 SCC
507; Raj Dea Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, [19991 7 SCC 604; Akhtari Bi v.
State of MP., 12001[ 4 SCC 355 and R.C. Sharma v. Union of India and Ors.,
F
119761 3 sec 574, relied on.
Surender Nath Sarkar v. Emperor, AIR (1942) Calcutta 225; Jagarnath
Singh and Ors. v. Francis Kharia and Ors., AIR (1948) Patna 414 and Sohagiya
v. Ram Brikash Mahto, (1961 BL.JR 282), referred to.
1.2. The intention of the Legislature regarding pronouncement of
G judgments can be inferred from the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Sub-section (I) of Section 353 of the Code provides that the
judgment in every trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction, shall be
pronounced in open court immediately after the conclusion of the trial or on
some subsequent time for which due notice shall be given to the parties or
H their pleaders. The words "some subsequent time" mentioned in Section 353
'
ANIL RAJ v. ST A TE OF BIHAR
301
contemplates the passing of the judgment without undue delay, as delay in A
the pronouncement of judgment is opposed to the principle of law. Such
subsequent time can at the most be stretched to a period of six weeks and not
beyond that time in any case. The pronouncement of judgments in the civil
case should not be permitted to go beyond two months. (308-C, D, El
1.3. It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement B
of judgment is contemplated either under the Civil Procedure Code or the .
Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the judgment is a
part of justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. It is the policy
and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which. efforts are required to
be made to come to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted C
and unpolluted justice. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High
Courts, it is appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the
pronouncement of judgments which shall be followed by all concerned, being
the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, for the present, are as under:
(i) The Chief Justice of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions D
to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved and is
pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page,
after the cause title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing
it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief'Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, E
should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High
Courts to furnish every month the list of cases· in the matters where the
judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment
is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice F
shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The
Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such
cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of
six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the judges
of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed G
as confidential and in a sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from
the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an
application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such
application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned H
'
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
B
(v) If the judgment, for any reasons, is not pronounced within a period
of six months, any of the parties of the said 1ist Shall be entitled to move an
application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to
withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other bench for fresh
arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to P.ass
any other order as he deems lit in the circumstances. [308-E, G, H; 309-A-HI
2. Enmity is a double edged weapon which can be a motive for the crime
as also the ground for false implication of the accused persons. In case of
C inimical witnesses, the courts are required to scrutinize their testimony with
anxious care to find out whether their testimony inspires confidence to be
acceptable notwithstanding the existence of enmity. Where enmity is proved
to be the motive for the commission of the crime, the accused cannot urge
that despite proof of the motive of the crime, the witnesses proved to be
inimical should not be relied upon. Bitter animosity held to be a double edged
D weapon may be instrumental for false involvement or for the wituesses
inferring and strongly believing that the crime must have been committed
by the accused. Such possibility has to be kept in mind while evaluating the
prosecution witnesses regarding the involvement of the accused in the ,
commission of the crime. Testimony of eyewitnesses, which is otherwise
E convincing and consistent, cannot be discarded simply on the ground that the
deceased were related to the eye-witnesses or previously there were some
disputes between the accused and the deceased or the witnesses. The existence
of animosity between the accused and the witnesses may, in some cases, give
rise to the possibility of the witnesses exaggerating the role of some of the
accused or trying to rope in more persons as accused persons for the
F commission of the crime. Such a possibility is required to be ascertained on
the facts of each case. However, the mere existence of enmity in this case,
particularly when it is alleged as a motive for the commission of the crime
cannot be made a basis to discard pr reject the testimony of the eye-witnesses,
whose deposition is otherwise consistent and convincing. [313-C, D, E, F, G[
G
3. S. 157 of the code is designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the
investigation of such cognizable offence so as to be able to control the
investigation and if necessary to give appropriate direction under Section 159
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But where the FIR is shown to have
actually been recorded without delay and investigation started on the basis
H of the FIR, the delay in sending the copy of the report to the Magistrate cannot
i
ANIL RA! v. ST A TE OF BIHAR
303
by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation was tainted anll the A
prosecution insupportable. Extraordinary delay in sending the copy of tl~e
FIR to the Magistrate can be a circumstance to provide a legitimate basis for
suspecting that the first information report was recorded on a later day than
the stated day affording sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce
improvements and imbelishment by setting up a distorted version of the B
occurrence. The delay contemplated under Section 157 of the Code of
Criminal procedure for doubting the authenticity of the FIR is not every delay
but only extraordinary and unexplained delay. However, in the absence of
prejudice to the accused the omission by the police to submit the report does
not vitiate the trial. In the present case, the FIR is shown to have been lodged
within 15 minutes after the occurrence and most of the accused apprehended C
immediately. There does not appear to be any possibili9' of falsely implicating
the accused persons. On facts also the courts below did not find any delay in
despatch of the copy of FIR to the Area Magistrate.
[314-F, G, H; 315-A, B, C, DJ
fa/a Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1972) SC 2679 and Sarwan D
Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1976) SC 2304, relied on.
4. The purpose of the FIR is to set the criminal law in motion which
does not require the details or the names of all the witnesses who have seen
the occurrence. It is not necessary that elaboration of every fact that had E
happened should be given by the person who lodges the first information
report. It has to be kept in mind that PW6 whose husband had been killed
must have been extremely perturbed at the time of lodging of the FIR and in
that state of mental agony she might not have been able to give details relating
to the names of the wiitnesses who had seen the occurrence. The presence of
all the eyewitnesses has been accepted by the courts below and there is no F
reason to take a different view, particularly this being a question of fact which
was fully noticed by the two courts on fact and inspite of that the courts had
believed the testimony of PWs I and 5. It is not the case of the appellant that
the names of the accused persons were nof mentioned in the FIR. It is also
not the case of the appellant that the statements made under Section 161 of
the Cr. P.C. of the aforesaid witnesses were not immediately recorded by the G
investigation agency. The submission that because the names of PWsl and 5
are not mentioned in the FIR no reliance can be placed on their testimony is
far fetched and without any substance. [317-D, E, F, GI
5. There is no substance in the submission that as PWJ2 was declared H
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A hostile and his not naming A2 the prosecution case against A2 could not
~ucceed. The mere fact that the court gave the permission to the Public
Prosecutor- to cross-examine his own witness by declaring him hostile does
not completely efface the evidence of such witness. The evidence remains
admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base conviction upon his
B testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. In the instant case PWl2
did not mention the presence of A2 for which he was declared hostile. In his
cross examination he admitted that bloodstained earth was recovered from
the spot where the deceased fell down. The occurrence having taken place
and the two persons having died on the date of occurrence have been admitted
even by PW12. There is, therefore, no reason to hold that as PWl2 has not
C named A2, he is entitled to acquittal. (317-H; 318-A, C, D, E]
6. Application Of Section 149 IPC would be highly unsafe unless it is
positively proved that each one of the accused shared the common object and
accordingly participated in the occurrence. Where the prosecution fails to
prove the existence of sharing of common object by all the members of the
D unlawful assembly it is unsafe to convict all the accused persons merely on
proof of their presence or some overt act which did not cause the death of
the deceased. Both the courts below have not found on facts that all the
accused persons including A3 to A 7 shared the common object with which
Al and A2 and fired the shots. Neither any direct evidence nor any
E circumstances have been brought on record to hold or infer the existence of
such a common object. Even if the existence of a common object is held
proved, it cannot be the common object for any offence other than committing
the offence of rioting. There is no evidence to show that the unlawful assembly,
of which they were a part, had the object of causing the death of either of the
deceased persons. The prosecution has established that the common object
F of the unlawful assembly was to commit the offence of rioting armed with
deadly weapons punishable under Section 148 IPC. The causing of death of
the deceased persons was the individual acts of Al and A2 and the prosecution
evidence does not show that other accused persons shared the said common
object. Therefore, the conviction of A3 to A 7 for the offence punishable under
G Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC is not sustainable. They are, however,
liable to be convicted under Section 148 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. Their
conviction and sentence under the Arms Act cannot be interfered with.
(319-C; 321-B, C, D, H; 322-C, Df
Masa/ti v. State of UP., (1964( 8 SCR 133; lalji v. State of UP., (1989(
H 1sec439 and Shamshul Kanwar v. State ofU.P., [1995] 4 SCC 430, relied on.
ANIL RA! v. ST A TE OF BIHAR
305
Per Thomas, J. (Supplementing) :
A
1. If delay in pronouncing judgments occurred on the part of the judges
of the subordinate judiciary the whip of the High Court studded with
supervisory and administrative authority could be used and it had been used
quite often to chide them and sometimes to take action against the erring
judicial officers. But what happens when the. High Court judges do not B
pronounce judgments after lapse of several months, and perhaps even years
since completion of arguments? the Constitution did not provide anything in
that area presumably because the architects of the Constitution believed that
no High Court Judge would cause such long and distressing delays. Such
expectation of the makers of the Constitution remained unsullied during the C
early period of the post Constitution years. But unfortunately, the later years
have shown slackness on the part of a few judges of the superior Courts in
India with the result that once arguments in a list concluded before them the
records remain consigned to hibernation. Judges themselves normally forget
the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced. Sometimes
the interval is so long that the judges forget even the fact that such a case is D
pending with them expecting judicial verdict. Though it is an unpleasant fact,
it is a stark reality. It is in the above'background, after bestowing deep
thoughts with a sense of commitment, some remedial measures as instructions
were laid down. However it is made clear that if the Chief Justice of a High
Court thinks that more effective measures can be evolved by him for slashing E
down the interval between conclusion of arguments and delivery of judgment
in that particular court, it is open to him to do so as substitute for the measures
suggested here-in-before. But until such measures are evolved by the Chief
Justice of the concerned High Court the measures suggested above would hold
the field. The above-enumerated measures are intended to remain only until
such time as the Parliament would enact measures to deal with this problem. F
[324-F, G, H; 325-A, ·B, F; 326-G-H; 327-A)
R.C. Sharma v. UOJ, [1976) 3 SCC 574, relied on.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
389 of 1998.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.1997 of the Patna High Court
in Crl. A. No. 170 of 1991.
WITH
Crl. Appeal Nos. 387-88/98, Crl. Appeal No. 199/99.
H
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A
R.K. Jain and K.B. Sinha, Ajay Bhalla, Rajeev Singh, Rajesh Prasad
Singh, Tripurari Ray, Vishwajit Singh, B.B. Singh and Kumar Rajesh Singh
for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SETHI, J. Before adverting to the merits of the appeal, I propose to
deal with the shocking state of affairs prevalent in some High _Courts as
brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the appellants. The dismay
picture depicted before us on the basis of the facts of these appeals is that a
few judges in some High Courts, after conclusion of the arguments, keep the
files withheld with them and do not pronounce judgments for periods spread
C over years. In the present appeals, the arguments were concluded and judgment
was reserved by the High Court on 23rd August, 1995 which was pronounced
on 14th August, 1997.
The inordinate, unexclaimed and negligent delay in pronouncing the
judgment is alleged to have actually negatived the right of appeal conferred
D upon the convicts under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. It is
submitted that such a delay is not only against the provisions of law but in
fact infringes the right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. Any procedure or course of action which does not
ensure a reasonable quick adjudication has been termed to be unjust. Such a
E course is stated to be contrary to the maxim "Actus Cariae Neminem Gadavi",
that an act of the court shall prejudice none.
The prevalence of such a practice and horrible situation in some of the
High Courts in the country has necessitated the desirability of considering the
effect of such delay on the rights of the litigant public. Though reluctantly,
F yet for preserving and strengthening the belief of people in the institution of
the judiciary, we have decided to consider this aspect and to give appropriate
directions.
It has been held time and again that justice should not only be done but
should also appear to have been done. Similarly whereas justice delayed is
G justice denied, justice withheld is even worst than that. This Court in Madhav
Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, [1978] 3 SCC 544 observed
that procedure contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution means "fair
and reasonable procedure" which comports with civilised norms like natural
justice rooted firm in community consciousness-not primitive processual
barabarity nor legislated normative mockery. Right of appeal in a criminal
H case culminating in conviction was held to be the basis of the civilised
;
' •
1,
ANIL RAI v STATE OF BIHAR [SETHI, J.]
307
jurisprudence. Conferment of right of appeal to meet the requirement of A
Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be made a fraught by protracting the
pronouncement of judgment for reasons which are not attributable either to
the litigant or to the State or to the legal profession. Delay in disposal of an
appeal on account of inadequate number of judges, insufficiency of ·
infrastructure, strike of lawyers and the circumstances attributable to the
State is understandable but once the entire process of participation in justice B
delivery system is over and only thing to be done is the pronouncement of
judgment, no excuse can be found to further delay for adjudication of the
rights of the parties, particularly when it affects any to their rights conferred
by the Constitution under Part-III.
Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the judgments in
Surender Nath Sarkar v. Emperor, AIR (1942) Calcutta 225, Jagarnath Singh
and Ors. v. Francis Kharia and Ors., AIR (1948) Patna 414, Sohagiya v.
Ram Briksh Mahto, (1961) BLJR 282 to show that only on the ground of
delay in rendering the judgment for the period ranging from six months to
c
ten months, the High Courts had held such judgments bad in law and set D
them aside. In RC. Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., [1976] 3 SCC 574
this Court, after noticing that the Civil Procedure Code did not provide a time
limit in delivery of a judgment held :
"Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between nearing
of arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by E
exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even
when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some
points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice.
But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete
confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be F
shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and
delivery of judgment. Justice, as we have often observed, must not
only be done but must manifestly appear to be done."
In Bhagwan Das Fateh Chand Daswani v. H.P.A. International and
Ors., [2000] 2 sec 13 this Court observed that "a long delay in delivering G
the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of parties to
a case." This Court in various cases including Hussainar Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 81, Hussainara Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 98, A. R. Antu lay v. R.S. Nayak,
[1992] 1 SCC 225, Kartar Singh v. State of Purijab, (1994] 3 SCC 569, Raj
Dea Sharma V. State of Bihar, (1998] 7 sec 507, Raj Dea Sharma(!!) V. H
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. I S.C.R.
A State of Bihar, [1999] 7 SCC 604 and Akhtari Bi v. State of MP., [2001] 4
sec 355 has in unambiguous terms, held that "the right of speedy trial to be
part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India."
Adverse effect of the problem of not pronouncing the reserved judgments
within a reasonable time was considered by the Arrears Committee constituted
B by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Chief Justices'
Conference. In its report of 1989-90 Chapter VIII, the Committee
recommended that reserved judgments should ordinarily be pronounced within
a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments. If,
however, a reserved judgment is not pronounced for a period of three months
C from the date of the conclusion of the arguments, the Chief Justice was
recommended to be authorised to either post the case for delivering judgment
in open court or withdraw the case and post it for disposal before an appropriate
bench.
The intention of the Legislature regarding pronouncement of judgments
D can be inferred from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsection (I) of Section 353 of the Code provides that the judgment in every
trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction, shall be pronounced in
open court immediately after the conclusion of the trial or on some subsequent
time ~or which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. The
words "some subsequent time" mentioned in Section 353 contemplates the
E passing of the judgment without undue delay, as delay in the pronouncement
of judgment is opposed to the principle of law. Such subsequent time can at
the most be stretched to a period of six weeks and not beyond that time in
any case. The pronouncement of judgments in the civil case should not be
permitted to go beyond two months.
F
It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of
judgment is contemplated either under the Civil Procedure Code or the
Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the judgment is a part
of justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. In a country like
ours where people consider the judges only second to God, efforts be made
G to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases
facilitates the people to raise eye-brows, some time genuinely which, if not
checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A
time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature,
respect and regards for the attainment of the Rule of Law. For the fault of
a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted
H to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice
t •
•
ANIL RAJ v. STA TE OF BIHAR [SETHI, J.]
309
for which efforts are required to be made to come to the expectation of the A
society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.
Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel
it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding pronouncement of
judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the
mandate of this Court. Such guildelines, as for present, are as under:
B
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate
directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved
and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where,
on the first page, after the cause title date of reserving the judgment
and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court C
officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative
side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches
in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the
matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the D
period of that month.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment
is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned
Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to
pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of E
circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have
not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of
conclusion of the arguments amongst the judges of the High Court
for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential
and in a se<:!ed cover.
F
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from
the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to
file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment.
Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench
concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
G
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period
of six months, any of the parties of the said I ist shall be entitled to
move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with
a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other
bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the H
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A
said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the
circumstances.
We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed
and implemented, considering them as self imposed restraints.
B
Let me now deal with the merits of the appeals which are directed
against the common judgment of the High Court of Patna passed in Criminal
Appeal Nos. 158, 168, 170, 184 and 196of1991 confirming the conviction
and sentence of 7 out of 9 accused persons for offences including under
Sections 302 and 149 !PC and sentencing them to life imprisonment and
acquitting the remaining two. The acquitted accused are Ram Parvesh Yadav
C (AS) and Bhajwan Yadav @ Gorakh Kahar (A9) and the Special Leave
Petion filed by Satya Narain Yadav (A7) was dismissed by this Court on
27 .3 .1998 on account of his failure to produce the proof of surrender. It has,
however, been brought to my notice that the aforesaid accused thereafter
surrendered and is presently confined in the jail. A vinash Chand Rai (A I)
D and Amit Kumar Rai (A6) have since died.
The facts of the case are that the present appellants, along with five
others formed an unlawful assembly in furtherance of the common object of
which they committed the murder of Lal Muni Rai and Chand Muni Rai on
21st June, 1989 at about 6 p.m. in their village Kuchhila. Both the deceased
E were real brothers with whom the accused persons are stated to have previous
enmity. On the date of occurrence when Lal Muni Rai @ Rabinder Nath Rai
was returning to his home after attending the meeting at Panchayat Bhawan
in connection with the Jawahar Rojgar Vojna, the accused caught hold of him
when he reached at a place few yards towards the north of the house of the
accused Subhash Chand Rai (A2). Accused were armed with weapons like
F guns and rifles. When Lal Muni Rai was caught hold of by the accused some
noise was raised which attracted the attention of his family members with the
result Chand Muni Rai (deceased), Bipin Rai (PW!), Sishir Rai (PW3), Sanjaiv
Rai (PW5) and Hoshila Devi (PW6) rushed to the spot. On reaching the spot
they saw that Lal Muni Rai had been held up by all the accused persons
G excepting Subhash Chand Rai (A2). When Lal Muni Rai Succeeded in
extricating himself from the clutches of the accused persons and tried to run
away from the place of occurrence, he was shot at by A vinash Chand Rai
(A 1) with his rifle. The shot hit the occipital region of Lal Muni Rai who fell
down on the ground and died on the spot. Another accused who was not
immediately identified at that time also shot at Lal Muni Rai with his gun.
H The moment Chand Muni Rai reached near the place of occurrence, Subhash
ANIL RA! v. STATE OF BIHAR (SETHI, J.]
311
Chand Rai (A2) who was standing in his verandah shot him from there with A
his gun which hit and injured Chand Muni Rai with the result he fell down
and died on the spot. Avinash Chand Rai (A I) fired some shots towards the
other family members of the deceased but none of them was injured. Three
of the accused ran away from the place of occurrence and left the village.
The remaining accused rushed towards the house of Avinash Chand Rai (A I)
and concealed themselves there. Terrified at that moment, the witnesses, the B
family members of the deceased persons, fled away from the place of
occurrence and came back th~;:e again after some time. The firing shots were
heard by police personnel at Kuchhila Police Station which was at a distance
of about half a kilometer from the place of occurrence with the result
Akhileshwar Kumar Singh, ASI (PWI I) and Arbind Kumar, AS! (PW13) C
reached on the spot with the police force. They found the dead bodies of the
deceased lying on the ground and found Hoshila Devi (PW6) weeping.
Statement of PW6 was recorded on the spot. The accused are stated to have
fired at the police party also. There was exchange of fire between the accused
and the police force. After some time Shri R.K. Sharma, S.I, arrived at the
scene along with additional police force. He directed PW! I to inform the D
senior police officers through wireless and bring more additional force for
the purposes of apprehending the accused. R.K. Poddar, Inspector of Police,
Mohania Police Station and other police officers arrived at the spot whereafter
the house of the accused was searched in the presence of Yamuna Dubey and
Matuki Singh. During the search of the house of Avinash Chand Rai (A I), E
where he was living with Anil Rai (A4), was arrested with a rifle, four live
cartridges and six empty cartridges. On the roof of the house of the Avinash
Chand Rai (A I) two unknown persons, one armed with country made gun
and other armed with Regular Double Barrel Gun were apprehended, who
upon inquiry, disclosed their names as Ram Parvesh Yadav@ Bharat Dusadh
(AS) and Bhajwan Ya.;av@ Gorakh Kahar (A9). Both of them were arrested F
along with their guns, live and mis-fired cartridges. Amit Kumar Rai (A6)
was found in the house of Avinash Chand Rai (A I) who was arrested along
with gun and 5 cartridges. The seizure list of the recovered articles were
prepared by the police officers in the presence of the witnesses. The three
accused, who had run away from the village, were apprehended fater. The G
police registered the case and after completion of investigation submitted the
charge-sheet against them. All the accused persons ple11ded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
In all the prosecution examined 14 witnesses. PWs I, 2, 5, 6 and 12
were cited as eye-witnesses. However, Mukati Singh (PW12) was declared H
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A hostile at the trial. The defence has also examined three witnesses, one of
whom is Dr. Basant Kumar, stated to have examined the injured accused
persons. On appreciation of the evidence, the trial court held that prosecution
had succeeded in proving the charges against the ac.cused persons, on proof
of which Avinash Chand Rai (Al) and Subhash Chand Rai (A2) were
B
convicted under Section 302 !PC and rest of the·accused under Section 302
read with Section 149 !PC. All the accused were also found guilty for the
commission of the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the accused
persons were sentenced to life imprisonment for the offence under Section
302 read with Section 149 IPC and to rigorous imprisonment for one year for
the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed
C to run concurrently.
The appeals filed by the accused persons, as noticed earlier, were
disposed of by the High Court vide the judgment impugned in these appeals.
Criminal Appeal No. 15S of 1991 filed by Subhash Chand Rai (A2) and
Criminal Appeal No. 170 filed by Avinash Chand Rai (Al) and Awadh
D Bihari Rai (A3), Criminal Appeal No. IS4 of 1991 filed by Avinash Chand
Rai (A I) and Amit Kumar Rai (A6) and Criminal Appeal No. 196/91 filed
by Avinash Chand Rai (Al) were dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 1S6/91
filed by Ram Parvesh Yadav (AS) and Bhajwan Yadav (A9) was partly
allowed in so far as their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149
E was concerned. The said appeal, in so far as it related to Satya Narain Yadav
(A 7) was dismissed. However, conviction and sentence of AS and A9 under
Section 27 of the Arms Act was not disturbed.
F
The State has not filed any appeal against the judgment of acquittal
relating to AS and A9.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant Subhash Chand Rai (A2)
has assailed the judgments of the trial as well as the High Courts on various
grounds. It is contended that as the witnesses relied upon by the courts were
inimical towards the accused persons, their testimony could not be relied
upon without corroboration in material particulars. He has also tried to take
G benefit of the alleged delay in sending the copy of the FIR to the Area
Magistrate. Referring to the deposition of witnesses, the learned counsel
contended that Hoshila Devi (PW6) cannot be held to be an eye-witness as
she has not seen the occurrence. It is further submitted that as the names of
PWs I and 5 are not mentioned in the FIR, no reliance can be placed upon
their testimony. Pointing out to some conflict between the deposition of eyeH witnesses and medical evidence with respect to the injuries received by the
ANIL RA! v. STATE OF BIHAR [SETI-II, J.)
313
"
deceased and with reference to the recovery of single barrel. gun from Subhash A
Chand Rai (A2) it is contended that the prosecution has failed to connect the
accused with the commission of the crime as the accused are alleged to have
received some injuries allegedly inflicted upon them by the police after arrest.
It is submitted that investigation being tainted, the benefit of acquittal should
be given to the accused persons.