# ANOTHER v. LALA KARAM CHAND THAP AR ETC - **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 9 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 98 to 106 of 1959 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, s. K. DAS, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MunHOLKAR - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/another-v-lala-karam-chand-thap-ar-etc-2119 - **Pages:** 25 ## Headnote Colliery Company-Violation of Coal Mines RegulationsProsecution of all directors of company, the managing agents and the manager of company-Legality-Mines Act of I923 repealed and re-enacted-Regulations made thereunder, if continue in force- ' Anyone of directors' meaning of-Indian Coal Mines Regulations, Ig26-Mines Act, r923 (4 of r923), s. JT(4)-Mines Act, Ig52, (35 of I95Z), ss. 2(r), 76-General Clauses Act, I897 (IO of r897), s. 24 -Constitution of India, Art. 20(I). 1~he directors of a company, which was the owner of a colliery, the directors of the managing agents of the company, and the manager and the agent of colliery were prosecuted for offences under ss. 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, for violation • February IO. 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] I96I of several regulations out of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. They challenged the validity of the prosecution on the Chief l"'P"'o' of grounds, inter alia (1) that as the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, Mines 1926, framed under the provisions of the Mines Act, 1923, had, v. under s. 31(4) of that Act, effect as if enacted in the Act, and Lala Katam as that Act had been repealed by the Mines Act, 1952, the said Chana Thapar Regulations had ceased to have any legal existence long before the date of the alleged violation, and (2) that the Regulations of 1926 were only deemed to be regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, and hence were not Jaws in force on the date of the alleged contravention, and, therefore, the prosecution in the present case was a violation of Art. 20(1) ,of the Constitution of India. Two of the directors of the company also raised an objection that the prosecution of all the directors was not. permitted by the Mines Act, 1952, in view of s. 76 of the Act, which provided that any one of the directors may be prosecuted. The directors of the managing agents contended that, in any event, as the managing agents were not the owners of the colliery, they could not be prosecuted. Held: (1) that in view of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, by which when an Act is repealed and re-enacted, rules and regulations framed under the repealed Act shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made under the provisions so re-enacted, s. 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923, which had been repealed, must be construed in such a way that for the purpose of the continuity of existence, the Regulations framed under that Act will not be considered· part of the Act. Accordingly, the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, continued to be in force at the relevant date and must be deemed to be regulations made under the Mines Act, 1952. Institute of Patent Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood, [1894] A. C. 347 and State v. K. B. Chandra, (1954) I.L.R. 33 Pat. 507, distinguished. (2) that the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, though they became Regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, in consequence of a deeming provision, nonetheless, were "laws in force" within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of V indhya Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. n88, distinguished. (3) that the expression "any one of the directors" in s. 76 of the Mines Act, 1952, means "every one of the directors''. Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, (1883) 25 Ch. D. 320, relied on. (4) that the managing agents of the colliery company were neither the owner of the mine nor the occupier within the , • meaning of s. 2(1) of the Mines Act, 1952, and, therefore, the , prosecution of the directors of the managing agents was not " maintainable. • ' 1 S.d.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11 ## Text _Characters 0–39,995 of 55,884. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39995 for what follows._ ' • 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 9 tax fell within the Provincial or the State List, the z96z levy would be valid under s. 292 of the Government Amalgamated of India Act and Art. 372 of the Constitution even Coalfields Ltd. without the aid of the special provision in s. 143 or v. Art. 277. In view of these considerations the learned Janapada Sabha, Attorney-General did not address us seriously on this Chhindwara point. Ayyangar ] . (3) The last point urged was as regards the validity of the increase in the rate of tax to 9 pies per ton effected in 1949, i.e., after the commencement of Government of India Act, 1935. This objection was not even hinted in the petition now before us, and we did not consider it proper to permit petitioners to raise the point. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed with costs . Petition dismissed. THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MINES AND ANOTHER v. LALA KARAM CHAND THAP AR ETC. (B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MunHOLKAR, JJ.) Colliery Company-Violation of Coal Mines RegulationsProsecution of all directors of company, the managing agents and the manager of company-Legality-Mines Act of I923 repealed and re-enacted-Regulations made thereunder, if continue in force- ' Anyone of directors' meaning of-Indian Coal Mines Regulations, Ig26-Mines Act, r923 (4 of r923), s. JT(4)-Mines Act, Ig52, (35 of I95Z), ss. 2(r), 76-General Clauses Act, I897 (IO of r897), s. 24 -Constitution of India, Art. 20(I). 1~he directors of a company, which was the owner of a colliery, the directors of the managing agents of the company, and the manager and the agent of colliery were prosecuted for offences under ss. 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, for violation • February IO. 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] I96I of several regulations out of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. They challenged the validity of the prosecution on the Chief l"'P"'o' of grounds, inter alia (1) that as the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, Mines 1926, framed under the provisions of the Mines Act, 1923, had, v. under s. 31(4) of that Act, effect as if enacted in the Act, and Lala Katam as that Act had been repealed by the Mines Act, 1952, the said Chana Thapar Regulations had ceased to have any legal existence long before the date of the alleged violation, and (2) that the Regulations of 1926 were only deemed to be regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, and hence were not Jaws in force on the date of the alleged contravention, and, therefore, the prosecution in the present case was a violation of Art. 20(1) ,of the Constitution of India. Two of the directors of the company also raised an objection that the prosecution of all the directors was not. permitted by the Mines Act, 1952, in view of s. 76 of the Act, which provided that any one of the directors may be prosecuted. The directors of the managing agents contended that, in any event, as the managing agents were not the owners of the colliery, they could not be prosecuted. Held: (1) that in view of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, by which when an Act is repealed and re-enacted, rules and regulations framed under the repealed Act shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made under the provisions so re-enacted, s. 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923, which had been repealed, must be construed in such a way that for the purpose of the continuity of existence, the Regulations framed under that Act will not be considered· part of the Act. Accordingly, the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, continued to be in force at the relevant date and must be deemed to be regulations made under the Mines Act, 1952. Institute of Patent Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood, [1894] A. C. 347 and State v. K. B. Chandra, (1954) I.L.R. 33 Pat. 507, distinguished. (2) that the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, though they became Regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, in consequence of a deeming provision, nonetheless, were "laws in force" within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of V indhya Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. n88, distinguished. (3) that the expression "any one of the directors" in s. 76 of the Mines Act, 1952, means "every one of the directors''. Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, (1883) 25 Ch. D. 320, relied on. (4) that the managing agents of the colliery company were neither the owner of the mine nor the occupier within the , • meaning of s. 2(1) of the Mines Act, 1952, and, therefore, the , prosecution of the directors of the managing agents was not " maintainable. • ' 1 S.d.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 98 to 106 of 1959. Chief Inspsctor of Appeals by special leave from the judgment and Mines order dated March 3, 1958, of the Patna High Court v. Lala Karam in M. J.C. Nos. 475, 476, 479 and 480 of 1956, 180 Chand Thapar of 1957 and 475 to 478of1956. N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants in Cr. As. Nos. 98 and 101 of 1959. G. S. Pathak, S. O. Banerjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellants in Cr. As. Nos. 102 to 106 of 1959 and respondents in Cr. As. Nos. 98 to 100 of 1959. R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents in Cr. As. Nos. 102 to 106 of 1959 and appellants in Cr. As. Nos. 99 and 100 of 1959. 1961. February 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-On Februarv 5, 1955, there was a Das Gupta J. tragic accident in the Amlabad Colliery, in Manbhum District, in the State of Bihar, as a result of which 52 persons lost their lives and one escaped with injuries. The court of enquiry which was appointed to hold an inquiry into the causes of the accident and the circumstances attending the accident submitted its report on September 26, 1955, holding that the accident was due to negligence and non-observance of some of the regulations of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. This report was duly published under s. 27 of the Mines Act, 1952. Thereafter, on March 3, 1956, the Government of India informed the manager and the agent of the colliery that a court of enquiry was being constituted under cl. (a) of the Regulation 48 to hold an inquiry into their conduct. Criminal proceedings were also instituted against 14 persons including the manager and the agent of the colliery, all the directors of the company which was the owner of the colliery and the directors of the managing agents of that company .. The complaints alleged violation by the 14 accused of several regulations out of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. There were two separate complaints in respect of the violation of different 12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] I96r regulations. It was alleged in one of the complaints Ch . 11-p 1 1that the accused persons had by the violation of the ; le ns ec or o l . . d h . . d Min" regu ahons ment10ne t erem comm1tte offences v. under s. 73 of the Mines Act, 1952; the other com. Lala Karam plaint alleged that by the violation of the regulations Chand Thapar mentioned therein the accused persons had committed offences under ss. 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1952. Das Gupta J. h S b 1 M k f T e u -Divisiona . agistrate too cognizance o the offences, and issued processes against all the 14 per. Rons on May 23, 1956. Six of the accused persons, Lala Karam Chand Thaper, H. P. Poddar, Jagat Ram Sharma, Kumud Ranjan Dutt, H. V. Varma and U. Mehta filed applications before the High Court of Patna for the issue of appropriate writs or orders for quashing the criminal proceedings. The main ground on which these different applications were based was that the regulations for the alleged violation of which the complaints were lodged had ceased to have any legal existence long before the date of the alleged violation by the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923, under which they had admittedly been made. Another ground taken by all the applicants was that the prosecution was in violation of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. In the application by two directors of the com. pany owning the mine, Lala Karam Chand Thaper and H.P. Poddar a further point was taken that the prosecution of all the directors was not permitted by the Mines Act, 1952. The directors of the managing agents raised in their applications the point that the managing agents not being owners of the colliery the directors of the managing agents should not, be prosecuted. The High Court rejected the applicants' contention that the Regulations framed under s. 29 of the Mines Act, 1923, ceased to have legal existence after the repeal of that Act. It however accepted the contention of the managing agents' directors that they were not liable to prosecution. The High Court also held on a consideration of the provision of s. 76 of the 1952 Act that all the directors of the company which owned the colliery could not be prosecuted and only one to be chosen by the complainant out of all the directors • , \ I • I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 13 could be proceeded against. On these findings the r96r High Court dismissed the applications of the manager . - d h d 11 d h 1. t' fChief Inspector of an t e agent, an a ow:e t e a pp wa ions o Mines the directors of the managmg agents. In the two v. applications by the two directors of the colliery comLala Kamm pany (Lala Karam Chand Thaper and H. P. Poddar) Chand Thapar it gave a direction requiring the respondents 2 and 3 before it, that is, the Chief Inspector of Mines, and Das Gupta f. the Regional Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad, "to choose one of the directors of the company for being prosecuted against and to remove the name of the other directors from the category of the accused persons". In the two criminal cases the two directors of the company obtained special leave to appeal against this direction and have, pursuant thereto, filed the two appeals which are now before us as Criminal Appeals Nos. 103 and 104of1959. The manager and the agent have also filed appeals against the order rejecting their applications after having obtained special leave from this Court. These two appeals are now numbered as Cr. Appeals Nos. 105 and 106 of 1959. The Chief Inspector of Mines and others who are made respondents in the application under Art. 226 have also filed appeals on special leave granted by this Court against the High Court's order in the applications of the directors of the managing agents allowing the same and also against the High Court's orders in the application of the two directors of the company asking the Chief Inspector of Mines and the Regional Inspector of Mines to choose one only of the directors for prosecution; their appeals in the application of the directors of the managing agents before us have been numbered as Criminal Appeals Nos. 100 and 101. Their appeals iu the applications of the directors of the colliery company are numbered 98 and 99 of 1957. . It will be convenient to refer to the appellants in 1 these four appeals as government-appellants. · tt At about the same time these several applications were made before the High Court, the agent and the manager of the colliery company also made applications to the High Court of Patna for the issue of 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] x961 appropriate writs or orders restraining the CommisCh' 1 sioner of Chotanagpur who had been appointed to "! ;,'::: 10 ' of hold the inquiry under Regulation 48, from holding v. that inquiry. The High Court held that no inquiry Lala Ka.am could be ordered against the agents. The manager's Chand Thapar application was however rejected. Against that order the manager Shri Kumud Ranjan Dutt obtained speDas Gupta ]. · 11 f h' Q 1 d ma eave rom t 1s ourt to appea an pursuant thereto has filed the appeal which is now before us as Appeal No. 102 of 1959. The Appeals Nos. 100 and 101 need not detain us long. For whatever be the controversy on other questions as regards the Regulation.~ of 1926 being in force after the repeal of the Mines Act of 1923 and as regards the alleged violation of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution, there is no manner of doubt that the High Court is right in holding that the managing agents of the colliery company are neither the "owner" of the coal mines nor the "manager" nor "agent" thereof. It. was not even suggested before us that the managing agents are either managers or agents. "Agent" has been defined in the Act as the representative of the owner in respect of the management, control and direction of the mines and managing agent of the company in no sense falls within this definition. "Manager" is not defined, but s. 17 of the Act provides that every mine shall be under one manager who shall have the prescribed qualifications and shall be responsible for the control, management, supervision and directions of the mines, and the owner and agent of every mine shall appoint himself or some other person having such qualifications to be such manager. In the Amlabad Colliery Mr. Kumud Ranjan Dutt was admittedly appointed the manager and it was on that basis that proceedings were commenced against him. The managing agent of the company was not and could not be the manager of the Amlabad Colliery. It was urged however that the managing agents of the colliery company are in occupation of the mines and thus fall within the definition of the word "owner" in s. 2(1) of the Act. The relevant portion of the definition of owner in s. 2(1) runs thus: " "Owner" when I I ,. ' 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 15 used in relation to a mine, means any person who is r96r the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the c . 1 -- / · f . h hie Inspector o mme or o any part thereof". The argument 1s t at Mines the managing agents exercise, by reason of their being v. managing agents of the colliery company, possession Lala Karam over the mine; and so "occupy" the mine. Though the Chand Thapar word "occupier" is not defined in the Act it is patently absurd to suppose that any and every person exercisDas Gupt,, f. ing possession over the mine, is an "occupier" and thus an owner of the mine, for the purpose of the Mines Act. From the very collocation of the words "immediate proprietor, or lessee or occupier of the mine", it is abundantly clear that only a person whose occupation is of the same character, that is, occupation by a proprietor or a lessee-by way of possession on his behalf and not on behalf of somebody else is meant by the word "occupier" in the definition. Thus, a trespasser in wrongful possession to the exclusion of the rightful owner would be an occupier of the mine, and so be an "owner" for the purposes of the Act. When however a servant or agent of the proprietor or lessee of a mine is in possession of a mine, he is in possession on behalf of his master or his principal, and not on his own behalf. It would be unreasonable to think that the legislature intended such servants or agents liable and responsible as "owner" of the mine. If possession on behalf of another was sufficient to make a person "occupier" within the meaning of s. 2(1), every manager would be an occupier and thus have all the responsibilities of an "owner". Many "agents" of the proprietors or lessee of the mine would similarly be "occupier" and therefore "owner". If that had been the intention of the legislature it would have been unnecessary and indeed meaningless to mention "agent" and "manager" in addition to the word "owner" in s. 18 of the Act, in the important provision as to who will be responsible for the proper carrying on of operations in the mine in regard to the provisions of the Act and Regulations and bye-laws and orders made thereunder. It would have been similarly unnecessary to mention "agent" and "manager" in addition to the word 16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) r96r "owner" in s. 22 which gives the Chief Inspector or ch· 1 IInspector power to give special directions for the " JI;;;~;;'" '1 removal of certain defects or in s. 61 providing for the v. framing of bye-laws. The very fact t.hat in ss. 18, 22 Lala Karam and 61 owner, agent and manager have been separaChand Thapar tely made responsible clearly shows that the legislature did not think that agent or manager would come Das Gupta f. within the definition of "owner" in s. 2(1). That must be because possession on behalf of somebody else was not in the contemplation of the legislature such "occupation" as to make the person in possession an "occupier" within the meaning of s. 2(1). Whatever possession, the managing agents of a colliery company exercise in and over a mine is exercised on behalf of the colliery company and not on their own behalf and so such managing agents are not occupier of the mine within the meaning of s. 2(k). The managing agent company, not being either agent or manager, or owner of the mine, no question of contravention by that company or any of its directors of the Coal Mines Regulations can arise. The High Court has therefore rightly quashed the criminal proceedings against the directors of the managing agent company. Appeals Nos. 100 and 101 are accordingly dismissed. The main controversy common to the other seven appeals is whether the Mines Regulations, 1926, framed as they were under s. 29 of the Mines Act, 1923, survived the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923, by the Mines Act, 1952. For a proper appreciation of the question involved it is necessary to have regard on the one hand to the provisions of s. 31 of the Mines Act, 1923, and on the other to the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The first sub-section of s. 31 provides that the power to make regula' tions and rules conferred by ss. 29, 30 and 30A is subject to the condition of the regulation and rules being made after previous publication. The fourth sub-section of that section lays down that regulations and rules shall be published in the official gazette and on such publication shall have effect "as if enacted in this Act". The regulations, which are alleged to have • I • \ J • 1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 17 been contravened were all made under s. 29 of the z96x 1923 Act, and admittedly they were duly published in Ch . 111 the official gazette. As a result of such publication, " ;;;!:; 10 ' 0 these regulations from the date of the publication, v. commenced having "effect as if enacted" in the Mines Lala Karam Act, 1923. The question we have to answer is: Did Chand Thapar the regulations stand repealed, when the Mines Act, 19 3 1 d B ,. d . Das Gupta ]. 2 , was repea e ? eiore en eavourmg to answer the question, we have to take note of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The relevant portion of this clause is in these words:- "When any Central ~ct is after the commencement of this Act repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any ...... rule ...... made or issued under the repealed Act shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by any ...... rule ...... made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted". It is convenient at this stage to state that a regulation is indisputably a rule within the meaning of these provisions. The present is a case, where the Mines Act, 1923, was repealed, and was re-enacted with modifications as the Mines Act, 1952: Section 29 of the 1923 Act empowering the Central Government to make regulations consistent with the Act for specified purposes was re-enacted in the 1952 Act as s. 57: regulations were made in 1926 under s. 29 of the 1923 Act, but at the relevant date, in 1955, no regulations had been made under s. 57 of the 1952 Act, so that in 1955 the Mines Regulations, 1926, had not been superseded by any regulations made under the re.enacted provisions of s. 57 of the 1952 Act: Therefore ifs. 24 of the General Clauses Act is operative the Mines Regulations, 1926, were in force at the relevant date in 1955, and shall be deemed to have been made under s. 57 of the 1952 Act, as there is no provision express or otherwise, in the later Act to the contrary, and the regulations are not inconsistent with the re.enacted provisions. 3 18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] z96I For the management-appellant, Mr. Pathak contends however that s. 24 of the General Clauses Act Chi./ Inspector of can have no operation in respect of these regulations Mines 1 d J . ' v. as they stood repea e a ong with the repeal of the Lala Karam Mines Act, 1923. His argument is simple. Section Chand Thapar 31( 4) of the 1923 Act says, these regulations shall have effect as if enacted in that Act. The consequence of Das Gupta J · this provision is that the regulations became part of the Act: the entire Act was repealed by s. 88 of the 1952 Act: the 1926 Regulations as part of the Act thus stood repealed. So, on the very day the 1952 Act came into force, the Rei;ulations of 1926 ceased to have legal existence. So, s. 24 of the General Clauses Act had nothing to operate upon. The whole foundation of the argument is the assumption that the necessary consequence of s. 31(4) of the 1923 Act is that the regulations, on publication, shall have effect as if enacted in the Act is that the Regulations became part and parcel of the Act. Is that assumption justified? In attempting to answer this question, it will be profitable to remember that the purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place in one single statute different provisions as regards interpretations of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified separately in many different acts and regulations. Whatever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings of words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to which it applies. The Mines Act, 1923, being a Central Act, s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to it, so that we have to read in the Mines Act, 1923, an additional provision embodying the words of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The result is that we have in this Mines Act of 1923 on the one hand the provision that the regulations made under s. 29 of the Act will have effect as if enacted in the Act and on the other, the further provision, that regulations made under s. 29 shall continue to remain in force when this Act is repealed and re-enacted and be deemed to have been made under the re-enacted provisions, it is otherwise expressly provided, unless and • ( ' • • .. I s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 19 until superseded by regulations made under the rer96r enacted provisions. Chief Inspector of If the words of s. 31(4) are construed to mean that Minos the regulations became part of the Act to the extent v. that when the Act is repealed, the regulations also Lala Karam stand repealed, a conflict at once arises between s. 31 Chand Thapar (4) and the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Das Gupta ]. Act. In other words, the Mines Act, 1923, while saying in s. 31( 4) that the repeal of the Act will result in the repeal of the regulations, will be saying, in the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act as read into it, that on the repeal of the Act, when the Act is repealed and re-enacted, the regulations will not stand repealed but will continue in force till superseded by regulations made under the re-enacted Act. To solve this conflict the courts must apply the rule of harmonious construction. According to Mr. Pa.thak we have perfect harmony if it is held that the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act will have effect only if the regulations are such as survive the repeal of the parent Act and at the same time, construe s. 31(4) to mean that the regulations became for all purposes part and parcel of the Act. To harmonise is not however to destroy. The so-called harmony on the learned counsel's argument is achieved by making the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act nugatory and in effect destroying them in relation to the Mines Act, 1923. We have to seek therefore some other means of harmonising the two provisions. The reasonable way of harmonising that obviously suggests itself is to construes. 31(4) to mean that the regulations on publication shall have for some purposes, say, for example, the purpose of deciding the validity of the regulations, the same effect as if they were part of the Act, but for the purpose of the continuity of existence, they will not be considered part of the Act, so that even though the Act is repealed, the regulations will continue to exist, in accordance with the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. This construction will give reasonable effect to s. 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923 and at the same time not frustrate the very salutary object of 20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) x96r s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. One may pause here Chief Inspector of to remember that regu~ations framed under an .Act Mines are of the very greatest importance. Such regulat10ns v. are framed for the successful operation of the Act. Lala Karam Without proper regulations, a statute will often be Chand Thapar worse than useless. When an Act is repealed, but reenacted, it is almost inevitable that there will be Das Gupta ]. some time lag between the re-enacted statute coming into force, and regulations being framed under the re-enacted statute. However efficient the rule mak. ing authority may be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the re. enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable. Is it conceivable that any legislature, in providing that regulations madtil under its statute will have effect as if enacted in the Act, could have intended by those words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and re-enacted, (as is more than likely to happen sooner or later), the regulations will have no existence for the purpose of the re-enacted statute, and thus the re-en. acted statute, for some time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter. The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the purpose be which induced the draftsmen to adopt this legislative form as regards the rules and regulations that they will have effect "as if enacted in the Act'', it will be strange indeed if the result of the language used, be that by becoming part of the Act, they would stand repealed, when the Act is repealed. One can be certain that that could not have been the intention of the legislature. It is satisfactory that the words used do not produce that result. For, if we apply the rule of harmonious construction, as has been pointed out above, s. 31(4) does not stand in the way of the operation of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The proper construction of a legislative provision as regards rules or regulations made under an Act having effect as if enacted in the Act, fell to be considered in several English and Indian decisions and from one of these-the earliest case in which the • .. > > • I 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 21 question appears to have been considered-Mr. Pathak r 96r sought assistance. That is the case of Institute of Chief Inspector of Patent Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood('). There, Mines a declaration was sought against Lockwood that he v. was not registered as a patent agent in pursuance of Lala Kamm the Patents, Design and Trade Marks Act, 1888 and Chand Thapar was not entitled to describe himself as a patent agent; Das Gupta J. and consequential relief was asked for. While the first section of the Act required such a registration, the Act itself did not provide "for the manner in which the register is to be formed, who is to be the Registrar, the formalities requisite for the registration, or any particulars in relation to it". The Act left to the Board of Trade to make such general rules as were required for giving effect to the first section. Among the rules made by the Board, was one requiring certain fee to be paid on first registration, and also an annual fee, non payment of which shall be a ground for cancelling the registration. The question arose whether the rules with reference to fees were intra vires or ultra vires. The House of Lords held that the rules were intra vires; but dealt also with a contention raised on behalf of the appellants that in view of the provisions in the Act that the rules "shall be of the same effect as if they were contained in this Act" the question whether the rules were intra vires or ultra vires could not at all be canvassed in the courts. Speaking about the effect of the above provisions, Lord Herschell, L. C., said:-"I own I feel very great difficulty in giving to this provision that they 'shall have of the same effect as if they were contained in the Act' any other meaning than this, that you shall for all purposes of construction, or obligation or otherwise, treat them, as if they were in the Act". Mr. Pathak fastens on the phrase "for all purposes of construction, or obligation or otherwise" and submits that this is a good authority for holding that for the purpose of deciding whether the rules were part of the Act, so as to attract the consequence of repeal, along with the repeal of the Act, the rules should be treated "as if they were in the Act" and so stood (I) [1894] A.C. 347• 22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] r96r repealed. We are bound however to take notice of the Ch . f 1-P 1 1fact that the question whether the rules were to be ie ns ec or o d . Mines treate as part of the Act to ascertam the effect on v. them of the repeal of the Act was not even remotely Lala Karam before the House of Lords. The sole question before Chand Thapar them was how far, if at all, the courts could consider the question of validity of the rules, in view of the Das Gupta ] . b · · d h · h a ove prov1s10ns as regar st err having "t e same effect as if they were contained in the Act''. That the Lord Chancellor was not concerning himself with the effect of this provision in other aspects is further clear from what he said immediately after the observations quoted above:- "N o doubt", said he, "there might be some confl.ict between a rule and a provision of the Act. Well there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best as you may. If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which is the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other. That would be so with regard to enactments and with regard to rules which are to be treated as if within the enactment. In that case probably the enactment itself would be treated as the governing consideration and the rule as subordinate to it". Not only was the question now before us not for decision in Lockwood's Case (1), but it is quite clear that the learned Lord Chancellor had no intention of dealing with questions like this, when he used the words on which Mr. Pathak has tried to rely. · In our opinion, Lockwood's Case (1) is no authority in favour of the construction urged by the learned .counsel for acceptance. In a later case of Ministry of Health v. The King (on the prosecution of Yaffe)(') the House of Lords considered the question how far the principle laid down in Lockwood's Case went. But there also, the question was as regards the soundness of a plea that the validity of a scheme which, on confirmation, had effect as if it was contained in the Act, could not be (r) [1894] A.C. 34'· (2) [1931] A.C. 494· ' ' I I 1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 23 questioned in the courts and the question now before I96r us did not even remotely come up for consideration. ci. / i . h' h 'd d b th p t '" In