# Ap•il 8 888 SUPREME CuURT REPOR1 S [1964] VOL. INNA:WlURI GOPALAN AND OIHERS v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 888
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-01-18
- **Bench:** B. P. Sjnha C. J, J. C. Shah, N. RAJA!lOPALA AYYA~GAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ap-il-8-888-supreme-cuurt-repor1-s-1964-vol-inna-wluri-gopalan-and-oihers-v-2853
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Salts Tax-E.umption-Notification
exempting textiles
etc.-Prov·iso-l1lri!)s of goods lr viribie l 1> additional excist dutyAndhra Prade.h General Sales Tax Ad, 1951 (A. P. 6 of 1951')
a. 9-Notiflcation dated Decembu 13, 1957-Additional Dutie.
of Excise (Levy and Distribution) Bill, 1!15'1, cl. 3.
On December 13, 1957, the State Government issued a
notification under s. 9 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales
Tax Act, 1947, txempting from tax the sale or purchase o(
certain goods including textiles. The proviso therein provided
that "in the case of auy class uf such goods in respect of which
additional duties of excise are leviable by the Ceutral Government under cl. 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Levy and
Distribution) Bill, 1957 .......... " the exemption shall be
subject to the condition that the deal(':r must prove that he has
paid the additional excise duty. The appellants had in stock
textiles which were admittedly not liable to tho additional
excise du•.y under cl. 3 of the Bill. The appellants claimed
exemption from sales tax under the notification in respect of
the •ale• of textiles in theiI stock. The State con tended that
since the object of the notification was
to avoid double
taJ<ation the exemption
could be claimed only
in cases
where the additional excise duty was leviable on the good• and
had been paid aud that as textiles were a class of good• on
which additional excise duty was leviable and the exemption
could be claimed only if •uch duty was levied and paid.
Held that the appellant• were entitled under the Notification to ex<:mption from >ale• tax on the sales of the textiles
in their stock. The appellants were clearly within the operative words of the notification and could be deprived of the
el<emption to which they were manifestly entitled thereunder
only if the case fell
within
the
proviso. The provi•o
wao not applicable to cases where additional excise duty was
nol leviable under cl. 3 of the Bill. The expression "clau
•
2;S.C.R .
SUPREME.COURT REPORTS
889
. of such goods" in the proviso has to be understood as a refer·
ence not merr ly to goods sprcified in the opening words of cl. 3
but to such goods as fa 11 within the entirety of the taxing provision and in respect of which additional excise duty would be
lcviablc.
Further, in a taxing statute there is no room for any
intcndment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the
.. words. If the tax prayer is within the plain terms of the
exemption he cannot be denied its bendit by calling io aid any
supposed intention of the exemption aa1hority.
Salomon v> Sak>mon & Co . .[1897) A: C. 22, referred IQ,
Ctvm APPELLATE J umsDICTlON : Civil Appeal
· No:488 of 1962 .
. Appeal· by special leave • from the judgment
and order.dated January 18, 1961, of the Andhra
·.Pradesh High Court in .Writ Petition No. 101 of
1959.
N. C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and A. K. Nag,
for the appellants.
· A. Ranganathan Chetty and P, D. Menon for
'"the respondents.
1963.
April 8.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
AYY.ANG.ARJ.-The proper construction and
legal effect of a notification under s. 9 ( 1) of the
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (A.P.
Vl of 1957) .which for shortness we would call the
., Act, is the. principal question that arises for con·
• sideration in this appeal by special leave in which
the coFrectncSS·1 of. the cdecisi-0n of the. High Court
dismissing a Writ Petition,, filed-.by,the,:l;\flpellants is
challenged.
·• Section I) of .the Act is the charging section
under which .dealers. are . liable to. pay sales tax on
their turnover ... Under. sub-s. (3) (a). of this section,
. ,1963
lnnamuri ( ,'oflalan
v.
tt11te of Andhra
Pradesh
Ayyangar J.
' .
1963
lrin"muri Gopa/an
v.
Stoll ef Andhra
Prad11h
Ayy,,.zar J.
S90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] \lot.
read with Sch. II to the Act cotton textitle goods
which was the commodity in which the appellants
were dealing, \Hrc liaUr to t;ix at a sing Ir point.
Section 9 of the Act enabled the State G0ver

## Text

1563
Ap•il 8
888 SUPREME CuURT REPOR1 S [1964] VOL.
INNA:WlURI GOPALAN AND OIHERS
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AND ANR.
(B. P. SJNHA C. J., J. C. SHAH and
N. RAJA!lOPALA AYYA~GAR JJ.)
Salts Tax-E.umption-Notification
exempting textiles
etc.-Prov·iso-l1lri!)s of goods lr viribie l 1> additional excist dutyAndhra Prade.h General Sales Tax Ad, 1951 (A. P. 6 of 1951')
a. 9-Notiflcation dated Decembu 13, 1957-Additional Dutie.
of Excise (Levy and Distribution) Bill, 1!15'1, cl. 3.
On December 13, 1957, the State Government issued a
notification under s. 9 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales
Tax Act, 1947, txempting from tax the sale or purchase o(
certain goods including textiles. The proviso therein provided
that "in the case of auy class uf such goods in respect of which
additional duties of excise are leviable by the Ceutral Government under cl. 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Levy and
Distribution) Bill, 1957 .......... " the exemption shall be
subject to the condition that the deal(':r must prove that he has
paid the additional excise duty. The appellants had in stock
textiles which were admittedly not liable to tho additional
excise du•.y under cl. 3 of the Bill. The appellants claimed
exemption from sales tax under the notification in respect of
the •ale• of textiles in theiI stock. The State con tended that
since the object of the notification was
to avoid double
taJ<ation the exemption
could be claimed only
in cases
where the additional excise duty was leviable on the good• and
had been paid aud that as textiles were a class of good• on
which additional excise duty was leviable and the exemption
could be claimed only if •uch duty was levied and paid.
Held that the appellant• were entitled under the Notification to ex<:mption from >ale• tax on the sales of the textiles
in their stock. The appellants were clearly within the operative words of the notification and could be deprived of the
el<emption to which they were manifestly entitled thereunder
only if the case fell
within
the
proviso. The provi•o
wao not applicable to cases where additional excise duty was
nol leviable under cl. 3 of the Bill. The expression "clau
•
2;S.C.R .
SUPREME.COURT REPORTS
889
. of such goods" in the proviso has to be understood as a refer·
ence not merr ly to goods sprcified in the opening words of cl. 3
but to such goods as fa 11 within the entirety of the taxing provision and in respect of which additional excise duty would be
lcviablc.
Further, in a taxing statute there is no room for any
intcndment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the
.. words. If the tax prayer is within the plain terms of the
exemption he cannot be denied its bendit by calling io aid any
supposed intention of the exemption aa1hority.
Salomon v> Sak>mon & Co . .[1897) A: C. 22, referred IQ,
Ctvm APPELLATE J umsDICTlON : Civil Appeal
· No:488 of 1962 .
. Appeal· by special leave • from the judgment
and order.dated January 18, 1961, of the Andhra
·.Pradesh High Court in .Writ Petition No. 101 of
1959.
N. C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and A. K. Nag,
for the appellants.
· A. Ranganathan Chetty and P, D. Menon for
'"the respondents.
1963.
April 8.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
AYY.ANG.ARJ.-The proper construction and
legal effect of a notification under s. 9 ( 1) of the
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (A.P.
Vl of 1957) .which for shortness we would call the
., Act, is the. principal question that arises for con·
• sideration in this appeal by special leave in which
the coFrectncSS·1 of. the cdecisi-0n of the. High Court
dismissing a Writ Petition,, filed-.by,the,:l;\flpellants is
challenged.
·• Section I) of .the Act is the charging section
under which .dealers. are . liable to. pay sales tax on
their turnover ... Under. sub-s. (3) (a). of this section,
. ,1963
lnnamuri ( ,'oflalan
v.
tt11te of Andhra
Pradesh
Ayyangar J.
' .
1963
lrin"muri Gopa/an
v.
Stoll ef Andhra
Prad11h
Ayy,,.zar J.
S90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] \lot.
read with Sch. II to the Act cotton textitle goods
which was the commodity in which the appellants
were dealing, \Hrc liaUr to t;ix at a sing Ir point.
Section 9 of the Act enabled the State G0vernment
to exempt the tax leviable under the Act.
In exercise of the power thus conferred a notification was
issued on December 13, 1957, which read :
"In exercise of the powers conferred by subSection (1) of Section 9 of the Andhra Pradesh
General Sales Tax Act, 1957, (Andhra Pradesh
Act VI of 1957, hereinafter referred to as the
said Act)
the Governor of Andhra Pradesh
hereby exempts from the tax payable under
the said Act, with effect on and from the
14th December, 1957, the sale or purchse of any
of the goods appended hereto :
Provided that in the case of any class of
such goods in respect of which additional
duties of excise are leviable by the Central
Government under clause 3 of the Additional
Duties of Excise (Levy and Distribution) Bill,
1957, read with
s. 4 of the provisional
Collection of Taxes Act, 1931 (Central Act
XVI of 1931 ), the exemption shall be subject
to the following conditions, namely:-
1. The dealer shall prove to the satisfaction
of the assessing authority that additional
duties of excise have been so
levied and
collected on such goods by the Central Government, in default of which the dealer shall be
liable to pay the tax under the said Act in
respect of such goods.
2. Any dealer who is so liable to pay the tax
may, at his option, pay, in lieu thereof a lump
sum by way of compensation determined in
the manner specified in condition (3).
..
. 2 s.c.R.. ·
,
l
·,
,
.
I
SUPREl\'IE COURT REPORTS
89i
"
J96J
······ .................................................. .
As nothing turns on the terms of condition 3 with
which the notification ends it is not set out. The
appendix which is referred to in the opening paragraph has three clauses the first of which is the only
material one and this runs :
"l. All varieties of textiles, viz., cotton,
woollen or silken including rayon, art silk or
nylon, whether manufactured by handloom,
powerloom or otherwise;"
Pausing here, it is
n~ces·sary to set out the
terms of cl. 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise
Bill, 1957, which is referred to in the proviso to the
opening paragraph of the notification.
Though
the Bill was later passed into law and became an
Act, we shall refer to the Bill conformably to the
phraseology of the notification. Clause 3 (1) which
is the relevant portion of that clause reads :
"3. (1)
There shall be levied· and collected
in respect of the following goods,
namely,
sugar, tobacco, cotton fabrics, rayon or artificial silk fabrics and woollen fabrics produced
. or manufactured in India and on all such
goods lying in stock within the precincts of
any factory, warehouse or other premises where
the sr!id goods were manufactured, stored or
produced, or ,in any premises appurtenant
thereto, duties of excise at the rates specified
in the First Schedule to this Act."
How the matter came before the High Court
was briefly this. There was no dispute that the
appellants were and are doing business in the
purchase and sale of textile goods.
They claimed
exemption from the payment of sales tax in respect
Innt1muri Gopalan
v.
Stalt1 of Andh'a
hoi1Sh
lnruunuri Gopalan
v.
SlaJt of A.11dhra
•' J',odtsh
Ayyanga1 J,
· 892 :SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!164].VOL.
of goods iu stock with them on December 14, 1957,
relying on the notification set out earlier. The Sales
Tax authorities, however, rejected this claim and as
a result a Writ Pttition was filed in the High Court
··under Art. 226 by the appellants praying.for a direc-
.tion for quashing the notice issued by the SalesTax
Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh
calling upon them to pay the sales tax on these goods.
It is now. necessary to mention . that· the . validity of
the action of the Sales. Tax Officials-the Commercial Tax Officer, the second rrspondent, .,-making
the demand was ·impugned by the appeilants not
merely on· the ground that no tax was piyable by
them by reason of the above notificati1m but also on
. various other grounds including the constitutional
invalidity of the Sales Tax Act itself and in .particular· the provisions imposing sale• tax on textile
goods. The learned Judges dismissed their petition
. rejecting everyone of the contentions urged, and the
appellants have come up in appeal· after obtaining
special leave. It must, however, be mentioned that
the argument regarding the constitutional invalidity
of the Act and the rules were not repeated before us
and the only point· arising for comideration is as
regards the construction of the notification.
Before· proceeding further it would be convenient to set out the grounds on which the learned
Judges held that the appellants were not wit;1in the
benefit of the exemption · conferted by the notification.
The argument urged on behalf of the State
..
" Government as regards the construction of the notification and which was accepted by the learned Judges
of the High Court, was briefly ·this." !The exemption
from payment of s_ales ~ax wai granted in. order to
1 .avoid·• double taxation i. e.,. b()th the excise duty
~ .
. ' •leviablc by the Central Government ·under cl. ,3 ~f
, • the Bill and sales tax to the State Government and 1t
. , was claimed that· this was made, out.by the terms of
:. idwproviso to 1-the notification.· In. other words.-.thc
·•
2 S.C.R..
SUPREME, COURT REPORTS : · 893
t
reasoning· was , that if the exemption provision con•
tained in the · 1st paragraph of the notification was
to operate, the goods must have been such that it was
liable to the tax under cl. 3(1) of the Bill and that
where. this condition was not satisfied the exemption
provision had no
application. It was admitted
before the High Court that the textile goods in the
possession of the appeJlants were not subject to excise
duty or the additional excise duty under cl. 3(1) of
the· Bill.
As no excise duty was leviable on these
goods there was, of course, no question of the dealer
being able to prove to the satisfaction of the assessing
authorities under condition l of the proviso that
additional duties had been levied and collected from
him.
Another and distinct line of argument was
based on the use of the expression "any class of
such goods" as distinguished from
"any goods"
occurring in the proviso and in regard to this the
learned Judges observed:
"Textiles fall within the class of such goods in
regard to which additional duties could be
levied in certain contingencies. It does n"ot
mean that only such goods as are actuallv
liable to be taxed by reason of s. 3 of the
abovementioned Central Act, that were in·
tended
to be
covered
by the
proviso.
If that \'lere so, the expression
'any class
of such
goods'
would
be
unmeaning.
In our opinion, that clause· only conveys the
thought 'goods belonging to the class' in respect
of which additional duties could be levied.
That expression does not exclude goods set out
in the appendix merely because they would not ·
faJI within the scope of Section 3 of the Central
Act."
On these l
J
lines of reasoning the learned
Judges held that the appellants were not entitled
to the benefit of the exemption and in consequence
1963
In~uri · Gopolon
v.
Stat6 of th1dh .. t1
PrGdesh-· ·
Ayyangar-J,
J9o3
itUJDmuri Go/14lan
v,
State of A11dMa
Pradtsh
A;yan1ar J.
894
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
directed the dismissal of the Writ Petition. It is the
correctness of this interpretation that is challenged.
before us.
Mr. Chatterjee,
learned
counsel
for the
appellants, submitted that on a plain readin'g of the
notification the appellants
were entitled
to
the
benefit of the exemption if para I stood alone. This
s·.Ibmission has to be accepted and we heard no serious
.ugument against it.
The competence of the State
Government to grant an exemption, whether qualified
or unqalified. not being in d1sputr, the only question
for consideration
i< whether the effect of the first
paragraphs of the notification has been qualified or
modified by the rest of tlir notification including the
conditions imposed
th,:· .:under.
Learned
counsel
for the respondent relied on the same two lines of
reasoning on which the High Court has decided the
Writ Petition.
He stressed before us in particular
the argument b:iscd on the use of the words "any.
clas~ of such goods" in the proviso.
The Ist paragraph of the notification grants
an exemption which, if it stood alone, provides that
no sales tax would be leviable on and from December
14, 1957 on the sale or purchase of every variety of
textiles.
This, however, is subject to a provi3o which
undoubtedly cuts into and restricts the operation of
the exemption clause and we have to determine the
extent of the restriction of the area carved out.
A
plain and prim•1 Jacie reading of the proviso without
going into the distinction between goods & "class
of goods" would appear to show that an exception
is made in cases where additional duties of excise are
"leviable" by the Central Government under cl. 3
of the Bill. In such cases
th~ conditions which
·• •
follow the proviso have to be sa•.isfied, viz., that the
'-.
additional duties of excise have to be proved to have
been paid by the dealer in order t<;> claim the benefit
of the exemption. It is now common ground that
-
. .
.+
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
no additional duty of excise was leviable in respect
of the goods in the possession of the appellants and
consequently there is no question of the· appellants
having to prove to the satisfaction of the assessing
authorities that such duties had been levied and
collected from them.
This would
be the plain
reading of the section.
Learned counsel for the
respondent, however, repeated before us the argument
which found favour with the learned Judges of the
High Court based on the interpretation which· he
sought to place on the words "any class of such
goods" 'in respect of which additional duties are
leviable.
Now, under cl. 3 (1) of the Bill, learned
counsel pointed out, additional duties of excise could
be levied on cotton fabrics produced or manufactured
in India and that it was only by reason of such goods·
not lying within the precincts of a factory, warehouse
etc. but with a dealer, that no such duty became
leviable in the case of the goods with the appellants.
The argument was that "textile goods" were "a
class of goods" in respect of which an additional
duty was leviable, though by reason of their location
viz., not being within the precincts of a factory,
warehouse etc. no duty could be levied and that
consequently unless condition 1 to the proviso was
satisfied the exemption could not be claimed. The
learned Judges accepted this argument,
but with
great respect to them, it appears to us that they were
in error' in doing ·so.
In the first place, "the class
of goods" referred to in the proviso to the notification
are such that in respect of them duties of excise are
leviable. If, therefore, in respect of a class of goods
such duties are not leviable because of the situs in
which they are lying or are stocked, they would not
be the class of goods in respect of which duties of
excise are leviable for the essential condition for the
proviso to be brought into operation is the liability
of the goods to the levy of the additional duty. It
therefore appears
to
us
that
the
expression
"class of such goods" has to be understood as being
1963
lnnamuri Gopdfan
v.
State of ,A,.dh,a
Ptad1sh
Ay_Jangcr J.
•
1961
.'nnamuri G#f>alon
•.
• fo/t of ~"d/lfa
P1atluJi
896 SUPREME'COURT REl'ORTS[l964] VOL .
a reference not merely to the goods specified in the· ·
opening words of cl. 3 (I) of the •Bill but 'to such ·
goods as fall •within the ·entirety of that
taxing
provision and in respect of which therefore the
additional duty would be leviable,' for in respect of
cotton fabrics produced in India per se or simplici tor
no excise duty would be leviable unless they are ·at
the premises which arc specified in the latter portion
of the cl. 3 (1) of the Bill. Both these conditions ·are
necessary to exist before the duty of excise
is
"leviable" and when the proviso therefore uses the
words "any class of such goods" it could only refer
to the class of goods named in the !st para ofcl. 3
(I )-lying stored or stocked in the places referred to
in the concluding portion of the clause.
There
is
another aspect
from which this
question of construction could be viewed. It cannot
be disputed that the proviso and the conditions .
appended thereto
form an integral part thereof.
It is obvious that where the proviso operates it would
be open to the dealer affected by it to pay the
additional duty and establish that he has paid such
duty and· thereby entitle himself to the exemption.
In other words, it cannot be that the proviso excludes
the exemption but in circumstances in which the
conditions cannot be fulfilled.
The conditions
themselves would thus throw light upon the words of
the proviso, and when the proviso is read with the
conditions of which they arc an integral part, the
conclusion is inescapable that the word "leviable"
u<ed in the proviso means that in respect of the goods
specified as regards which he claim~ exemption from
the payment of sales tax there was a liability upon
hin le pay the additional excise duty under cl. :J of
the Bill for it was only in that event that he would
~.
be able to prove to the assessing authorities that that
additional duty has been levied and collected from
him.
...
2 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .S97
Learned Counsel for the respondent also repea·
ted before us the other line of argument which the
High Court accepted viz., that the notification of
Government in granting the exemption was to avoid
double taxation, viz., of liability to pay both the
, excise duty as well as the sales tax and that as in the
present case the appellants were admittedly not
bound to pay the additional excise duty they could
make no claim to the benefit of the exemption either.
We do not feel persuaded to accept this argument.
No doubt, statutes have to be construed as a whole
so as to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy among
its several provisions, but if there is nothing to
modify, nothing to alter, or nothing to qualify the ·
language of a statute, the words and sentences have
to be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning
[vide 36 Hals (3rd Eda.) s. 585]. What we are now
concerned with is a fiscal provision and it has often
been said that there is no equity in a taxing statute
and either the subject is within it or not, on the
words of the enactment or the rules validly made
thereunder. In a taxing statute there is no room
for any intendment but regard must be had to the
clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is
governed wholly by the words of the provision.
If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the
exemption he cannot be denied its benefit by calling
in aid any supposed intention of the exempting
authority. lf such intention can be gathered from
the construction of the words of the statute or rule or
by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is
different, but that is not the position here. In this
connection we might refer to the observations of
Lord Watson in Salomon v. Salomon &! Oo. ('):
"Intention of the legislature is' a common but
very slippery phrase, which, · popularly understood may signify anything from intention
embodied in positive enactment to speculative
opinion as to what the legislature probably
(!) [1897] A,0, 22. 38.
'
J96J
IM4!1Wri~an
...
Slot• •f lrulllro
Pr..•l1sh
..i_,,.,.,., /,
1963
lnnanuni Gopalan
••
Stolt of .fndhro
Pr~sh
h7angar J.
-
8!l8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.~
would have meant, although there has been an
omission to enact it.
In a Court of Law or
Equity,
what the legislature intended to be
done or not to be done can only be legitimately
ascertained from that which it has chosen to
enact, either in express words or by reasonable
and necessary intendment."
Learned counsel for the State is possibly right in
the submission that the object behind the framers of
the notification was to avoid double taxation but
the operntion of an en~ctment or of a notification has
to be judged not by the object which the legislature or
the notifying authority, a~ the case may be, may have
had in mind but by the words which it ha~ employed
to effectuate the legislative intent. In the case before
us the operative words of the notification are to be
found in the I st paragraph granting the exemption
and it was not disputed that the appellants were within
that provision. The next question would be as to
whether the exemption to which •he appellants were
manifestly entitled under the !st paragraph of the
notification they have been dtprived of by the
operation of the proviso. If the prol'iso on its
proper construction,
as we have endeavoured to
point out earlier, cannot apply to cases where an
additional duty of excise is not lcviable under cl. 3
of the Bill it would follow that the operation of the
exemption is
unaffected by· the
proviso.
The
appellants were therefore entitled to the relief from
sales tax granted by the notification dated December
13, 1957.
In the writ Petition which they filed to the High
Court they prayed for a declarati<m that certain
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act VI of 1957 were
ultra vires the Constitution of India. As stated earlier,
this point about the constitutional invalidity of the
Act was abandoned in this Court and the argument
before us was confined wholly to their claim to
exemption under the notification.
•
-
;
. .
•
2 S.C.R;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
The appeal is accordingly allowed. and the
order· of the learned Judges dismissing the
Writ
Petition is set aside. The relief to which the
appellant would be entitled would be, having regard
to the fact that appellants failed in their attempt to
impugn the constitutional validity ·of the Act etc., a
declaration that they are entitled to the benefit of
the notification exempting them from the payment
of sales tax in respect of textile goods in stock
with them on December 14, 1957, and restraining
the respondents from levying or collecting sales tax
from
them in respect of such stock. As the
appellants challenged unsuccessfully
the constitutional validity of the Sales Tax Act before the
High Court we do not consider that the order for
costs passed by the learned Judges of the High Court
should be interfered with. The appellants, however,
will be entitled to costs in this Court.
,
Appeal allowed.
SUBE SINGH & ANR.
ti.
KANHA YA AND OTHERS
(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
and j. C. SHAH Jj.)
Custom-Ancestral agric"ltltural lands in Jhajjar Tehsil,
Rohtak DiBtHct of Punjab-Unrestricted power of a Jat to
trans/er it for consideration-No right of son or reversionary
heirs to get it set a.tide . unless transaction is for immoral purposes-No distinction bP.tween sonle.s holder and hokler having
son-Authority not followed for a long period, ignored by this
Court.
A jat holding antestral agricultural land injhajjar Tehsil
· of Rohtak district in Punjab .has by custom a power to transfer
J!JfS
lnnamuri Gopalan
••
State of Andhr
P1ad1sh
A)Jangarf
1963
April 9