# Appeal dismissed. THE DISTRICT BOARD, GHAZIPUR v. LAKSHMI NARAIN SHARMA

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 81
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 372 of 1956
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. Sub Ba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/appeal-dismissed-the-district-board-ghazipur-v-lakshmi-narain-sharma-2049
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Regulatio~ and Control of Trade-District Board, power ofIf impliedly repealed-Sanitation, connotation of-U. P. District
Boards Act, Ig22 (U. P. X of I922), ss. 9I(q) and I74-U. P.
Panchayat Raj Act, I947 (U. P. XXVI of Ig47), ss. IS and III.
The appellant framed bye-laws for the regulation and control of flour, rice .and oil mills under which a licence had to be
obtained on payment of licence fee for running a mill. The
\;ye-laws were framed under s. 174 of the U. P. District Boards
Act, 1922. The respondent contended that the bye-laws were
ultra vires and void as the District Boards had been divested of
their powers to regulate and control trade under the District
Boards Act on account of s. III of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act,
1947, which operated in tbe same field.
Held, that the bye-laws had been validly made and that
the District Boards were not divested of their powers to regulate and control trade under the District Boards Act, 1922, by
the provisions of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. Section 9x(q)
of the District Boards Act cast a duty . on the District Boards
to make provisions for regulating offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices and s. 174(2)(k) specifically
empowered District Boards to make bye-laws in this respect.
There was no similar duty or power conferred upon Village
Panchayats under the Panchayat Raj Act and consequently the
question of the.later enactment prevailing over the former did
u
The Commissioner
of Income-lax,
Bihar & Orissa
Shah].
October z6.
i960
The District
Boa1·,fl. Gha::ipur
v.
Laksl11ni
Narain Sharma
82
SUPREM~ COURT REPORTS
[1961]
not arise. The reference to "sanitation" in s. 15(c) of the
Panchayat Raj Act did not cover regulation and control of
trade. Though the word" sanitation'' in its widest connotation
was capable of including this, it was not used in its widest sense
in s. 15(c) but only in its ordinary sense in relation to conservancy, drainage and the like. Section III of the Panchayat Raj
Act was in general terms, but bye-laws could be framed under
it only in respect of the functions and duties imposed upon a
Gram Panchayat under ss. IS and 16.
Held, further, that the licence fee charged by the District
Board could not be struck down on account of fees being charged
from the respondent in respect of his mills under the U. P. Rice
and Dal Mills Control Order, 1948, and the U. P. Pure Food Act.
The licence fee charged by the District Board was !or the regulation of obnoxious trades and the purpose of this regulation
was different from the purpose for which fee was charged from
the respondent under the Essential Supplies Act and the Pure
Food Act.

## Text

,/
I
-
I
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
81
both altered when agricultural income is appropriated
under the covenant in the deed of trust as remunera- Maharajadhiraja
tion for services rendered.
Sir Kameshwar
In this view, the appeal fa.ils and is dismissed with
Singh
costs.
v.
Appeal dismissed.
THE DISTRICT BOARD, GHAZIPUR
v.
LAKSHMI NARAIN SHARMA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. SUB BA RAO, K. N. WANCHOO
and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Regulatio~ and Control of Trade-District Board, power ofIf impliedly repealed-Sanitation, connotation of-U. P. District
Boards Act, Ig22 (U. P. X of I922), ss. 9I(q) and I74-U. P.
Panchayat Raj Act, I947 (U. P. XXVI of Ig47), ss. IS and III.
The appellant framed bye-laws for the regulation and control of flour, rice .and oil mills under which a licence had to be
obtained on payment of licence fee for running a mill. The
\;ye-laws were framed under s. 174 of the U. P. District Boards
Act, 1922. The respondent contended that the bye-laws were
ultra vires and void as the District Boards had been divested of
their powers to regulate and control trade under the District
Boards Act on account of s. III of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act,
1947, which operated in tbe same field.
Held, that the bye-laws had been validly made and that
the District Boards were not divested of their powers to regulate and control trade under the District Boards Act, 1922, by
the provisions of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. Section 9x(q)
of the District Boards Act cast a duty . on the District Boards
to make provisions for regulating offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices and s. 174(2)(k) specifically
empowered District Boards to make bye-laws in this respect.
There was no similar duty or power conferred upon Village
Panchayats under the Panchayat Raj Act and consequently the
question of the.later enactment prevailing over the former did
u
The Commissioner
of Income-lax,
Bihar & Orissa
Shah].
October z6.
i960
The District
Boa1·,fl. Gha::ipur
v.
Laksl11ni
Narain Sharma
82
SUPREM~ COURT REPORTS
[1961]
not arise. The reference to "sanitation" in s. 15(c) of the
Panchayat Raj Act did not cover regulation and control of
trade. Though the word" sanitation'' in its widest connotation
was capable of including this, it was not used in its widest sense
in s. 15(c) but only in its ordinary sense in relation to conservancy, drainage and the like. Section III of the Panchayat Raj
Act was in general terms, but bye-laws could be framed under
it only in respect of the functions and duties imposed upon a
Gram Panchayat under ss. IS and 16.
Held, further, that the licence fee charged by the District
Board could not be struck down on account of fees being charged
from the respondent in respect of his mills under the U. P. Rice
and Dal Mills Control Order, 1948, and the U. P. Pure Food Act.
The licence fee charged by the District Board was !or the regulation of obnoxious trades and the purpose of this regulation
was different from the purpose for which fee was charged from
the respondent under the Essential Supplies Act and the Pure
Food Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 372 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order da.ted January
18, 1!156, of the Alla.ha.bad High Court in Special
Appeal No. 43 of 1955.
G. C. Mathur, for the appellant.
G. P. Singh and K. P. Gupta, for the respondent.
S. P. Sinha and P. C. Agarwala, for Intervener
No. l.
Radheylal Agarwala and P. C. Agarwala, for Intervener No. 2.
Frank Anthony and M. I. Khowaja, for Intervener
No. 3.
1960. October 26.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
w anchoo ; .
WAN CHOO J .-This is an appeal on a. certiticate
granted by the Alla.ha.bad High Court. The respondent is carrying on the trade of hulling rice, milling
grains and-extracting oil in village Nandganj within
the area of Ga.on Sabha Ba.ra.pur. He obtained licences
for the three trades under the United Provinces Rice
and Dal Control Order, 1948, as also under the Uttar
Pradesh Pure Foo.cl Act, 1950. Further the Ga.on
Sabha. a.lso imposed a. licence fee of Rs. 6/- and a ta.:11:
» ...
'
-1 •
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
z960
ofRs. 8/- on each mill within its jurisdiction and the
respondent had been paying that as well. In 1953 the
District Boa.rd, Ghazipur, in which district the village Board, Ghazipur
is situate, enforced bye-laws for the regulation and
v.
The District
control of flour, rice and oil mills in the rural areas of
Lakshmi
the district under which a licence has to be obtained Narain Sharma
by such mills on payment of Rs. 20/- as licence-fee
per year per mill. When the respondent was served
with a. notice to take out a licence for each mill . and
to pay the licence-fee, he objected to the legality and
validity of the levy and thereafter filed a writ petition
in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
His contention in this connection was three-fqld,
na.mely-(i) After the constitution of Gaon Sabha
Bara.pur under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, No.
XXVI of 1947, the District Boa.rd had been divested
of its power and jurisdiction in the matter of regulation and control of trade under the relevant provisions
of the U. P. District Boards Act, No. X of 1922; (ii)
the respondent had pa.id the necessary licence.fees
under the U.P. Rice and Dal Control Order, 1948 and
the U. P. Pure Food Act, 1950 and could not be asked
to pay the licence-fees over a.gain under the District
Boards Act; and (iii) in any case the levy was too
high and not in proportion to the actual and probable
expenses which the District Board would have to incur
in controlling or regulating trade and was meant to
augment the general revenues of the District Board .
The writ petition was heard by a learned Single
Judge of the High Court who appears to have dismissed it in limine by a reasoned judgment negativing all
the three contentions raised by the respondent. The
respondent then went in appeal and the Appeal Court
allowed the appeal holding that in view of s. 111 of
the Panchayat Raj Act, the District Board had. lost
its power to make bye-laws for the regulation and
control of trade under s. 174 of the District Boards
Act. The Appeal Court was further of the view that
the levy was not out of proportion to the expeQses to
be incurred by the District Board in the matter of
regulation and control and was not a. tax. It did
not decide the third point raised on behalf of the
Wanchoo ].
The District
Board, Gha.zi.Pur
v.
Lal?shmi
J\tarain Shartna
Wanchoo ].
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
respondent. The District Board then applied for a
certificate to appeal to this Court, which was granted;
and that is how the matter has come up before us.
The main question which falls for consideration in
this appeal is whether the view of the Appeal Court
that the District Board has Jost its power to make
bye-laws under s. 174 of the District Boards Act for
regulation and control of trade in view of s. 111 of the
Panchayat Raj Act, is correct. Learned counsel for
the appellant puts his argument on this point in two
ways. In the first place, he urges that the Panchayat
Raj Act does not contain any provision by which the
Gaon Sabha or the Gaon Panchayat has been given
the ·power to regulate or control trade and therefore
even if the Panchayat Raj Act is to prevail over the
District Boards Act, where the two deal with the same
matter, this particular power remains in the District
Board as it is not included within the powers exercisable by Panchayats under the Panchayat Raj Act.
In the alternative, he urges that the intention of the
legislature was not that those provisions of the District
Boards Act which are common in the two Acts should
be repealed by necessary implication, and therefore
the District Board's power to control and regulate
trade would remain whatever may be the provision of
the Panchayat Raj Act.
We shall therefore examine the first contention
raised on behalf of the appellant under this head, for
if the Panchayat Raj Act has not provided for the
control and regulation of trade by the Gaon Sabha or
the Ga.on Panchayat, there will be no question of any
inconsistency between the District Boards Act and the
Panchayat Raj Act and therefore no question of the
later Act (i. e., the Panchayat Raj Act) prevailing over
the earlier Act (i. e., the District Boards Act). Section
91 of the District Boards Act provides for what may
be called compulsory duties of District Boards and
cl. ( q) of this section lays down that every board shall
make reasonable provision within the district for
regulating offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades,
callings or practices. Section 106 of the District
Boards Act gives power to the Board to charge a fee
--
-•
2 S.C.R.
~~'i'REME COURT REPORTS
85
to b,, fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or
permission which it is entitled or required to grant by
or under the District Boards Act. Section 174 gives
power to the District Boa.rd to frame bye-laws consistent with the Act and with any rules framed by the
State Government for the purpose of promoting or
mairita.ining the health, safety and convenience of the
inhabitants of the area and for the furtherance of the
administration of the district under the Act. In particular, power is given by s. 174 (2) (k) to the District
Board to frame bye-laws for regulating slaughterhouses and offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades,
callings or practices and prescribing fees to defray the
expenditure incurred by it for this purpose. It is not
in dispute that the District Boa.rd bas power under
these provisions to frame bye-law& for regulation of
these trades, (namely, hulling rice, milling 'grains and
extracting oil). · Therefore, unless this power is ta.ken
a.way expressly or by necessary implication by any
provision of the Panchaya.t Raj Act, the District
Boa.rd would be entitled to frame the bye.laws which
it did in 1953 and charge licence-fees thereunder ..
Turning now to the Pancha.yat Rf!tj Act, we find
that s. 15 of this Act provides for what may be called
the compulsory duties of a. Ga.on Pa.nchaya.t while
s. 16 provides for what may be called its optional
duties. Section 111 gives power to the prescribed
authority to make bye-laws for a, Ga.on Panchayat
within its jurisdiction consistent with the Act and the
Rules ma.de thereunder for the purpose of promoting
or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of
persons residing within the jurisdiction of a Ga.on
Panchayat and for furtherance of .the administration
of Ga.on Pancha.yats under the Act. The prescribed
authority in this case is the Executive Committee of
the District Boa.rd (see s. 56 of the District . Boards
Act) which may be assumed for present purposes to be
different from the District Board as such. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that reading ss. 15
and 16 together with s. 111 it is obvious that regula..
tion or control of trades, callings and practices is not
within the purview of the Panchayat Raj Act. There
The Dislricl
Board, Ghazipur
v.
Lakshmi
Narain Sharma
Wanchoo ].
86
SUPREME COURT REPORT·'l
(1961]
r96o
is no doubt that neither s. 15 nor s. 16 containo any
The District
provision
corresponding to s. 9l(q) of the Distrw~
Board, Ghazipur Boards Act.
Therefore, prima facie the Panchayat
v.
Raj Act has nothing to do with the regulation or conLakshmi
trol of offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callNa.ain Sharma ings or practices and this power of the District Board
-
is unaffected by anything in the Panchayat Raj Act.
Wa11choo ].
L
I ,.
h
h
earned counse ,or t e respondent,
owever, urges
that though there is no specific provision relating to
such regulation or control in the Panchayat Raj Act
in ss. 15 and 16, this matter of regulation and control
is impliedly covered by cl. (c) of s. 15 of the Panchayat Raj Act, which enjoins on a Panchayat the duty
to make reasonable provision for sanitation and taking
curative and preventive measures to remove and to
stop the spread of an epidemic. It is urged that
'sanitation' must be given a very wide meaning and
that meaning will include the regulation of offensive,
dangerous or obnoxious trades. It may be that on the
widest meaning of the word " sanitation " such regulation may be included in it; but looking to the scheme
of the District Boards Act as well as the Panchayat
Ra.j Act, it is, in our opinion, not correct to give the
widest possible connotation to the word "sanitation "
in cl. (c) of s. 15.
Section 9l(m) of the District
Boards Act provides for ... public va.ccination, sanitation and the prevention of disea.se "; but in spite of
this entry rela.ting to sa.nita.tion there are other provisions in s. 91 which dea.l with what would be covered
by " sanitation" if it were to he given the widest possible meaning a.s, for example, cl. (e) relating to construction and repair of public wellB, etc. and drainage
works and the supply of water from them ; cl. (n)
relating to provision of a sufficient supply of pure and
wholesome water where the health of the inhabitants
is endangered by the insufficiency or unwholesomeness
of the existing supply, guarding from pollution water
used for human consumption and preventing polluted
water from being so used; cl. (r) relating to dissemination of knowledge on such matters as disease, hygiene,
sanitation, etc. This will show that the word "sanitation" in cl. (m) of s. 91 is not used in its widest sense.
-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
Similarly in s. 92 (which provides for optional duties
r96o
of District
Boards), cl. (c) refers to reclaiming
d
d
The District
unhealthy localities; an cl. (i) to conserving an preBoa,,a, Ghazipur
venting injury or contamination to or pollution of,
v.
rivers and other sources of water supply, which
Lakshmi
matters would be covered within the wide meaning of Narain Sharma
sanitation. It is obvious therefore that when the word
"sanitation" is used in the District Boards Act it is
IVanchoo f.
used in a restricted sense. Similarly in the Panchayat
Raj Act cl. (c) of s. 15 mentions" sanitat,ion ". Clause
(g) relates to regulation of places for the disposal of
carcases and of other offensive matters which would
clearly be covered by " sanitation " in its widest sense
and would have been unnecessary if sanitation was to
be given its widest meaning in this section. Clause (k)
of s. 15 provides for regulation of sources of water
supply for drinking purpose which would again be
included within the widest meaning of the word
" sanitation ". Clause (r) provides for allotment of
places for storing manure which would again be
embraced within the widest meaning of the word
"sanitation" and need not have been separately provided for, if sanitation in cl. (c) had the wide meaning
- urged for it on behalf of the respondent. Further
s. 16 (which deals with discretionary functions of a
Gaon Panchayat) provides in cl. (c) for filling in of
insanitary depressions and levelling of land-a clause
which would be unnecessary if" s~nitation •: has the
widest possible meaning. Clause (1) of s. 16 provides
for regulating the collection, removal and disposal of
manure and sweepings and making arrangement for
the disposal of carcases of animals, which again would
be covered by cl. (c}, if sanitation is to be given the
widest possible me\l>ning. Clause (m) provides for prohibiting or regulating the curing, tanning and dyeing
of skins within 220 yards of the abadi, which again
would be covered by the word " sanitation " if it had
the wide meaning urged on behalf of the respondent.
It would thus be clear that both in the District Boards
Act as well as in the Panchayat Raj Act when the
word "sanitation " has been used it has not been used
in its widest sense; it seems to have been used in its
ordinary meaning, i. e., the improvement of sanitary
1960
The District
Boan[, Ghazipur
v.
1.'Varain
Sharma
Wanchoo J.
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
conditions specially with regard to dirt and infection
and would thus be confined to matters of conservancy
and drainge and the like. In the context therefore of
both the District Boards Act and the Panchayat Raj
Act, it seems to us that the word " sanitation " as
used in s. 91 of the District Boards Act and s. 15 of
the Panchayat Raj Act is confined to its ordinary
meaning in relation to conservancy and drainage and
the like with reference to the necessity of avoiding
dirt and disease and cannot be given such a wide
meaning as to include control or regulation of trades,
callings or practices. Section 18 of the Panchayat
Raj Act gives a clear indication that it is the ordinary
meaning that is intended by the word "sanitation "
in cl. (c) of s. 15. Section 18 deals with improvement
of sanitation and provides that a Ga.on Panchayat
may by notice direct the owner or occupier of any
land or building, to close, remove, alter,
repair,
cleanse, disinfect or put in good order any latrine,
urinal, water-closet, drain, cesspool or other receptacle
for filth, sullage-water, rubbish or refuse and so on;
to cleanse, repair, cover, fill up, drain off, deepen or to
remove water from a private well, tank, reservoir,
pool, pit, depression or excavation therein which may·
appear to be injurious to health or offensive to the
neighbourhood ; to clear off any vegetation, undergtowth, prickly pear or scrub.jungle; and to remove
any dirt,, dung, nightsoil, manure or any noxious or
offensive matter therefrom and to cleanse the land or
building. It must therefore be held that the Panchayat Raj Act does;not provide for control and regulation of trades, callings or practices like s. 91 ( q) of the
District Boards Act.
It is however urged that even though ss. 15 and 16
do not specifically deal with control and regulation of
trades, callings or practices, s. 111 is.in very general
terms and gives powers to the prescribed authority to
frame any bye-laws relating to promotion or maintenance of health, safety and convenience of persons
residing within the jurisdiction of a Gaon Panchayat.
It is true that these words in s. 111 are of wide amplitude; but they cannot, in our opinion, be widened
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
beyond the duties imposed on a Ga.on Panchayat or
r96o
Ga.on Sabha under ss. 15 and 16 or any other proviTl
D"
.
sion of the Panchayat Raj Act. The bye-laws framed Boa:~. c':~::~ur
under section 111 which are for the promotion or
v.
maintenance of health, safety and convenience have
Lakshmi
also to be in furtherance of the administration of Gaon N arnin Sharma
Pa.ncha.yats under the Act.
Therefore if Gaon Pand
Wanchoo J.
chayats have administrative functions un er ss. 15
and 16 or any other provision of the Act, bye-laws
can be framed under s. 111 for these purposes in order
to further the administration of Gaon Panchayats.
But, if as we have held, Gaon Panchayats are not
invested with the duty to control and regulate trades,
callings and practices, there can be no question of
framing bye-laws in that behalf under s. 111 on the
basis of the wide words used therein. The power to
frame bye-laws under s. 111 is, in our opinion, conditioned by the duties and functions imposed on a Gaon
Panchayat under ss. 15 and 16 as well as other provisions of the Panchayat Raj Act. It is not in dispute
that ,there is no other provision of the Panchayat Raj
Act which imposes a duty on Gaon Pancha.yats to
control or regulate trades, callings or practices and
therefore the power under s. 111 does not extend to
prescribing bye-laws for that purpose. The only
other section to which our attention is drawn is
s. 37(d) by which a Gaon Sabha has been given the
power to impose a tax on trades, callings and professions, not exceeding such rate as may be prescribed.
This in our opinion has nothing to do with the regulation of trades, callings and practices and levying of
licence-fees in that behalf. What this provision refers
to is what is provided in item 60 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule and not fees properly so-called. We
are therefore of opinion that as the Panchayat Raj
Act does not provide for control or regulation of the
nature mentioned in a. 9l(q) of the District Boards
Act, there is no question of the power of the District
Board under s. 174 to frame bye-laws and to prescribe
fees in that behalf being taken away by s. 111 of the
Panchayat Raj Act. It seems that this aspect of the
matter was not argued in the High Court at all and it
1Z
r960
The Disttict
Board, G ha~ipur
v.
Lakshnii
Jllarain Shanna
Wanchoo j.
90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
appears to have been assumed there that the Panchayat Raj Act also provided for the same matter as was
covered bys. 9l(q) of the District Boards Act and it
was probably on that basis that the High Court held
that s. 111 of the Panchayat Raj Aot prevailed over
s. 174 of the District Boards Act.
In the view we
have taken it is not necessary to consider the alternative argument raised on behalf of the appellant in
respect of this point.
This brings us to the point which was not considered by the Appeal Court, though the learned Single
Judge had dealt with it and held against the respondent. That contention is that certain fees are being
levied on the respondent in respect of these mills
under the U. P. Rice and pal Mills Control Order, 1948
and the U. P. Pure Food Act and therefore the District Board cannot levy any further licence.fee under
s. 9l(q) of the District Boards Act read with s. 174.
As pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the fees
levied under the Control Order of 1948 which depends
for its existence on the Essential Supplies Act and
under the U. P. Pure Food Act are for different purposes of those Acts. The fee charged by the District
Boa.rd is for regulation of obnoxious trades and the
purpose of this regulation is different from the purpose
for which fees are levied under the Essential Supplies
Act and the Pure Food Aot. Under these circumstances we see no reason for striking down the regulatory
provisions made under the District Boards Act and
the licence-fee charged thereunder. The fact that
there may be some overlapping between the reg11latory provisions made under the U. P. Pure Food Act
and those made under the District Boards Act can
have no relevance on the validity of the bye-laws and
the licence-fee charged under them.
In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed,
the order of the Appeal Court set aside and the writ
petition dismissed. However, as the point on which
the appellant has succeeded in· this Court was not
specifically raised in the High Court, we order the
parties to bear their own costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
l
,.