# ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA

- **Citation:** [2010] 7 S.C.R. 1119
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-07-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2004
- **Bench:** Dr. B.S. Chauhan, Swatanter Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ashok-kumar-v-state-of-haryana-26878
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

PENAL CODE, 1860:
A
B
s. 304-8 rlw s.2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Dowry c
death - Conviction - Plea that every demand could not be
termed as dowry demand - HELD: The expressions 'or any
time after the marriage' and 'in connection with the marriage'
cover all demands made at the time, before or after the
marriage so far they were in connection with the marriage -
0
The expression 'demand for dowry' has to be construed
ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding the
expression - The expression 'in connection with the marriage'
has to be given a wider connotation - In the instant case, the
evidence of prosecution witnesses as also the defence witness
satisfied the ingredients of s. 304-8 - Conviction sustained -
E
Dowry Prohibition Ac,t, 1961 - s.2 - Evidence - Testimony of
defence witness - Interpretation of Statutes - Rule of ejusdem
generis.
s.304-8 - Expression 'soon before her death' - HELD:
Cannot be given a narrower meaning - Further, interpretation
given should be one which would further the object and cause
F
of the law enacted and avoid absurd result - For want of any
specific period, concept of reasonable period would be
applicable - Jn the instant case, there is evidence ofdernafld G
of money 20-22 days prior to incident and on failure to satisfy
the demand, victim subjected to harassment and torture when
she reached her matrimonial home 7-8 days prior to her
death - Interpretation of statutes - Doctrines - ·Concept of
reasonable period.
1119
H
1120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R.
A
s.304-8 - Dowry death - Presumption - HELD: The
legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to
provisions of s. 304-8 - Once prosecution proves its case with
regard to basic ingredients of s. 304-8, court will presume by
deemed fiction that the accused have caused the death of the
B bride - Interpretation of Statutes - Deeming fiction.
CONSTITUTION OF /NOIA, 1950:
Articles 136 and 142 - Exercise of power to award
appropriate sentence - Conviction and sentence of ten years
C RI awarded by courts below uls 304-8 /PC - HELD: Cruelty
and harassment to deceased was caused by her mother-inlaw and brother-in-law, who were acquitted by High Court -
Their acquittal was not challenged -
In the facts and
circumstances, in order to do complete justice in exercise of
o power under Article 142, sentence of accused reduced to
seven years RI - Penal Code, 1860 - S. 304-8 - Sentencing.
EVIDENCE:
Statements of witnesses - HELD: Have to be read in their
E entirety - There may be certain variations in the statements,
therefore, they should be appreciated and dealt with upon
their cumulative reading - Penal Code, 1960 - s. 304-8.
Defence witness - HELD: Defence would be bound by
the statement of the witness produced by it - Penal Code,
F s.304-8 IPC.
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
s.313- Recording of statement of accused - HELD: The
G purpose of the mandatory requirement is to put every
incriminating evidence to accused and to give him a fair
chance to offer his explanation - However, if the accused
makes a false statement, court may draw adverse inference
- In the instant case, accused failed to substantiate his
statement that the bride was in love with somebody else and
H
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1121
as she was not permitte<;I to marry according to her choice,
A
she committed suicide - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304-8.
s. 154 - FIR - Delay in registration - Dowry death -
Fifteen hours delay in registration of FIR - HELD: In the
circumstances of the case, there is no inordinate or 8
unexplained delay in lodging the FIR - Penal Code, 1860 -
s.304-8.
WORDS AND PHRASES:
Expressions 'or any time after the marriage', 'in c
connection with the marriage' occurring in s.2 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 and 'demand for dowry' used in s.3048 /PC - Connotation of.
The appellant was married on 9.10.1986, and his wife
died of burn injuries on 16.5.1988. The prosecution case
D
was that the appellant, his mother and brother harassed
and t

## Text

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[2010] 7 S.C.R. 1119
ASHOK KUMAR
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2004)
JULY 8, 2010
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
PENAL CODE, 1860:
A
B
s. 304-8 rlw s.2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Dowry c
death - Conviction - Plea that every demand could not be
termed as dowry demand - HELD: The expressions 'or any
time after the marriage' and 'in connection with the marriage'
cover all demands made at the time, before or after the
marriage so far they were in connection with the marriage -
0
The expression 'demand for dowry' has to be construed
ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding the
expression - The expression 'in connection with the marriage'
has to be given a wider connotation - In the instant case, the
evidence of prosecution witnesses as also the defence witness
satisfied the ingredients of s. 304-8 - Conviction sustained -
E
Dowry Prohibition Ac,t, 1961 - s.2 - Evidence - Testimony of
defence witness - Interpretation of Statutes - Rule of ejusdem
generis.
s.304-8 - Expression 'soon before her death' - HELD:
Cannot be given a narrower meaning - Further, interpretation
given should be one which would further the object and cause
F
of the law enacted and avoid absurd result - For want of any
specific period, concept of reasonable period would be
applicable - Jn the instant case, there is evidence ofdernafld G
of money 20-22 days prior to incident and on failure to satisfy
the demand, victim subjected to harassment and torture when
she reached her matrimonial home 7-8 days prior to her
death - Interpretation of statutes - Doctrines - ·Concept of
reasonable period.
1119
H
1120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R.
A
s.304-8 - Dowry death - Presumption - HELD: The
legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to
provisions of s. 304-8 - Once prosecution proves its case with
regard to basic ingredients of s. 304-8, court will presume by
deemed fiction that the accused have caused the death of the
B bride - Interpretation of Statutes - Deeming fiction.
CONSTITUTION OF /NOIA, 1950:
Articles 136 and 142 - Exercise of power to award
appropriate sentence - Conviction and sentence of ten years
C RI awarded by courts below uls 304-8 /PC - HELD: Cruelty
and harassment to deceased was caused by her mother-inlaw and brother-in-law, who were acquitted by High Court -
Their acquittal was not challenged -
In the facts and
circumstances, in order to do complete justice in exercise of
o power under Article 142, sentence of accused reduced to
seven years RI - Penal Code, 1860 - S. 304-8 - Sentencing.
EVIDENCE:
Statements of witnesses - HELD: Have to be read in their
E entirety - There may be certain variations in the statements,
therefore, they should be appreciated and dealt with upon
their cumulative reading - Penal Code, 1960 - s. 304-8.
Defence witness - HELD: Defence would be bound by
the statement of the witness produced by it - Penal Code,
F s.304-8 IPC.
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
s.313- Recording of statement of accused - HELD: The
G purpose of the mandatory requirement is to put every
incriminating evidence to accused and to give him a fair
chance to offer his explanation - However, if the accused
makes a false statement, court may draw adverse inference
- In the instant case, accused failed to substantiate his
statement that the bride was in love with somebody else and
H
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1121
as she was not permitte<;I to marry according to her choice,
A
she committed suicide - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304-8.
s. 154 - FIR - Delay in registration - Dowry death -
Fifteen hours delay in registration of FIR - HELD: In the
circumstances of the case, there is no inordinate or 8
unexplained delay in lodging the FIR - Penal Code, 1860 -
s.304-8.
WORDS AND PHRASES:
Expressions 'or any time after the marriage', 'in c
connection with the marriage' occurring in s.2 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 and 'demand for dowry' used in s.3048 /PC - Connotation of.
The appellant was married on 9.10.1986, and his wife
died of burn injuries on 16.5.1988. The prosecution case
D
was that the appellant, his mother and brother harassed
and tortured the bride for dowry; that one week prior to
the incident the deceased came to her parents and stated
that her husband wanted to set up a new business for
which he required a sum of Rs.5000/-; that her father
E
· could not manage the money due to which the accused
burnt her. The trial court convicted all the three accused
of the offence charged. On appeal, the High Court
acquitted the mother and the brother of the appellant.
It was contended for the appellant that every demand
F
by the husband or his family members could not be
termed as 'dowry demand' within the meaning of s.2 read
with s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and,
consequently, the death of the deceased could not be
termed as a 'dowry death' within the ambit and scope of G
s.304-8.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Explanation to s.304-8 IPC requires that the
H
1122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R.
A expression 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in s.2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, i.e. any pr9perty or
valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly by one party to another, by parents
of either party to each other or any other person at,
B before, or at any time after, the marriage and in
connection with the marriage of the said parties but does
not include dower or mahr under the Muslim Personal
Law. The expressions 'or any time after marriage' and 'in
connection with the marriage of the said parties'; which
c were introduced by amendments appear to have been
added in s.2 with the intention to cover all demands at
the time, before and even after the marriage so far they
were in connection with the. marriage of the parties. This
clearly shows the intent of the legislature that these
0 expressions are of wide meaning and scope and they
cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning.
However, the demand of dowry has to be 'in connection
with the marriage' and not so customary that it would not
attract, on the face of it, the provisions of the section.
E [para 10-11) [1133-H; 1134-A-E]
Madhu Sudan Malhotra v. K.C. Bhandari (1988) Supp.
1 SCC 424; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa
2004 (3) SCR 32 = (2004) 4 SCC 470; Ram Singh v. State
of Haryana 2008 (2) SCR 216 = (2008) 4 SCC 70; Satbir
F Singh v. State of Punjab 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 353 =AIR
2001 SC 2828 and Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra 2007
(1 ) SCR 164 = (2007) 9 SCC 721, referred to.
1.2. The courts have also taken the view that where
the husband had demanded a specific sum from his
G father-in-law and upon not being given, harassed and
tortured the wife and after some days she died, such
cases would clearly fall within the definition of 'dowry'
under the Act. [para 13) [1135-A-E]
H
1.3. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1123
any relative could be directly relatable to or in connection
A
with, any demand for dowry. The expression 'demand for
dowry' will have to be construed ejusdem generis to the
word immediately preceding this expression. Similarly, 'in ·
connection with the marriage' is an expression which
has to be given a wider connotation. [para 16] [1136-H;
B
1137-A-B]
1.4. In the instant case, PW-1, the father of the
deceased, stated that six months after the marriage of the
deceased, her husband and in-laws started harassing her
for insufficient dowry. He further stated that 20-22 days
C
prior to her death the deceased had told him that she was
being troubled for a sum of Rs.5000/- which was required
by her husband as he wanted to change his business.
PW-2 supported the statement of PW-1. PW-3 stated that
the husband of the deceased and her in-laws used to illD
treat the deceased and were demanding dowry and; that
he informed PW-1 about the death of the deceased due
to burn injuries. [para 25] [1144-G-H; 1145-A-G]
1.5. The most important witness was DW-3, the sister
E
of the deceased, aged about 14 years. She was examined
as defence witness. She stated that her sister (the
deceased) had complained that her husband and in-laws
demanded dowry and also used to give her be~ting; that
she came to their home 20 days prior to her death, and
F
told that her in-laws had demanded a T.V. and Rs.5,000/
-. This statement of DW-3 in cross,examination, in fact, is
clinching evidence. The defence would be bound by the
statement of the witness produced by it whatever be its
worth. On the face of the evidence adduced by PW-1 read
in conjunction with the statement of DW-3, the G
ingredients of s.304-B IPC have been satisfied. [para 26,
28 and 30) [1146-D-F; 1147-A-H]
1.6. There are certain variations or improvements in
the statements of PWs but all of them are of minor nature.
H
1124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R.
A The statements of the witnesses have to be read in their
entirety to examine their truthfulness and the veracity or
otherwise. It will neither be just nor fair to pick up just a
line from the entire statement and appreciate that
evidence out of context and without reference to the
B preceding and subsequent lines. It is always better and
in the interest of both the parties that the statements of
the witnesses are appreciated and dealt with by courts
upon their cumulative reading. [para 28] [1147-B-E]
Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan 2007 (11 ) SCR 219 =
C (2007) 14 sec 176, relied on.
2.1. The words 'soon before her death' used in s.3048 IPC cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning.
They must be understood in their plain language and
o with reference to their meaning in common parlance.
These are the provisions relating to human behaviour
and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower
meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the
provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal
E provisions and must receive strict construction: But, even
the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions
have to be read in conjunction with other relevant
provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the
interpretation given should be one which would avoid
absurd results on the one hand, and would further the
F object and cause of the law so enacted, on the other.
[para 14] [1136-F-H; 1136-A-B]
2.2. The concept of reasonable time is the best
criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination of
G such cases. There should be a reasonable, if not direct,
nexus between the death and the dowry related cruelty
or harassment inflicted on the deceased. For want of any
specific period, the concept of reasonable period would
be applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand
H of dowry should not be so ancient whereafter the couple
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1125
and the family members have lived happily and that it
A
would result in abuse of the said protection. These
matters will have to be examined on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. In the instant case, there
is definite evidence to show that nearly 20-22 days prior
to the
1incident, the deceased had come to her parental s
home and informed her father ~bout the demand of Rs.
5,000/- and harassment and torture to which she was
subjected to by her husband and his relatives. Her father
had consoled her ensuring that he would try to arrange
for the same and thereafter took her at her matrimonial c
home 7 -8 days prior to her death. [para 15 and 29] [1136B-G; 1147-F·G]
Tarsem singh .vs. State of punjab 2008 (17) SCR 379 =
2009 AIR 1454 and Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2004) 3 sec 98, referred to.
3. The legislature has applied the concept of
deeming fiction to the provisions of s.304-B IPC. Once the
prosecution proves its case with regard to the basic
ingredients of s.304-B, the court will presume by deemed
fiction of law that the husband and/or his relatives
complained of, have caused the death of the bride. Such
·a presumption can be drawn by the court keeping in view
the evidence, produced by the prosecution in support of
the substantive charge u/s 304-B.Of course, it would be
a rebuttable presumption. [para 18] [1138-A-E]
Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu 2003 (3) Suppl.
SCR 1 = AIR 2003 SC 3828, relied on.
D
E
F
4.1. It is a settled principle of law that dual purpose
G
is sought to be achieved when the courts comply with .
the mandatory requirement of recording the statement of
an accused u/s 313 CrPC. Firstly, every material piece of
evidence which the prosecution proposes to use against
the accused should be put to him in clear terms; and
H
1126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 7 S.C.R.
A secondly, the accused should have a fair chance to give
his explanation in relation to that evidence as well as his
own versions with regard to alleged involvement in the
crime. However, if the statements made by the accused
are false, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences.
B Further, the pr·ovisions of s. 313 (4) Cr.PC explicitly
provide that the answers given by the accused may be
taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put
in as evidence for or against the accused in any other
enquiry or trial for any other offence for which, such
C answers may tend to show he has committed. Thus, the
use of a statement u/s 313 of Cr.PC as an evidence is
permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its
own limitations. Courts may rely on a portion of the
statement of the accused and find him guilty in
0 consideration of the other evidence against him led by the
prosecution. However, such statements made under this
Section should not be considered in isolation but in
conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Another important caution that courts have declared is
that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely
E on the statement made u/s 313 Cr.PC as it cannot be
regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. [para 22-23]
[1141-G-H; 1143-B-F]
Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay AIR
F 1953 SC 247, referred to.
4.2. In the instant case, from various answers given
by the accused to the court in his statement recorded u/
s 313 Cr.P.C., it appears that the death of the deceased
by burning is not disputed. However, besides denying
G the case of the prosecution, the appellant took the stand
that he was falsely implicated in the crime. According to
him, the deceased was not happy with the marriage
inasmuch as she was in love with somebody else and
wanted to marry him and, as it was not permitted by her
H family, she committed suicide. It was for the accused to
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1127
prove his defence, but, he has led no evidence in this
A
regard and thus, the Court cannot believe this version put
forward by the accused. [para 24 and 30] (1144-C-E;
1145-H; 1146-A-B]
5. There is no inordinate or unexplained delay in
lodging the FIR. The incident occurred at 4.00 p.m. on
8
16.05.1988. The victim died at 9.00 p.m. on the same day.
The complainant family got the information of the death
from a relative, PW-3. Thereafter, they must have tried to
get the body subjected to the postmortem and have the
same released for performing the last rites. The FIR was
C
registered at 7.30 p.m. on 17.05.1988 which obviously
would mean that the complainant had reached the police
station even prior thereto. The conduct of the
complainant and the witnesses is in line with the
behaviour of a person of common prudence and the facts
D
and circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate
. proper exercise of due diligence on the part of these
witnesses. The FIR cannot be said to have been
registered belatedly. Even if the delay is presumed, it is
not of such a nature that would entail any benefit to the
E
accused. [para 31] (1048-C-H; 1049-A]
6.1. There being no infirmity in the concurrent
judgments of the Sessions Judge and the High Court,
there is no reason to interfere with the same in law or on
facts. Thus, the conviction of the accused is sustained.
[para 32] (1049-B]
F
6.2. As regards the quantum of punishment, it is not
even the case of the prosecution that at the time of
occurrence, the accused-appellant was present at home G
and he failed to protect or save the deceased from
burning which caused her death. Besides, the marriage
itself has survived for a short period of nearly one and a
half years. The cruelty and harassment to the deceased
H
1128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 7 S.C.R.
A was stated to have been caused by the mother-in-law and
the brother in law of the deceased. They have been
acquitted by the High Court for total lack of evidence.
Neither the State nor the complainant has preferred an
appeal against their acquittal. The accused is aged about
8 48 years. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case and in exercise of powers under Article 142
of the Constitution of India to do complete justice, the
Court is of the considered view that ends of justice would
be met by awarding the accused the minimum sentence
C provided in law, i.e. 7 years of rigorous imprisonment.
[para 33] [1049-C-F]
D
E
F
G
H
Case Law Reference:
2008 (2) SCR 216
referred to
para 12
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 353
referred to
para 12
(1988) Supp. 1 sec 424
referred to
para 12
2004 (3) SCR 32
referred to
para 12
2008 (17) SCR 379
referred to
para 15
(2004) 3 sec 98
referred to
para 15
2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 1
relied on
para 18
2007 (1) SCR 164
referred to
para 20
2007 (11) SCR219
relied on
para 21
AIR 1953 SC 247
referred to
para 23
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1489 of 2004.
From the Judgment & Order dated 16.12.2003 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
No. 38-SB of 1989.
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1129
Vijay R. Datar, Vined Jhanji, Jyoti Mendiratta and Balraj
A
Dewan for the Appellant.
Roopansh Purohit and Kamal Mohan Gupta for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Inter alia but primarily the
appellant has raised a question of law in the present appeal.
The contention is, that every demand by the husband or his
family members cannot be termed as 'dowry demand' within
C
the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short referred to as 'the Act') and
consequently, the death of the deceased cannot be termed as
a 'dowry death' within the ambit and scope of Section 304-8
of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the Code') and, as such,
D
the conviction and order of sentence passed against the
appellant is liable to· be set aside.
2. It is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the
question of law has to be examined in light of the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Thus, reference to the facts
E
giving rise to the present appeal would be necessary.
3. Vipin @ Chanchal @ Rekha, the deceased and Ashok
Kumar, the appellant herein, were married on 9th October,
1986. Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased had given
F
sufficient dowry at the time of her marriage according to his
means, desire and capacity. But, the appellant and his family
members i.e. Mukesh Kumar, the brother of the appellant and
Smt. Lajwanti, the mother of the appellant were not satisfied
with the dowry. They allegedly used to harass and maltreat the
G
deceased and used to give her beatings. They had demanded
a refrigerator, a television etc. One week prior to the date of
occurrence, the deceased came to the house of her father at
Kaithal and narrated the story. She specifically mentioned that
her husband wanted to set up a new business for which he
H
1130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 7 S.C.R.
A required a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. The father of the deceased could
not manage the same due to which the appellant and his family
members particularly, Lajwanti and Mukesh alleged to have
burnt the deceased by sprinkling kerosene oil on her as a result
of which the deceased died in the hospital at about 4.00 p.m.
B on 16.05.1988. The father of the deceased received
information of the incident from his sister's son Subhash
Chand. Neither the appellant nor his family members informed
him about the said demise.
The father of the deceased moved a complaint (Ex. PA)
C before SI Randhir Mohan who made endorsement (Ex. PA/1)
on the basis of which FIR (Ex. PL:) was recorded. This was
done by SI Randhir Mohan on the basis of ruqa (Ex. PQ)
received on 16.05 1988 at about 5.45 p.m. The deceased was
brought to the hospital as a burnt case in gasping condition and
D she expired in casualty. The said officer went to the General
Hospital, completed the proceedings under Section 174 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (for short 'the Cr.PC') and during
those proceedings he recorded the statements of Lajwanti,
mother in law of the deceased, Ram Lal, father in law of the
E deceased, Khem Chand, Harbans Lal and one Arjun Dass.
Thereafter, the body was sent for postmortem which was
handed over to Hanbans Lal, after the post mortem. The
complaint was made by Harbans Lal (PW-1) on 17th May, 1988.
Site Plan (Ex. PW) as well as the photographs (Ex. P-14 to PF 17) and their negatives (Ex. P-18 to P-21) were prepared by
Photographer Satish Kumar (PW-10). Ex. PS was also taken
into possession which was half burnt small tin, containing 3
litres of kerosene oil under Ex. PH which was sealed. Certain
other goods like hammer (Ex. PK), broken piece of a wooden
G door (Ex. P-11 ), half burnt match stick, match box etc (Ex. P12) were also taken into possession.
4. After completing the investigation of the case and
recording the statements of the relevant witnesses, the
Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet in terms of
H Section 173 of the Cr.PC. The case was committed to the Court
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1131
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of Sessions by the learned CJM vide his order dated 18th
A
October, 1988 which framed the charge under Section 304-8
of the Code read with Section 34 of the Code. Upon
completion of the evidence of prosecution, statement of the
accused under Section 313 of Cr.PC was recorded.
5. The learned Trial Court by a detailed judgment dated
8
13.01.1989/16.01.1989 held all the three accused viz., Ashok
Kumar, Mukesh Kumar and Lajwanti, guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 304-8 of the Code and vide order
of the same date, sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.
C
1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of
sentence passed by the Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal o
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh,
which was partially accepted. Lajwanti and Mukesh, the mother
and brother of the accused Ashok Kumar, were acquitted of
the offence under Section 304-8 of the Code while the
conviction of Ashok Kumar, accused was upheld and the order
E
of sentence was also maintained by the High Court.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 16th
December, 2003, Ashok Kumar, the appellant herein, has filed
the present appeal. While impugning the judgment under appeal
and besides raising the legal contention afore noticed, it is also
F
contended that the Courts below have failed to appreciate the
evidence in its correct perspective. The evidence brought on
record clearly show that there was no connection between the
death of the deceased and the alleged dowry demands or
alleged cruelty. Further, it is contended that there was delay in
G
registration of the FIR and no explanation has been rendered
whatsoever in that behalf. The occurrence was dated
16.05.1988 at 4.00 p.m. and the FIR was lodged on
17.05.1988, while the deceased died in the hospital on
16.05.1988. Unexplained and inordinate delay in lodging FIR
H
1132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R.
A (Ex. PU) creates a serious doubt on the case of the
prosecution. There were no specific allegations made in the FIR
with regard to dowry and the allegations made, in any case,
did not specify the basic ingredients of dowry demand. While
criticizing the serious contradiction between the statements of
B prosecution witnesses, it is also contended that the prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt
particularly, keeping in view the letters written (Ex. DB to DJ),
no offence could be established against the accused and, as
such, he is entitled to be acquitted.
C
8. On the contrary, it is argued on behalf of the State that
by virtue of cumulative effect of the statements of Harbans Lal,
the father of the deceased (PW-1), Krishna Rani, the mother
of the deceased (PW-2) and Subhash Chand (PW-3) read in
conjunction with documentary evidence and the statement of the
D Investigating Officer, the prosecution has been able to prove
the charge beyond any reasonable doubt. It is contended that
one witness, produced by the accused himself, has fully
corroborated the case of the prosecution and, as such, the
appellant was rightly convicted and sentenced by the Courts
E below and the judgment under appeal does not suffer from any
legal or other infirmity. According to the prosecution, the appeal
should be dismissed.
9. At the very outset, we would proceed to deal with the
F legal submissions made on behalf of the appellant. But before
that, we must notice that the appellant was neither charged with
the offence under Section 4 of the Act nor he has been found
guilty of the said offence. Thus, the submissions have to be
examined only from the point of view that the appellant has been
convicted for an offence under Section 304-B of the Code and
G the provisions of the Act are relevant only for examining the
merit or otherwise of the contention raised that the expression
'dowry', as per explanation to the provisions of Section 304-B
of the Code, has to be given the same meaning as in Section
2 of the Act.
H
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1133
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
10. The appellant was charged with an offence under
A
Section 304-8 of the Code. This penal section clearly spells
out the basic ingredients as well as the matters which required
to be construed strictly and with significance to the cases where
death is caused by burns, bodily injury or the death occurring
otherwise than under normal circumstances, in any manner,
B
within 7 years of a marriage. It is the first criteria which the
prosecution must prove. Secondly, that 'soon before her death'
she had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the
husband or any of the relatives of the husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry then such a death shall c
be called 'dowry death' and the husband or the relative, as the
case may be, will be deemed to have caused such a death.
Explanation to this section requires that the expression 'dowry'
shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act. The
definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Act reads as under : 0
"In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security
given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other
person,
E
at or before [or any time after the marriage] (in connection
F
with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include]
dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation 11.--The expression "valuable security" has the
G
same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860)."
11. From the above definition it is clear that, 'dowry' means
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly by one party to another, by parents
H
1134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R.
A of either party to each other or any other person at, before, or
at any time after the marriage and in connection with the
marriage of the said parties but does no! include dower or mahr
under the Muslim Personal Law. All the expressions used under
this Section are of a very wide magnitude. The expressions 'or
B any time after marriage' and 'in connection with the marriage
of the said parties' were introduced by amending Act 63 of
1984 and Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 02.10.1985 and
19.11.1986 respectively. These amendments appear to have
been made with the intention to cover all demands at the time,
c before and even after the marriage so far they were in
connection with the marriage of the said parties. This clearly
shows the intent of the legislature that these expressions are
of wide meaning and scope. The expression 'in connection with
the marriage' cannot be given a restricted or a narrower
0 meaning. The expression 'in connection with the marriage' even
in common parlance and on its plain language has to be
understood generally. The object being that everything, which
is offending at any time i.e. at, before or after the marriage,
would be covered under this definition, but the demand of dowry
has to be 'in connection with the marriage' and not so customary
E that it would not attract, on the face of it, the provisions of this
section.
12. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to certain
examples showing what has and has not been treated by the
F Courts as 'dowry'. This Court, in the case of Ram Singh v.
State of Haryana ((2008) 4 SCC 70], held that the payments
which are customary payments, for example, given at the time
of birth of a child or other ceremonies as are prevalent in the
society or families to the marriage, would not be covered under
G the expression 'dowry'. Again, in the case of Satbir Singh v.
State of Punjab [AIR 2001 SC 2828], this Court held that the
word 'dowry' should be any property or valuable given or
agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. The
customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other
H ceremonies are not covered within the ambit of the word
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1135
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
'dowry'. This Court, in the case of Madhu Sudan Malhotra v.
A
K. C. Bhandari [(1988) Supp. 1 SCC 424], held that furnishing
of a list of ornaments and other household articles such as
refrigerator, furniture and electrical appliances etc., to the
parents or guardians of the bride, at the time of settlement of
the marriage, prima facie amounts to demand of dowry within
B
the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. The definition of 'dowry'
is not restricted to agreement or demand for payment of dowry
before and at the time of marriage but even include subsequent
demands, was the dictum of this Court in the case of State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa [(2004) 4 SCC 470).
c
13. The Courts have also taken the view that where the
husband had demanded a specific sum from his father-in-law
and upon not being given, harassed and tortured the wife and
after some days she died, such cases would clearly fall within
the definition of 'dowry' under the Act. Section 4 of the Act is
D
the Renal Section and demanding a 'dowry', as defined under
Section 2 of the Act, is punishable under this section. As
already noticed, we need not deliberate on this aspect, as the
accused before us has neither been charged nor punished for
that offence. We have examined the provisions of Section 2 of
E
the Act in a very limited sphere to deal with the contentions
raised in regard to the applicability of the provisions of Section
304-B of the Code.
14. We have already referred to the provisions of Section
F
304-8 of the Code and the most significant expression used
in the Section is 'soon before her death'. In our view, the
expressions 'soon before her death' cannot be given a
restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in
their plain language and with reference to their meaning in
G
common parlance. These are the provisions relating to human
behaviour and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower
meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the provisions
of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must
receive strict construction. But, even the rule of strict
H
1136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 7 S.C.R.
A construction requires that the provisions have to be read in
conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the
Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would
avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the
object and cause of the law so enacted on the other.
B
15. We are of the considered view that the concept of
reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for
appreciation and examination of such cases. This Court in the
case of Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 2009 SC 1454),
held that the legislative object in providing such a radius of time
C by employing the words 'soon before her death' is to
emphasize the idea that her death should, in all probabilities,
has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other
words, there should be a rec:sonable, if not direct, nexus
between her death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment
D inflicted on her. Similar view was expressed by this Court in
the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2004) 3
SCC 98], where this Court stated that determination of the
period would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given
case. However, the expression would normally imply that there
E has to be reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and
the death in question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom
would have specified any period which would attract the
provisions of this Section. However, there must be existence
of proximate link between the acts of cruelty. along with the
F demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any
specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be
applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry
should not be so ancient whereafter, the couple and the family
members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse
G of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not
strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions
unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. These
matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts and
circumstances of a given case.
H
16. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1137
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
relative could be directly relatable to or in connection with, any
A
demand for dowry. The expression 'demand for dowry' will have
to be construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately
preceding this expression. Similarly, 'in connection with the
marriage' is an expression which has to be given a wider
connotation. It is of some significance that these expressions
B
should be given appropriate meaning to avoid undue
harassment or advantage to either of the parties. These are
penal provisions but ultimately these are the social legislations,
intended to control offences relating to the society as a whole.
Do_v1ffY is something which existed in our country for a c
considerable time and the legislature in its wisdom considered
it appropriate to enact the law relating to dowry prohibition so
as to ensure that any party to the marriage is not harassed or
treated with cruelty for satisfaction of demands in consideration
and for subsistence of the marriage.
o
17. The Court cannot ignore one of the cardinal principles
of criminal jurisprudence that a suspect in the Indian law is
entitled to the protection of Article 20 of the Constitution of India
as well as has a presumption of innocence in his favour. In other
words, the rule of law requires a person to be innocent till proved
E
guilty. The concept of deeming fiction is hardly applicable to
the criminal jurisprudence. In contradistinction to this aspect, the
legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to the
provisions of Section 304-8. Where ot-her ingredients of
Section 304-B are satisfied, in that event, the husband or all
F
relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. In other
words, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed
by fiction of law. Once the prosecution proves its case with
regard to the basic ingredients of Section 304-B, the Court will
presume by deemed fiction of law that the husband or the
G
relatives complained of, has caused her death. Such a
presumption can be drawn by the Court keeping in view the
evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the
substantive charge under Section 304-B of the Code.
H
1138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 7 S.C.R
A
18. Of course, deemed fiction would introduce a rebuttable
presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading
their defence and proving that the ingredients of Section 3048 were not satisfied, rebut the same. While referring to raising
of presumption under Section 304-8 of the Code, this Court,
8
in the case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2003
SC 3828], stated the following ingredients which should be
satisfied :
"4 .................. .
C
(1)
The question before the Court must be whether the
D
E
accused has committed the dowry death of a
woman. (This means that the presumption can be
raised only if the accused is being tried for the
offence under Section 304-8, IPC).
(2)
The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or his relatives.
(3)
Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.
(4)
Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her
death."
19. In light of the above essential ingredients, for
F constituting an offence under Section 304-8 of the Code, the
Court has to attach specific significance to the time of alleged
cruelty and harassment to which the victim was subjected to
and the time of her death, as well as whether the alleged
demand of dowry was in connection with the marriage. Once
G these ingredients are satisfied, it would be called the 'dowry
death' and then, by deemed fiction of law, the husband or the
relatives would be deemed to have committed that offence. The
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while relying upon
the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), contended that the concept
of 'soon before the death' is not attracted in relation to the
H alleged harassment or cruelty inflicted upon the deceased, in
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
1139
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the facts of the present case. The oral and documentary
A
evidence produced by the prosecution does not suggest and
satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence.
20. Similarly, reference was also made to the judgment
of this Court in the case of Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra
[(2007) 9 SCC 721], to substantiate the contention that there
B
was no co-relation between giving or taking of the property with
the marriage of the parties and, as such, the essential
ingredients of Section 2 of the Act were missing. Accordingly,
it is argued that there was no demand of dowry by the appellant
but it was merely an understanding that for his better business,
C
at best, the amounts could be given voluntarily by the father of
the deceased. This fact was further sought to be substantiated
while referring to the following abstracts of the judgment in the
case of Appasaheb (supra):
"6 ........ The learned trial Judge then sought clarification
from the witnesses by putting the following question:
"Question: What do you mean by 'domestic cause'?
D
Answer: What I meant was that there was a demand for
E
money for defraying expenses of manure, etc. and that was
the cause."
In the very next paragraph she stated as under:
"It is not true to suggest that in my statement before the
police I never said that ill-treatment was as a result of
demand for money from us and its fulfilment. I cannot
assign any reason why police did not write about it in my
statement."
xxx
xxx xxx
xxx
9.