# ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2021] 9 S.C.R. 1162
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2021-11-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6915 of 2021
- **Bench:** K. M. Joseph, S. Ravindra Bhat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/assa-singh-d-by-lrs-v-shanti-parshad-d-by-lrs-others-35298
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953:
s. 25 - Bar of jurisdiction of the civil court under - When the
landlord-tenant relationship is disputed in a proceeding u/s. 14A -
Held: If a landlord-tenant relationship is disputed, despite the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Court, to even order
eviction of a tenant, the Civil Court would still retain jurisdiction in
a case, despite the bar u/s. 25 - Thus, the validity of the orders u/s.
14A is open to scrutiny in a Civil Court, in a situation, when the
tenant denies and disputes the case of the landlord that there is a
landlord-tenant relationship - However, a mere plea by the tenant,
should not render the Authorities helpless and bereft of power to
order eviction - In a situation, where the Authority finds the plea of
the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt at blocking
the proceedings, the validity enacted u/s. 25 cannot be diluted - On
facts, appellant claiming to have purchased the suit property from
Mahant, the previous landlord filed application for ejectment of
respondent No. 1-tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent which
was allowed by the Assistant Collector and thereafter, upheld by
the Collector and the Commissioner - First respondent then filed
suit seeking declaration that the suit property is owned by a Mandir,
the Mahant having sold it to appellant as manager of the Mandir
without having any title in the property- Suit decreed by the trial
court holding that the Mandir was the owner and no rights were
conveyed to the appellants under the sale - Thereafter, appeal as
also Second Appeal by the appellants dismissed - Appellants claim
under an assignment made by the Mahant, who has been found to
be without Authority to convey any right to the appellants - In such
circumstances, it cannot be said that the suit filed by tenant is clearly
barred - s. 14A.
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s. 25 - Exclusion of courts and authorities - Interpretation
of - Explained.
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887: ss. 40-45, 75-78, 80, 82, 84, 88,
89, 98-100 - Provisions pertaining to ejectment of tenant -
Provisions pertaining to jurisdiction and procedure - Stated.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953
received the assent of the President on 15.04.1953. The Act went
on to introduce the concept of permissible area, which was
defined in the Act. It further provided for protection of the tenant
from being evicted except in certain circumstances.
[Para 15][1176-A-B]
1.2 The submission of the respondent, who successfully
instituted the Suit in question and prosecuted the same, is that
the bar on the Section 25 will not apply, having regard to the fact
that there is a dispute relating to the very existence of landlordtenant relationship; and that the ouster of the Civil Court's
jurisdiction does not apply in view of the fact that plaintiff-tenant
does not admit that the appellants are his landlords. Such a
question cannot be decided by the Authority in an action under
Section 14A of the Act. Equally, the incompetency is applicable
to the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Body, viz., the
Collector and the Commissioner. In fact, the Financial
Commissioner rightly opined that it is a matter for consideration
by a Civil Court. [Para 21][1178-C-E]
1.3 The application for ejectment was filed by the appellants
claiming to have purchased the rights of the previous landlord by
way of sale deed. The dispute was whether the Mandir was the
owner and the Mahant was competent in his own rights to convey
the rights of the land owner. The Assistant Collector, Collector
and the Commissioner repelled the contention of the respondenttenant, by holding that in view of the transfer by the sale deed
dated 16.11.1956 by the Mahant, the appellants became landlords,
competent to eject the respondent-tenant. The findings of the
Civil Courts, on the other hand, is that the respondent-tenant
has never paid rent and attorned to the appellants and the

## Text

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[2021] 9 S.C.R.
 [2021] 9 S.C.R. 1162
1162
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs.
v.
SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 6915 of 2021)
NOVEMBER 17, 2021
[K. M. JOSEPH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953:
s. 25 - Bar of jurisdiction of the civil court under - When the
landlord-tenant relationship is disputed in a proceeding u/s. 14A -
Held: If a landlord-tenant relationship is disputed, despite the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Court, to even order
eviction of a tenant, the Civil Court would still retain jurisdiction in
a case, despite the bar u/s. 25 - Thus, the validity of the orders u/s.
14A is open to scrutiny in a Civil Court, in a situation, when the
tenant denies and disputes the case of the landlord that there is a
landlord-tenant relationship - However, a mere plea by the tenant,
should not render the Authorities helpless and bereft of power to
order eviction - In a situation, where the Authority finds the plea of
the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt at blocking
the proceedings, the validity enacted u/s. 25 cannot be diluted - On
facts, appellant claiming to have purchased the suit property from
Mahant, the previous landlord filed application for ejectment of
respondent No. 1-tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent which
was allowed by the Assistant Collector and thereafter, upheld by
the Collector and the Commissioner - First respondent then filed
suit seeking declaration that the suit property is owned by a Mandir,
the Mahant having sold it to appellant as manager of the Mandir
without having any title in the property- Suit decreed by the trial
court holding that the Mandir was the owner and no rights were
conveyed to the appellants under the sale - Thereafter, appeal as
also Second Appeal by the appellants dismissed - Appellants claim
under an assignment made by the Mahant, who has been found to
be without Authority to convey any right to the appellants - In such
circumstances, it cannot be said that the suit filed by tenant is clearly
barred - s. 14A.
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s. 25 - Exclusion of courts and authorities - Interpretation
of - Explained.
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887: ss. 40-45, 75-78, 80, 82, 84, 88,
89, 98-100 - Provisions pertaining to ejectment of tenant -
Provisions pertaining to jurisdiction and procedure - Stated.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953
received the assent of the President on 15.04.1953. The Act went
on to introduce the concept of permissible area, which was
defined in the Act. It further provided for protection of the tenant
from being evicted except in certain circumstances.
[Para 15][1176-A-B]
1.2 The submission of the respondent, who successfully
instituted the Suit in question and prosecuted the same, is that
the bar on the Section 25 will not apply, having regard to the fact
that there is a dispute relating to the very existence of landlordtenant relationship; and that the ouster of the Civil Court's
jurisdiction does not apply in view of the fact that plaintiff-tenant
does not admit that the appellants are his landlords. Such a
question cannot be decided by the Authority in an action under
Section 14A of the Act. Equally, the incompetency is applicable
to the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Body, viz., the
Collector and the Commissioner. In fact, the Financial
Commissioner rightly opined that it is a matter for consideration
by a Civil Court. [Para 21][1178-C-E]
1.3 The application for ejectment was filed by the appellants
claiming to have purchased the rights of the previous landlord by
way of sale deed. The dispute was whether the Mandir was the
owner and the Mahant was competent in his own rights to convey
the rights of the land owner. The Assistant Collector, Collector
and the Commissioner repelled the contention of the respondenttenant, by holding that in view of the transfer by the sale deed
dated 16.11.1956 by the Mahant, the appellants became landlords,
competent to eject the respondent-tenant. The findings of the
Civil Courts, on the other hand, is that the respondent-tenant
has never paid rent and attorned to the appellants and the Mandir
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& OTHERS
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was the owner and no rights were conveyed to the appellants
under the sale. [Para 22][1178-E-G]
2.1 Section 14A of the Act provides that the Assistant
Collector is to proceed as provided for in sub section 2 of Section
10 of the Act and the provisions of sub section 3 of Section 10
was to apply in relation to such application. Section 10 (2) declares
that on the receipt of an application the Assistant Collector after
giving to the parties notice in writing and the reasonable
opportunity to be heard determine the dispute summarily and
shall keep a memorandum of evidence and a gist of his final order
with brief reasons therefor. Section 10 (3) on the other hand
provides that when an application has been made which in the
context of Section 14A must be read as an application under
Section 14A, any proceeding in relation to the same matter
pending in any other court or before any other authority shall be
stayed on receipt of information by that court or authority from
the Assistant Collector that he has received an application under
Section 14A. The effect of Section 10 (3) further would be that all
proceedings in a court or before any authority shall lapse when
the dispute has been determined by the Assistant Collector acting
under the Act.There are two aspects which emerge. The first
aspect is that the Assistant Collector acting under Section 14A
read with Section 10 (2) must give a reasonable opportunity to
the tenant and determine the dispute summarily. This is an
important pointer to the nature of the power which is exercised
by the Assistant Collector. In a case of a dispute raised by the
tenant about the very existence of the landlord-tenant
relationship, in a provision which contemplates evicting a person
who is the tenant, the duty to render a summary decision appears
incongruous with the imperative need for the authority to be able
to unravel the many dimensions of a dispute which is genuinely
raised by the tenant about there being a landlord-tenant
relationship. In other words what is to be rendered is a summary
decision and justice would neither be done to the nature of the
power enjoyed by the Assistant Collector nor to the right of a
party to seek redress in a Civil Court otherwise, unless the power
of the Civil Court is preserved. [Paras 46-48][1196-C, F-H;
1197-A-D]
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Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC
547:[1962] SCR 673 - referred to.
2.2 The other aspect which emerges is that Section 10(3)
which contemplates proceedings in relation to the same matter
in any other court or authority being stayed, when such court or
authority is informed by the Assistant Collector of having received
an application under Section 14A read with Section 10. The law
giver has however provided that the Assistant Collector must
proceed with the application but determine the dispute summarily.
Upon the dispute being determined by the Assistant Collector
the proceedings which were stayed by the court or any other
authority would lapse. This sub section gives the impression that
the powers of the Assistant Collector are meant to be exhaustive.
[Para 49][1197-E-F]
2.3 An application for ejectment of a tenant is to be made
before the Assistant Collector under Section 14A. Such an
application is to be decided after giving notice and it is to be
decided summarily. Since the exclusive power to decide the
application to evict the tenant has been conferred on the Assistant
Collector, the law giver has further contemplated that after receipt
of such an application by the Assistant Collector no other court
or authority is to proceed with 'any case relating to the same
matter' upon being informed by the Assistant Collector of the
receipt of the application under Section 14A. What is more such
proceeding is to lapse after the determination of the dispute by
the Assistant Collector. The law giver no doubt does contemplate
an exclusive and expeditious remedy for the landlord to seek
eviction brooking no over lapping of jurisdiction by exercise of
power by any other court or authority on a parallel basis. However,
this provision cannot mean that when the very existence landlordtenant relationship is brought under a cloud by the tenant raising
a dispute then the very premise on which the exclusive jurisdiction
conferred on the Assistant Collector is not overturned. In other
words, the law giver has proceeded on the basis that the Assistant
Collector is clothed with the power to decide a matter relating to
eviction in a summary fashion. This would be inconsistent with
scenario where the very existence of the landlord-tenant
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relationship is disputed. The law giver in other words proceeds
on an assumption that the application made by the landlord is
against a person who is indeed the tenant. [Para 50][1197-G-H;
1198-A-D]
2.4 What is contemplated is that during the pendency of
the proceeding before the Assistant Collector even a suit in a
civil court where the title of the landlord is questioned or in other
words there is a challenge thrown to the very existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship is not permitted. Even in such a
scenario after the conclusion of the proceeding, in the light of
the decisions of this court starting with Magiti Sasamal's case,
Raja Durga Singh's case and Richpal Singh's case, would apply
and the bar under Section 25 would not available. The Civil Court
would have the power in a case where without it being a frivolous
challenge to the landlord tenant-relationship, in a genuine dispute
relating to landlord-tenant relationship, the orders passed by the
authorities under the Act can be found to be null and void for the
reason that transgressing the power conferred, the authorities
proceed to decide the matter, (which again it must be remembered
under Section 10 (2) is to be a summary decision) which is the
vexed issue relating to the very existence of the landlord-tenant
relationship. [Para 51][1198-D-G]
Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC 547 :
[1962] SCR 673; Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v.
Tholu and others AIR 1963 SC 361 : [1963] SCR 693;
Richpal Singh and others v. Dalip (1987) 4 SCC 410 :
[1988] 1 SCR 93 - referred to.
2.5 The words used in Section 25 of the Act, is that except
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the validity of any
proceeding or Order, taken or made under the Act, cannot be
questioned in any Court or before any other Authority. In other
words, an Order passed under Section 14A, could be challenged
by way of an Appeal, Review and Revision, as provided in the
Tenancy Act, adverted to in Section 24 of the Act. This explained,
the question perseveres, however, as to whether the validity of
proceeding or Order passed, is beyond challenge in a Civil Court,
under circumstances analogous to that obtaining, with reference
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to a proceeding under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. In
other words, Section 77 of the Tenancy Act, inter alia, provided
for seeking eviction of a tenant before the Revenue Officer.
Section 14A of the Act, similarly, confers powers upon the
Revenue Officer, to entertain an application for evicting a tenant.
[Para 52][1198-G-H; 1199-A-C]
Amar Singh and others v. Dalip (1981) ILR 3 P&H
582 - referred to
2.6 The principles relating to exclusion of Civil Court's
jurisdiction are well-settled. Ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is not readily inferred. In the scheme of the Tenancy Act
also, an Order under Section 77 could be subjected to Appeal,
Review and Revision, as provided in the Act. Section 77(3) of
the Tenancy Act, purported to confer exclusive power on the
Revenue Court to decide certain disputes and ousted jurisdiction
of courts. This included the proceeding to evict the tenant. In
other words, Civil Court could not entertain the application to
evict a tenant. It is in this statutory framework that this Court
has stated the view that if a landlord-tenant relationship is
disputed, despite the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Revenue Court, to even Order eviction of a tenant, the Civil
Court would still retain jurisdiction in a case where there is a
dispute relating to landlord-tenant relationship. The Act was
enacted in 1953. Section 14A of the Act, provided for the eviction
of a tenant notwithstanding anything contained in any other law.
Therefore, apart from the fact that it became an exhaustive
catalogue of circumstances, entitling the landlord to launch
proceedings for eviction and also further designating the Statutory
Authority, before which, it could be filed, it provided for a bar to
challenge the validity of the orders passed, except by way of the
remedies provided under the Tenancy Act. There would not be
any justification for revisiting the principle laid down that when
the relationship between landlord and tenant is contested, the
Civil Court continue to have the jurisdiction despite the bar under
Section 25 of the Act. There is no reason to hold that the validity
of the Order passed by the Assistant Collector, as may be upheld
in Appeal, Review or Revision, cannot be questioned in a Civil
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Court, if the expression "validity" is conflated with legality. In
other words, if an Order is illegal, it would be invalid. The illegality
of an Order can arise out of various causes. An Order may be
illegal, and therefore, invalid, on the ground that the Author of
the Order, in this case, the Authorities designated under Section
14A, did not have the power to decide the issue. In this case, the
concern is with illegality due to absence of power. This Court is
not called upon to decide the position, where the Authority, under
the Act, violates the fundamental procedure relating to natural
justice and the Civil Court is invited to sit in Judgment over the
same. It is found that the expression "validity of the decision or
the Order" in Section 25 of the Act, would not include a case
where, despite a dispute projected, that there was no landlordtenant relationship, the Authority decides the said issue in the
course of the Order of Eviction, under Section 14A, after brushing
aside the tenant's objection relating to his position, viz., that he
is not a tenant. In such a situation, the validity is tied-up with the
fundamental aspect of absence of power of the Authority to decide
on the question of landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, the
validity of the orders under Section 14A is open to scrutiny in a
Civil Court, in a situation, when the tenant denies and disputes
the case of the landlord that there is a landlord-tenant relationship.
However, a mere plea by the tenant, should not lead, without
anything more, to render the Authorities helpless and bereft of
power to order eviction. In a situation, where, the Authority finds
the plea of the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt
at blocking the proceedings, the validity enacted under Section
25, cannot be diluted. The position must be understood as that
the power to decide, cannot be assigned to the Authorities under
the Act, of the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship.
[Para 53][1199-C-H; 1200-A-F]
3. The case of the appellants is that of failure to pay rent by
the respondent-tenant. The tenant claims to be a tenant under
the Mandir, which has been found to be the owner of the property.
Appellants claim under an assignment made by the Mahant, who
has been found to be without Authority to convey any right to the
appellants. In such circumstances, the submission of the
appellants is meritless. [Paras 54, 55][1200-F-G]
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Shankar Singh Etc. v. Mangal Singh Etc. AIR 1973
P&H 307; State of Punjab (now Haryana) and others
v. Amar Singh and another (1974) 2 SCC 70 : [1974] 3
SCR 152; Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union
of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929;
Kamla Devi Widow of Hans Raj, etc. v. Financial
Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab and others (2013)
SCC Online P&H 7911; Bhagwat Sharan (Dead
Through Legal Representatives) v. Purushottam and
others (2020) 6 SCC 387; Heman and another
Appellants v. Tulsi Ram R.S.A. No. 1511 of 1970;
Chandu Lal v. Kalia and Goria Civil Revision No. 849
of 1973; Kul Bhushan etc. v. Faquira and others L.P.A.
No. 35 of 1974; Ramzani v. Abad Shah R.S.A. No. 1975
of 1971; Jia Lal and another v. State of Haryana and
others Writ Petition No. 1785 of 1968; Jaswant Rai
and another v. Bhagwan Dass and another R.S.A. No.
1120 of 1963; Raja Ram and another v. Raghubir Singh
and another Civil Writ No. 1288 of 1967; Khazan Singh
another v. Dalip Singh and another L.P.A. No. 623 of
1968; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Ratan Singh and
another (1964) 1 SCR 259 - referred to
Case Law Reference
AIR 1973 P&H 307
referred to
Para 24
[1974] 3 SCR 152
referred to
Para 24
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929
referred to
Para 24
(2020) 6 SCC 387
referred to
Para 24
(1964) 1 SCR 259
referred to
Para 37
[1962] SCR 673
referred to
Para 48, 51
[1963] SCR 693
referred to
Para 51
[1988] 1 SCR 93
referred to
Para 51
(1981) ILR 3 P&H 582
referred to
Para 52
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6915
of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.02.2004 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No.1777 of 1981.
Ms. Archna Midha, Vineet Bhagat, K. G. Bhagat, Ms. Manju
Bhagat, Mohit Gulati, Advs. for the Appellants.
Tarun Jindal, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. An application for Ejectment was filed by the Appellants and
Proforma Respondents 2 to 21 for ejectment of Respondent No. 1 on
the ground of non- payment of rent. The application was filed under the
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 hereinafter referred to as
'the Act'.The application was allowed by the Assistant Collector1st Grade,
Ferozepur by Order dated 13.09.1972. The appeal filed by the first
respondent before the Collector, Ferozepur under Section 24 of 'the
Act'was dismissed vide order dated 04.09.1973. The Commissioner by
order dated 04.02.1974 on revision filed by the first respondent
recommended to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab for setting aside
the order leaving the parties to seek relief through the Civil Court. This
reference was disallowed and the revision petition of the first respondent
was dismissed by the Commissioner, Punjab vide his order dated
22.08.1974. The review filed by the first respondent was dismissed. The
first respondent instituted a Suit wherein the relief sought as noted in the
judgment of the Trial Court is:
"... declaration to the effect that agricultural land measuring 594
kanals 17 marlas as per details given in the heading of the plaint,
situated in Jhoke Harl Har, Tehsil Ferozepure as entered in
Jamabandi for the year 1965-66 is owned by Mandir Jhoke Hari
Har (Public Religious Endowment) through Shri Inder Singh son
of Harnam Singh resident of village Jhoke Hari Har, one of the
worshippers and defacto trustee of Mandir Jhoke Hari Har
(defendant No.18) and defendant No. 1 to 17 have got no concern
with the land and a decree for ejectment of land in dispute obtained
by defendant No. 1 to 17 against the plaintiff from the Assistant
Collector Grade-I, Ferozepure is nullity and without jurisdiction
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with consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the
defendants No. I to 17 from taking actual possession of the suit
land."
3. The Trial Court, by Judgment dated 18.11.1978, decreed the
Suit. The Appeal carried by the appellants before the 1st Additional District
Judge, Ferozepur, was dismissed. By the impugned Decree and Judgment,
the Regular Second Appeal No. 1777 of 1981, has been dismissed.
4. We heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants and learned
Counsel for the Respondents. The only question, which falls for our
decision, revolves around the interpretation of Section 25 of the Act.
Section 25 of the Act reads as follows:
"Section 25. Exclusion of courts and authorities - Except in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, the validity of any
proceedings or order taken or made under this Act shall not be
called in question in any court or before any other authority."
5. In other words, the only contention asserted by the appellants
is that the suit filed by the first respondent is clearly barred. On the other
hand, the contention of the respondents is that, having regard to both the
facts and law, the Suit is maintainable.
THE FINDINGS IN THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
6. It is necessary to notice the case of the appellants. They claim
that they purchased the suit property which measured 594 Kanals and
17 Marlas by sale deed dated 16.11.1956 from Mahant Ramji Dass. The
first respondent was the tenant in the said land. The case of the first
respondent, on the other hand, was that, he obtained the Suit land on
lease on 20.10.1955 from Mahant Ramji Dass as the Manager of the
Mandir for a period of five years on payment of Rs.1,000/- per annum
as rent. Thereafter, the suit property was leased to him for a period of
20 years from 1960 to 1980. While so, it is the further case of the first
respondent that Mahant Ramji Dass sold the Suit land to the appellants
vide registered sale deed dated 16.11.1956,without having any title in the
property, as the property belonged to the Mandir. Thus, the first
respondent set up the case that he was not a tenant under the appellants.
Resultantly the order passed for eviction was null and void being without
jurisdiction. The appellants took up the contention that the land was the
personal property of Mahant Ramji Dass and on failure of the first
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respondent as tenant to pay the rent the application before the Revenue
Court was perfectly maintainable.
7. The Trial Court framed 8 issues. They are as follows: -
"l. Whether the plaintiff secured the disputed land on lease from
Mandir Jhoke Hari Har defendant No.18 through its Manager
Ramji Dass deceased and is in possession of the disputed land as
lessee of defendant No.18? OPP
2. Whether Mahant Ramji Dass (deceased) was the absolute
owner of the disputed land having right to alienate the same?OPD
3. Whether Mahant Ramji Dass (deceased) validly sold the
disputed land in favour of defendants No. I to 17 by means of
registered sale deed dated 16.11.56? If so, its effect?OPD
4. Whether the orders of ejectment passed by the Revenue
Authorities are void and illegal in view of the grounds mentioned
in para No.4 of the plaint? OPP
5. Whether the present suit is barred by principle of resjudicata?
OPD
6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court
fee and jurisdiction? OPD
7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the title of
Mahant Ramji Dass deceased in the disputed property? OPD
8. Whether there is no Mandir by the name of Mandir Jhoke Hari
Har, if so, what is its effect? (Onus objected to)"
8. The Trial Court held that the suit land was the property of the
Mandir. It was leased to the first respondent plaintiff by its Manager
Mahant Ramji Dass. It proceeded to hold further that there is no valid
sale vide registered sale deed dated 16.11.1956 to the appellants, as
Mahant Ramji Dass had no title in the property to convey. Answering
Issue No. 4, it was found that the revenue authorities had no jurisdiction
to order eviction. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant
between the appellants and the respondent. Issue No. 6 was not pressed
and it stood decided against the appellants. Equally, the Court found that
the Suit was not barred by principle of res judicata. The respondent
was found not estopped from challenging the title of Mahant Ramji Dass.
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9. The First Appellate Court found that Section 116 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'Evidence Act') did not apply to a person
who claimed to be a representative of the landlord by assignment by
merely purchasing the landlord's interest. The purchaser did not become
the landlord entitled to the protection of Section 116 of Evidence Act. It
was only if the tenant attorned to him that benefit of Section 116 of
Evidence Act became available. The Appellate Court found that there
was no evidence that first respondent had paid any rent to the appellants
or recognized them as the landlords. There was no privity of contract. In
other words, Section 116 of the Evidence Act was available only to a
person who was the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. The tenancy
in favour of the first respondent had commenced based on the lease
deed dated 20.10.1955 executed by the General Attorney of Mahant
Ramji Dass, Shri Balak Nath. This lease was found to be period of 5
years wherein the Mandir was described as the owner in possession.
Therefore, when the subsequent lease deed was executed dated
25.01.1956, the first respondent was already in possession as a tenant.
The tenancy was under the Mandir and not under the Mahant in an
individual capacity. The further finding of the Appellate Court is that, in
the Jamabandis for the year 1939-40, the Suit property had been recorded
as owned by the Mandir under the management of Mahant Ramji Dass
Chela Baba Mohan Dass. In the earlier Jamabandis though the name
of the Mandir did not occur as owner, it was found that the property had
been devolving from Guru to Chela. The natural heirs were being
excluded. Mahant Ramji Dass, through the General power of Attorney,
had admitted that the Suit property was owned by the Mandir. Mahant
Ramji Dass was only its Manager. The first respondent was not a party
to the decree dated 26.08.1960 obtained by Mahant Ramji Dass. Equally,
the Mandir was also not a party under the revenue records. Mahant
Ramji Dass was not the owner of the property mutation in favour of the
vendees was not being sanctioned. Then, the Mahant filed the said Suit,
wherein, the appellants were made defendants, who admitted the claim
of Mahant Ramji Dass.The suit went uncontested in the First Appellate
Court. Consequently, it is found that the Decree, dated 26.08.1960, was
merely a collusive decree. Mahant Ramji Dass being only the manager
of the suit property was bereft of power to sell and the sale deed was
invalid. Consequently, the appellants did not acquire title.
10. The High Court, by the impugned Judgment, agreed with the
concurrent findings of the courts. The High Court went on to find Mahant
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs.
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Ramji Dass was only the Manager of the Mandir and he did not have
power to alienate its property. Protection under Section 116 of the
Evidence Act was not available to the appellants as there was no landlordtenant relationship between the appellants and the first respondent. The
contention further that the sale deed and the Decree dated 26.08.1960,
could only be challenged by the Mandir and not by the first respondent
was rejected. It was found that no such plea was raised in the courts
below. It was further found that the legal proposition that a revenue
court authorities could not decide the question of title has not been disputed
by the Counsel for the appellants. The revenue authority acted illegally
by deciding the question of title and passing Order of Eviction.
11. We are concerned in this case with the bar of jurisdiction of
the Civil Court under Section 25 of the Act. The Act must be read and
understood bearing in mind, the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act,
1887 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tenancy Act', for short). The word
'tenant' is defined in the Tenancy Act in Section 4(5). The word 'landlord'
was defined in Section 4(6) of the said Act, as meaning the person under
whom a tenant holds land, and to whom, the tenant, or but for the special
contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land. The word 'tenant' and
'landlord' were defined to include the predecessors and successors in
interest of a tenant and landlord, respectively. Under Section 5, tenants
having right of occupancy was described and declared. Chapter III of
the Tenancy Act dealt with 'rents' generally. Rents were to consist of
either produce rents or cash rents. Section 39 provided for ground of
ejectment of occupancy tenant.
12. Section 40 provides for ejectment of tenants for a fixed term.
The third categorization of tenant in the matter of ejectment is captured
in Section 41, which provided for ejectment of tenant from year to year.
Section 42 provided for restriction on ejectment. It reads as follows:
"42. Restriction on ejectment - A tenant shall not be ejected
otherwise than in execution of a decree for ejectment, except in
the following cases, namely:-
(a) when a decree for an arrear of rent in respect of his tenancy
has been passed against him and remains unsatisfied;
(b) when a tenant has not a right of occupancy and does not hold
for a fixed term under a contract or a decree or order of competent
authority."
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13. Section 43 provided for the exceptional cases mentioned in
Section 42, viz., when a tenant could be ejected, otherwise than in
execution of a Decree for Ejectment. The application was to be made to
a Revenue Officer. Sections 44 and 45 provided for circumstances
mentioned in Section 42(a) and 42(b), prospectively. Section 50A provided
for a bar to Civil Court entertaining a Suit filed by a tenant contesting his
liability to ejectment or to recover possession or occupancy rights or to
recover compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein. Chapter
VII deal with jurisdiction and procedure. Section 75 provided that there
shall be the same classes of Revenue Officers as provided in the Punjab
Land Revenue Act, 1887. Section 76 provided for applications and
proceedings to be considered by the Revenue Officer. They were divided
into three groups. Section 77(1) reads as follows:
"77. Revenue Courts and suits cognizable by them - (1) When a
Revenue-officer is exercising jurisdiction with respect to any such
suit as is described in sub-section (3); or with respect to an appeal
or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, he shall be called
a Revenue Court."
14. Section 77(3) provided that the Suit mentioned thereafter, were
to be instituted, heard and determined by the Revenue Court and no
other Court was to take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect
to which any such Suit may be instituted. Again, it is divided into three
groups. In the first group, Clause (e) was "Suits by landlords to eject the
tenant". Under Section 78, the Financial Commissioner was conferred
general superintendence and control over all other Officers and Revenue
Courts. Section 80 provided for Appeal from an Original or Appellate
Order or Decree made under the Tenancy Act by a Revenue Officer or
Revenue Court. Section 82 provided for power of review by a Revenue
Officer. Section 84 provided for the power of Revision with the Financial
Commissioner, the Commissioner and Collector. Section 88 provided for
the procedure to be followed by the Revenue Court. The Revenue Officer
and the Revenue Court are empowered under Section 89 to summon
any person. Section 98 contemplated power to refer a party to a Civil
Court. Section 99 clothes the Presiding Officer of a Civil or a Revenue
Court entertaining doubts regarding jurisdiction to refer a matter to the
High Court. Section 100 empowered the High Court in certain
circumstances to validate proceedings held under mistake as to
jurisdiction.
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15. The Act of 1953, with which, we are concerned, received the
assent of the President on 15.04.1953. The Act went on to introduce the
concept of permissible area, which was defined in the Act. It further
provided for protection of the tenant from being evicted except in certain
circumstances. The word "land owner" was defined in Section 2(1) as
follows:
"2(1) "Landowner" means a person defined as such in the Punjab
Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act XVII of 1887), and shall include
an "allottee" and "lessee" as defined in clauses(b) and (c),
respectively, of section 2 of the East Punjab Displaced Persons
(Land Resettlement)Act, 1949 (Act XXXVI of 1949), hereinafter
referred to as the "Resettlement Act". Explanation - In respect
of land mortgaged with possession, the mortgagee shall be deemed
to be the landowner."
16. "Tenant" was assigned the same meaning as was assigned
under the Tenancy Act and was to include a sub-tenant and selfcultivating lessee but not to include a present holder, as defined in Section
2 of the Resettlement Act. Section 9 provided for the liability of the
tenant to be ejected. This was to apply not withstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force. Section 9(ii) provided for
ejecting of the tenant if he failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient
cause. Section (iii) further provided for ejectment of the tenant in arrears
of rent at the commencement of the Act. There were other grounds also
available. Section 14A of the Act read as follows:
"14-A. Not with standing anything to the contrary contained in
any other law for the time being in force, and subject to the
provisions of section 9-A.-
(i)
a land owner desiring to eject a tenant under this Act shall
apply in writing to the Assistant Collector First Grade having
jurisdiction, who shall thereafter proceed as provided for in
sub-section (2) of sub-section 10 of this Act, and the
provisions of sub-section (3) of the said section shall also
apply in relation to such application, provided that the tenants
rights to compensation and acquisition of occupancy rights,
if any under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 ( XVI of 1887),
shall not be affected;
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(ii)
a land-owner desiring to recover arrears of rent from a
tenant shall apply in writing to the Assistant Collector Second
Grade, having jurisdiction, who shall thereupon send a notice
in the form prescribed to the tenant either to deposit the
rent or value thereof , if payable in kind or give proof of
having paid it or of the fact that he is not liable to pay the
whole or part of the rent or of the fact of the landlords
refusal to receive the same or to give a receipt, within the
period specified in the notice. Where, after summary
determination, as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section
10 of this Act, the Assistant Collector finds that the tenant
has not paid or deposited the rent he shall eject the tenant
summarily and put the landowner in possession of the land
concerned;
(iii)
(a) if a landlord refuses to accept rent from his tenant or
demands rent in excess of what he is entitled to under this
Act, or refuses to give a receipt, the tenant may in writing
inform the Assistant Collector second Grade, having
jurisdiction of the fact; 1New section 14-A, added by Punjab
Act, 11 of 1955.
(b) on receiving such application, the Assistant Collector
shall by a written notice require the landlord to accept the
rent payable in accordance with this Act, or to give a receipt,
as the case maybe, or both,within 60 days of the receipt of
the notice."
17. Section 23 read as follows:
"23. Abrogation of pending decrees, orders and notices:
No decree or order of any court or authority and no notice of
ejectment shall be valid to the extent to which it is consistent with
the provisions of this Act."
18. Section 24 provided for Appeal, Review and Revision and it
reads as follows:
"24. The provisions in regard to appeal, review and revision under
this Act, shall, so far as may be, the same as provided in Sections
80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Act XVI
of the 1887)."
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19. It is thereafter that Section 25 provided:
"25. Exclusion of courts and authorities:
Except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the validity
of any proceeding or order taken or made under this Act, shall not
be called in question in any court or before any other authority."
20. We are called upon to decide the ambit of Section 25 of the
Act, which is the only contention raised by the appellants. We have
already noticed that the appellants have lost in all the three Courts on
merits.
21. The contention of the respondent, who successfully instituted
the Suit in question and prosecuted the same, is that the bar on the
Section 25 will not apply, having regard to the fact that there is a dispute
relating to the very existence of landlord-tenant relationship. It is his
contention that the ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction does not apply
in view of the fact that plaintiff-tenant does not admit that the appellants
are his landlords. Such a question cannot be decided by the Authority in
an action under Section 14A of the Act. Equally, the incompetency is
applicable to the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Body, viz., the
Collector and the Commissioner. In fact, the Financial Commissioner
rightly opined that it is a matter for consideration by a Civil Court.
22. To recapitulate the facts, application for ejectment was filed
by the appellants claiming to have purchased the rights of the previous
landlord by way of sale deed dated 16.11.1956. The dispute was whether
the Mandir was the owner and the Mahant was competent in his own
rights to convey the rights of the land owner. The Assistant Collector,
Collector and the Commissioner repelled the contention of the respondenttenant, by holding that in view of the transfer by the sale deed dated
16.11.1956 by the Mahant, the appellants became landlords, competent
to eject the respondent-tenant. The findings of the Civil Courts, on the
other hand, is that the respondent-tenant has never paid rent and attorned
to the appellants and the Mandir was the owner and no rights were
conveyed to the appellants under the sale.
23. Both parties have relied upon a large body of case law.
THE CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY THE APPELLANTS
24. They are as follows:
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i.
In Shankar Singh Etc. v. Mangal Singh Etc.1, an ex parte
Order of Ejectment passed by the Assistant Collector came
to be set aside by the Collector. The Collector ordered the
tenant to be put back in possession. The learned Judge found
assurance in the principle that an act of Court could not
cause injury to any of the parties. The Court relied upon
Rules made under the Act and also the Tenancy Act. It
was further, no doubt, observed that, under Section 25 of
the Act, the Order could not be challenged in a Civil Court
and the Suit was, therefore, barred under Section 25. We
may at once notice that this case did not involve any dispute
concerning the existence of landlord-tenant relationship.
ii.
In State of Punjab (now Haryana) and others v.