# ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD v. P. N. SHARMA AND ANOTHER - **Citation:** [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964-12-09 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J. c. SHAH, S. M. Sikri, R. S. Bachawat - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/associated-cement-companies-ltd-v-p-n-sharma-and-another-3414 - **Pages:** 32 ## Headnote COflStilution of India, 1950, Art. 136(1)-Trlbunal-What 13-Faetories Act {63 of 1948), s. 49{1) and (2) and Punjab Welfare Ofjiceri R~ crultment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, rr. 6(3), Proviso 2{S) and (6)-Scope of-R. 6(3) Proviso 2, if invalid. Tho appellant appointed the ht reopondent as a Welfare Officer u required by the Factories Act, 1948 and the Punjab Welfare Officers llocruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952. The letter of appointment stated that the !st respondent was liable to be transferred from one unit of the appellant to another and that his services could be terminated • c by the appellant by one month'll notice or with one month's pay in lieu 0 thereof. On the ht respondent being unprepared to go to a place to which he was transferred, the appellant terminated his services with one month's salary. The !st respondent aj>pealed to the 2nd respondent, the State of Punjab, the appellate authonty under r. 6(6) and the 2nd respondent ordered his re1DStatement as the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner as required by r. 6(3), proviso 2, was not obtained. In appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that : (i) the rule requiring the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner was invalid u it was outside the scope of the rule-malting authority conferred on the K State Government by s. 49(2) of the Act, and (ii) the order of reinstat&- ment passed by the 2nd respondent was invalid as the appeal by the !st respondent to the 2nd respondent was incompetent. The !st respondent also raised a preliminary objection that the appeal to the Supreme Court was incompetent because the 2nd respondent was not a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136{1) of the Constitution. HELD : (i) The 2nd respondent is a tribunal within the meaning ot r Art. 136( I) having regard to the distinctive features of the power conf•- red on it by r. 6(5) and (6). (387 BJ (Per Gajendragadkar, C. J., M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah and S. M. Sikri, JI.) : In considering the questipn about the status of any body or authority as a tribunal under the article, the consideration about tho presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of G the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possessed the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The _main and basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, bas been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying the test, there can be no doubt that the power which the 2nd respondent exercised under rr. 6(5) and (6) of the Rules is a part of the State's judicial power. It H bas been conferred on the 2nd respondent by a statutory rule 8J!d it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its welfare officers. There is a li.r an affirmation by one party and denial by another, A B c D E ., G H A.c.c. LTD. 11. P. N. SHAllMA (Gajendragadkar, C./.) 367 and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the 2nd respondent ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal. In reaching a fair and objective decision in the dispute brought before it iii its appellate jurisdiction, the State Government has the power to devise its own procedure and to exercise such other incidental and subsidiary powers as may be necessary to deal effectively with the dispute. [386 F-H; 387 A-B, E] Per Bachawat, 1. The basic test of a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136, is that it is an adjudicating authority (other than a coun) vested with the judicial power of the State. In India, the State has inherent judicial powers or functions and the courts and other authorities vested by the ## Text _Characters 0–39,748 of 86,978. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39748 for what follows._ ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. v. P. N. SHARMA AND ANOTHER December 9, 1964 {P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.) COflStilution of India, 1950, Art. 136(1)-Trlbunal-What 13-Faetories Act {63 of 1948), s. 49{1) and (2) and Punjab Welfare Ofjiceri R~ crultment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, rr. 6(3), Proviso 2{S) and (6)-Scope of-R. 6(3) Proviso 2, if invalid. Tho appellant appointed the ht reopondent as a Welfare Officer u required by the Factories Act, 1948 and the Punjab Welfare Officers llocruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952. The letter of appointment stated that the !st respondent was liable to be transferred from one unit of the appellant to another and that his services could be terminated • c by the appellant by one month'll notice or with one month's pay in lieu 0 thereof. On the ht respondent being unprepared to go to a place to which he was transferred, the appellant terminated his services with one month's salary. The !st respondent aj>pealed to the 2nd respondent, the State of Punjab, the appellate authonty under r. 6(6) and the 2nd respondent ordered his re1DStatement as the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner as required by r. 6(3), proviso 2, was not obtained. In appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that : (i) the rule requiring the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner was invalid u it was outside the scope of the rule-malting authority conferred on the K State Government by s. 49(2) of the Act, and (ii) the order of reinstat&- ment passed by the 2nd respondent was invalid as the appeal by the !st respondent to the 2nd respondent was incompetent. The !st respondent also raised a preliminary objection that the appeal to the Supreme Court was incompetent because the 2nd respondent was not a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136{1) of the Constitution. HELD : (i) The 2nd respondent is a tribunal within the meaning ot r Art. 136( I) having regard to the distinctive features of the power conf•- red on it by r. 6(5) and (6). (387 BJ (Per Gajendragadkar, C. J., M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah and S. M. Sikri, JI.) : In considering the questipn about the status of any body or authority as a tribunal under the article, the consideration about tho presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of G the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possessed the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The _main and basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, bas been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying the test, there can be no doubt that the power which the 2nd respondent exercised under rr. 6(5) and (6) of the Rules is a part of the State's judicial power. It H bas been conferred on the 2nd respondent by a statutory rule 8J!d it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its welfare officers. There is a li.r an affirmation by one party and denial by another, A B c D E ., G H A.c.c. LTD. 11. P. N. SHAllMA (Gajendragadkar, C./.) 367 and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the 2nd respondent ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal. In reaching a fair and objective decision in the dispute brought before it iii its appellate jurisdiction, the State Government has the power to devise its own procedure and to exercise such other incidental and subsidiary powers as may be necessary to deal effectively with the dispute. [386 F-H; 387 A-B, E] Per Bachawat, 1. The basic test of a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136, is that it is an adjudicating authority (other than a coun) vested with the judicial power of the State. In India, the State has inherent judicial powers or functions and the courts and other authorities vested by the State with judicial functions are regarded as delegates of the State judicial power. The courts alone have no monopoly of the judicial power. An authority other than a coun vested with the judicial power of the State in this sense is regarded 81 a tribunal under the article. The investiture of the trappings of a coun is not an essential attribute of a tribunal. The plentitude of the residuary appellate power under Art. 136 embraces within its scope all adjudicating authorities vested with the judicial power of the State, whether or not such authorities have the trappings of a court. In order to be a tribunal, ii is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. The appellate function and the power of conclusive determination of the civil rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy between them indicate that the 2nd respondent is under a duty to act judicially and to decide the dispute aolely by ascertaining the facts on the materials before it and by the application of the relevant law on the point. As the rule does not prescribe any procedure for the hearing of the appeal the 2nd respondent may de\ise it> own procedure consistently with its judicial duty. [392 D-F; 393 E, H; 394 A.C, D-E; 396 C-E] Case law reviewed. (ii) (Per Gajendragadkar, C.J., M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah and S. M. Sikri, JJ.) : Tue w<>rds "conditions <>f service" used in s. 49(2) are wide enough to cover the provis<> (2) tor. 6(3). CC>nditi<>ns of service would take in the termination of services and incidentally, the conditions subject to which such terminati<>n could be brought about. A statut<>ry rule impooing the obligati<>n on the management, prescribed by the 2nd proviso to r. 6(3) would fall within s. 49(2) of the Act and therefore, the rule ie not invalid. [388 C-E, G] (iii) (By Full CC>urt) : The appeal preferred by the 1st respondent to 2nd respondent is incompetent. [389 H; 397 B-CJ Tue scheme of the reievant rules is that if the management applies for the concurrence of the Labour CC>mmissioner and the concurrence is not given by him, the management can appeal under r. 6(5). If the concurrence is given, or if a welfare officer's services are terminated without applying for concurrence, be. may appeal under r. 6(6);, bu~ before such an appeal can be competent 11 must appear that the term10a11on of semce wu 1n the nature of a punitive action. The termination in the instant case was no more than a discharge in terms of the conditions of .service. It ill not a punishment and so is outside r. 6(3) altogether. It 1s true that the form in which the order has been passed will not necessarily determine the character of the termination. The order of discharge in the instant case was a bona/id• order of discharge, and the employer passed the order, because it was not its intention to cast any slur upon the employee, even though it thought it necessary to terminate his services. [388 H; 389 A-B, H; 390 c. Fl 368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1965] 2 S.C.R. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 44 of A 1964. Appeal by special leave from the order dated July. 4, 1962, of the Government of Punjab (Labour Department) in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule 6 of the Punjab Welfare Officers (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules, 1952. M. C. Seta/vad, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants. J. P. Goyal, for respondent No. I. Gopa/ Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2. B The Judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, C SHAH and SIKRI JJ. · was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR C. J. BACHA \VAT J. delivered a separate Opinion. Gajendragadkar, C. J. The principal point of law which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether respondent No. 2, the State of Punjab, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule D 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1) of the Constitution. The appellant, the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Bhupendra Cement Works, .Surajpur, challenges the validity of the appellate order passed by respondent No. 2 on July 4, 1962 under the provision F..: of the said Rule, directing the appellant to reinstate its Welfare Officer, P. N. Sharma-respondent No. 1. At the hearing of this appeal, a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Goyal on behalf of respondent No. 1 that special leave should not have beeri granted to the appellant, because the appeal is incompetent inasF much as respondent No. 2 against whose appellate decision the appellant purports to have preferred the present appeal is not a tribunal under Art. 136(1). If the preliminary objection fails, then it would become necessary to consider the appellant's contention that the impugned appellate order is invalid and erroneous and must be set aside. The appellant is a company with its Head Office in Bombay and it runs 14 cement factories, 2 collieries and one fire-brick works in 8 States of the Union of India. One such Cement Works G is the Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur within the territorial limits of respondent No. 2. Under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (No. 63 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) read H with the provisions of the Rules, the appellant was required to appoint one Welfare Officer and to notify his appointment and A.C.C, LTD. v. P. N. SHARMA (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 369 A qualification to the Chief Inspector of Factories. Respondent No. 1 was appointed such a Welfare Officer. The letter of appointment issued to him on March 2, 1956, stated that he would be liable to be transferred from one unit of the appellant to another and that his services could be terminated by the appellant by one month's notice or with one month's pay in lieu thereof. ResponB dent No. 1 was first posted at Lakheri Cement Works, Lakheri in Rajasthan, where he joined duty on March 14, 1956. Thereafter, he was transferred from one place to another according to the requirements of service and the working of the appellant's factories. On June 26, 1960, he was posted at the Bhupendra Cemeμt Works. He was working at these Works until September 26, C 1961, when his services were terminated. It appears that the appellant transferred respondent No. I from Bhupendra Cement Works to Kymore Works which is near Katni in Madhya Pradesh, but apparently, respondent No. 1 was not prepared to go to Kymore Works, and after long and protracted correspondence between the 0 parties, the appellant wrote to him on September 26, 1961, that since he had not proceeded to Kymore on transfer as directed, he had ceased to be in the employment of the appellant, and his name had been struck off from the Company's roll. Respondent No. 1 then filed an appeal before respondent No. 2 as the appellate authority under. R. 6(6) of the Rules. On receiving E notice of the said appeal, the appellant filed its written statement and disputed the validity of the grievance made by respondent No. 1 in respect of the termination of his services. Respondent No. 2 then passed the impugned order on July 4, 1962. This order was issued in the name of the Governor Qf Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by R. 6(6) of the R~les, and it directed that the F Governor of Punjab was pleased to reinstate respondent No. 1 as Labour Welfare Officer in the service of the appellant. "However", says the order, "nothing in this order shall be construed to prevent the management from taking action against Mr. P. N. Sharma in accordance with the provisions of the Rules for snch acts and G commissions on his part as may have come to their notice". lt is the validity of this order which is challenged before us by the appellant. Before proceeding to deal with the preliminary objection, we may conveniently refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Act has been passed in 1948 with the object of H consolidating and amending the law regulating labour in factories. Consistently with this object and policy, the Act has made several beneficient provisions in the interests of industrial labour employed 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965] 2 S.C.ll. in factories to which the Act applies. Section 49 deals with the A appointment of Welfare Officers. S.49(1) provides that in every factory wherein five hundred or more workers arc ordinarily em- .ployed, the occupier shall employ in the factory such number of welfare officers as may be prescribed. It is common ground that the appellant falls within thi; scope of s.49(1}, and so, it has been appointing welfare officers in its factories; in fact, respondent No. 1 B was one of such Welfare Officers appointed by the appellant Section 49(2) provides that the State Government may prescribe the duties, qualifications and conditions of serviee of officers employed under sub-section (1 ). It is )>y. virtue of the powers conferred on the State Government that respondent No. 2 has framed C the Rules. The Rules were framed by respondent No. 2 in 1952 and have 'been published in the Punjab Government Gazette on March 26, 1952, and they came into force from September 30, 1952. Rule 4 prescribes the qualifications for the appointment of a Welfare D Officer. R. 5 provides for the procedure which has to be followed in appointing Welfare Officers. R.6 prescribes conditions of service of Welfare Officers and R. 7 prescribes their duties. R.8 confers power on the State Government to exempt any factory or class or description of factories from the operation of all or any of these Rules, subject to compliance with such alternative E arrangement as may be approved. In the present appeal, we are concerned with R.6. Rule 6 reads thus :- "(l) A Welfare Officer shall be given appropriate status com:sponding to the status of the other executive heads of the factory. F (2) The conditions of service of a Welfare Officer shall be the same as of other members of the Staff of <:orresponding status in the factory. ( 3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2) the management may impose any one or more of G the following punishments on Welfare Officers :- (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments including stoppage at an efficiency bar; (iii) reduction to a lower stage in a time scale; H (iv) suspension; and A B c D F A.C.C, LTD. v. P. N. SHARMA (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 37! (v) dismissal or termination of service in any other manner; Provided that no order of punishment shall be passed against the Welfare Officer unless he has been informed of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him; Provided further that the management shall not impose any punishment other than censure except with the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, Punjab. (4) The Lapour Commissioner, Punjab, before passing orders on a reference made under second proviso to sub-rule (3), shall give the Welfare Officer an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and if necessary, may hear the parties in person. (5) If the Labour Commissioner, on a reference made to him under the second proviso to sub-rule (3) of rule 6, refuses to give his concurrence, the management may appeal to the State Government within thirty days from the date of the receipt of such refusal. The decision of the State Government shall be final and binding. (6) A Welfare Officer upon whom the punishment mentioned in clause (v) of sub-rule (3) is imposed may appeal to the State Government against the order of punishment within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order by him. The decision of the State Government shall be final and binding. (7) The State Government may pass such interim order as may be necessary pending the decision of appeal filed under sub-rule (5) or sub-rule (6). It would be noticed that it is under rule 6(6) that the impugned G order has been passed by respondent No. 2, and the question which has first to be considered in dealing with the present appeal is whether respondent No. 2 can be said to be a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1) so as to justify the appellant to bring the· appellate decision of respondent No. 2 before this Court by special leave under the said Article. H Art. 136(1) reads thus :- "Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave •372 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS [1965) 2 S,C.R. to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, A sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India." Mr. Goyal contends that respondent No. 2, is not a tribunal under Art.136(1), and so, the impugned appellate order passed by it cannot be challenged by appeal under the said article. It would be B J noticed that Art.136(1) refers to a tribunal as distinguished from a court. The expression "court" in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. ! A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which C are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary courts which have been 1 constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of courts and to their adjudication are normally . entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as betD ween the citizens and the State. These courts can be descnbed as \ ordinary courts of civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are E judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. In every State there are administrative bodies or authorities which are required to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in F an administrative manner and their decisions are described as adminhtrative decisions. In reaching their administrative decisions, administrative bodies can and often to take into consideration questions of policy. It is not unlikely that even in this process of reaching administrative decisions, the administrative bodies or authorities are required to act fairly and objectively and would in many cases have to follow the principles of natural justice; but G the authority to reach decisions conferred on such administrative bodies is clearly distinct and separate from the judicial power conferred on courts, and the decisions pronounced by administrative bodies are similarly distinct and separate in character from judicial decisions pronounced by courts. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Art.136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our ConstiH ·- A.C.C. LTD. v. P. N. SHARMA (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 373 A tution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic: both the courts and the tribunals are1 "constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions." (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others) (1). B They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes betw~en parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so C strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the1 case of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the D said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to E transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is reaUy not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature F which is common to both the courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State. This problem has been considered by this Court on several occasions and judicial decisions show that it arises in two different forms. Sometimes, the question which is posed for the decision G of this Court is whether a particular decision reached by an authority or a body can be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari by the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Art.226; and in dealing with this question, it becomes necessary to enquire whether the impugned decision is a judicial or quasi-judicial deciH sion and whether in reaching it, the authority concerned was required to adopt a judicial approach and follow the principles of (1) [195511 S.C.R. 267 at v. 272. 374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (196SJ 2 S.C.R. natural justice. We will very briefly indicate how this question has been considered by this Court by referring to some important decisions in that behalf. In the Pr" F pellant with a specific charge, it was a nullity. In dealing with the appellant's contention that the watch committee had to act judicially, Lord Reid has exhaustively considered the judiciel decisions bearing on this point. He referred in particular to the following observation made by Atkin L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, Exparte London Electricity, Joint Committee Co. G ( 1920) Ltd. & Others( 1) : ''Wherever any body of pers~ns having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs." This observation was later read by Lord Hewart, C.J. in Rex v. Legislative H Committee of the Church Assembly, Exparte Havnes Smith('), as meaning that before the decision of any authority could be sub- (I) [192411 K.B.D. 171, 205. (2) [192811 K.B.D. 411. L3Sup./65-8 376 SUPRBMB COUi.T llBPORTS [1965] 2 S.C.R. jected to the writ jurisdiction, it must appear that the said btJdy A ' should have legal authority to detetmine questions affecting the rights of subjects and should further be required to act judicially. The duty to act judicialiy, observed Lord Hewart, C. J., is an ingredient which, if the test is to be satisfied, must be present. The Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne('), had taken B the same view. Dealing with the order passed by the Controller of Textiles in Ceylon under a Defence Regulation which empowered him to cancel a licence "where the controller has reasonable grounds to believe that :my dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer," the Privy Council held that it did not follow from the words of the relevant Defence Regulation that the conC troller must be acting judicially in exercising the power. It is a long step, said the Privy Council, in the argument to say that because a man is enjoined that he must not take action unless he has reasonable ground for believing something he can only arrive at that belief by a course of conduct analogous to the judicial proD cess. And yet, unless that proposition is valid, there is really no ground for holding that the controller is acting judicially or quasijudicially when he acts under this regulation. If he is not under a duty so to act, then it would not be according to law that his decision should be amenable to review and, if necessary, to avoidance by the procedure of certiorari. E Having set out these decisions, Lord Reid expressed his dissent from the gloss which has been put by Lord Hewart C. J. in Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly(') on the observations of Atkin, L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners('), and the view taken by the Privy Council in F Nakkuda Ali('); and he held that "the power of dismissal conferred on the watch committee bys. 191(4) could not have been exercised and cannot now be exercised until the watch committee have informed the constable of the grounds on which they propose to proceed and have given him a proper opportunity to present his case in defence." (p. 79). In other words, according to Lord G Reid's judgment, the necessity to follow judicial procedure and observe the principles of natural justice, flows from the nature of the decision which the watch committee had been authorised to reach under s. 191(4). It would thus ·be seen that the area where the principles of natural justice have to be followed and judicial approach has to be adopted, has become wider and consequently, H (I} [1951] A.C.. 66, 77. (.!) [1928] I K.B.D. 411 (3) (1924} 1 K.B.D. 411. I A.C.C. LTD. v. P, N. SHARMA (Gajendragadkar, C.1.) 377 A the horizon of the writ jurisdiction has been extended in a corresponding measure. In dealing with questions as to whether any impugned orders could be revised under Art. 226 of our Constitution, the test prescribed by Lord Reid in this judgment may afford· considerable assistance. B In Nagendra Nath Bora & Another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, & Ors.(') this Court had to consider whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution could be invoked against the decision of the appellate authority constituted under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 (E. B. & Assam Act I of C 1910). The scheme of the Act was examined and it was noticed that the Act had laid down a regular hierarchy of authorities, one above the other, with the right of hearing appeals or revisions. It is true that there was no provision in the Act which required, in express terms, that reasoned orders should be recorded; but in the context of the subject-matter of the rules, it was held that it D was the duty of the appellate authority to hear judicially, that is to say, in an objective manner, impartially and after giving reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned in the dispute, to place their respective cases before it. (p. 1254). On that view of the matter, the decision of the appellate authority was theoretically held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. E 226 to issue a writ of certiorari. In Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India & Others('), this Court held that in exercising its power of review under rule 54 of the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1949, the Central Government acted judicially and not administratively. In consequence, the deF cision of the Central Government was liable to be questioned on proper grounds under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The question as to whether the State Government in granting the mining lease acted merely administratively or not, was not considered in this case, because it was enough for the purpose of deciding the appeal that the powers of review were not administrative powers and G exercise of the said powers would be subject to examination by the High Courts under Art. 226. It will be noticed that in these cases, this Court was not called upon to consider whether the authorities whose decisions were challenged under Art. 226 were tribunals or not, be ca use the H requirement that the impugned decision should be that of a tribunal which has been prescribed by Art. 136(1) is not to be found (I) [19S8] S.C.R. 1240. (2) (1960] 2 S.C.R. 775. 378 SUPllBMS COUR.T llEPOllTS (1965) 2 S.C.R. in Art. 226; and so, the only point which fell for decision was A whether the impugned orders amounted to judicial or quasi-judicial decisions liable to be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Art. 226, or not. That problem is different from the one which we have to decide in the present case. Let us now refer to some of the decisions which deal with the B problem with which we are concerned. The .first decision where this question was elaborately ·considered was pronounced in the case of The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., and the Bharat Bank Employees' Union, Delhi(1). In that case, an award pronounced by an Industrial Tribunal .under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, was brought c to this Court in appeal by special leave under Art. 136(1), and the respondents' preliminary objection that the appeal was in1 competent, raised the problem as to whether the Industrial Tribunal was a tribunal under Art. 136(1) or not. The majority decision was in favour of the view that the Industriai Tribunal is a tribunal within. the meaning of Art. 136(1). Mahajan J., who D delivered the principal judgment in support of the majority view on this point, held that "industrial tribunals though they are not full-fledged Courts, yet exercise quasi-judicial functions and are v.ithin the ambit of the word 'tribunal' in Art. 136 of the Constitution.". (p. 476). "The condition. precedent," said Mahajan I .. "for bringing a tribunal within the"'itmbit of Art. 136 is that it I: should be constituted by the State. Again, a tribunal would be outside the ambit of Art. 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely admini.9-- trative or executive duties (p. 478)." It is in this connection that the learned Judge added that tribunals, however, which are found invested with certain functions of a court of justice and have some F of its trappings also would fall within the ambit of Art. 136, because, according to the learned Judge, the intention of the Constitution by the use of the word "tribunal" in the article seems to have been to include within the scope of Art. 136 tribunals adorned with similar trappings as Court but strictly not coming within that G definition (p. 474). The fact that awards pronounced by Industrial Tribunals become enforceable under s. 17 A subject to the conditions therein prescribed, did not make any difference to the legal position that the lndl.lStrial Tribunals were tribunals within the meaning of Art. 136(1). The majority decision in the case of the Bharat Bank(1 ), to H which we have just referred was adopted unanimously by this Court c•> (t9SOJ s.c.R. 459. A.C.c. LTD. v. P. N. SHARMA (Gajendragadkar, C.I.) 379 A in. the case of Durga Shankar Mehta('). Speaking for the Court, Mukherjea, J., observed that it was now well-settled by the majority decision of the Court in the case of Bharat Bank(') that the expression ''Tribunal" as used in Art. 136 does not mean the same thing as "Court" but includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the State and are invested B with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions, subject, of course, to the exception specifically provided for by Art. 13 6 ( 2) . In M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others("), the question which arose for decision of c this Court was whether the Central Government, while it exercises its appellate power under s. 111 (3) of the Companies Act, 1956 (No. I of 1956), was a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1). In considering this question, the scheme of the relevant provisi.Jns of the Act was examined, the earlier decisions bearing on tho point were taken into account and it was held that s. 111(3) required D that the Central Government, while acting as an appellate authority, had to act judicially and was entrusted with the judicial powers of the State to adjudicate upon rights of the parties in civil matters when there is a lis between the contesting parties, and so, the conclusion was inevitable that it acts as a tribunal and not as an executive body. In that connection, Shah J ., who spoke for the E majority of the Court, observed that the proceedings before the Central Government have all the trappings of a judicial tribunal; and by way of illustration, he referred to the fact that pleadings had to be filed, evidence had to be led, and the disputes had to be decided according to law after considering the representations F made by the parties. Hidayatullah J ., differed from the majority decision on the question as to the final order which should be passed in the said appeals. He held that there was no reason for the Central Government to have passed the impugned order, and so, he wanted the appeals to be allowed. Accordingly, he directed that the impugned order G should be set aside and appeals should be allowed with costs. On the preliminary question as to whether the appeals were competent, the learned Judge agreed with the majority decision that the Central Government was a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1). Construing Art. 136(1), the learned Judge observed that courts and tribunals act judicially in both senses which he had earlier di&- H cussed, and in the term "Court" are included the ordinary and (I) [19551 I S.C.R: 257. (2) [1950] S.C.R. 459. (3) (1962] l S.C.R: 339, 352. 380 SUPREME COUllT REPOR.TS [1965) 2 S.C.R. . permanent tribunals and in the term "tribunal" are included all A others, which are not so included. Among the powers of the State, said Hidayatullah J., is included the power to decide ·controversies between parties. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. B Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different (pp. 362-63). Thus, it would be noticed that all the learned Judges who heard this case~ were agreed in taking the view that the essential power wliich was exercised by the courts and tribunals alike was the judicial power of the State. In Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmichand and Others( 1 ), this Court has held that the Conciliation Officer acting under clause 29 of the Order promulgated in 1954 under the U.P.