# ASSOCIATION v. TFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 476
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1957-10-25
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. w ANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUP'l'A
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/association-v-tfie-regional-labour-commissioner-1724
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Minimum Wages, Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing
in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, r948 (II of r948),
ss. 5 (2), 27, Sch., Part I item 8.
The Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under
s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wa~cs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME. COURT RF..A?ORTS
477
the minimum rates of wages for employment in stone breaking
x960
and stone crushing operations carried on in mines in exercise of
the authority delegated to it by the President by a notification :Vladhya Pradesh
under Art. 258 of the Constitution. The appellant company, lVIineral I nduslry
Association
engaged in manganese mining industry, challenged the validity
v.
of the said notification by a writ petition filed in the High Court Regional Labour
and its case was that the said notification was ultra vires s. 5(2)
Commissioner
of the Act.
The High Court found against the appellant and
rejected the petition. The question for determination in the
appeal, therefore, was whether item 8 in Part l of the Schedule
to the Act, properly construed, included stone breaking and stone
crushing operations in a mining industry:
Held, that item 8 in Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948, was not intended to cover the breaking or
crushing of stones incidental to mining operations and must be
limited to stone breaking and stone crushing employment in
quarries. The impugned notification was, therefore, ultra vires
s. 5(2) of-the Act and could not be enforced.
It would, however, be open to the Government, if it so
desired, to achieve the object it had in view in issuing the impugned notification by adding appropriate items to the Schedule
in exercise of its power under s. 27 of the Act :
Held, further, that it was not necessary for the appellant to
challenge the ·vires of the Presidential notification in the first
instance in order that he might impugn the notification in
question.
A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti, [1955]
2 S.C.R. n96, referred to.

## Text

. 476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z96o
and
if it resulted
in retrenchment that was
51
d -:;-;:;
inevitable. These facts would show that in that
;~;;n; ·c":."0/"' case there was reorganisation of the business result.
India Ltd.
ing in retrenchment. In the present case no such
v.
thing arises and the only question for decision is
Its Wa>kmen
whether the work which is perennial and must go
on from day to day and which is incidental and
Wanchoo ].
April 7.
necessary for the work of the refinery and which is
sufficient to employ a considerable number of wholetime workmen and which is being done in most
concerns through regular workmen should be allowed
to be done by contractors. Considering the nature of
the work and the conditions of service in the present
case we are of opinion that the tribunal's decision is
right and no interference is called for, except that the
date .should now be changed, for such a direction cannot be put into force with retrospective effect from
November l, 1958. It appears that a few months
remain before the present contract will come to an
end. We think that for these few months the present
system may continue.
W' e therefore dismiss the
appeal with this modification that the order of the
tribunal will be carried into effect from such date on
which the present contract in force in the company
comes to an end. The respondents will get their costs
from the company.
Appeal dismissed subject to modification..
MADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y
ASSOCIATION
v.
TFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER
JABALPUR AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO
and K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)
Minimum Wages, Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing
in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, r948 (II of r948),
ss. 5 (2), 27, Sch., Part I item 8.
The Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under
s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wa~cs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j
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•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME. COURT RF..A?ORTS
477
the minimum rates of wages for employment in stone breaking
x960
and stone crushing operations carried on in mines in exercise of
the authority delegated to it by the President by a notification :Vladhya Pradesh
under Art. 258 of the Constitution. The appellant company, lVIineral I nduslry
Association
engaged in manganese mining industry, challenged the validity
v.
of the said notification by a writ petition filed in the High Court Regional Labour
and its case was that the said notification was ultra vires s. 5(2)
Commissioner
of the Act.
The High Court found against the appellant and
rejected the petition. The question for determination in the
appeal, therefore, was whether item 8 in Part l of the Schedule
to the Act, properly construed, included stone breaking and stone
crushing operations in a mining industry:
Held, that item 8 in Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948, was not intended to cover the breaking or
crushing of stones incidental to mining operations and must be
limited to stone breaking and stone crushing employment in
quarries. The impugned notification was, therefore, ultra vires
s. 5(2) of-the Act and could not be enforced.
It would, however, be open to the Government, if it so
desired, to achieve the object it had in view in issuing the impugned notification by adding appropriate items to the Schedule
in exercise of its power under s. 27 of the Act :
Held, further, that it was not necessary for the appellant to
challenge the ·vires of the Presidential notification in the first
instance in order that he might impugn the notification in
question.
A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti, [1955]
2 S.C.R. n96, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 389 of 1959. -
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 25, 1957, of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur in
Misc. Petition No. 476 of 1956.
A. S. Bobde and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant.
H. J. Umrigar K. L. Hathi and R.H. Dhebar, for
respondent No. 2;
·
1960. April 7.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises from a Gajendragadkar J.
writ petition filed by the appellant, Madhya Pradesh
·
Mineral Industry Asso~iation, in wh~ch the appellant
challenged the validity of the notification issued by
the Madhya Pradesh State Government on March 30,
1952, under s. 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948
(11 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act).
The High Court of Bombay at Nagpur dismissed
the appellant's petition but has granted the appellant
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478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r960
a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the
Constitution. It is with the said certificate that the
Madhya Pradesh
Mineral Industry present appeal has been brought to this Court.
Association
The appellant is a non-pr_ofit making company
limited by guarantee and registered under s. 26 of the
Regional Labour
v.
commissioner
Indian Companies Act, 1913. It has been formed
with the object of protecting and promoting the
Gajendragadkar J. interest of its members-shar_eholders who are engaged
in the mining industry by all legitimate and constitutional means. It appears that under Art. 258 of the
Constitution the President of India by Notification
No. S.R.O. 2052 published on December 11, 1951,
entrusted Governments of certain States including
Madhya Pradesh with their consent the functions of
the Central Government under the Act in so far as
such functions relate to the fixation of minimum rates
of wages in respect of employees employed in stonebreaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in
mines situated within their respective States. Pursuant to the said delegation the Madhya Pradesh
Government issued the impugned notification purporting to act under s. 5(2) of the Act.
This notification
has prescribed the minimum rates of wages for
employment in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing
operations carried on in mines. The rates thus prescribed were inclusive of dearness allowance or compensatory cost of living allowance.
The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur, Respondent 1, wrote to the appellant for the first
time on June 20, 1956, stating that the State of
Madhya Pradesh, Respondent 2, had considered the
question whether the Act was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had come to the conclusion
that it was so applicable; that is why the appellant's
members were asked by respondent 1 to implement
the Act within a fortnight from the receipt of his
letter. The appellant made several representations to
respondent 1 urging that the Act was inapplicable to
the manganese mining industry; nevertheless respondent 1 threatened large-scale prosecution of the appellant's members on the basis that the Act applied to
them, and its provisions had been contravened by
them. The appellant was thus driven to file the
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
present petition because it alleged that it had no .alternative remedy, at any rate equally speedy and efficaeix960
M adhya Pradesh
ous, and so it was urged on its behalf that the High Mineral Industry
Court should issue a writ quashing the impugned
Association
v.
notification as ultra vires. In its petition the appelh
II
d h
h
fi
.
.
d b
h
Regional Labqur _
lant ad also a ege t at t e noti ca.t10n issue
y t e
commissioner
President of India under Art. 258 cannot fasten upon
the manganese mining industry the character of Gajendragadkar J.
· employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing and
if that was the object of the said notification it was
invalid.
The respondents disputed the correctness of the
appellant's contention that the impugned notification
is invalid. It was urged on their behalf that any
industry wherein the workers are employed in operations involving stone-breaking or stone-crushing is
governed by the Act. In their written statement they
described the details about the mining operations and
contended that the mining of manganese ore mainly
consists of development work or the removal of overburden, breaking of big mineral stones like boulder ore
or bed ore to manageable sizes, dressing of ores to
remove impurities, etc. According to the respondents,
having regard to the nature of the manganese mining
industry the Act applied to the stone-breaking or
:'!tone-crushing operations connected with it.
The High Court has accepted the respondent's plea
and has rejected the appellant's prayer that a writ
ghould be issued in its favour prohibiting the respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Act against
its members. Unfortunately, on two important points
the High Court has misdirected itself. It appears to
havi;i assumed that the impugned notification has
added an entry in the Schedule to the Act, ;ind has
observed that as a result of the said addition the provisions of the Act came to be applied to the employment in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations
carried on in the mines.
The High Court has made
this observation in setting out the appellant's case.and
it is on the basis of this observation that the High
Court has proceeded to examine the validity of the
appellant's contention. It is, however, clear that the
impugned notification does not purport to add any
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
'960
item ·in Schedule I and that was also not the case of
Madhya p,adesh th.e appellant. Thus the assi:impt~on ~ade by the
Mine>al lndust'Y High Court on both the pomts IS, with respect,
Association
erroneous.
Regiona~·Labour
In its ju~gment the ~igh Court ~as al~o observed
Commis.<ioncr
that the vires of the impugned not1ficat10n, though
. -
challenged in the petition, was not challenged before
Ga1endragadkar J ·the High Court and so the only question that remained for its decision was one of interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the entry introduced by the
notification. This statement again does not appear to
be entirely correct. The principal, if not the sole,
ground on which the appellant sought for a writ from
the High Court was that the impugned notification
was ultra vires s. 5(2) of the Act. If the validity of
the said notification had been conceded by the appellant its writ petition would have immediately become
ineffective because if the notification is valid then the
question of construction of the material entry can
present no difficulty whatever. In terms tbe stonobreaking and stone-crushing operations carried on in
mines are specified and the appellant could not possibly urge that the relevant activities carried on by its
members did not attract the said description. In view
of the fact that the High Court ·has made a clear
statement to the effect that the vires of the impugned
notification had not been challenged before it we were
at first not inclined to allow Mr. Bobde, for the appellant, to argue that point before us; however, after
hearing him and after constdering the rest of tho
record we are satisfied that the statement made in the
judgment is not accurate. In the petition filed by the
appellant the validity of two notifications was challenged ; the first was the notification issued by the
· President of India under Art. 258 oft.he Constitution,
and the second is the impugned notification under
which proceedings are threatened against the appellant's mem hers. It is clear from the record that the
appellant did not and could not have pressed its case
against the validity of the first notification, but it did ,
press its objection against the validity of the second
notification; and that would be clear from the certificate of fitness granted by the.High Court itself. The
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
certificate says that the questions raised by the appelz960
Ia_nt relat~ to the applicab.ility of the pr~visions of the Madhya Pradesh
Act to persons employed m stone-breakmg or stone- Mineral Industry
crushing operations carried on at various manganese
Association
mines. Now it is clear that this question can arise - R .
~· L b
only if the appellant seeks to challenge the validity
~~'::.'::issi~n~~·
of the notification, not otherwise. It is because the
·
employees in question are, according .to the appellant, Gajendragadkar J.
not employed under any of the items prescribed in
the Schedule to the Act that the impugned notification
is invalid ; in that context the questions posed in the
certificate would arise.
If the notification itself is
valid then the solution to the question posed can
hardly be regarded as fit for a certificate under Art.
133(1)( c) of the Constitution. Besides, the appellant's
contention against the validity of the impugned notification has been set ou_t in its application for certificate. before the High Court and the same has been
expressly repeated in the statement of case filed by
the appellant before us.
We must, therefore, hold
that the High Court was in error in assuming that
the vires of the impugned notification had been conceded by the appellant before it.
This is another
serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court.
As a consequence of the two infirmities in the judgment the approach which the High Court adopted in
dealing with the matter has -been consid€lrably influenced. It has no doubt considered the meaning of Uie
word "employment " and " stone" in connection
with the expression "stone-breaking" and "stonecrushing ". Even this part of the discussion in the
judgment seems to as!lume that the impugned notification has really added one item to the list in the Schedule. It has apparently not been realised that if the
present notification purpotted to make an addition to
the items in the Schedule there would. have been no
controversy between the parties. Accordin,g to . the
High Court employment should be given its wider
sense and should be held to mean " the action of employing or the state of being employed". The High
Court has also held that the word " stohe" should be
taken to mean " a piece of rock or hard mineral substance (other than metal) of a small and moderate
/
482
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
'960
size". The interpretation of the two words adopted
Madhya Pradesh by the High Co~rt. has been taker: by it ~rom the
Mineral Industry Shorter Oxford Dwt10nary, and ha vmg assigned to
Association
the two words the two respective meanings just stated
llegiona~Labour ·the High ~ourt has. held that ston~-brei;tking and
Commissioner
stone-crushmg operat10ns earned on m mmes would
G . d-dk 1 attract the provisions of the Act.
a;en raga "' •
Before dealing with the vires of the impugned
notification it would be material to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act has been passed
to provide for minimum rates of wages in certain
employments.
Section 2(b) defines the appropriate
government as meaning, inter alia, (1) in r\)lation to
any scheduled employment carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or in relation to
a mine the Central Government, and (2) in relation to
any other scheduled employment the State Government.
It would thus appear that the Legislature
intended that the provisions of the Act may in due
course be extended to mines and so it has prescribed
that in respect thereof the Central Government would
be the appropriate Government.
Section 2(e) defines
an employer as meaning, inter alia, any person who
employs whether directly or through another person
or whether on behalf of himself or any other person
one or more employees in any scheduled employment
in respect of which minimum rates of wages have
b~en fixed uhder this Act. Section 2(g) defines scheduled employment as meaning an employment specified in the Schedule or any process or branch of work
forming part of such employment. Section 3 authorises the appropriate government to .fix minimum
rates of wages in regard to the employments specified
in Parts I and II of the Schedule respectively and
prescribes the procedure in that behalf.
Section 5
lays down the procedure for the fixing and revising
of minimum wages. Section 5(2) provides that after
following the procedure prescribed by the said section
the appropriate government shall by notification in
the official gazette fix, or as the case may be, revise
the minimum rates of wages in respect of each scheduled employment, and unless such notification othervJise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
_,
••
of three months from the date of its issue.
There is
I960
only one more section which needs to be mentioned,· Madhya Pradesh
that is s. 27 which empowers the appropriate governMineral Industrv
dd
h
f
h
S h d
Association ·
ment to a
~o eit er part o
t e
c e ule any
employment in respect of which it is of opinioh that Region:i J,abour
minimum, rates of wages should be fixed under this
Commissioner
Act after following the procedure prescribed by it, and
. -
the section adds that after the notification is thus Ga1endragadkar f.
issued the Schedule shall, in its application to the
State, be deemed to be amended accordingly.
It is thus clear that the whole scheme of the Act is
intended to work in regard to the emplOyments specified in Part I and Part II of the Schedule and the Legis- ·
lature has wisely left it to the appropriate government to
decide to what employments the Act should be extended
and in what areas. Section 5(2) empowers the appropriate government to fix or revise minimum wages in
regard to any of the employments in the Schedule to
which the Act applies. This power can be exercised
only if the employment in question is specified in the
Schedule and the Act is therefore applicable to it. Section 27 confers a wider power on the appropriate
government, and in exercise of tpe said power the
appropriate government may add an employment to
the Schedule. The nature and extent of the said two
powers are thus quite separate and distinct and there
can be no doubt that what can be done by the appropriate government in exercise of its power under s. 27
cannot be done by it in exercise of its pe>wer under
s. 5(2). It is significant that the impugned notification
has been issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government
by virtue of the powers under s. 5(2) of the Act
which have been delegated to it by the President irr
exercise of his authority under Art. 258 of the Constitution. The main argument urged by Mr. Bobde is
that the impugned notification is ultra vires s. 5(2)
because stone-breaking and stone-crushing operations
in manganese mines do not fall under any of the items
in Part I of the Schedule. The dispute thu~ raised
really lies within a very narrow compass : Does employment in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in mines ,.specified in the impugned
notific~tion amount to employment in ,atone-breaking
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
x960
or stone-crushing which is item 8 in Part I of the
ground that the
under any other
M d' -P d h Schedule to the Act? It is common
a "Y"
ra es
1
.
t"
d
.c ]]
Mineral Industry emp oyment m ques 10n oes not ia
Assodation
item in Part I.
v.
Regional Labour
It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages
Commissioner
Act are intended to achieve the object of doing social
. --
justice to workmen employed in the scheduled emGa;endragadkar f· ployments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for
them, and so in construing the said provisions the
court should adopt what is sometimes described as a
beneficent rule of construction. If the relevant words
are capable o(two constructions preference may be
given to that construction which helps to sustain the
validity of the impugned notification; but it is obvious that an occasion for showing preference for one
construction rather than the other can legitimately
arise only when two constructions are reasonably
possible, not otherwise.
Now, does employment in
stone-breaking or stone-crushing as specified in Part I
of the Schedule on a reasonable construction include
stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations in a mining industry ? In answering this question it would
· be necessary to bear in mind that the scheduled employment under s. 2(g) covers the employment specified
in the Schedule or any process or branch of work
forming part of such employment. It is conceded
before us by both the parties that the provisions of
the Act aP.ply to the scheduled employments in all
branches of their work which may be incidental to
the main scheduled employments.
The impugned
notification, on the other hand, applies only to the ·
stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations carried on
in mines and it does not cover other operations connected with the manganese mining works. This position
is inconsiiitent with the scheme of the Schedule and
that is a point which prima facie is in favour of the
appellant's contention.
It is, however, urged by Mr. Umrigar, for the respondents, that the word "employment" as well as
the word "stone" used in item 8 should receive their
widest denotation, and that, according to him, would
include stone-breaking or 13tone-orushing operation&
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
485
carried on in mines. It is conceded that stone-breakr960
ing or stone-crushing operations have to be carried
on in regard to the work in manganese mines. M~dhya Pradesh
,
Mineral Industry
Stones are beaten . to small pieces by means of a
Association
hammer and they are washed and passed. through
v •.
sieves of different meshes before manganese is obtain- Regional. L_abour
ed. ·When the Schedule refers to the employment
Commissioner
of stone-breaking or stone-crushing does it referGajendragadkar J.
to the incidental stone-breaking or stone-crushing in
connection with manganese piine operations ?
In
a chemical or a geological sense stones may include
manganese and that is one of the meanings given to
the word in the Short.er Oxford Dictionary. On the
other hand, the word "stone " as popularly understood
in ordinary parlance particularly when it is coupled
with the word "breaking" or " crushing " would exclude manganese. When we speak of stone-breaking
or stone-crushing normally we refer to stone in the
sense of " piece of rock " and that would exclude
manganese. Employment in stone-breaking or stonecrushing in this sense would refer to quarry operations. Thus whether or not the word " stone " should
be understood in the wider sense or in a limited sense
must depend upon the context in which the word is
used. The intention which is reasonably deducible .
from the context would decide whether it is the
expanded meaning or the limited meaning of the word
that can be accepted. The same consideration could
apply to the denotation of the word "employment".
We have carefully considered all the items in the
Schedule and have taken into account the general
beneficent policy of the Act but we are unable to hold .
that when item 8 refers to stone-breaking or stonecrushing it is intended to cover the breaking or the
crushing of stones incidental to the manganese mining
operations. The context seems to exclude the application of the wider meaning of the word " stone " used
in item 8. Therefore, our conclusion is that the stonebreaking or stone-crushing operations which are carried
on in mines are not included in item 8 in the Schedule;
a.n:d if that be the true position the impugned notification issued by the State Government under s. 5(2) is
ultra vires.
Cii
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
r96o
The High Court has referred to the fact that in
describing some items in Part I the word " any '' has
Madhya Pradesh
Mineral Indmtry been used whereas the said word has not been used in
Association
item 8. For instance, item 1 refers to employment in
v.
any woollen carpet making or shawl weaving establishRegionaz Labour
Commissioner
ment, whereas item 8 merely refers to employment in
stone-breaking and stone-crushing. The absence of
Gajendragadkar J. the word" any" according to the High Court indicates
that the wm:d "stone" as well as the word "employment" had been used in their wide denotation. We
are not satisfied that this conclusion is right. In fact
it appears to us that if the word "auy" had been used
in item 8 it might have helped to make its scope
wider; that is to say, if item 8 had read as "employment in any stone-breaking or any stone-crushing
operations" it might have tended to make its scope
wider.
As it stands the entry is, in our opinion, confined to stone-breaking and stone-crushing employment in quarries and not in mines.
As we have already pointed out a notification under
s. 5(2) can be issued only in respect of employment.s
which fall under the Schedule. We would, however,
like to add that this conclusion merely helps to emphasise the fact that the appropriate government may,
and can, act under s. 27 of the Act if it is desired that
the employment in mines or in connection with any
operations incidental to mining should be governed
by the provisions of the Act.
Section 27 empowers
the appropriate government to add items to the
Schedule and it would be open to the appropriate
government to adopt such a course if it is intended to
achieve the object with which the impugned notification has been ·issued.
One more point still remains to be considered.
Mr. Umrigar attempted to argue that the appellant
cannot challenge the vires of the impugned notification without challenging the vires of the delegation of
authority effected by the notification issued by the
President of India under Art. 258 of the Constitution.
The argument is that if the notification of the President is valid then the State Government bas merely
exercised its authority as a delegate and its validity
cannot be challenged in isolation from the principal
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
or parent notification _which conferred the authority
z960
on the State Government. This contention has obvi- M dh--;,
ously not been raised before the High Court. Besides, Mfne!a~ Tn~:~~:;
if the State Government purports to take action on
Association
the strength of the impugned notification which is
v.
h
1
Regional Labour
invalid it would be open tot e appe lant to resist the
commissioner
threatened action on the ground that the notification
-
is invalid and no action can be validly taken againstGajendragadkar J.
the appellant for the contravention of the provisions
of the Act. As this Court has observed in A. Thangal
Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti(1 ), "there
can be no agency in the matter of a commission of a
wrong. The wrong-doer would certainly be liable to
be dealt with as a party directly responsible for his
wrongful action", and it was added that" on the
analogy of a civil wrong the tortfeasor could certainly
not protect himself against the liability on the ground
of having committed the tort under the directions of
his principal, and so the agent could in no event
exculpate himself from the liability for the wrongful
act done by him and if he is amenable to the jurisdic·
tion of the High Court the High Court could certainly
issue an appropriate writ against, him under Art. 226".
By parity of reasoning it would follow that if the
impugned notification issued by the State Government
is ultra vires it cannot fall back upon the President's
notificatioi+ in support of the plea that the action
which it proposes to take against the appellant would
nevertheless be justified. We must accordingly hold
that it is open to the appellant to claim a writ against
the respondents even without challenging the vires of
the Presidential notification.
In the result we hold that the impugned notification
issued by respondent 2 is invalid and canno_t be enforced.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order"
passed by the High Court set aside and the application for a writ made by the appellant allowed with
costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
(1) (1955] 2 s.c.R, 1196, i:au,