# ATTAR SINGH & OTHERS v. THE STATE OF U. P

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 928
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 119 of 1957
- **Bench:** S. R. Das, N. H. Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. Wanohoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/attar-singh-others-v-the-state-of-u-p-1673
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

1
ricultural .Holdings, Consoli<fation of-Constitutional validity o enactment-Procedure, if _discriminatory-U.P. Consolidatio11 o Holdings Act (U.P. V of r954) as amended by Act No. XV.(
of r957, ss. 8, 9, IO, r4 to r7, r9 to 22, 49-Constilution of India,
Arts. r4, 3r(2).
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity oi the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. V of 1954), as amended by the amending Acts, which was intended to encourage the
development of agriculture by the allotment of compact areas to
tenure-holders in lieu of scattered plots so that large-scale cultivation might be j)Qssible with all its attendant advantages. A
notification was issued under s. 4 of the impugned Act declaring
the decision of the State Government to formulate a scheme of
consolidation in respect of the area where the petitioners held
their lands. This was followed up by a statement of proposals
under s. 19. The petitioners objected to these proposals and
thereafter appealed to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) but
to no effect. It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf that
(1) the provisions of ss. 8, 9 and IO read with those of s. 49 of the
impugned Act were discriminatory in that they laid down a
procedure for correction and revision of revenue records for
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
villages under consolidation that was vitally different from that
z958
applicable to other villages under the U.P. Land Revenue Act,
1901 ; (2) that ss. 14 to 17 as also ss. 19 to 22 read with s. 49 conAttar Singh
ferred arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities in respect
and Others
of the lands of the tenure-holder and his rights therein and
v.
deprived him of the protection of courts available to other tenure Th• State of u. P.
holders and that (3) s. 29B which provided for compensation, by
giving inadequate compensation, offended Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
Although the procedure laid down by the impugned Act was
to some extent different from that under the U.P. Revenue Act,
r901. it was by no means arbitrary or devoid of natural justice.
Regard being had to the advantages that consolidation conferred
on the tenure-holder such difference was supportable as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia reasonably
connected with the object of the Act. The expeditious procedure
for effectuating consolidation laid down by ch. II of the Act
read with the Rules, therefore, could not be said to violate Art.
14 of the Constitution.
Nor could for similar reasons the provisions of ch. III of the
Act be said to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. The provision
of s. 22(2) of the Act which made the decision of the arbitrator
final by ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary courts even where a
party had obtained a decree which might be under appeal, was
necessary in the interest of expedition.
Having regard to the peculiar conditions in cases of this
kind and the advantages a scheme of consolidation offered to
the entire body of tenure-holders, it could not be said that the
cash compensation for tenure holders provided by s. 29B of the
impugned Act was inadequate, even assuming that Art. 31(2)
applied to the case.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Writ Petition No. 119 of
1957.
Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of :Fundamental Rights.
Achhru Ram, J.P. Goyal and K. L. Mehta, for the
petitioners.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
K. L. Misra, Advocate-General for the State of U. P.
and Gopi Nath Dixit, for the respondent.
1958.
December 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Wat1choo J.
Constitution challenges the constitutionality of the
117
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z958
U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (U. P. V of 1954),
as amended by U. P. Acts No. XXVI of 1954,
~~~· c:i!~;:
No. XIII of 1955, No. XX of 1955, No. XXIV of 1956
v.
and No. XVI of 1957, (he

## Text

1958
}Jaji Mohammad
Ekramul llaq
-V.
Tlie Slate of
IVest Bengal
J{apur ].
December z7.
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
premises No. 9 Chittaranjan Avenue to the other building which the Government had also requisitioned.
This will work out to Rs. 3,175. In the circumstances
Rs. 3,200 per mensem would be a fair compensation
and we would therefore enhance the compensation to
that figure and the appeal would be allowed to that
extent.
·
Although the appellant has not succeeded in getting
the whole of his claim decreed, there is no reason for
depriving him of his costs proportionate to his success.
We accordingly allow proportionate costs.
Appeal partly allowed.
ATTAR SINGH & OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF U. P.
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA,
K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. WANOHOO, JJ.)
1
ricultural .Holdings, Consoli<fation of-Constitutional validity o enactment-Procedure, if _discriminatory-U.P. Consolidatio11 o Holdings Act (U.P. V of r954) as amended by Act No. XV.(
of r957, ss. 8, 9, IO, r4 to r7, r9 to 22, 49-Constilution of India,
Arts. r4, 3r(2).
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity oi the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. V of 1954), as amended by the amending Acts, which was intended to encourage the
development of agriculture by the allotment of compact areas to
tenure-holders in lieu of scattered plots so that large-scale cultivation might be j)Qssible with all its attendant advantages. A
notification was issued under s. 4 of the impugned Act declaring
the decision of the State Government to formulate a scheme of
consolidation in respect of the area where the petitioners held
their lands. This was followed up by a statement of proposals
under s. 19. The petitioners objected to these proposals and
thereafter appealed to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) but
to no effect. It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf that
(1) the provisions of ss. 8, 9 and IO read with those of s. 49 of the
impugned Act were discriminatory in that they laid down a
procedure for correction and revision of revenue records for
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
villages under consolidation that was vitally different from that
z958
applicable to other villages under the U.P. Land Revenue Act,
1901 ; (2) that ss. 14 to 17 as also ss. 19 to 22 read with s. 49 conAttar Singh
ferred arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities in respect
and Others
of the lands of the tenure-holder and his rights therein and
v.
deprived him of the protection of courts available to other tenure Th• State of u. P.
holders and that (3) s. 29B which provided for compensation, by
giving inadequate compensation, offended Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
Although the procedure laid down by the impugned Act was
to some extent different from that under the U.P. Revenue Act,
r901. it was by no means arbitrary or devoid of natural justice.
Regard being had to the advantages that consolidation conferred
on the tenure-holder such difference was supportable as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia reasonably
connected with the object of the Act. The expeditious procedure
for effectuating consolidation laid down by ch. II of the Act
read with the Rules, therefore, could not be said to violate Art.
14 of the Constitution.
Nor could for similar reasons the provisions of ch. III of the
Act be said to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. The provision
of s. 22(2) of the Act which made the decision of the arbitrator
final by ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary courts even where a
party had obtained a decree which might be under appeal, was
necessary in the interest of expedition.
Having regard to the peculiar conditions in cases of this
kind and the advantages a scheme of consolidation offered to
the entire body of tenure-holders, it could not be said that the
cash compensation for tenure holders provided by s. 29B of the
impugned Act was inadequate, even assuming that Art. 31(2)
applied to the case.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Writ Petition No. 119 of
1957.
Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of :Fundamental Rights.
Achhru Ram, J.P. Goyal and K. L. Mehta, for the
petitioners.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
K. L. Misra, Advocate-General for the State of U. P.
and Gopi Nath Dixit, for the respondent.
1958.
December 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Wat1choo J.
Constitution challenges the constitutionality of the
117
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z958
U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (U. P. V of 1954),
as amended by U. P. Acts No. XXVI of 1954,
~~~· c:i!~;:
No. XIII of 1955, No. XX of 1955, No. XXIV of 1956
v.
and No. XVI of 1957, (hereinafter called the Act).
1'h• Stat• of u. P. The applicants a.re four brothers holding land in
village Banat, tahsil Kairana, District Muzaffarnaga.r.
Wamhoo J.
A notification was issued under s. 4 of the Act in
respect of 223 villi~ges in tahsil Kaira.na., declaring
that the State Government had decided to make a
scheme of consolidation in that area. This was followed up by necessary action under the various provisions of the Act resulting in a statement .of proposals
under s. 19. Objections to these proposals were filed
by the petitioners and others, which were decided in
April 1956. The petitioners went in appeal to the
Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which was decided
in August 1957. It was thereafter that the present
petition was filed in this Court.
The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
the Act on various grounds, of which the following
five have been urged before us:-
(1) Section 6 read with s. 4 of the Act gives
arbitrary powers to the State Government to accord
discriminatory treatment to tenure-holders in different
villages by placing some villages under consolidation
while excluding others, thus offending Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
(2) Sections 8, 9 and 10 read with s. 49 of the Act
provide a procedure for the correction and revision of
revenue records for villages under consolidation,
which is vitally different from that applicable to
villages not under consolidation, and there is thus
discrimination whieh offends Art. 14 of the Constitution;
(3) Sections 14 to 17 read with s. 49, confer arbitrary powers on thii consolidation authorities under
which they can deprive a tenure-holder of his land or
rights therein and the tenure-holder has been deprived of the protection of courts available to other
tenure-holders in villages not under consolidation,
thus creating discrimination which offends Art. 14.
( 1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
(4) Sections 19 to 22, read with s. 49, again create
:r958
discrimination on the same grounds as ss. 14 to 17,
Attar Singh
and are, therefore, hit by Art. 14; and
and Others
. (5) Section 29-B, which provides for compensav.
tion gives inadequate compensation and is, therefore, The State of u. P.
hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
Before we take these points seriatim, it is useful to
Wanchoo f.
refer to the background of this legislation. As far
back as 1939, the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act
No. VIII of 1939, was passed. It was, however, of
little effect, because it could only be applied when
more than one-third of the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for an order of consolidation of the village. It was, therefore, felt that some
kind of compulsion would be necessary in order to
achieve consolidation of holdings in villages. That
consolidation would result in improving agricultural
production goes without saying and it was with the
object of encoqraging the development of agriculture
that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character were taken up in various States, after the recommendation of The Famine Inquiry Commission, 1944,
in its Final Report ; (See page 263).
The State of
Bombay was the first to pass an Act called the Born.
bay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of
Holdings Act, (Born. LXII of 1947). This was followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh. The object
of the Act is to allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to tenure-holders so that large scale cultivation may be possible with all its attendant advantages.
Thus, by the reduction of boundary-lines saving of
land takes place and the number of boundary-disputes
is reduced. There is saving of time in the management of fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from
travelling from field to field, which may be at considerable distances from each other. Proper barriers
such as fences, hedges and ditches can be erected
around a compact area to prevent trespassing and
thieving. It would further be easier to control irrigation and drainage and disputes over water would be
reduced considerably where compact areas are allotted
to tenure-holders. Lastly, the control of pests, insects
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
i9j8
and plant-disease is made easier where farmers have
compact areas under cultivation. These advantages
J:C
Alla, Singh
l .
f
l d .
and Oth"'
resu tmg rom conso i at1on of holdings are intended
•.
to encourage the development of agriculture and
n, Stat• of u. P. larger production of food grains, which is the necessity of the day.
WancAoo J.
With these objects in mind, the Act was passed by
the U. P. Legislature in 1953 and received the assent
of the President on March 4, 1954. It was published
in the gazette on March 8, 1954, and declarations
under s. 4 were made for the major part of the State
of Uttar Pradesh, including the petitioners' village, in
July, 1954.
The scheme of the Act is as follows :-
When consolidation of a village is taken up, the
first thing that is done is to correct the revenue records, and ss. 7 to 12 deal with that. Then comes the
second stage of preparing what are called statements
of principles; (see sa. 14 to 18). Objections to these
principles are entertained and decided and thereafter
the principles are confirmed under s. 18. Then comes
the third stage (vide ss. 19 to 23), which deals with
the preparation of the statement of proposals. Objections to this are also invited and disposed of, and
then proposals are confirmed under s. 23. After the
proposals have been confirmed, we come to the last
stage in which the confirmed proposals are enforced;
(see ss. 24 onwards). It will be clear therefore from
the objects of the Act and the advantages that accrut.
from its implementation that it is a piece of legislation, which should be a boon to the tenure-holders in
a village and should also lead to the development of
agriculture and increase of food-production. It is in
this setting that we have to examine the attack that
has been made on the constitutionality of the Act.
Re. 1 : Section 6 of the Act gives power to the
State Government at any time to cancel the declaration made under s. 4 in respect of the whole or any
part of the area specified therein. When such declaration is made the area ceases to be under consolidation operations and s. 5 which provides for the effect
of a declaration ceases to operate. It is urged that s. 4
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l{,EPORTS
933
gives arbitrary power to the State Government to
I958
.~
cancel the declaration, even with respect to a part of
Attar Singh
the area covered by it and thus discriminates between
and Otlrers
villages which are under consolidation and those
v.
which are not under consolidation. The learned Addi- The State of u. l'.
tional Solicitor General counters this argument in two
) S
.
h'
Wanchoo j.
ways: (i
ect1on 6 is not mg more than a restatement of the power which the State Government otherwise possessed under the General Clauses Act; and
(ii) the. high status of the authority to whom the power
is given, namely, the State Government, and the rules
framed under the Act laying down a standard for the
Government to follow, remove any flavour of arbitrariness which the terms of the section might import. It
is not necessary to express any opinion in this case on
the said contention, for, even if it be accepted, the
result would be only thats. 6 would be struck down.
The petitioners would be in the same position with s. 6
on the Statute or without it. It may be that, if a citizen in whose favour an order of consolidation has been
made but subsequently cancelled, comes to court with
a grievance that the order of consolidation was for his
benefit but was cancelled in exercise of a power under
a void section, this question might arise for consideration. It may also be that the petitioners' right might
be infringed ifs. 6 were not severable from the other
provisions of the Act which enable the Government to
dfrect consolidation of holdings. The power of cancellation cannot be said to be so inextricably mixed up
with the power to order consolidation as to prevent
the operation of one section without the other. Nor
can it be said that the Legislature would not have
conferred the power on the Government to consolidate
holdings without at the same time conferring on them
the power to cancel the said order of consolidation.
The said provisions are clearly severable. In the circumstances, as the petitioners' case is not affected by
8. 6 of the Act, we leave this open to be decided in an
appropriate case.
.
Re. 2 : This deals with the first stage of revision
and correction of maps and records, which has to take
place before ·the actual consolidation scheme is put
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r95B
into force.
Section 7 provides for the examination of
the revenue records by the Assistant Consolidation
Attar Singh
Olli
d h
f
and oihm
cer an
e is enjoined to test the accuracy o the
v.
village map, khasra and the current annual registers
The S•••• of u. P. by making a partal in accordance with the procedure
to be prescribed. After he has done the partal, he is
Wauchoo f.
to prepare a statement showing the mistakes discover.
ed in the map, khaara and khatauni, and the number
and nature of disputes pertaining to land records
under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Then under
s. 8 he submits a report to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in this connection with his opinion whether
any revision of such maps and records is needed.
On
receipt of this report, the Settlement Officer may
either order the Assistant Consolidation Officer to proceed with the correction of maps and records, which
we presume he will order when there are not too many
mistakes, or recommend to the State Government for
revision of maps or records in accordance with the
provisions of Ch. IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act,
1901, which he will presumably do if there are too
many mistakes found. If the Assistant Consolidation
Officer is ordered to make the corrections he will make
a further partal, if necessary, and correct the map or
the entries in annual register in accordance with the
procedure to be prescribed. The procedure is prescribed in r. 22 and among other things it lays down
that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall issue a
notice to all persons affected by the provisional entries
proposed by him; objections are invited and parties
are examined and heard and their evidence taken and
then the Assistant Consolidation Officer makes the
corrections. His order is open to appeal within twenty.
one days under s. 8(4) to the Consolidation Officer, and
the order of the latter is made final.
It is urged that this procedure is vitally different
from the procedure prescribed under the U. P. Land
Revenue Act and that under s. 49 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts with respect to
any matters arising out of consolidation proceedings is
barred, thus depriving those affected by the orders of
the Consolidation Officer the right to file a suit as they
•
•
\
-
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
could have done under the provisions of the U. P.
z95B
Land Revenue Act; (see ss. 40, 41, 51 and 54). There
Atta• Singh
is no doubt that there is some difference between the
and others
procedure provided under the Act and that which the
v.
tenure-holders would have been entitled to if their Th• State of u. P,
village wa.s not under consolidation. But if consolidation is a boon to the tenure-holders of a village, as we
Wanchoo f.
hold it is, and if it is to be put through within a reasonable period of time, it is necessary to have a procedur~ which would be shorter than the ordinary
procedure under the U. P. Land Revenue Act or
through a suit in a civil or revenue court. The procedure that has been provided cannot by any means be
said to be arbitrary or lac;king in the essentials of principles of natural justice. The Assistant Consolidation
Officer gives notice to the persons affected, hears their
objections and gives them au opportunity to produce
evidence. Thereafter he decides the objections and
one appeal is provided against his order. This should,
in our opinion, be enough in the special circumstances
arising under the Act to do justice to those who object
to the correction of records.
All that has happened
is that the number of appeals is cut down to one and
that in our opinion is not such a violent departure
from the ordinary procedure as to make us strike
down the provisions contained in Ch. II of the Act as
discriminatory, in the peculiar circumstances arising
out of a scheme of consolidation which must, if it has
to be of any value, be put through within a reasonable
period of time. Whatever difference there may be
may well be supported as a permissible classification
on an intelligible differentia having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Furthers. 12 provides that where there is dispute as
to title and such question has not already been determined by any competent Court, the Consolidation
Officer has to refer the question for d.etermination to
the Civil Judge who thereafter will refer it to the
arbitrator. The arbitrator then proceeds in the manner
provided by r. 73 and gives a hearing to the parties
a.nd ta.kes evidence both oral and doqumentary before
making his award; and s. 37 of the Act makes the
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r95B
Arbitration Act applicable to the proceedings before
the arbitrator in the matter of procedure.
Taking,
Attar Singh
f Ch JI
b
.,.d Others
therefore, the scheme o
.
and remem ering that
v.
if consolidation is to be put through there must be a
Tl" state of u. P. more expeditious procedure, there is in our opinion
--
rational basis for classification which justifes the proceWanchoo f.
dure under Ch. II of the Act read with the Rules in
villages where consolidation scheme is to be effective.
The attack, therefore, under Art. 14 of the Constitution on the provisions of Ch. II fails.
Re. 3 and 4 : The contentious on these heads may
be taken together.
They attack the provisions of
Ch. III dealing with the Statement of Principles and
Statement of Proposals. The.statement of principles
is first published and objections are invited. Under
s. 17 the Assistant Consolidation Officer decides the
objections after hearing the parties, if necessary, and
taking into account the view of the Consolidation
Committee. He then submits a report to the Consolidation Officer who after hearing the objectors and
taking such evidence as may be necessary passes final
order and confirms the statement of principles; (see
r. 43-B). Similarly, when statements of proposals are
published, objections are invited to them, and the
same procedure is followed in the decision of these
objections as in the case of the objections to the statement of principles. In the case of the statement of
proposals also, there is similar provision to refer disputed question of title to the Civil Judge, who, in his
turn, refers it to the arbitrator. Section 22 also provides that where such question has been referred to the
arbitrator, all suits or proceedings in the court of first
instance, appeal, reference or revision, in which the
question of title to the same land has been raised,
shall be stayed. Section 22(3) makes the decision of
the arbitrator final.
There is no provision for appeal
in Ch. III though in fact two persons hear the matter,
namely, the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the
Consolidation Officer. But the main attack is on the
provisions of s. 22(2) on account of which it is said
that even where a party has obtained a decree which
might be under appeal, the jurisdiction of the ordinary
(
-
...
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
937
courts is taken away and the decision of the arbitraz958
tor is made final. That is undoubtedly so.
But ifthe
consolidation scheme has to be put through in a rea-
~:;·0~!:~:
sonable period of time such a provision is, in our
v.
opinion, necessary ; but for it the consolidation The State of u. P.
schemes may never be really put through for there
will be little purpose in ma.king consolidation where
Wanchoo J.
a. large number of disputes a.re pending in the courts.
Reasons which we have given in dealing with the
second point apply with equal force to these two
points also, and we are of opinion that there is a
rational basis for a classification which has a nexus
with the object of the Act, and therefore, the attack
under Art. 14 on the provisons of Chapter III also
must fail.
Re. 5.
Under this head, the inadequacy of compensation provided under s. 29-B of the Act is raised.
It may be mentioned that the Act, as originally
passed, did not contain any provision for compensation. There were a. number of writ applications in the
Allahabad High Court and that court held that inasmuch as some property was taken away under s. 14(1)
(ee) for public purposes and no compensation was provided, that provision was void under Art. 31 (2) as it stood
before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955
(hereinafter called the Fourth Amendment). Appeals
by the State Government from that decision of the
Allahabad High Court are pending before us and we
shall deal with them separately. The legislature then
enacted s. 29-B laying down the principles on which
compensation would be paid for lands taken away
under s. 14 (1) (ee) after the decision of the Allahabad
High Court. This section was put by Act XVI of 1957
in the original Act with retrospective effect from the
date from which the original Act was enforced. It is
urged that the compensation
provide~ therein is
inadequate, and, therefore, the provision should be
struck down under Art. 31 (2), as it was before the
Fourth Amendment.
Arguments were also addressed
on the question whether s. 29-B would be saved by the
us
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
x958
Fourth Amendment. We, however, think it unnecessary to go into these arguments for we have come to
A•
1;·0~!ngh
the conclusion that in the circumstances of this case
an v. "'
the compensation provided under s. 29-B is adequate.
Th• State of u. P. Assuming that the case is governed by Art. 31 (2) a.s it
was before the Fourth Amendment, s. 29-B provides
Wan•hoo J.
for payment of cash compensation equal to fonr ti~es
the value determined a.t hereditary rates to a. bhumidar
and two times the value to a sirdar. The difference
between the two rates has not been attacked for the
rights of a bhumidar a.re much higher than the rights
of a. sirdar. The bhumidar is the owner of the land
while the sirdar is merely a tenant; but the argument
is that the a.mount provided is inadequate, and that it
is certainly not the fair market value of the land.
Let us see whats. 14 (1) (ee) provides. It lays down
the be.sis on which the tenure-holder will contribute
towards the land required for public purposes and the
extent to which vacant land may be utilised for the
said purpose. We are here concerned with the first
pa.rt, namely, the contribution of tenure-holders
towards land required for public purposes. In this
case the petitioners had lands in one chak of the rental
value of Rs. 20-6,0 and they have been a.llottea lands
of the rental value of Rs. 20-5-0 instead. In another
chak, in place of land the rental value of which is
Rs. 148-10-0 they have been allotted land of the rental
value of Rs. 147-13-0. Thus out of the land valued a.t
Rs. 169-0-0, they have been allotted land of the value
of Rs. 168-2-0, and land valued a.t Annas 0-14-0 has
gone to the common pool. The percentage is just
over a. half per cent. It hardly ever exceeds one per
cent. Thus the land which is ta.ken over is a small
bit, which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything.
These small bits of lands a.re collected from various
tenure-holders and consolidated in one place and
added to the land which might be lying vacant so that
it may be used for the purposes of s. 14 (l).(ee). A
compact area. is thus created and it is used for the
purposes of the tenure-holders themselves and other
villagers.
Form CH-21 framed under r. 41 (1) shows
the purposes to which this land would be applied,
I
l
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
namely, (1) plantation of trees, '(2) pasture land,
r958
(3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation
d
d
.
h
h I
Attar Sittgll
groun , (6) graveyar s, (7) primary or ot er sc oo,
and 01,,,,,
(8) playground, (9) panchayatghar, and (IO) such other
v
objects. These small bits of land thus acquired from The s1ata
0
of u. P.
tenure-holders are consolidated and used for these
purposes, which are directly for the benefit of the
Wanclioo · /.
tenure-holders. 'I' hey are deprived of a small bit and
in place of it they are given advantages in a much
larger area of land made up of these small bits and
also of vacant land. The question then is whether in
these circumstances it can be said that the tenureholders have been given adequate compensation by
s. 29-B for the small bits of land acquired from them
for public purposes. This case must be distinguished
from other cases where lands are acquired under the
Land Acquisition Act, for here the benefit is direct to
the tenure-holders while in ordinary cases of land
acquired for public purposes, if there is any benefit to
the person from whom the land is acquired, it is
indirect and remote. It is contended on behalf of the
State in the circumstances that the compensation
which the tenure-holders get is not merely the ca.sh
compensation which they receive under s. 29-B but
also the advantage which they receive by these small
bits taken from them being consolidated into a larger
area of land in which they will have benefits, the
nature of which is indicated in form CH-21, over and
above the advantage of having their scattered holdings
consolidated into a compact block. The question,
therefore, is ·Whether in these circumstances the provi~
sion of actual cash compensation under s. 29.B can ~
said to be inadequate. We a.re of opinion that taking
into account the peculiar conditi,ons in ca.ses cif
this kind and remembering that the land ta.ken
from ea.ch individual tenure-holder may be a small
bit and it
is then consolidated into a. la.rge
area by adding some other lands ta.ken from ot.her
tenure-holders, and the whole i& then used for the
a.dv-a.ntage of the whole body of tenure-holders, it
cannot oe said that the ca.sh compensation, added to
the advantages which the tenure-holders get in the
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z95B
large area of land thus constituted and on account of
getting a compact block for themselves, is inadequate.
Altar Singh
h
and Othm
Therefore, assuming t at Art. 31 (2) applies as it was
v.
before the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be said that
n, Stale of u. P. the compensation which the tenure.holders will get
under s. 29-B is inadequate in the circumstances. This
Wa•<hoo J.
ground of attack also therefore fails.
Dtcemb1r 18.
There is no force in this petition and it is hereby
dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
MIZAJI AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF U.P.
(JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAs and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Murder-Unlawful Assembly-Common object to take forcible
possession-Killing by one-Liability of others-Sentence-Indian
Penal Code, z86o, (XLV of z86o) ss. z49 and 302.
Early one morning the five appellants, Tej Singh armed
with a spear, his son Mizaji armed with a pistol which he carried
in the folds of his dhoti, his nephew Subedar, his cousin Macha)
and his servant Maiku armed witli Jathis went to take forcible
possession of a field which was in the cultivatory possession of
Rameshwar and others. While Tej Singh stood guard, Maiku
started ploughing and overturning the jowar that had been sown
in one portion of the field and the others started cutting the
sugarcane which stood in another portion. When Rameshwar
and others arrived they protested to Tej Singh, whereupon all
the accused gathered near Tej Singh and asked the complainants
to go away otherwise they would be finished. On their refusal
to go, Tej Singh asked Mizaji to fire at them and Mizaji shot
Rameshwar dead. The Courts below found that the common
object of the unlawful assembly was to take forcible possession
of the field and to meet every eventuality even to the extent of
causing death if interfered with. It accordingly convicted the
appellants under s. 302 read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code, and
sentenced Mizaji to death and the others to imprisonment for
life. The appellants contended that the other appellants could
not have the knowledge that Mizaji carried a pistol in the folds
,,
,