# B 1koru Singh v. Sta~o/U.P·

- **Citation:** [1963] 1 S.C.R. 63
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 52 of 1960
- **Bench:** J. L. KAPu, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/b-1koru-singh-v-sta-o-u-p-2621
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Rent Oontrot-Donation received by a person for charitable
trU8~Wlien an offence-Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lo<Iging
House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bom. 57 of 1947) s. 18 (1).
.
.
The appellant was the President, Truste(' and Secretary
of a Sangh, which was a public trust registered under the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The appel!ant agreed to
grant the lease of a residential block, which was owned by the
Sangh, at a monthly rent of Rs. 85.00 in favour of the first
respondent on payment of Rs. 3,251 /- as donation to the builcii~ fund ~f the said Sangh, which was paid before the first
respondent actually occupied the premises.
The appellant
was convicted under s. 18 (1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates 1Control Act, 1947, by the Presidency
Magistrate who held that the amount was received as premium,
as a condition precedent for letting the premises. On appeal
the High Court held that the aforesaid payment even if it did
not come within the expression "premium or other like sum"
for granting the tenancy of the premises, it was received by
the appellant as "consideration other than the standard rent"
in respect of the grant;of a lease of the premises and dismissed
the appeal. The appellant came up by special leave in appeal
to the Supreme Court.
The question is whether a sum of money paid ostensibly
as a donation by a person to the person acting on behalf of the
landlord, which was a cha1itable trust, in respect of the grant
a lease of the premises, came within the expression "fine,
premium or other Jike 'sum or deposit or any consideration
other than the standard rent" in sub·s. (1) of • 18 of the Act.
1962
B 1koru Singh
v.
Sta~o/U.P·
Raghubar D~Yal J.
1962
March2'1,
1962
Vithal Krishn•Ji
Niue11dleor
••
Porduman
Ram Singh
64
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Held that where the donation has been received in
respect of ihe granting of the lease and not as a free donation
for the advancement of the purposes of the Sangh it will come
within the e,xpression "premium" or "consideration'' ins. 18 .
The consideration can be pecuniary or non .. pecuniary.
The mere use of the v.ord "donation" dose not take
away the effect of the other expressions used which clearly
support that the payment was made for the purpose of getting
the tenaney of the premises.
The appellant was a trustee of the Sangh. He was
receiving rent on account and on behalf of the Sangh aud
clearly. therefore he comes within the expression "landlord"
as defined in the Act. The fact that he had acted on behalf
of the trust and not for any personal reasons docs not affect
the question or the appellant's conduct coming within the
provision of s. W (I) and can affect only the quantum of
sentence.
Karunsey Kanji v. V elji Virji, ( 1954) 56 Born. L. R. 619.

## Text

1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'I' REPORTS
bond afresh when Bekaru furnished fresh surety in
place of Sa.fir Hussain's surety bond. We therefore
hold that the appellant's bond has been rightly
forfeited ou the non-appearance of Ram Narain in
Court. W c therefore dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismisse.d·.
VITHAL KRISHNAJI NIVENDKAH
v.
PARDUMAN RAM SINGH & ANOTHER
(J. L. KAPu.& and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Rent Oontrot-Donation received by a person for charitable
trU8~Wlien an offence-Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lo<Iging
House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bom. 57 of 1947) s. 18 (1).
.
.
The appellant was the President, Truste(' and Secretary
of a Sangh, which was a public trust registered under the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The appel!ant agreed to
grant the lease of a residential block, which was owned by the
Sangh, at a monthly rent of Rs. 85.00 in favour of the first
respondent on payment of Rs. 3,251 /- as donation to the builcii~ fund ~f the said Sangh, which was paid before the first
respondent actually occupied the premises.
The appellant
was convicted under s. 18 (1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates 1Control Act, 1947, by the Presidency
Magistrate who held that the amount was received as premium,
as a condition precedent for letting the premises. On appeal
the High Court held that the aforesaid payment even if it did
not come within the expression "premium or other like sum"
for granting the tenancy of the premises, it was received by
the appellant as "consideration other than the standard rent"
in respect of the grant;of a lease of the premises and dismissed
the appeal. The appellant came up by special leave in appeal
to the Supreme Court.
The question is whether a sum of money paid ostensibly
as a donation by a person to the person acting on behalf of the
landlord, which was a cha1itable trust, in respect of the grant
a lease of the premises, came within the expression "fine,
premium or other Jike 'sum or deposit or any consideration
other than the standard rent" in sub·s. (1) of • 18 of the Act.
1962
B 1koru Singh
v.
Sta~o/U.P·
Raghubar D~Yal J.
1962
March2'1,
1962
Vithal Krishn•Ji
Niue11dleor
••
Porduman
Ram Singh
64
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Held that where the donation has been received in
respect of ihe granting of the lease and not as a free donation
for the advancement of the purposes of the Sangh it will come
within the e,xpression "premium" or "consideration'' ins. 18 .
The consideration can be pecuniary or non .. pecuniary.
The mere use of the v.ord "donation" dose not take
away the effect of the other expressions used which clearly
support that the payment was made for the purpose of getting
the tenaney of the premises.
The appellant was a trustee of the Sangh. He was
receiving rent on account and on behalf of the Sangh aud
clearly. therefore he comes within the expression "landlord"
as defined in the Act. The fact that he had acted on behalf
of the trust and not for any personal reasons docs not affect
the question or the appellant's conduct coming within the
provision of s. W (I) and can affect only the quantum of
sentence.
Karunsey Kanji v. V elji Virji, ( 1954) 56 Born. L. R. 619.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 52 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated September 9, 1959, of the Bombay
High Court in Criminal Appeal No 916, of 1959.
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
H. R. Khanna and R, H. Dhebar, for the respondent No. 2.
1962. March 27. The Judgment of the Court
wa.8 delivered by
RAGHUBAR
DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by
special leave, raises the question whether a sum
of money paid ostensibly as a donation by a person
to the person acting on behalf of the landlord,
which was a charitable trust, in respect of tho
grant of a lcaso of the premises, oame within the
expression 'fine, premium or other like sum or
deposit or any consideration other than the standard rent' in sub-s. (1) of s. 18 of the Bombay
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947 (Bom. Act LVII of 1947), hereinafter called
the Act.
The question arises in these circumstances.
The appellant was the President, Trustee and
Secretary of the Tillori Kunbi Samajonnati Sangh
(hereinafter called the Sangh), Bombay, in 1958.
The Sangh was a public trust registered under
the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The first
respondent approached him for taking on rent
one of the residential blocks of W aghe Hall at St.
Xavier Road, Parel Bombay, which was owned by
the aforeHaid 8augb. Tho appollant agreed to grnnt
the lease of tho premises at a monthly rout.al of
Rs.85/- in favour of the firnt respondent on payment of Rs.3201/- as donation to the building fund
of the said Sangh. The first respondent paid this
amount in four instalments, three of whioh were
paid prior to May 1, 1958, and the fourth, of
Rs.1,000/-, on May I, 1958, before his actually
occupying the premises. The appellant admits
the receipt of this amount of Rs.3251/-, for donation to the building fund.
He contends that he
was not a. 'landlord' as defined
in the Act. The
Presidency Magistrate, 7th Court, Dadar, held
that the amount was received as a premium, as a
condition precedent for letting the premises to
the first respondent and that therefore the appellant oomm i tted the offence under s.18( I ) of the
Act.
On appeal, the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay held that aforesaid payment, even if it
did not come within the expression 'premium or
other like sum' for granting the tenancy of the
premises, it was received by
th~ appellant as
'consideration other t,han the standard rent' in
respect of tho grant of a lease of the premises and
therefore the conviction was correct. It acGordingly dismissed the appeal. It is against this
order that the appellant has filed thiti appeal.
1962
Vitt.al KrishnoJi
NivendkaT
••
Parduman
Ram Singh
Vit.hal Kriihnoji
JVfoeru//clJf'
..
Parduman
1,l.,,. Singh
Raihuhar Doral J.
66
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS (1963)
Learned counsel for the appellant has urged
that various enactments allowed companies to
receive donations and that the Memorandum of
.Association and the Rules of the Sangh also permitted receipt of gifts of money, that the first
respondent made the donation voluntarily and
that therefore the donation ·cannot amount to a
'premium' or 'consideration' contemplated by subs.( l) of s.18 of the Act. The fact that the Sangh
can legally'
received donations from
persons
whether belonging to the Tillori Kunbi community or not has no bearing on the question before
us. If the donation has been reoeived in respect
of the grantiu.l( of the lease and not as :i free
donation for tho advancement of the purpose of
the Sangh, it will come within the expresHion
'premium' or 'consideration' in s.18.
Both the Courts below have held that the
so called donation was not a free gift to the Sangh
but was paid by the first respondent and received
by the appellant for the letting of tho premises
to the first respondent. There is evidence on
the
record
to
support
this finding of fact.
We see no reason to consider the finding vitiated
by any error of law.
Our attention has been drawn by the learned
counsel for the appellant to the letter dated
July 2, 1958, sent by the first respondent to the
Secretary of the Sangh.
'l'he first respondent said,
in paragraph 1:
" ... I
became a tenant of oilc of your
ground floor blocks by paying a donation
;
of Rs.3251/- only and in return I was promised a clean new block."
This statement in no way supports the contention
for the appellant that the amount was paid as a
free gift for furthoring the objects of the Sangh.
On the other hand, it clearly 1tates that the first
-
(
.)
'·
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
respondent became a tenant by paying a donation
of Rs.3251/-. The mere use of the word 'donation'
does not take away the effect of the other expressions used which clearly supports the finding of the
High Court that the payment was made for the
purppse of getting ~he tenancy of the premises.
It was further urged that charitable trusts are
exempt from the operation of the Act and reference was made to the provisions of s. 4 of the Act.
Clause (ii) of sub-s.(2) of this section provides that
the State Government may direct that all or any
of the provisions ·of ·the Act shall not, subject to
such conditions and terms af it may specify, apply
genera.Uy to premises held by a public trust for a
religious or
charitable
purpose and let at
a
nominal or concessional rent. There is nothing on
the record to show that the State Government had
issued any such directions. Further, the amount
charged for the premises let to th~ first respondent
cannot be said to be . nominal and has not been
shown to be concessional rent..
This contention
therefore has· no foroe.
The, contention that the appellant does not
oome within the expreBBion 'landlord' defined in
sub-s.(3) of s.5 has no force. ,The expression
'landlord' includes a person who is receiving, or
is entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit
of any other person, or as a trustee for any
other person. The
appellant was
a
trustee
of the Sangh. He was receiving rent on account
and on behalf of the Sa.ngh and clearly therefore
he comes within tihe expression 'landlord' as defi·
ned in the Act.
It is further contended that the a.mount pa.id
d·oes not· come within the expressions 'premium'
or 'consideration' in sub-s.{l) of s.18 of the Act.
We do not agree. 'Premium means any amount
paid for the purpose of getting a lease. It was
196!
V itlial Irrisli noji
Nivendkar
"·
P.rdum6n
Rom SU.,11
~Ragliubar Dltflul .1.
1962
Vitlial Krirh11aii
Nive11dkar
v.
Parduma11
R•m Sinch.
Raghubar Dayal J,
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
certainly paid as >t •consideration for obtaining
the lease in this case. \Ve agree with the High
Court that there is no reason to restrict the expression 'consideration' to non-pecuniary oonsideration alone, as was held in Karamsey Kanji v.
Valji Virji (') No good reason exists for rest rioting tile meaning of this word to non-pecuniary
consideration alone, even though any pecuniary
consideration paid in respect of the grant of the
lease will usually come within the expression
'premium'. The foot that the sentence of fin ti,
according to the provisions of sub-s.(l) of s.18,
is not to be less thu,n the 'valmi of the consi<lcrntion received' is not suilicicnt tu limit the expression 'consi<loration' to uun-pecuniary consideration
alone.
The previous
rent-control Aots, viz., the
Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939 (Bom.
Act
XVI of 1939) and the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates
and lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944 (Act
VII of 1\144) which were repealed by the Act
provided in s.10 - and 8 respectively, against the
landlord's requiring the payment of any fine, premium or any other like sum in addition to the
rent in consideration of the grant, renewal or
continuanc.i of a tenancy of any premises. The
addition of words ·deposit or any consideration' in
su b-s.( 1)
of s.18, must have been to cover all
payments besides the standard rent in consideration of getting the tenancy. In the circumstances,
it need not be a matter of surprise that certain
extra. payments may come within more than one
of the expressions 'fine', 'prf'mium' 'other like
sum', 'deposit' or 'consideration'.
In this connection, reference may be made
to Explanation I to sub-s.(4) to s.18 which reads:
"For the purpose of sub-section (1) .
(a) except as provided in sub-section (3)
(I) (1954) 56. Bom, L.R. 619.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
receipt of rent in advance for more than
three months in respect of premises Jet for
the purpose of residence, or
(b) where any furniture or other article
is sold by the landlord to the tenant either
before or after the creation of tenancy of any
premises, the excess of the1price received over
the reasonable price of the furniture or article,
shall be deemed to be a fine or premium or
consideration."
The receipt of rent referred to in cl.(a) and the
excess of the price received over the reasonable price
of the furniture or other article referred to in cl.(b)
is always to be in cash and yet the Explanation
provides that the receipt of rent and the excess of
the price coming within the provisions of cls.(a)
and (b) respectively, shall be deemed to be a 'fine
or premium or consideration•.
Lastly, it was urged that the appellant just
acted on behalf of the trust and not for any personal
reasons. Such a consideration does not
a.fi\1ct the question of the appellant's conduct
coming within the prnvisions of sub.s.(l) of s.18
ancl can affect only the sentence, which, in the
present case, had been tho minimum possible under
the law. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment till the 'rising of tho Court and a fine of
Rs. 3251/-. Sub-a.
(1)
of s.18 provides that a
person, on conviction for tho offence under that
section be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months and shall a]so be
punished with fine which shall not be less than
the amount of fine, premium ,or sum or deposit
or the value of the consideration received by him.
We are therefore of opinion that the appellant has been rightly convicted under s.18( I) of
the Act l\nd, accordingly dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismiBsed.
1962
Vit hol Krithnaji
Nivendkar
"·
Porduman
Rom Singh
Roghubar Doyal J.