# B. J. SHELAT v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 553
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-03-28
- **Bench:** R. S. Sarkaria, N. L. Untwalia, P. S. Ka!Lasam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/b-j-shelat-v-state-of-gujarat-anr-7361
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Bombay Civil Service Rules-r. 161(2) (ii)
proviso--Scope of-Government
liad power to withhold permission for voluntary
retirement if departmentat
proceedings are under contemplation-Government servant gave due notice of
intention to retire-Order of suspension not comniunicated to Government servant before retirement-Communication if incumbent-Government if
competent to take disciplinary action after retirenient.
Rule 161 (2)(ii) of the Bombay
Civil Services
Rules provides :
"any
Government servant to whom clause (a) applies may, by giving notice of not
less than three months in writing to the Appointing Authority, retire
from
service .... and in any other case, after he has attained the age of 55 years.
Provided that it shall be open to the Appointing _Authority to
withhold'
permission to retire to a Government servant who is under suspension, or against
"°·horn departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated, and who seeks
to retire under this sub-clause."
During the pendency of certain appeals before the High Court from the
decisions of the &J)pellant who was a Judicial Officer the accused in those cases
filed affidavits aUeging corruption on the part of the appellant. In the meantime on July 17, 1973 the appellant gave a notice under r. 161 communicating
his desire to retire on attaining the age of 55 years, on December 3, 1973. On
December 11, 1973, pending finalisation of departmental proceedings 'vhich
were under contemplation, the High Court sbspended him from service.
The appellant's v..Tit petition challenging the Governments nction in taking
disciplinary action against him after retirement was dismissed by the High Court.
The Special Leave Petition filed by him in this Coun was allowed to be with~
drawn reserving to him the right to agitate the question whether disciplinary
action could be taken against him after retiremiynt.
Eventually, hovvever, he
was dismissed.
On the question whether it was incumbent on the Government to communicate to the Government servant its decision to \1.'ithhold permission to retire
on one of the grounds specified in the proviso :
IIELD :
1. For the proviso to become operative it is necessary that the
Government should not only take a decision but communicate it to the Government servant.
It is not necessary that the communication should reach the
Governn1ent Set>:ant.
[558 E]
c
E
F
2. But for the proviso the right of the Government servant to retire V.'Ould
have been absolute.
The proviso has restricted the right conferred
on the
Goven1ment sen·ant under it.
It is open to the Appointing A.uthority to withhold permission to retire when the Government servant is under suspension or
G
departnten:al proceedings are pending or are cont~1nplated against him.
[557
C-EJ
3. The proviso
contempl~tes positive action by the Appointing Authority.
The \Vords "it shall be Open to the Appointing Authority to withhold pern1ission"
ii:t r. 161 proyis_o indicate that the Appointing Authority has got an option- to
wtthhold pern11ss1on and that could be exercised by communic:ating its intention
to withhold permission to the Government servant. The Appointing Authority
may have con~idc:ed the question and may not have taken a decision either way
H
or after considering the facts of the case may have come to the conc1usion
that it is better to aUow the Government servant to retire than take any action
against him.
[558 C-E]
A
. B
554
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
Dinesh Char;dra Sangma v. State of Assam ""d ()rr
[1978]1 S.C.R. 607,
distinguished.
· .,
L.ewi' & Allenby (1909) Ltd. v. Pegge; [1914] l Ch. D. 782; held inapphcabJe.
State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram; [1970] 2 S.C.R. 657; Suue of Punjab v.
Amar Singh Harika; A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1313; referred to .
In the instant case it was incumbent on the Appointing Authority to withhold
permission to retire on one of the conditions mentioned in the proviso.
Admittedly the order of suspension was not communicated before the date of
retirement.
Therefore, disc

## Text

)
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•
553
B. J. SHELAT
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
March 28, 1978
[R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA AND P. S. KA!LASAM, JJ.]
Bombay Civil Service Rules-r. 161(2) (ii)
proviso--Scope of-Government
liad power to withhold permission for voluntary
retirement if departmentat
proceedings are under contemplation-Government servant gave due notice of
intention to retire-Order of suspension not comniunicated to Government servant before retirement-Communication if incumbent-Government if
competent to take disciplinary action after retirenient.
Rule 161 (2)(ii) of the Bombay
Civil Services
Rules provides :
"any
Government servant to whom clause (a) applies may, by giving notice of not
less than three months in writing to the Appointing Authority, retire
from
service .... and in any other case, after he has attained the age of 55 years.
Provided that it shall be open to the Appointing _Authority to
withhold'
permission to retire to a Government servant who is under suspension, or against
"°·horn departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated, and who seeks
to retire under this sub-clause."
During the pendency of certain appeals before the High Court from the
decisions of the &J)pellant who was a Judicial Officer the accused in those cases
filed affidavits aUeging corruption on the part of the appellant. In the meantime on July 17, 1973 the appellant gave a notice under r. 161 communicating
his desire to retire on attaining the age of 55 years, on December 3, 1973. On
December 11, 1973, pending finalisation of departmental proceedings 'vhich
were under contemplation, the High Court sbspended him from service.
The appellant's v..Tit petition challenging the Governments nction in taking
disciplinary action against him after retirement was dismissed by the High Court.
The Special Leave Petition filed by him in this Coun was allowed to be with~
drawn reserving to him the right to agitate the question whether disciplinary
action could be taken against him after retiremiynt.
Eventually, hovvever, he
was dismissed.
On the question whether it was incumbent on the Government to communicate to the Government servant its decision to \1.'ithhold permission to retire
on one of the grounds specified in the proviso :
IIELD :
1. For the proviso to become operative it is necessary that the
Government should not only take a decision but communicate it to the Government servant.
It is not necessary that the communication should reach the
Governn1ent Set>:ant.
[558 E]
c
E
F
2. But for the proviso the right of the Government servant to retire V.'Ould
have been absolute.
The proviso has restricted the right conferred
on the
Goven1ment sen·ant under it.
It is open to the Appointing A.uthority to withhold permission to retire when the Government servant is under suspension or
G
departnten:al proceedings are pending or are cont~1nplated against him.
[557
C-EJ
3. The proviso
contempl~tes positive action by the Appointing Authority.
The \Vords "it shall be Open to the Appointing Authority to withhold pern1ission"
ii:t r. 161 proyis_o indicate that the Appointing Authority has got an option- to
wtthhold pern11ss1on and that could be exercised by communic:ating its intention
to withhold permission to the Government servant. The Appointing Authority
may have con~idc:ed the question and may not have taken a decision either way
H
or after considering the facts of the case may have come to the conc1usion
that it is better to aUow the Government servant to retire than take any action
against him.
[558 C-E]
A
. B
554
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
Dinesh Char;dra Sangma v. State of Assam ""d ()rr
[1978]1 S.C.R. 607,
distinguished.
· .,
L.ewi' & Allenby (1909) Ltd. v. Pegge; [1914] l Ch. D. 782; held inapphcabJe.
State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram; [1970] 2 S.C.R. 657; Suue of Punjab v.
Amar Singh Harika; A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1313; referred to .
In the instant case it was incumbent on the Appointing Authority to withhold
permission to retire on one of the conditions mentioned in the proviso.
Admittedly the order of suspension was not communicated before the date of
retirement.
Therefore, disciplinary action cannot be taken after the date of
his retirement.
[558 F-G]
CIVIL APPEI.LATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 923/77.
(Appeai by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
13-8-1976 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 1216/76).
V. M. Tarkunde, P. H. Parekh, Manju Sharma and C. B. Singh
for the Appellant.
D. V. Patel and S. P. Nayar for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
.E
F
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KAILASAM, J.
This appeal is preferred by special leave against
the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated l3ih August, 1976
dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant against the order of
dismissal passed by the Government on 21st January, 1976.
The appellant B. J. Shelat was born on 4th December,
1918 .
He joined as a Magistrate on 5th January, 1950 in the pre-reorganized State of Bombay. On the bifurcation of the State of Bombay on
1st May, 1960 he was allotted to the State of Gujarat a; a Chi!
Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class.
On 4th November, 1961
the appellant was appointed by the Governor of Gujarat as a Magistrate for the city of Ahmedabad.
On 9th
November,
1970 the
appellant gave a notice of retirement to the Government of Gujarat
through the Registrar of the High Court.
He intimated that as he
had completed 50 years on 4th December, 1968 he intended to retire
from 10th May 1971 if Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Servcies Rules
permitted him to do so.
The Registrar of the High Court replied to
this notice on I Ith January, 1972 informing the appellant that he
may send a fresh application on the lines of his application dated 9th
November, 1970.
The appellant had delivered several judgments under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act during the period 24th January, 1972
to i 7th August, 1972.
These judgments were taken on appeal to
the High Court and in the High Court during the per;od 19th June,
1973 to 10th August, 1973 the accused in the variolls cases relating
to food adulteration filed affidavits alleging that they had paid some
moneys to 'the appellant.
When these appeals were pending berore
the High Court on 17th July, 1973 the appellant gave a second notice
under Rule 161 intimating his intel}tion to retire on reaching the age
•
)
SHELAT v. GUJARAT STATE (Kailasam, !.)
555
.of 55 years i.e. on 3rd December, 1973. But before 3_rd D_eccmb~r,
1973, the date on which the appellant was due to. retrre, tne Chief
City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, informed
the
peUtmner
on
23rd
November 1973 under the directions of the Chief Justice and Judges
of the HigJ1 Court of Gujarat calling upon him to submit his explanation as regards allegation made in the affidavits.
The appellant submitted his explanation on 26th November, 1973.. On 11th J:?ecember,
1973 the High Court issued an order of suspens10n as the High Co.urt
was of the view that it was desirable to suspend the appellant pendmg
.i]nalisation of departmental proceedings against him which were under
contemplation.
The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the jurisdiction. of
the Government to take disciplinary action against him after retirement. This petition was dismissed and a Letters Patent Appeal filed
by the appellant was also dismissed on 24th December, 1973.
The
.appellallt filed a special leave petition in this Court against the order
Df dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court and this Court on
25th April, 1975 allowed the appellant to withdraw hi~ petition reserving his right to agitate the questio_n as to whether disciplinary action
can ':Jc taken against him after retirement when final
orders
were
vassed in the disciplinary inquiry against him.
In the meantime a
chargesheet was issued to the appellant by the High Court on l'Sth
January, 1974 and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 25th
July, 1974 holding that the charges were not proved. But the High
'Court did not agree with the report of the lnquiry Offlcer and directed
the appellant to show cause why a different view from that of the
lnquily Ofiicer be not taken.
On receipt of the appellant's reply the
High Court recommended the punishment of dismissal to the Government and the impugned order was passed by the Government on 21st
January, 197 6.
The appellant preferred writ petition to the
High
Court and the High Court by its judgment dismissed it holding that
there is evidence on which a reasonable inference of guilt could
be
drawn and therefore it could not interfere with the order of dismissal.
Hence, the present appeal.
Mr. V. !"l. Tarkunde, the learned counsel for the appellant, raised
~wo content10ns before: us, He submitted. that after the passing of the
unpugned order of dismissal by the Governinent on 21st January,
1976 it has become necessary to question the
jurisdiction of the
authority to take disciplinary action against the appellant after
his
retirement,_ a !Juestion which was speci~cally reserved for the appellant by this Court.
Secondly, he submitted that on the merits there
is no evidence on which a court can come to the conclusio11 that the
·<:harges that were framed against tlie appellant had been rstablished.
We will proceed to consider the question of the jurisdiction of the
au!hority to take disciplinary action against the appellant after his
·retirement. . It m_ay be recalled that the appellant gave a notice inti_!llatmg !us mte.nhon to retire on 17th July, 1973
statin,g
that
he
mtended to retire on reachmg the age of 55 years on 3rd December
}9_73. He attained the age of 55 years on 3rd December, 1973 and
:it IS common ground that the notice of suspension was issued by the
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556
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
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High Court only on 11th December, 1973. But befor<> 3rd December,
1973 it is admitted that a show-cause notice was issued on 23rd
November, 1973 by the Chief City Magistrate on\ the directions of tl1e
High Court calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation and
the appellant submitted his 'explanation on 26th November, 1971.
Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provides for the
B retiremer.t of Government servants
before attaining the
age
c:t
snperannuation. Rule 161 (!) (aa) providesc
D
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"Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a)
(l) An appointing authority shall, if he is
of
the
opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the
absolute right to retire any Government ser>ant to which
clause (a) applies by giving him notice of not less
than
three months in writing or three months pay and allowances
in lieu o[ such notice :
x
x
x
Sub-rule (2) (ii) is as follows :-
"any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies
may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing
to
the
Appointing
Authority,
retire
from
service x x x x x and in any other case, after he has attained
the age of 55 years."
There is no dispute that the Rnle applicable is Rule 161(2) (ii) and
the appellant is entitled to retire by giving a notice of not les's ban
3 months after he has attained the age of 55 years. Under Rnle 161
(1) (aa) (1) the appointing authority has an absolute right to retire
any Governm(•nt servant to whom clause (a) applies in public interest
by giving him notice of not less than three months in. writing or three
months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. But the Government servant has no such absolute right. A right is con~erred on the
Government 'ervant under Rule 161 (2) (ii) to retire by giving not
less than three months notice on his attaining the prescribed. age.
Such a right is subject to the proviso which is incorporated to the
sub-section which reads as follows :-
"Provided that it shall be open to the appointing authority to withhold permission to retire to a Government servant who is under suspension, or against whom departmental
proceedings are pending or contemplated, and who seeks to
retire under this sub-clause."
But for the proviso a Gov_ernment servant wonld be at liberty
tO"
retire by givmg not less than three months notice in writing to the
appointing authority on attaining the prescribed 1ge.
This position
has been made clear by this Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma
v.
H
State of Assam and Others(1) where the Court was considering the
effect of the (Assam) Fundamental Rule 56(c) which confers right
(1) [1978] 1 C.R. 607.
•
~·
SllELAT v. GUJARAT STATE (Kailasam, J.)
5 57
-0n the Government servant to voluntary retire.
Rule 56(c) of the
A
{Assam) Fundamental Rules runs as follows :--
"(c) Any Government servant may, by giving notice of
not less than three months in writing
to the appropriate
authority, retire from service after he has attained the age
oE ilfty years or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier."
·On a construction of the Rule this Court held that the ~ondition of
service which i' envisaged in Rule 56(c) giving an option in absolute
terms to a Government servant to voluntary retire with three months'
previous notice, after he reaches 50 years of age or has completed 25
years of service, cannot be equated with a contract of employment as
envisaged in Explanation 2 to Rq]e 119 of the Defence of India Rules
and that Rule 56 is a statutory condition which oper.1ted in law without reference to a contract of employment and when once the conditions of Fundamental Rule 56(c) are fulfilled the Government servant must be held to have lawfully retired. But for the proviso to
Rule 161(2) (ii) the decision of this Court in the case cited above
would be applicable and the right would have been absolute. But the
proviso has restricted the right conferred on the Government servant.
Under the proviso it is open to the appointing authority to withhold
permission to retire to a Government servant when ( 1) he is nnder
snspension, or (2) against whom departmental proc.,edings are pending or contemplated. Tuns the permission to retire can be withheld
by the appointing authority either when the Government servant is
under suspension or against whom
departmental
proce·,ding;;
are
pending or contemplated. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant
that admittedly he was not under suspension on the date when nc
attained the age of 55 years and that no departmental proceedings
were pending or contemplated against him as requir~d under the proviso. No departmental proceeding was pending but on the facts on~
cannot say that a proceeding was not under contemplation.
Mr. T:irknnde, the learned counsel for the appellant, further submitted that in any event the appointing authority had not .:hosen to
withhold permission to retire before the date of superannuation. It
wa,; subnntted on behalf of the respondent, the State of Gujarat that
a reading of Rule 161(2) (ii) woul.d show that a Government s~rvant
c!lnnot !etire_ wit~out t~ specific .P<:rmission of the appointing authority ana as m this case no pernnss1on was granted it should he held
that the appointing antbority withheld permission to the Government
s~rvant to retire according to the proviso. In support of this contention Mr_. _Pate_!, the l<:amed counsel for the State of Gujarat, relied on
the decJSJon ~n .Lewis & Allenby. (1909), !-imi:ed v. Pegge.(I)
In
that case a !Jm;ted company demised a residential fiat for a term of
y~ars and the lessee covenanted not to assign or underlet the premises
~v1thout the consent of the company, such consent not to be withheld
m the case cf a respectable or responsible person.
On 3rd April,
1913 the less~e applied to the Secretary of the company for leave to
sub-let to Higham a respectable and responsible person and asked
(l) [1914] 1 Ch. Division p.782.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll978] 3 S.C.R.
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to know by April 14 as Higham wanted possession on that elate. The·
Secretary torgot to communicate with his directors.
On 14th April
the lessee not having received a reply sub-let to Higham . and gave
him possession. In an action by the company to recover possession
for breach of the covenant the Court held that as consent is not to
be withheld in the case of a respectable and responsible pers•Jn, if the
lessee applies for such consent and within a reasonable time that conB
sent is not granted, then within the meaning of the covenant it iswithheld and the lessee will not lose his property if he assigns to the
person whose name he has given to the landlord.
On the circumstances of the case the_ Court was of the view that the period between
3rd April and 14th April was a reasonable time and inasmuch as no
intimation was made to him either way in the interval there has been
no breach of the covenant and the sub-lease to Higham was good.
C
We fail to understand how this decision advances the contenEcn o!
Mr. Patel. As no communication was received the Court held that
the granting of the permission was a mere formality and that ii had
to be taken that the con~ent was granted. In the case before us it is
incumbent on the appointing authority to withhold permission to retire
on one of the conditions mentioned in the proviso. We are of the
n
VieW that the pIOViSO COUtemplates a positive acti<IJI by the appoint·
ing authority. The words "It sball be open to the appointinp, authority to withhold permission" would indicate
that
the arpointing
authority has got an option to withhold permission and that could be
exercised by communicating its intention to withhold perrrission to
the Government servant.
The appointing authority ;nay have considered the question and might not have taken a decisio11 cit11er way
E
or after con;idering the facts of the case might have wme to the conclusion that it is better to allow the Government servant to retire than
take any action against him.
For the proviso to become operative it
is necessary that the Government should not only take a decision but
communicate it to the Government servant. It is not necessary that
the communication should reach the Government servant. As held by
thh Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram(1) it will be sufficient if
such an order is sent out and goes out of control of the appointing
F
authority before the relevant date. After referring to the earlier decisions, th~ CotJrt held that the actual knowledge by the Government
servant of an order of dismi"ssal may perhaps become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in the State of Punjah v.
Amar Singh l!arika(') contemplated but an order of suspension when
once issued and sent out to the concerned Government servant must
be held to have been communicated no matter when
he actuallv
G
received it. The question as to when the order •hould be deemed to
have been communicated is not relevant in this case as admittedlv the
order o' suspension was not communicated before the date of s~perannuation.
.
Mr. Patel next referred us to the meaning of the word "withhold"
in Webster's Third New International Dictionary which is given as
H
''hold back" and submitted that the permission should be deemed to
(!) [1970] 2 S.CR. 657.
(2) A.!.R. 1966 S.C. !3!3.
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SHELAT v. GUJARAT STATE (Kailasam, J.)
559
have been withheld jj' it is not co=unicated. We are not able to
A
read the meaning of the word "withhold" as indicating that ~ !he
absence of a communication is must be understood as the pernuss1on
having been withheld.
It will be useful to refer to the analogons pro<ision in the Fundamental Rules issued by the Government of India applicable to the
Central Government servants. Fundamental Rule 56(a) provides that
except as otherwise provided in this Rule, every Government servant
shall retire from service on the afternoon of the !a.st day of the month
in which he attains the age of fifty-eight years. Fundamental Rule 56
(j) is similar to Rule 161 (aa) (1) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules
conkrring an absolute right on the appropriate authority to retire a
Government servant by giving not less than three months
notice.
Under Fundamer.tal Rule 56(k) the Government servant is entitled
to retire from service after he ha.s attained the age of fifty-five years
by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority on attaining the age specified. But proviso (b) to
sub-rule 56(k) states that it is open to the appropriate anthority to
withhold permission to a Government servant under suspension who
seeks to retire under this clause. Thus under the Fundamental Rules
issued by the Government of India also the right of the Government
servant to retire is not an absolute right but is sub~ect to the proviso
whereunder the appropriate authority may withhold permission to a
Government smvant under suspension.
On a consideratioa of Rule
161 (2) <ii) and the proviso we are satisfied that it is incumbent on
the Government to cn=unicate to the Government servant its decision to withhold permission to retire on one of the ground spccificcl
in the proviso .
In the view we have taken that the appointing authority has no
jurisdiction to take disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant who had effectively retired, the question as to whether the High
Court was right in holding that the <,lisciplinary authoritv had sufficient
gmunds for dismissing the appellant does not ans0. · 111e Inquiry
Officer held that the charges had not been established as the witnesses
who made al!egJtions against the 11ppellant in their affidavits failed to
appear before it. The High Court or the adJninislracive side came to
a different conclusion on examining the record relating to three criminai cases where the accused pleaded guilty but the appellant did not
pronounce his judgment and postponed it to some months thereafter.
In one case the accused pleaded guilty on 16th December, 1971 hut
the judgment was pronounced on 21st March, 1972. In the second
case the accused pleaded guilty on 23rd December, 1971
and the
judgment was pronounced on 24th January, 1972 and in the third
case the plea of guilty was on 26th Jone, 1972 and the judgment was
pronounced on 17th August, 1972.
The High Court observed :
. "While exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226 we are not concerned with the adequacy of evidence. All that w~ have to see is
whether there is evidence on which a reasonable inference could be
drawn." Jn the circumstances of the case, the High Court was of the
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560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
'
view that it was not called upon to interfere.
As already stated, as
we have come to the conclusion that the disciplinary action cannot be
taken after the date of his retirement, we refrain f~om expressing any
opinion on the correctness of the decision taken by the appointing
authority.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the impugned order nnd the
judgment of the High Court are set aside. There will be no order as
to costs.
P.B.R
Appeal allowed.
\.:.
/
"277SCIJ78-GIPF.
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