# B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [2020] 12 S.C.R. 974
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2020
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1460 of 2010
- **Bench:** Indira Banerjee, S. Ravindra Bhat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/b-k-ravichandra-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-34544
- **Pages:** 26

## Headnote

Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act,
1952:
Requisition under - Continuation of occupation of the Union
Government, even after lapse of the Act - Refusal to hand back the
possession - High Court by impugned order despite holding that
the Union claim has no merit, did not issue any direction to release
the lands in question - Appeal to Supreme Court - Held: Acquisition
under the Act is temporary - State's occupation ceased to be lawful,
with the lapse of the Act in the year 1987 - Right to property though
not fundamental, is a valuable constitutional right ensuring
guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty - Court's role is to act
as the guarantor and protector of the people's liberties - It is not
open to the State to claim that the law or the Constitution can be
ignored or complied at its convenience - Permitting the State to
assert its indefinite or overriding right to continue occupying one's
property, bereft of lawful sanction, would be condoning lawlessness
- The State is directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to
the appellants.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The legal effect of requisitioning immovable
property is that temporarily- i.e. for the period the requisition
order is in operation, the owner loses her possessory rights, even
though the title remains undisturbed. Since the deprivation of
possession is through authority of law, in keeping with fair
procedure, the law (in this case, the Requisitioning Act) provides
for payment of compensation in accordance with predetermined
principles. Yet, the taking of property by definition is finite: it
cannot result in expropriation or deprivation of title altogether,
unless another process for acquiring it, is initiated. [Para 18][989B-D]
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 974
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Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra (1994)
4 SCC 192 : [1994] 3 SCR 746 - followed.
Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P (1997) 4 SCC
511 : [1997] 1 SCR 1056 - relied on.
2. Although the right to property is not a fundamental right
protected under Part III of the Constitution of India, it remains a
valuable constitutional right. The decisions of this court, and the
history of the right to property show that though its pre-eminence
as a fundamental right has been undermined, nevertheless, the
essence of the rule of law protects it. The evolving jurisprudence
of this court also underlines that it is a valuable right ensuring
guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty. The phrasing of
Article 300-A is determinative and its resemblance with Articles
21 and 265 cannot be overlooked- they in effect, are a guarantee
of the supremacy of the rule of law, no less. [Paras 21 and 26][993B; 998-B-C]
Delhi Airtech Services Pvt Ltd v. State of U.P (2011) 9
SCC 354 : [2011] 12 SCR 191; State of Rajasthan v.
Basant Nahata (2005) 12 SCC 77 : [2005] 3 Suppl.
SCR 1; K. T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
(2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; T. Vijayalakshmi
v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502 : [2006]
7 Suppl. SCR 534; D. B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition
Officer (2020) 4 SCC 572; State of U.P. v. Manohar
(2005) 2 SCC 126 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911;
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P)
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517;
Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai
Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013) 5 SCC 627 : [2013] 2 SCR
664 - relied on.
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial
Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6
SCR 799; Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore
Municipal Corporation (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9
SCR 373; M. C. Mehta v Union of India (2020) SCC
Online (SC) 658 - referred to.
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
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3. It is not open to the State: in any of its forms (Executive,
State Agencies or Legislature) to claim that the law - or the
Constitution can be ignored, or complied at its convenience.
[Para 26][998-B]
Superintendent Remembra

## Text

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B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1460 of 2010)
NOVERMBER 24, 2020
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act,
1952:
Requisition under - Continuation of occupation of the Union
Government, even after lapse of the Act - Refusal to hand back the
possession - High Court by impugned order despite holding that
the Union claim has no merit, did not issue any direction to release
the lands in question - Appeal to Supreme Court - Held: Acquisition
under the Act is temporary - State's occupation ceased to be lawful,
with the lapse of the Act in the year 1987 - Right to property though
not fundamental, is a valuable constitutional right ensuring
guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty - Court's role is to act
as the guarantor and protector of the people's liberties - It is not
open to the State to claim that the law or the Constitution can be
ignored or complied at its convenience - Permitting the State to
assert its indefinite or overriding right to continue occupying one's
property, bereft of lawful sanction, would be condoning lawlessness
- The State is directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to
the appellants.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The legal effect of requisitioning immovable
property is that temporarily- i.e. for the period the requisition
order is in operation, the owner loses her possessory rights, even
though the title remains undisturbed. Since the deprivation of
possession is through authority of law, in keeping with fair
procedure, the law (in this case, the Requisitioning Act) provides
for payment of compensation in accordance with predetermined
principles. Yet, the taking of property by definition is finite: it
cannot result in expropriation or deprivation of title altogether,
unless another process for acquiring it, is initiated. [Para 18][989B-D]
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 974
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975
Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra (1994)
4 SCC 192 : [1994] 3 SCR 746 - followed.
Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P (1997) 4 SCC
511 : [1997] 1 SCR 1056 - relied on.
2. Although the right to property is not a fundamental right
protected under Part III of the Constitution of India, it remains a
valuable constitutional right. The decisions of this court, and the
history of the right to property show that though its pre-eminence
as a fundamental right has been undermined, nevertheless, the
essence of the rule of law protects it. The evolving jurisprudence
of this court also underlines that it is a valuable right ensuring
guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty. The phrasing of
Article 300-A is determinative and its resemblance with Articles
21 and 265 cannot be overlooked- they in effect, are a guarantee
of the supremacy of the rule of law, no less. [Paras 21 and 26][993B; 998-B-C]
Delhi Airtech Services Pvt Ltd v. State of U.P (2011) 9
SCC 354 : [2011] 12 SCR 191; State of Rajasthan v.
Basant Nahata (2005) 12 SCC 77 : [2005] 3 Suppl.
SCR 1; K. T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
(2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; T. Vijayalakshmi
v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502 : [2006]
7 Suppl. SCR 534; D. B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition
Officer (2020) 4 SCC 572; State of U.P. v. Manohar
(2005) 2 SCC 126 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911;
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P)
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517;
Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai
Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013) 5 SCC 627 : [2013] 2 SCR
664 - relied on.
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial
Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6
SCR 799; Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore
Municipal Corporation (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9
SCR 373; M. C. Mehta v Union of India (2020) SCC
Online (SC) 658 - referred to.
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
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3. It is not open to the State: in any of its forms (Executive,
State Agencies or Legislature) to claim that the law - or the
Constitution can be ignored, or complied at its convenience.
[Para 26][998-B]
Superintendent Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v.
Corpn. of Calcutta [1967] 2 SCR 170 - relied on.
Director of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation
of Calcutta [1961] 1 SCR 158 - stood overruled.
4. The Union asserted that it had acquired at least some
parts of the suit lands; these were examined by the High Court
on two occasions, and in arbitration proceedings under the
Requisitioning Act, on three occasions. Each time, the factual
findings went against the Union. The Union's occupation ceased
to be lawful, with the lapse of the Requisitioning Act, in 1987.
Yet, it has implacably refused to hand back possession, each time
asserting that it has some manner of rights over it. The High
Court, while noticing that the Union's claim had no merits (in
both its appeal, which was dismissed, as well as in the impugned
judgment, disposing of the writ petition), nevertheless refused
to issue any direction for the release of the suit lands. The
rationale given was that the adjoining areas had been acquired
and were used by the Union for defense purposes. The impugned
judgment granted indefinite time to the Union to take steps to
acquire the suit lands. The Union has not chosen to do so these
last 12 years. These facts paint a stark, even sordid picture.
[Para 24][996-F-H; 997-A]
5. To permit the State: whether the Union or any State
Government to assert that it has an indefinite or overriding right
to continue occupying one's property (bereft of lawful sanction)-
whatever be the pretext, is no less than condoning lawlessness.
The courts' role is to act as the guarantor and zealous protector
of the people's liberties: be they assured through the freedoms,
and the right to equality and religion or cultural rights under Part
III, or the right against deprivation, in any form, through any
process other than law. Any condonation by the court is a validation
of such unlawful executive behavior which it then can justify its
conduct on the anvil of some loftier purpose, at any future time-
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aptly described as a "loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need." [Para 26][998-C-F]
Korematsu v. United States 323 US 214 (1944) -
referred to.
6. The impugned judgment committed an error in refusing
relief to the appellants. 33 years (based upon cessation of the
Union's legal possession) is a long enough time, even in India, to
be kept away from one's property. The respondent Union is
directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to the
appellants, within three months. Furthermore, it is open to the
appellants to seek compensation based on fresh fixation of capital
value and recurring annual value, based on the different fiveyear periods for the last 20 years. Such a claim shall be referred
to arbitration, within four weeks of receipt of the reference. The
arbitrator shall proceed to pronounce the award within six months
of receipt of the reference. This is independent of the Union's
obligation to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the
suit lands within three months. [Para 27][999-A-C]
Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah
and Anr. [1990] 1 SCR 4; Union of India v. B. M.
Krishnamurthy 1995 (4) KarLJ 607; Vidya Devi v. State
of H.P. (2020) 2 SCC 569; State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar (2013) 1 SCC 353 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1990] 1 SCR 4
referred to
Para 9
(2020) 2 SCC 569
referred to
Para 15
[2012] 13 SCR 29
referred to
Para 15
[1994] 3 SCR 746
followed
Para 19
[1997] 1 SCR 1056
relied on
Para 20
[2011] 12 SCR 191
relied on
Para 21
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 1
relied on
Para 21
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
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[2011] 13 SCR 636
relied on
Para 22
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 534
relied on
Para 22
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911
relied on
Para 22
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517
relied on
Para 22
[2013] 2 SCR 664
relied on
Para 22
[2007] 6 SCR 799
referred to
Para 22
[2016] 9 SCR 373
referred to
Para 22
(2020) 4 SCC 572
relied on
Para 23
[1961] 1 SCR 158
stood overruled Para 25
[1967] 2 SCR 170
relied on
Para 25
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1460
of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2008 of the High Court
of Judicature at Karnataka in W.P. No. 8340 of 2006(LA).
Mohan Parasaran, V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. Advs. V. Balachandran,
Siddharth Naidu, M/S. KSN & Co., K.M. Natraj, Abhishek Kumar,
Sharath Nambiar, Arvind Kr. Sharma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, V. N.
Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This appeal by special leave questions a judgment of the
Karnataka High Court1. The High Court rejected the appellants' claim
to direct the respondent (hereafter called "the Union") to vacate their
lands, leaving it open to the latter to initiate appropriate proceedings for
acquisition of certain lands (which belonged to the appellants).
2. Parliament, in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Union,
enacted the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable properties Act,
1952 (hereafter called "the Requisitioning Act"). It was brought into
force on 15.03.1952.2 The object of the Act was to enable the Union to
1 Dated 11.01.2008 in W.P. 8340/2006
2 By virtue of Section 1(3), the Act was initially temporary, and to remain in force for
six years.
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requisition or acquire immovable property if the competent authority was
of the opinion that any property was necessary for a public purpose. By
Section 1(3), the Requisitioning Act was to be in force for six years.
Section 3 clothed the Union with the power to requisition properties for
any public purpose; Section 7 provided the procedure to requisition (or
acquire) lands. It also spelt-out the condition precedents for exercise of
the power. Section 8 provided for compensation with regard to property.
Section 8(2) laid out the principles applicable for determination of
compensation for the property as a recurring one3. On 27.02.1958, the
Requisitioning Act was amended and the period of its operation extended.
In the meanwhile, the Defence of India Act, 1962 (hereafter referred to
as "the DIA") was enacted by Parliament empowering the Central
Government with powers akin to those enacted under the Requisitioning
Act. The Union invoked its powers under the DIA and requisitioned the
three described properties which belonged to the predecessor of the
appellants (hereafter referred to as "the suit lands"). These comprised
of Survey Nos. 101/1 & 101/2 - the two survey numbers aggregating 2
acres 39 guntas and Survey No.104 (2 acre 8 guntas) in Byppanahalli,
Bangalore South Taluk. The then owner, i.e. late B.M. Krishnamurthy,
the appellants' predecessor handed over the possession of the suit lands
under protest; these were taken over under Section 30 of the DIA. The
competent authority fixed the compensation for these lands by order
dated 18.12.1964. The approval for this compensation fixation was given
much later - in 1968.
3. By Act 48 of 1963, Section 1(3) of the Requisitioning Act was
amended, and the period of operation of the Requisitioning Act was
3 Section 8(2) (a) provided inter alia, as follows:
"a recurring payment in respect of the period of requisition of a sum equal to the rent
which would have been payable for the use and occupation of the property, if it had been
taken on lease for the period."
Section 8 (2) (b) provided for payment of
(b) such sum or sums, if any, as may be found necessary to compensate the person
interested for all or any of the following matters, namely:
(i)
pecuniary loss due to requisitioning;
(ii) expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises;
(iii) expenses on account of reoccupying the premises upon release from
requisition; and
(iv) damages (other than normal wear and tear) caused to the property during
the period of requisition, including the expenses that may have to be incurred
for restoring the property to the condition in which it was at the time of
requisition.
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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extended till 14.03.1970. In the meanwhile, the DIA lapsed with effect
from 10.01.1968. The Requisitioning Act was amended, incorporating
Section 25, which enacted that the immovable property requisitioned
under the DIA, which had not been released as on 10.01.1968 was
deemed to have been requisitioned under the Requisition Act. It also
continued the status quo with respect to determination of compensation
completed under the DIA. This Amendment Ordinance was replaced
by an actual amendment, to the Requisitioning Act. The Requisitioning
Act was again amended in 19704, to delete Section 1(3) of the main Act.
The Amendment Act also enabled requisitioning of property and stated
that requisitions were to be continued and were to be released after 12
years (subsequently the period of 12 years was extended to 17 years)5.
4. In late 1972, the predecessor of the appellants felt that the
compensation fixed for the suit lands was inadequate and applied for
enhancement. This was in terms of the amendment of 1970 (because
the land requisitioned in 1963 was deemed to have been continued by
the Act of 1968). As required by Section 8 of the Requisitioning Act, this
dispute was referred to an arbitrator under Section 8(2). The reference
made was in respect of the amount of compensation payable, the recurring
payments in respect of the periods of requisition and the sums equal to
the rent that would have been payable for the occupation and use of the
property and other sums towards 4 years of losses, i.e. pecuniary loss
expense on account of the vacating of the requisitioned premises,
4 Act 1 of 1970. The effect of this amendment Act was to change the temporary
character of the legislation.
5 Section 6(1A) reads as follows:
" 6. Release from requisitioning.-(1) The Central Government may at any time release
from requisition any property requisitioned under this Act and shall, as far as possible,
restore the property in as good a condition as it was when possession thereof was taken
subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear and irresistible force:
Provided that where the purposes for which any requisitioned property was being used
cease to exist, the Central Government shall, unless the property is acquired under
section 7, release that property, as soon as may be, from requisition.
[(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Central Government
shall release from requisition,-
(a) any property requisitioned or deemed to be requisitioned under this Act before the
commencement of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
(Amendment) Act, 1970 (1 of 1970), on or before the expiry of a period of [seventeen
years] from such commencement;"
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expenses on account of re-occupying of premises after release from
acquisition and damages other than normal repairs. At that point in time,
Section 6(1A) contemplated retention of property for a total period of 3
years. Therefore, the recurring payment was in respect of a short
duration. The period of requisition under Section 8(2A)6 for the purpose
of compensation determination was, during the pendency of the
reference, increased to five years.
5. The reference was notified in a Gazette notification published
by the Central Government. On 17.07.1975, the Arbitrator pronounced
an Award which determined compensation as 6% per annum on the
capital value of land, assessed at 3 per square foot accepting the land
requisitioned to be in Survey nos.103/2 and 104 in Byppanahalli. The
Central Government had, in the arbitration proceeding, contended that
the suit lands had also been acquired by virtue of a prior notification.
6 "Section 8(2A) reads as follows:
The recurring payment, referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2), in respect of any
property shall, unless the property is sooner released from requisition under Section 6
or acquired under Section 7, be revised in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
(2-B)-
(a) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act for the
period of five years or a longer period immediately preceding the commencement of the
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1975-
(i) first with effect from the date of such commencement, and
[(ii) secondly with effect from the expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect from the
expiry of ten years, from such commencement;]
(b) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act
immediately before such commencement for a period shorter than five years and the
maximum period within which such property shall, in accordance with the provisions
of sub-section (1-A) of Section 6, be released from requisition or acquired, extends
beyond five years from such commencement,-
(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which
possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the
competent authority under Section 4, and
[(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect
from the date of expiry of ten years, from the date on which the revision made under
sub-clause (i) takes effect;]
[(c) in any other case,-
(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which
possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the
competent authority under Section 4, and
(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect
from the date of expiry of ten years, from the date on which the revision under subclause (i) takes effect.]
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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The arbitrator considered this contention too and after examining the
award of the LAC held:
"From the evidence of RW-2 and also from the copy of the
Ex-R-13 and possession certificate as per Ex.R-14, it is
established that 24 guntas and 29 sq. yards of land in
S. No.103/2 and 8 guntas of land and 22 yards of land in
S. No.104 of Byyappanahali were acquired for the purpose
of NGEF and possession was taken by NGEF deducting the
said acquired portion of the land in S. No.103/2 and 104 of
Byyappanahalli the claimant would be the owner of the said
lands in ARE No.72-73."
6. In view of the evidence it was also held that the appellants'
predecessor was entitled to receive compensation in respect of Survey
No.104, deducting the portion of land acquired for the purposes of NGEF.
This Award was made on 17.07.1975.
7. The Requisitioning Act underwent a further amendment7.
Section 8(2B) stated that recurring payment would be revised by redetermining the amount8. As a consequence of this amendment of 1975,
the recurring payment required to be determined and fixed under Section
8(2) had to be first decided and fixed with effect from the date of
commencement of the Act and again with effect from the expiry of five
years from the commencement of the amending Act. The amending Act
came into force on 07.03.1975.
8. To continue the narrative, the arbitrator's award was appealed
against by the UOI. The award had determined compensation in terms
of the DIA and later - since it lapsed in 1968, also having regard to the
principles spelt-out in Section 8 of the Requisitioning Act as amended.
On 21.07.1978, the Central Government's appeal was disposed of in
7 Act 2 of 1975, which amended Section 6(1A) and substituted 10 years for the existing
period for compensation determination. It also added Section 8(2A) by creating a
deeming fiction that unless the property was released from requisition under Section 6
or duly acquired under Section 7, the recurring payment would be revised under provision
of newly added sub-section (2B).
8 Section 8(2B) reads as follows:
"(2B) The recurring payment in respect of any property shall be revised by re-determining
such payment in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-section
(1), read with clause (a) of sub-section (2), as if such property had been requisitioned
under this act on the date with effect from which the revision has to be made under such
sub-section (2A)"
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terms of a joint memo filed by the parties by which it was agreed that
the matter with respect to determination of compensation would be
remanded/remitted for fresh adjudication; however, the compensation
fixation of 10.01.1968 was agreed to be final and binding. The only caveat
added was that the question of maintainability of appeals under Section
11 of the Requisitioning Act was pending before this Court in certain
proceedings. However, the parties agreed that till disposal of appeal by
the arbitrator, the compensation fixed @ 3 per square foot would be
operative. It was further agreed that in case the appeals were not held
to be maintainable, the compensation fixed by the award was to be treated
as final. But on the other hand, if the appeal was held to be maintainable,
the arbitrator had to decide the fixation of compensation for the period
prior to 10.01.1968.
9. By a judgment of this Court9, it was held that an award covering
the period of requisition can be challenged in appeal and that the award
made under DIA was not appealable. Thus, the compensation fixation
for the period upto 10.01.1968 in this case (when the requisition of suit
lands was made under DIA) became final.
10. On 28.01.1985, in the second arbitration proceeding, based on
the fixation of compensation till 10.01.1968, it was held that the fixation
of compensation till 10.01.1968 had to be accepted and basic fixation of
rent was to be increased for over 5 years thereafter. The arbitrator then
proceeded to fix the rental compensation payable per square foot for 3
distinct periods, i.e. 10.01.1968 to 10.01.1973 (@ 4.10 per square
foot); 10.01.1973 to 10.01.1975 (@
 5.40 per square foot) and
10.01.1978 to 10.01.1985 ( Rs.10.20 per square foot). The parties
appealed against this judgment. By common judgment and order10 in
MFA 1405/1985, decided on 24.11.1994, a Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court noted that the issue as to the extent of land for
which compensation had to be determined was one that required decision
by the arbitrator. The High Court noted that there was no evidence to
deduce whether notice under the Land Acquisition Act had been served,
and that there was nothing to show when the award was made by the
Collector, to support the Union's contention about the acquisition of certain
portions of the suit land. These were, therefore, left for enquiry and
fresh decision. The Court proceeded to decide on the issue of
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
9 Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah and Anr. 1990 (1) SCR 4
10 Reported as Union of India v B.M. Krishnamurthy 1995 (4) KarLJ 607.
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compensation and held that the agreed compensation in terms of the
previous joint memo, i.e. for the period up to 10.01.1968 was final. The
Division Bench further noted that the arbitrator was not bound to treat
the amounts fixed for the period as on 10.01.1968 as the basic figure
and proceed to increase the rent periodically. It was noted that the question
of fixation for a period of five years arose after Section 8(2A) was
introduced to the Requisitioning Act- thus the recurring compensation
question had to be decided from 10.01.1968 and then from the
commencement of the Amendment Act and again from the expiry of
that Act. It, therefore, held, upon a reading of Section 8(2A) that
"recurring compensation payable in this case from 10.01.1968
to the commencement of the amendment Act 2 of 1975 upto
07.03.1975 shall be fixed and for the period 07.03.1975 it
should be done as indicated in Section 8(2A).''
11. The award, therefore, was set aside and the matter was
remitted for fresh consideration by the arbitrator. In this fresh (third)
round, the arbitrator published two awards - one dealing with the extent
of land, and the other the compensation payable. After examining all the
evidence, including the documentary evidence, presented by the parties,
as well as the oral testimony, i.e. the oral deposition on behalf of the
UOI, it was held that Survey nos. 103/1 and 103/2 were not validly
acquired by the Central Government and that Survey No.104 was validly
acquired. The other award determined the land value and recurring annual
value at different rates, which is set out below in a tabular form:
Sl. No.
Period
Rate (Capital value) (to be
calculated for 2 acres 39
guntas)
Annual
recurring
rate
1.
10.1.1968 to 07.03.1975
` 1 per square foot
6% p.a.
2.
07.03.1975 to 07.03.1980
` 1.5 per square foot
6% p.a.
3.
07.03.1980-07.03.1985
` 5 per square foot
6% p.a.
4.
07.03.1985-07.03.1990
` 25 per square foot
6% p.a.
5.
07.03.1990-07.03.1995
` 45 per square foot
6.5% p.a.
6.
07.03.1995-07.03.2000
` 100 per square foot
6% p.a.
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12. Aggrieved by the two awards, both dated 28.02.2000, the Union
preferred an appeal (MFA 2220/2002) before the Karnataka High Court.
During its pendency, the widow of the late BM Krishnamurthy and the
present appellants, her children, filed a writ petition (WP 8340/2006)
claiming that since the period of requisition had ended and the suit lands
had not been acquired, the possession of the Union after 1987 was
untenable in law. In a judgment delivered on 11.01.2008 (i.e. the same
day when the impugned judgment was pronounced) the Division Bench
of the Karnataka High Court rejected the contentions of the Union visa-vis its acquisition of suit lands, or any part thereof, and noted that the
court was concerned "only with Sy. Nos. 103/1 and 103/2 for the
period between 1968 and 2000 and so far as Sy. No. 104 is
concerned, between the period 1968 and 1977, as the portion of
the land measuring 11985.24 square feet undisputedly came to be
acquired". It upheld the awards of the arbitrator fixing the compensation
in 2000 and held that:
"Accordingly, in view of the discussion and reasoning stated
above, we confirm the fact that neither Sy. No. 103/1 nor Sy.
No. 103/2 ever came to be validly acquired by the authorities
for the benefit of appellant herein. We hold the rental
compensation computed by the arbitrator is just and proper."
13. The Union sought special leave to appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution, against the said judgment dismissing its appeal11. By
order dated 10.09.2010, that special leave petition was dismissed, keeping
it open for the Union to acquire the property, in accordance with law.
Thus, as regards the question of ownership and the rental payable till the
period 07.03.2000, the issue attained finality. By the impugned judgment
delivered 11.01.2008, the Division Bench after considering the records,
dismissed the appellants' writ petition and held that
"It is also noticed from the records, originally the land in
question came to be handed over to the defence authorities It
is also noticed from the records, originally the land in question
came to be handed over to the defence authorities by invoking
the provisions of defence of India Act 1962 which act came
to be repealed on 10.01.1968. By virtue of Section 25 of the
Requisitioning Act, 1952, whatever has been done under the
Defence Act of India, is presumed to have been done under
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
11 SLP (C) CC No. 12634/2008.
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the Requisitioning Act, therefore, u/s 6 of the Requisitioning
Act, the authorities could not have held the property beyond
08.03.1987 at any cost. We say so because withing the said
period, of 07.03.1987, apparently, there was no valid
acquisition of properties by the concerned authorities as noted
above.
It is also brought to our notice that though portions of land
in different Sy. Numbers adjacent to these lands came to be
acquired in the year 1972 and also on earlier occasions, such
acquisitions never came to be challenged by the respective
owners and the defence authorities continued to be in
possession of those properties as beneficiaries after acquiring
the said lands by the competent authority. We notice that from
the contentions of the defence authorities right from 1941 till
date, about 600 acres is in possession of them and some of
the lands are acquired other than the lands in question. This
Sy. No. 103 seems to be in the centre of that 600 acres on this
vast area of 600 acres which is enclosed by a fence by the
authorities. They have put up firing range, buildings, parade
ground etc.
In that view of the matter, as we noted above already, at this
late hour of the day, it would not be just and proper to direct
the respondents to hand over the possession of those
properties. In the connected MFA No. 2220/02, we have
already approved the computation of rental compensation
awarded by the arbitrator upto 07.03.2000. The petitioners
are entitled to seek compensation for the subsequent period
in accordance with law.
The Respondents - defence authorities and the State
Government are at liberty to initiate acquisition proceedings
so far as these lands are concerned if they need in respect of
property in Sy. No. 102/1 and 103/2 as well, for the benefit of
the defence authorities."
The contentions
14. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, the appellant's senior counsel, argued
that having upheld the main contentions with respect to the ownership
and title of the suit lands, the impugned judgment erred in law, in refusing
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to grant the reliefs claimed in the writ proceedings. It was argued that
even if arguendo any acquisition notification had covered any period
upto 1975, with the coming into force of the 1984 amendments to the
Land Acquisition Act, a period of 2 years was statutorily granted by
Parliament to complete the acquisition, i.e. to issue the award. Since
concededly there was no award valid ever made by virtue of the operation
of law, i.e. Section 11A12, the question of ownership, which was decided
by the arbitrator in the first and third award, became conclusive and
binding. It was also urged that the directions of the earlier Division Bench
ruling in B.M. Krishamurthy13 were specifically to determine the extent
of land acquired; in compliance, the arbitrator, in the third arbitration
proceedings, by the first award, decided the extent of acquired land.
Those findings of the arbitrator, rendered by virtue of the earlier remand,
became final because the Union's appeal was rejected by the Division
Bench. Further, the special leave petition against that judgment was
rejected by this court.
15. It was argued that once the issue of ownership stood settled
conclusively, the Union had to vacate the suit property, because its
possession was not justified or authorized by law. Learned counsel relied
on the ruling of this court14 which held, recollecting an earlier judgment
in State of Haryana v Mukesh Kumar15 that the right to property is
"not only a constitutional or statutory right, but a human right".
This court quoted with approval earlier judgments, which had ruled that
deprivation of possession of one's property without a law was untenable.
It was argued that the determination of compensation was up to the
period ending in 2000, i.e. 20 years ago. In the meanwhile, the value of
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
12 Section 11A reads as follows:
"11A. Period shall be which an award within made. - The Collector shall make an
award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of
the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award
shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration
is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded."
13 Supra n. 10
14 Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. 2020 (2) SCC 569.
15 2013 (1) SCC 353
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property, as well as recurring value of compensation had risen
astronomically as the suit lands had great commercial potential.
16. Mr. K.M. Natraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, urged
this court not to interfere with the impugned judgment. According to
him, the High Court correctly denied the claim to release of lands, since
it was a dispute which had to be decided by the civil court. The learned
ASG sought to argue that the findings with regard to extent of ownership
were ambiguous and the courts committed errors in ignoring that the suit
lands were acquired through notifications in 1941. Mr. Natraj contested
the submission that the lands were unlawfully occupied, pointing out that
the properties were requisitioned validly and that those orders were never
questioned by either the predecessor of the appellants or them, in any
properly instituted proceedings.
Analysis and findings
17. From the narration of events, it is clear that first, the suit
properties were requisitioned in 1963, under the DIA. The amendment
to the Requisition Act, which enacted Section 25 in 1968, had the effect
of creating a deeming fiction that requisitions under the DIA were deemed
to be under the Requisitioning Act. Thereafter, due to successive
amendments to the Requisitioning Act, the period of requisition continued;
it finally ended in 1987. In the meanwhile, the original landowner, late
Krishnamurthy, sought and was granted a reference to arbitration, on
the issue of compensation payable. The first award made in 1975, decided
both the question of extent of land requisitioned (and also the land owned
by the landowner). The award was questioned, but the appeal was
disposed of by the High Court on 21.07.1978, on the basis of a joint
memo. The fresh determination which was made through the award
dated 28.01.1985, again re-determined the compensation payable for
the period after 1.10.1968, using the capital value fixed earlier as the
basis. This led to the judgment of the High Court16 which held that there
was no evidence to support the Union's contention that some part of the
suit lands had been acquired. However, on that question as well as the
issue of basis for the recurring compensation (as well as its computation),
the dispute was remitted. This time, the arbitrator rendered two awardsone, deciding the question of ownership or its extent and the second, on
the question of compensation determination. The Union appealed to the
16 Dated 24.11.1994
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High Court; that appeal17 was dismissed by a judgment, delivered on the
same day as the impugned judgment. The Union's special leave petition
was dismissed 10 years ago (on 10.9.2010). This court left it open to the
Union to take steps in accordance with law, with respect to the property.
The impugned judgment too, held that the question of ownership had
attained finality - and in favour of the appellants. That part of the judgment
has not been appealed against by the Union.
18. The legal effect of requisitioning immovable property, it goes
without saying, is that temporarily- i.e. for the period the requisition order
is in operation, the owner loses her possessory rights, even though the
title remains undisturbed. Since the deprivation of possession is through
authority of law, in keeping with fair procedure, the law (in this case, the
Requisitioning Act) provides for payment of compensation in accordance
with predetermined principles. Yet, the taking of property by definition is
finite: it cannot result in expropriation or deprivation of title altogether,
unless another process for acquiring it, is initiated.
19. Whilst dealing with a similar enactment18 this court, in Grahak
Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra19 held through a Constitution
Bench, that requisition, by its nature, is temporary and that the
landowner's right to property cannot remain suspended indefinitely, at
the wishes of the state or its agencies:
"16. We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in
the cases of Collector of Akola [(1968) 1 SCR 401 : AIR 1968
SC 244] and Jiwani Kumar Paraki [Jiwani Kumar
Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612]
that the purpose of a requisition order may be permanent.
But that is not to say that an order of requisitioning can be
continued indefinitely or for a period of time longer than
that which is, in the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, reasonable. We note and approve in this regard, as did
this Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki case [Jiwani Kumar
Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612],
the observations of the Nagpur High Court in the case
of Mangilal Karwa v. State of M.P. [ILR 1955 Nag 34 : AIR
1955 Nag 153] which have been reproduced above. That the
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
17 MFA 2220/2002
18 The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
19 (1994) 4 SCC 192 at page 204
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concept of requisitioning is temporary is also indicated by
the Law Commission in its Tenth Report and, as pointed out
earlier, by the terms of the said Act itself, as it originally stood
and as amended from time to time. There is no contradiction
in concluding that while a requisition order can be issued for
a permanent public purpose, it cannot be continued
indefinitely. Requisitioning might have to be resorted to for a
permanent public purpose, to give an example, to tide over
the period of time required for making permanent premises
available for it. The concepts of acquisition and requisition
are altogether different as are the consequences that flow
therefrom. A landlord cannot, in effect and substance, be
deprived of his rights and title to property without being paid
due compensation, and this is the effect of prolonged
requisitioning. Requisitioning may be continued only for a
reasonable period; what that period should be would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would
ordinarily, be for the Government to decide."
20. When this court had to adjudicate, in Rajendra Kumar Gupta
v. State of U.P20 on somewhat similar facts, i.e. the requisition having
been resorted to during a national emergency under the DIA, and its
continuance under the Requisitioning Act, the question which arose was
the continued possession by the state. The court held that such possession,
long after the requisition period had ceased, was contrary to law and
observed that:
"14. We, therefore, will have to examine the efficacy of the
impugned order from the point of view of its prolonged
duration uptil now which as seen earlier has been spread
over more than two decades from the date on which it got its
birth on 29-10-1976. For deciding this question we will assume
with the respondents, for the sake of argument, that on the
day on which it was passed it was validly passed under the
provisions of Section 23. Even then the moot question still
remains whether such an emergency order of requisition which
might be justified in those days when it was passed could
now be permitted to continue indefinitely.