# B. PRABHAKARA RAO v. DESARI PANAKALA RAO & OIBERS

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 1032
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-04-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No.,1989 of 1975
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/b-prabhakara-rao-v-desari-panakala-rao-oibers-6723
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A
B
c
D
B. PRABHAKARA RAO
v.
DESARI PANAKALA RAO & OIBERS
April 5, 1976
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, V. R. KRISHNA !YER & N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.J ·
Motor Vehicles Act. 1947-Ss. 47 and 57-Andhra Pradesh State Tramport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971, r.15-Va/idity of.
Tribunal-If had power to admit evidence beyond the tilnt limitttl by s.
n~J.
.
Rule 15 of the Andhra Prad~h State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules,
1971, states that parties to the appeal or application shall not be entitled to
produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, before the Tribunal
e:xcept in cases stated therein but it empowers the Tribunal to allow evidence
o! documents to be produced or witnesses to be examined for any other sum~
c1ent reason.
The Regional Transport Authority granted a stage carriage permit to the
appellant.
Before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal another applicant
produced certain information against the appellant which was not mentioned
either in his history sheet or in the representations of any party under s. 57(3)
of the Act.
Rejecting the appellant's objection that such new grounds could
not be heard from an pbjector at the stage of appeal, the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant's permit and gave it to respondent
No. 2.
On appeal it was contended that a representation under s. 57(4) could not
be made at the appellate stage beyond the time limited by that section and if
rule 15 permitted it, it violated the substantive provisions of the Act.
E
Dismissing the appeal,
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HEID : Rule 15 is intra vires and ·it merely makes patent what is otherwise
l...\
latent in the statutory provisions. Rule 15 does not entitle parties to the appeal,
or application to produce additional evidence but clothes the Tribunal with d.iscretionanr power to allow such evidence. What is received is not qua representation under s. 57(4) but qua evidence with public interest flavour.
[1041F;
I039Cl
United Motor Works, A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 154 and Cumbum Roadways, A.I.R.
1965 Mad. 79, approved.
(a) Public interest is the paramount consideration in transport business while
private rights apparently constitute a quasi-lis for decision. The touchstone
of better merit is solely the ability to serve the public and the hierarchy of
transoort tribunals. bearin~ true faith and allegiance to s. 47 of the Motor
Vehicles Act. 1948 have the duty and, therefore, the power to consider all
factors pertinent to the larger scheme of efficient public transport. The duplex
scheme of the statute is the holding of a public enquiry to determine who will
serve public interest best but ordinarily activated into that enquiry by ·private
applicants for permits. The pro bone publico character of the hearing cannot
be scuttled in the name of competitive individual rights and narrow procedural
trappings. [I033E-GJ
(b) Section 47 enjoins upan the Regional Transport Authority to have regard to the presiding idea of public interest generally and iii its ramifications as
set out ins. 47(1)(a) to (f). In addition, the RTA shall also receive repre<entations as mentioned therein and take them into the reckoning. It is not as if
the sole sollrce of decision-making materials consists of the representations made
under s. 57(3) within the time stipulated in s. 57(4). The primary channel .ta
the information that the RTA may gather bearing on matters touched upon 1n
'· 47(l)(a) to (f) supplemented by facts stated in representation referred to In
.
1032
I
B. P. RAO v. D. P. RAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
10 33
i. 57(3). Under s. 47 passengers' associations, police officers, local authorities
and existing operators who may have nothing directly to do with the rivalry for
A
a permit have a place in the scheme and may make representations on a variety
of· matters.
So ~lso, in an appeal, the RTA it<;elf may be heard.
Thus_. the
ronsiderations going into the judicial verdict are dominated by public interest~
non-parties who have only to present points germane to public interest are
all

## Text

A
B
c
D
B. PRABHAKARA RAO
v.
DESARI PANAKALA RAO & OIBERS
April 5, 1976
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, V. R. KRISHNA !YER & N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.J ·
Motor Vehicles Act. 1947-Ss. 47 and 57-Andhra Pradesh State Tramport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971, r.15-Va/idity of.
Tribunal-If had power to admit evidence beyond the tilnt limitttl by s.
n~J.
.
Rule 15 of the Andhra Prad~h State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules,
1971, states that parties to the appeal or application shall not be entitled to
produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, before the Tribunal
e:xcept in cases stated therein but it empowers the Tribunal to allow evidence
o! documents to be produced or witnesses to be examined for any other sum~
c1ent reason.
The Regional Transport Authority granted a stage carriage permit to the
appellant.
Before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal another applicant
produced certain information against the appellant which was not mentioned
either in his history sheet or in the representations of any party under s. 57(3)
of the Act.
Rejecting the appellant's objection that such new grounds could
not be heard from an pbjector at the stage of appeal, the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant's permit and gave it to respondent
No. 2.
On appeal it was contended that a representation under s. 57(4) could not
be made at the appellate stage beyond the time limited by that section and if
rule 15 permitted it, it violated the substantive provisions of the Act.
E
Dismissing the appeal,
F
G
H
HEID : Rule 15 is intra vires and ·it merely makes patent what is otherwise
l...\
latent in the statutory provisions. Rule 15 does not entitle parties to the appeal,
or application to produce additional evidence but clothes the Tribunal with d.iscretionanr power to allow such evidence. What is received is not qua representation under s. 57(4) but qua evidence with public interest flavour.
[1041F;
I039Cl
United Motor Works, A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 154 and Cumbum Roadways, A.I.R.
1965 Mad. 79, approved.
(a) Public interest is the paramount consideration in transport business while
private rights apparently constitute a quasi-lis for decision. The touchstone
of better merit is solely the ability to serve the public and the hierarchy of
transoort tribunals. bearin~ true faith and allegiance to s. 47 of the Motor
Vehicles Act. 1948 have the duty and, therefore, the power to consider all
factors pertinent to the larger scheme of efficient public transport. The duplex
scheme of the statute is the holding of a public enquiry to determine who will
serve public interest best but ordinarily activated into that enquiry by ·private
applicants for permits. The pro bone publico character of the hearing cannot
be scuttled in the name of competitive individual rights and narrow procedural
trappings. [I033E-GJ
(b) Section 47 enjoins upan the Regional Transport Authority to have regard to the presiding idea of public interest generally and iii its ramifications as
set out ins. 47(1)(a) to (f). In addition, the RTA shall also receive repre<entations as mentioned therein and take them into the reckoning. It is not as if
the sole sollrce of decision-making materials consists of the representations made
under s. 57(3) within the time stipulated in s. 57(4). The primary channel .ta
the information that the RTA may gather bearing on matters touched upon 1n
'· 47(l)(a) to (f) supplemented by facts stated in representation referred to In
.
1032
I
B. P. RAO v. D. P. RAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
10 33
i. 57(3). Under s. 47 passengers' associations, police officers, local authorities
and existing operators who may have nothing directly to do with the rivalry for
A
a permit have a place in the scheme and may make representations on a variety
of· matters.
So ~lso, in an appeal, the RTA it<;elf may be heard.
Thus_. the
ronsiderations going into the judicial verdict are dominated by public interest~
non-parties who have only to present points germane to public interest are
allowed to represent their point of view. [1038C; !035B'Cl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.,1989 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
28th November 1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ
Appeal No. 1038 of 1973.
M. N. Phadke and B. Kantarao, for the Appellant.
B
V. S. Desai, K. R. Chaudhury, S. L. Setia and Mrs. V. Khamw,
C
for Respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KrusHNA !YER, J.
Counsel for the appellant-a jolted transport
op«ator--has assertively argued for an untenable position, heedless
of the true nature of 'transport permit' jurisprudence.
The sole issue
on which limited leave has been granted to him by this Court under
Art. 136 lends itself to straight forward resolution, once we grasp the
public character of the litigation and public purpose of the jurisdiction
where permits regulating the plying of stage carriages are awarded or
refused.
The conscience of this branch of public law is justice to the
public, although, in the process of adjudication, private claims to
carry on transport business through permits are comparatively evaluated. Public interest is the paramount consideration,
while
private
rights, fundamental though, apparently constitute the quasi-/is for decision. The touchstone of better merit is solely the ability to serve the
public, and the hierarchy of transport tribunals, bearing true faith and
allegiance to s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1948 (for short, the Act)
have the duty and, therefore, the power to consider all factors pertinent
to the larger scheme of efficient public transport. To equate-and
thereby hamstring-this jurisdiction and processual law with what
governs a civil proceeding under the Civil Procedure Code, is to miss
the policing policy of the law and maim the amplitude of the powerduty complex. In other words, the duplex scheme of the statute is the
holding of a public enquiry to determine who will serve public interest
best but ordinarily activated into that enquiry by private applicants for
permits.
The pro bono publico character of the hearing cannot be
scuttled in the name of competitive individual rights and narrow procedur11.l trappings.
The minimal facts.
The appellant and the 1st respondent, among
others, applied for permits to ply a stage carriage on a specified route
in the Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh.
Although there were two
permits for issuance, one was given to R2 and that has become final.
We are now concerned only with the other permit which had been
granted by the Regional Transport Authority (acronymically, RTA)
to the appellant but was switched over to the 1st respondent by the
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I 034
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.
State Transport Appellate Tribunal (STAT) or taking into consideration a fresh ground and supporting evidence to the effect that the appellant was guilty of a transport tax violation and had compounded that
offence under s. 60(3) of the Act.
The power in this behalf was
stated to be based on r. 15 of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport
Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Appellate rules), which reads :
"15. Additional Evidence (i) The parties to the appeal
or application shall not be entitled to produce additional
evidence whether oral or documentary before the Tribunal
but,-
( a) if the authority from whose order the appeal or
application is preferred has refused to admit evidence
which ought to have been admitted, or
(b) if the party seeking to adduce additional evidence
satisfies the Tribunal that such evidence, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence was not within
his knowledge or could not be produced by him at
or before the time when the order under appeal was
passed; or
( c) if the Tribunal requires any documents to be produced or any witnesses to be examined to enable it to
pass just orders; or
(d) for any other sufficient reason, the ·Tribunal may
allow such evidence or documents to be produced
or witnesses examined :
Provided that where such evidence is received the other
party shall be entitled to produce rebutting evidence, if any.
(ii) If the Tribunal is of opin'on that any witness should
be examined in connection with any case before it, ;t may
instead of examining him before itself, issue a commission
to the concerned Regional Transport Authorities or the
State Transport Authority as the case may be, or to an
Advocate or such other suitable person as it may deem fit, in
the circumstances of the C'ase."
The vires of this rule was challenged before us and we will examine
the contention.
But, to continue the narrative,. when the appellate
authority deprived the appellant of his permit he attacked the order
without avail, before the High Court at both tiers.
Un<launtccl. he
has carried the appeal to this Court where the controversy is confined
to the validity of r. 15, although we have heard arguments on a
wider ba<is to apprec;ate the point made by counsel.
The argument
of ultra vires umed before us rests on the scone of ss. 57(4) and 64
of the Motor Vehicles Act and the fitrnent of r. 15 into the purpose and
text of these provisions.
Hav;ng heard counsel on both sides, we are disincl'ned to accede
to th 0 submission of Shri Phadke for the appellant. Why? We will
proceed to answer.
·
•
I
B, P, RAO v. D. P. RAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
103 5
Rulings galore, of this Court and the High Courts, have focussed
A
on s. 47 of the Act to emphasize that the quasi-judicial bodies entrusted with the work of issumg stage-carriage permits must be conscious
of the brooding presence of public interest, in the midst of the sparring
contest of private applicants.
A casual perusal of that provision
brings home this juristic under-pinning of the
jurisdiction. Against
this background, we may notice the meaning of the clauses which
broaden the nature of the enquiry and mark it off from a traditional
B
civil litigation. Passengers' associations, police officers, local authorities and existing operators who may have nothing directly to do with
the rivalry for a permit have a place in the scheme and may make
representations on a variety of matters.
So also, in an appeal, the
RTA itself may be beard.
Thus, the considerations going mto
the
judicial verdict are dominated by public interest; non-parties who have
only to present points germane to public interest are allowed to reprec
sent therr point of view.
Why?
Because the object of the regulatory statute is to promote smooth public transport and subject to the
weighty faetors bearing thereon set down in s. 4 7 (I) of the Act and,
indeed, with a view to serve the public the better, applicants are chosen
in recognition of their fundamental right u.nder Art. 19 canalised by
reasonable restrictions in public
interest.
To imprison
such
an
enquiry into the familiar mould of a civil proceeding in ordinary courts
D
is to be pathological, if one may say so. A freer, healthier, approach is
the prescr;ption.
Of course, Shri Phadke is right in that any representation, ground or evidence presented by anyone prejudicing
the
right of an applicant has to be considered only subject to the canons
of natural justice and in the discretion of quasi-judicial authority.
Justice to the public and the parties can and must be harmonised.
Such is the simplistic statement of the Jaw.
E
A few more facts and scme more law are necessary.
As stated earlier, the appellant got the permit from the RTA
although both the contestants before us were equally qualified, having
obtained equal marks on the basis of the Andhra Pradesh
Motor
Vehicles Rules (for short, the MV rules).
The appellate result went
against the appellant because another applicant who had filed
an
appeal before the STAT produced, at that stage, a certificate from the
concerned authority to prove that the present appellant had used
a
contract carriage jlS a stage-carriage on a trip to Tirupati and had
compounded this offence by payment of a fee of Rs. 2,340/-.
This
circumstance was regarded by the STAT as a blot on the history-sheet
of the appellant, although inadvertently omitted from the history-sheet
prepared officially for the consideration of the RT A. It is admitted
on all hands that this semi-punishment had not been mentioned in the
representations of any party under s. 57(3) of the MV Act.
Therefore, an objection was raised before the ST AT that this ground was
new, although the episode which formed its basis existed prior to the
disposal of the applications by the RTA. It was further urged that
such new grotmds could not be heard from an objector who had not
included it in his representation made within the
time
foi'•ed
by
s. 57(4) of the Act. However, the STAT over-ruled these objections
and proceeded on the footing that this was
material information
F
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[1976] 3 S.C.R.
1036
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
relevant to s. 4 7 (I ) and nsed it, after giving a fair opportnnity to the
•
affected appellant to meet it. Consequentially, he upset the award of
the permit to the appellant since this factor tilted the scales against the
appellant.
We cannot, in this Court, and especially on a limited
~~
leave, look into the evaluation.
These foundational facts are common ground, but the divergence
B
arises on the exercise of the power under r.15 of the Appellate Rules.
Shri Phadke contended that a representationist, under s. 57(3)
&
J
( 4), had to abide by the time-limit discipline of the provision and
could not transgress it by making an additional representation at the
appellate stage beyond the time limited by s. 57 ( 4). If r. 15 permitted such a course, it violated the substantive provision of the Act.
·'
Since a stream cannot rise above its source and rules cannot go beE
c
yond the sections of the Act, this Court must hold the said rule
void. Any way, if s. 57(3) & (4) had a more spacious connotation than was attributed to it by Shri Phadke, r. 15 could have full
play and be accommodated within the parent provision in the Act
regulating procedure.
This was the
counter-contention
of
Shri
V. S. Desai for the contesting respondent.
~
D
Before proceeding further, it is useful to extract s. 57(3)
and
( 4) and test whether the rule-making power has exceeded the ambit
of s. 57 or gone counter to it in framing r. 15 (earlier extracted) :
"57. Procedure in applying for and granting permits.-
x
x
x
x
(3) On receipt of an application for stage carriage perE
mit or a public carrier's permit, the Regional Trausport Authority shall make the application available
for inspection at the office of the auhority and shall
publish the application or the substance thereof in
,,._
the prescribed manner together with a notice of the
'
. date before which representations in
connectlon
therewith may be submitted and the date, not being
F
less than thirty days from such publication, on which
and the time and place at which, the application
and any representations received, will
be
considemi :
Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or
with
modifications
G
would have the effect of increasing the number of
vehicles operating in the region, or in any area or
on any route within the region, under the class of
permits to which the applications relate, beyond the
limit fixed in that behalf under sub-section (3)
of
Section 47 or sub-section (2) of Section 55, as the
I
case may be, the Regional Transport Authority may
H
summarily refuse the application without following
the procedure laid down in this sub-section.
(4) No representation in connection with an application
referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered
B. P. RAO v. D. P. RAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
103 7
by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is
made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the
applicant by the person making
such
representation."
W c unhesitatingly agree with Shri Phadke that natural justice-that
fine facet of judicial ethos-must broadly inform exercise of power by
administrative tribunals.
This obligates such bodies to
give
an
affected party. a fair opportunity to meet any evidence obnoxious to
his case if it is to be pressed into service against him.
In the present instance, it is not disputed, as the High Co11rt has noted, that the
canons of natural justice have been conformed to. The
surviving
issue therefore is as to whether there is any soundness in the submfasion that s. 57(3) & (4) read with s. 47 builds barricades against
receiving any information by the STAT from any representator beyond the time fixed in the above sub-sections of s. 57.
f
Administrative law-a growing branch of Indian jurisprudence
-has a mission.
Where the trellis work of technical procedures and
rules of evidence usually applicable to ordinary courts under
the
Code contains too many taboos regarding pleadings and too many
prescriptions regarding trials, admiootrative bodies, manned by lay
and legal men, charged with duties which are wider than decision of
individual disputes between specific parties and
operating
quasijudicially at the public-interest level, have to enjoy more liberal powers
and less formal and more flexible processes if they are to fulfil the
statutory behest efficaciously.
To over-judicialize is to undermine.
In the construction of statutes establishing administrative agencies and
defining their powers, there is little scope for the deep-rooted shibboleth that into the statute must be, read, by lawyer's instinct, the
J. requirements of the trial of a civil suit or the hearing of an appeal by
the ordinary courts of the land.
This may result in defeating their
obvious purpose.
We will therefore briefly examine the
legislative
goal of the statute under construction, the general policy of
the
legfalature in enacting the relevant sections and the definition of the
sources from which information or evidence may be sought by the
tribunal working within the framework of the Act.
Mr.
Justice
Frankfurter has aptly stated that 'the answers to the problem of an
art are in its exercise' and John Chipman had said that the process
of statutory construction is a practical art (See : Extrinsic Aid in the
Construction of Statutes-by V. S. Deshpande-Journal of Indian
Law Institute-Vol. Il, April-June 1969, p. 123, 126).
Thus, the
true t.est of the amplitude and correct interpretation of s. 57(3) &
1
( 4) is to be found in a study of its area and its exercise, as intended
\
by its makers.
The oft-quoted saying of Mr. Justice Holmes that
'the meaning of a sentence it to be felt rather than to be proved' also
helps us to feel our way through the public law area sketched
by
s. 57(3) & (4) understood in the background of s. 47
and
the
conspectus of other provisions.
We have to shake off from
onr
minds that the type of litigation contemplated by s. 57 is the thrust
and parry in a civil suit or appeal.
With these observations we may
take a bird's eye view of the relevant provisions of the Act to give
us a hang of the subject and help us interpret adequately .
. 16-725 SCI 7r,
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103 8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
Section 42 of the Act insists on a permit being taken by every
transport operator. Section 44 lays down how the RTA is to be
constituted.
It has a mixed composition of lay and judicially-trained men, the reason being that the process of adjudication is
not )-J
purely legal pug1lis but a broader search taking note of public con- ·
siderations which may not be brought to its notice by contenders for
permits.
The nature of the enquiry is reflected in the very structure
of the body. Section 46 speaks of applications for
stage-carriage
permits. When we reach s. 47, we have to take a close-up·of :.hat
provision.
Properly understood, s. 47 enjoins upon the RTA
to
have regard to the presiding idea of public interest generally and in
its ramifications as set out ins. 47(1) (a) to (f). In addition, the
RTA shall also receive representations as mentioned therein and take
them into the reckoning. It is not as if the sole source of decisionmaking materials consists of the representations made under s. 5 7 ( 3)
within the time stipulated ii). s. 57(4). The primary channel,
it
looks, is the information that the R TA may gather, bearing on matters touched upon ins. 47(1) (a) to (f), supplemented by
facts~
stated in representations referred to in s. 57 (3).
Once we grasp
this essential truth, the resolution of the conflict raised in this case
is easy.
The focus is not on who, as between A and B, has the title
to the permit, but on who, as between A and B, should be preferred
to better serve the public interest.
We may, as a result of the above discussion, set down the following five propositions :
1. Stage-carriage permits are granted for providing an
efficient public transport system.
2. The adjudicatory content has dual elements-public
interest in the best stage-carriage service and private
title to better serve the public.
3. The procedure is flexible, free from the rigidity of court
trials, and this flexibility flows from the duty of the
tribunal, charged with the task of picking out him
who has the best plus points for plying a good bus
service, to discharge it properly.
A people-conscious
power cannot be pared· down in a self-defeating manner.
4. An activist tribunal (RTA, and, in exceptional cases,
even the STAT) may even collect useful information
bearing on considerations set out in s. 47 and, after
public exposure of such information at the hearing and
reasonable opportunity to meet it, if anyone is
adversely affected, put it into the crucible of judgment.
5. The antithesis is not between the right of representation within the time limited by s. 57 ( 4) and beyond
it but between representations by statutorily authorised entities under ss. 4 7 and 57 and receipt of relevant
I
•
B. P. RAO v. D. P. RAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
I 03 9
evidence or information from any source whatsoever
at any stage whatsoever but subject to the wholesome.
rules of natural justice.
A
rhcsc fivefold guidelines squarely accommodate r. 15
within
the
framework of ss. 47, 57 and 54 of the Act and there is no spill-over
breaching the banks of the provisions.
The rule merely gives e!Iccl
B
to what the sections intend and is not therefore ultra vires.
Here the certificate of payment of compounding fees was ftlcu
by one of the appellants before the STAT and was received not as a
representation unuer s. 57 ( 4) but as some information . the STAI
regarded had a bearing on matters falling under s. 47. It is important to note that r. 15 docs not entitle parties to the appeal or application to produce additional evidence but clothes the tribunal with
discretionary power to allow such evidence.
What is received is not
qua representation under s. 57 ( 4) but. qua evidence with public interc
est flavour.
The rule is good and covers familiar ground to enable
just orders being passed. A reference to order XLI, rule 27 C.P.C.
and s. 540 Cr!. P.C. proves this point. Justice to the public is the
keynote of ss. 47, 57 and r. 15. We are not lobbying for unconventional procedures of quasi-judicial tribunals but interpreting the
relevant provisions according to well-established canons.
We must
listen to the signature tune of quasi-judicial justice to appreciate the
uote.
We may also highlight the basic principle that subject to
statutory regulations, each tribunal has its inherent power to device
its own procedure.
Novelty, if it improves purposeful ell1ciency, is
not anathema.
But caution must be exercised in going against timetried procedures lest processual law prove a charter for chaos. Likewise, it is necessary to mention that while a 'representator' under s.
47, read with s. 57, has a right to make representations and be heard,
subject to the limitations written into those provisions, those who fall
under it or outside it have no right to bring in evidence or
urge
grounds as and when they please or at all unless the tribunal, in its
discretion, chooses to accept such extra information.
The first is a
right of the 'representator' the second is the power of the tribunal.
We are strengthened in our general
approach
and
particular
construction by a ruling of this Court in New Prakash Transport(') and
two rulings of the High Courts, one of a Full Bench of the Madras
High Court (AIR 1965 Madras 79) and the other a Division Bench
of the Patna High Court to which one of us (Untwalia, J.) was a party
(AIR 1964 Patna 154).
In United Motor Works('), the Patna Case, the Court observed :
"It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court in that
case that the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed
thereunder do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a Court of Justice and no elaborate procedure has
been prescribed as to how the parties interested have to be
heard either before the Regional Transport Authority
or
(I) [1957] S.C.R. 987.
!2) AJ.R. 1964 Pat 154.
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1040
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
before the Appellate Transport Authority.
The principle
is well established that in the absence of any such prescribed procedure the appellate authority may adopt any procedure which it thinks best for hearing the appeal provided always that the rules of natural justice are observed.
The matter has been clearly put by Lord Loreburn in the
course of his speech in Board of Education v. Rice (1911
AC 179) as follows :
"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they
have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of vari_ous kinds. In the present instance, as
in many others, what comes for determination is sometimes
a matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law.
It
will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but
sometin1es it will involve a matter of law as well as a matter
oi fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone.
In such
cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law
and also to .ascertain the facts.
I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to
both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one
who
decides anything.
But I do not think they are bound to
treat such a question as though it were a trial.
They have
no power to administer an oath, and need not examine
witnesses.
They can obtain information in any way they
think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who
arc parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting
any relevant statement prejudicial to their view."
Ramaswami C. J., (as he then was) also laid down :
"It is . . . manifest that the power of
the
appellate
authority is co-extensive with the power of the Regional
Transport Authority in this respect, and there is no reason
why the appellate authority should not take these matters
in"to consideration in deciding the appeal under s. 64 of the
Act."
It is trite that an appeal is a re-hearing and ordinarily
appellate
power is as wide as original power.
The facts of jhe Patna cnse
(supra) bear a close paraJlel to our case.
Another point with which we are not concerned and also decided
in the Patna judgment (one of the two writ petitions heard together)
was challenged in the Supreme Court and reversed.
That bears upon
the inter-state routes which does not arise in the instant appeal before
us.
In Cumbwn Roadways(') Kailsam J. (as he then was), speaking
for tlle Full Bench, stressed the same view.
The headnote in the
Report is sufficiently explicit and we quote :
"The representator, who makes the representation otherwise than under s. 57(4) will not have a right to have his
(I) A.T.R. 1965 Mad. 79.
..
/
..
'
B. P. RAO l'. D. P. RAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
1041
objection heard and considered, but there is no prohibition
against the authority taking the information furnished by
the objector and acting on it after giving an opportunity to
the affected party, to prove that the information is false or
that it should not be acted upon.
The jurisdiction of the
Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal to
act upon any information, whether it was brought
to its
notice by the objector or by the Transport Authority cannot
be questioned.
But it is within the
discretion
of
the
Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal to
accept the information taking into account the relevant circumstances under which the information was brought before it. If the authority decides to accept, it is bound to
give a reasonable opportunity to the affected person to show
cause as to why the information should not be acted upon.
When the authority is acting on the information, but
not
as a representation by the objector, the person affected cannot object to the authority considering the information on
the ground that it was brought to its notice by one of the
objectors without including the information in the representation made by the objector.
The right of the representator as such is no doubt limited, for, he has no right to insist
that any representation made otherwise than under s. 57 ( 4)
should be considered in the manner prescribed
under s.
57(5). But that does nut in any way debar the authority
under s. 47(1) of the Act from taking the information into
account for deciding to whom the permit should be given
in the interests of the public."
The decision of the Assam High Court (AIR 1959 Assam 183)
brought to our notice by Shri Phadke docs not really consider the
issue from the position we have delineated and turns on approach
which is not quite correct.
Our conclusion therefore is that r. 15 is intra vires and, further
A
B
c
D
E
that the said rule merely makes patent what is otherwise latent in
F
the statutory provisions.
The appeal accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal dismissed.