# 'B v. SHAMBHOO NARAIN SINGH

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 151
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-03-31
- **Case number:** Civil Appe11l No. 721 of 1966
- **Bench:** S. M. Sikri, R. S. Bachawat, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/b-v-shambhoo-narain-singh-4726
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

U.P. Panchayat Raj Act 1947, s. 95(i)(g)-Pradhan of Gaon SabhaSuspension, pending enquiry, power-Up~pradhan to officiate as Pradhan
during suspension--IJ can be ordered-Pradhan·~ relationship lvith Governmena.
The respondent was elected as Pradhan of a Goan Sabha in
Uttar
Pradesh.
The appellant-government by an order suspended the respondent, and pending enquiry, directed the respondent to give charge to the
up..pradhan. The respondent filed a writ petition ·in the High Court chlJ.
lengin11 the order. The High Court dismissed the petition but in appeal,
the High Court quashed the order holding that s. 95(i) (g) of the U.P.
Panchayat Raj Act. 1947 did not empower the Government lo p ... the
impuped order. In appeal by special leave,
this
Court affirmin1 the
decision of the appellate bench of the High Court,
HELD : Where an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also arants
the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are eaential.
ly necenary to its execution. But before implying the existence of such a
power the court must be satislied that the existence of that power is absolutely essentfal for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely
that it is convenient to have such a power. The power to place Wider
suspension an officer is not absolutely essential for the proper exercise of
the power conferred under s. 95 (i) (g). It cannot be said that the power
in question cannot be properly exercised without the, power to su!Pend
pending enquiry. The mere possibility of interference with the course of enquiry or of further misuse of powers are not sufficient to enlarge the
scope of a statutory power. If it is otherwise, the mere power to punish
an offender woulct have been held sufficient to arrest and detain him pend·
ing enquiry and trial There would have been no ne<d to confer specific
power to arrest and detain persons charged with offences before
their
conviction. Further no provision either in the Act or in the rules framed
thereunder has been shown under which the Government
could have
directed the up-Pradhan to officiate as Pradhan during the suspension of
the respondent. If the order could not have been made, as it could not
be made, then the question arises as tQ who could discharge the functions
or Pra~han when he is placed under suspension pending enquif'y of the
charges levelled against him.
Absence of a provision providing for such
a contingency is !l clear indication of the absence of the power contended
for. (154 F-155 DJ
Babu Nandan v. Sub Divisional Officer Sclempur, A.LR. 1966 All,
1958, approved.
A Pradhan cannot be considered as a servant of Government.
HC is
an elected representative.
There is no contractual relationship between
him and the Government much less the relationship of master and servant
(154 A-BJ
H
Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union,
[1960] I S.C.R. 476; T. Caiee v. U. !ormanik Siem, [19611 1 S.C.R. 750;
R. P,, KGpur v. Union of India [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431 and Ba/want Rai Ratilal Paul v. State of Maharashtra, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 577, held inapplicable.
152
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
[1970] I s.c.R.
The Goan Sabha is the creature of a statute. Its powers and dutiea
A
as well as the powers and duties of its officers arc all regulated by the Act.
Hence no question of any inherent power arises for consideration..
Smt. Wra Devi cl Ors. v. Diltrlct Boord, Shahjalumpur, [1952) S.C.R.
1122, referred to.

## Text

A
SUB·DIVISIONAL OFFICER, SADAR, FAIZABAD
'B
c
D
E
F
G
v.
SHAMBHOO NARAIN SINGH
March 31, 1969
[S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act 1947, s. 95(i)(g)-Pradhan of Gaon SabhaSuspension, pending enquiry, power-Up~pradhan to officiate as Pradhan
during suspension--IJ can be ordered-Pradhan·~ relationship lvith Governmena.
The respondent was elected as Pradhan of a Goan Sabha in
Uttar
Pradesh.
The appellant-government by an order suspended the respondent, and pending enquiry, directed the respondent to give charge to the
up..pradhan. The respondent filed a writ petition ·in the High Court chlJ.
lengin11 the order. The High Court dismissed the petition but in appeal,
the High Court quashed the order holding that s. 95(i) (g) of the U.P.
Panchayat Raj Act. 1947 did not empower the Government lo p ... the
impuped order. In appeal by special leave,
this
Court affirmin1 the
decision of the appellate bench of the High Court,
HELD : Where an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also arants
the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are eaential.
ly necenary to its execution. But before implying the existence of such a
power the court must be satislied that the existence of that power is absolutely essentfal for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely
that it is convenient to have such a power. The power to place Wider
suspension an officer is not absolutely essential for the proper exercise of
the power conferred under s. 95 (i) (g). It cannot be said that the power
in question cannot be properly exercised without the, power to su!Pend
pending enquiry. The mere possibility of interference with the course of enquiry or of further misuse of powers are not sufficient to enlarge the
scope of a statutory power. If it is otherwise, the mere power to punish
an offender woulct have been held sufficient to arrest and detain him pend·
ing enquiry and trial There would have been no ne<d to confer specific
power to arrest and detain persons charged with offences before
their
conviction. Further no provision either in the Act or in the rules framed
thereunder has been shown under which the Government
could have
directed the up-Pradhan to officiate as Pradhan during the suspension of
the respondent. If the order could not have been made, as it could not
be made, then the question arises as tQ who could discharge the functions
or Pra~han when he is placed under suspension pending enquif'y of the
charges levelled against him.
Absence of a provision providing for such
a contingency is !l clear indication of the absence of the power contended
for. (154 F-155 DJ
Babu Nandan v. Sub Divisional Officer Sclempur, A.LR. 1966 All,
1958, approved.
A Pradhan cannot be considered as a servant of Government.
HC is
an elected representative.
There is no contractual relationship between
him and the Government much less the relationship of master and servant
(154 A-BJ
H
Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union,
[1960] I S.C.R. 476; T. Caiee v. U. !ormanik Siem, [19611 1 S.C.R. 750;
R. P,, KGpur v. Union of India [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431 and Ba/want Rai Ratilal Paul v. State of Maharashtra, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 577, held inapplicable.
152
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
[1970] I s.c.R.
The Goan Sabha is the creature of a statute. Its powers and dutiea
A
as well as the powers and duties of its officers arc all regulated by the Act.
Hence no question of any inherent power arises for consideration..
Smt. Wra Devi cl Ors. v. Diltrlct Boord, Shahjalumpur, [1952) S.C.R.
1122, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appe11l No. 721 of
1966.
.
B
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
December 9, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench
in Special Appeal No. 93 of 1963.
C. B. Agarwala 3111d O. P. Rana, Cor the appellant.
S. C. Agarwal, R: K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty,
for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hedge J. Io this appeal by special leave, the scope of a. 95
( 1 )(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (to be hereinafter
nierrcd to as the Act) arises for decision.
The facts material for the purpose of deciding this appeal are
these : The respondent was the elected Pradhan of the Gaoo
Sabha of Asapur District Faizabad. The Sub-Divisional Officer,
Sadar,
Faizabad placed him under suspension
as per his
Jrder of September 18, 1963. The order in question reads as
follows:
"Sri Shambhoo Narain Singh, Pradhan of Gram
Sabha and Chairman Land Management Committee
of village Asapur is placed under suspensiqn with effect
from the immediate date.
lie is further directed to
hand over the charge to the Up-Pradhan of Gram Sabha,
Asapur.
The Up-Pradhan will function as Pradhan
till further orders. The charge sheet against Sri Shambhoo
Narain Singh will follow.
Sd/- S. M. Abbas,
P.C.S.
Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Faizabad.tt
The validity of this order is being challenged in these proceedings. It is the common case of both the parties that the
suspension ordered thereunder is merely a suspension pending
enquiry and is not a punishment imposed under s. 95(1)(g). '!'he
question for decision is whether the appellant had the competence
. to place the respondent under suspension pending enquiry into
the charges levelled against the
respondent.
The
impugned
order was challenged before a single judge of the Allahabad
c
D
..
I
F
G
H
(
•
•
. s. D. o. v. SllAMBliOO (Hegde, J,)
153
"
A
High Court by meil\llS of a petition under Art. 226 of the Consti·
tuuon. The leamed single judge dismissed that petition but in
appeal the appellate bench upheld the contention of the respon·
dent and quashed the same holding that s. 95(1) (g) did not
empower the appellant to pass the impugned order. It is the
correctness of that conclusion that is in issue in this appeal .
•
c
To repeat, the respondent is an elected Pradhan. His fi&hts
-and duties are regulated by the Act. He is not a government
servant though he has to be deemed as a public servant within
the meaning of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code ijll view of s. 28
of the Act. He is not a subordinate of the Sub-Divisional Offi.cer
or even of the Gowmment. It is true that the Act has conferred·
on the State Government certain powers of control ~
supervision
over the Gaon Sabhas and its office-bearers.
These powers are
enumerated ins. 95. Under s. 95(1) (g), power is conferred on
the Government to suspend or remove a member of a Goan
Panchayat or joiiut committee (or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti) an
office-bearer of a Gaon Sllbha or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or
p
Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if the conditions mentioned
therein are satisfied. But that power is admittedly a power to
punish. No specific power to suspend a Pradhan pending enquiry
:\lltO the .charges levelled against rum has been conferred on the
State Government, This much is conceded. In view of s. 96A
the· power conferred on the Government under s. 9 5 can be
delegated to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to
such coD,ditions and restrictions as the Governmqnt may deem
fit to impose. The State Government's power under s. 95 ( 1 )(g)
has been delegated to Sub-Divisional Officers. Therefore if the
State Government is held to have power to suspen4. an office·
bearer of a Gaon Sabha pending e,nquiry into the i:harges levelled
against him that power must be held to have been delegated to
F
the Sub-Divisional Officers. Therefore the essential question is
whether the State Government has power to make the impugned
order.
A faint attempt was made/ to ~w that the relationship
between the ~tate Government and the Pradhans is that Of master
and servants and that being so the State GoveIPllllent has comG
petence to require Pradhans not to discharge their.· functions as
Pradhans during the pendency of an enquiry into the charges
made against tbem. It was urged that if the court is plea.Sed to
hold that the relationship between the State Government and the
Pradhans. is that of a master and the servants then the appellant
could call into aid the rule laid down by this Court in Manage.
I
ment of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union;(')
T. Cafee v. U. Jormanfk Siem;(') R. P. Kapur v. Union o1
(1) (19601) I S.C.R. 47ff. .
(2) [1961) I S,C.R. ''°·
Lil SupCI/69-11
/ /
154
SUP!l.EME COURT lll!PORTS
(1970] I S.C.R
'India('); and Balwam Rai Ratilal Patel
v. Stale of Ma/uuashtra(').
This is a wholly
untenable contention.
A
Pradhan
cannot be considered as a servant of the Government. He is an
elected representative.
There is no
contractual
relationship
between him and the Government much less the relationship of
master and servant.
As mentioned earlier his rights and duties
are those laid down in the Act. Therefore the rule laid down in
the above cited decisions is wholly inapplicable to the facts of this
case. In this case there is no question of suspending a servant
from performing the duties of his office even though the contract
of service is subsisting. In the case of a master and his servant it
is a well established right of the master to give directions to his
servant relating to his duties.
That power includes within itself
the right to direct the servant to refrain from performing his
duties but that docs :not absolve the liability of the master to pay
the remuneration contracted to be paid to the servant unless otherwise provided in the contract, even during the period the servant
is required not to perform his duties.
The Goan Sabha is the creature of a statute. Its powers and
duties as well as the powers and duties of its officers are all
regulated by the Act.
Hence no question of any inherent power
arises for consideration-see Sm. Hira Devi and Ors. v. District
Board, Shahjahanpur(').
The only other contention advanced is that power claimed
should be held to be an essential power for the proper discharge
of the conferred power. It was urged that without such a power,
char~es framed against any office-bearer
cannot
be
properly
i.nqwred into as he may utilise his office to interfere with the
course of enquiry and the possibility of bis continuing to misuse
his office during the pendency of the enquiry cannot be ruled out.
It is well recognised that where an Act confers a jurisdiction,
it impliedly also grants the power of doiing all such
acts, or
employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution.
But before implying the existence of such a power the
court must be satisfied that the existence that pow~r is absolutely
essential for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely
that it is convenient to have such a power. We are not satiified
that the power to place under suspeDSion an officer is absolutely
essential for the proper exercise of the power conferred under s. 95
(1 )(g). It cannot be said that the power in question cannot be
properly exercised without the power to suspend pending enquiry.
The mere possibility of interference with the course Of enquiry or
of funher misuse of powers are not ~ufficient to enlarge the scope
of a statutory power. If it is otherwise the mere power to punish
(t)[t9641 S S.C.R. 431.
(l) [t9S21 &.C.R. 1122.
(2) 119681 2 S.C.R. sn.
A
B
•
c
D
E
F
c
'·
..
H
B
c
D
s. D. o. v. Sl(AMlllOO (H•gde, J.)
155
an offender would have been held sufficient to arrest and detain
him pending enquiry and trial. There would have been no need
to ·conter specific power to arrest and detain persons charged with
offeDCea before their conviction.
The unsustaiinability of the contention of the appellant would
become obvious on an examination of the various provisions of
the Act. Under the impugned order, the appellant had directed
the up-Pradhan to officiate as Pradhan during the suspension of
the respondent. Our attention has not been invited to any provision either in the Act or in the rules framed thereunder under
which the appellant could have made such an order. If he could
not have made that order, as in our cp);nion he could not have,
then the question arises as to who ·could discharge the functions
of a Pradhan when he is placed under suspension pending enquiry
of the charges levelled against 'him. Absence of a provision providing for such a contingency is a clear indication of the absence
of the power contended for.
For the reasons mentioned above, we agree with the appellate
bench of the High Court that the impugned order was made with-
.out the authority of law. That is also the view taken by the
Allahabad High Court in Babu Nandan v. Sub Divisional Officer
SalemP,ur('). We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.
Y.P.
Appeal dismissed.
(I) A.I.R .. 1966 All. 158.