# BABU RAM PRAKASH CHANDRA MAHESHW ARI v. ANTARIM ZILA PARISHAD MUZAFFAR NAGAR

- **Citation:** [1969] 1 S.C.R. 518
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-08-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 605 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswam! A!'Id A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/babu-ram-prakash-chandra-maheshw-ari-v-antarim-zila-parishad-muzaffar-nagar-4432
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 2'26--Altcr11a1ive retncdies 1101 availed of1/i,::h (.'ourt can still rnterrain writ petition and issue writ. of certiorari
'vhere Tribunal has acrt•d on a provision ol law u·hic:h i.<; ulira vircs and
where natural ju.Y1ice is denied.
The appellant \\'a..; a partncr.;;hip firn1 carrying on the bu..,incss of n1anuB
facturing Khandsari Sugar in the District of ~1uzaffarnagar, U.P.
Under
C
s. l 14 of the U.P. l)L~lrict Ho:1nt.; Act X of 1922 .1 Oi_c;lric1 Board had
J>Q\\'cr to levy a taX on circumstances and propcrtv suhjcct 10 certain conditions and restrictions.
ll1c pov:crs of Dio;tnct Board..;, under the aforesaid Act \\'Crc by virtue of the U.P. Antarim Zila Parishad Act, 1958 conferred on the Parishads formed under the latter Act. The U.P.
Anlarim
Zila Parishad Act 1958 expired on 31st December.
1959
but its
life
was extended to 3 lst December. 1960 bv
.<\menclin~ Act
No
1 of
1960 \vhich rccei\'ed the aS-"iCnt of the G0vemor on
Januarv 5,
1960.
\Vhcn the taxing olliccr of the Antarim Zila P<irishad ~fuzaff1irnagar suhD
jectcd the appefl<1nt to circumstances and property tax for 1959-~6()
the
appellant filed a writ petition in the Jligh Court contending inter
afio
that Amending Act J\;o. I of 1960 could not continue the Act of 1958
hecause the latter had already expired on 31st December, 1959 \Vhile the
former received the consent of the Governor on January 5. 1960.
The
con'\tit111ionali1v of the taxing provisions Y•;is aho challenged.
The \\'ri:
petilion \\'Js tfir,;,mi<:scd hy the High Court on the "olc ground that
the
E
rcmedv hy \Vav of appeal under s. 128 t)f the District Bo:ird<: Act J 922.
had not heen exhausted. The U.P. Kshetra Samitis and
Zila
Parishads
Adhiniyam of 1961 (U.P. Act ~2 of 1961) was
passed
in
November.
1961.
Acting under it the tax.ing officer of 1he Zila Parishad suhjected
the appellant to circumstances and properl'y lax for the year 1961-6:!
'vithout givin!! anv notice or inviting objections.
In respect of this asse'\<;-
mcn1 also the appellant filed a \vrit petition in the Hi!!h Court pleading
denial of natural ju~ticc as \\"ell :t'i challeng:in,g the con..,titution;.ility of the
F
taxing. provisions.
This petition \'."as :ilso dismtssccl on the san1e ~ound
:is the c:irlicr one. The ;1ppellant came to thi'i Court.
HFIJ) : The rul(' of exh~Hl''\lion o'f st1tutorv rcmedicc; brf(1rc a \\'rit
ic; gr,1nted is n n1le of self impO<\cd limitation. a "n1le of policy :-ind dio;crc·
tion rather than a rule of la\\1 and the court may therefore in cxception<ll
ca(,e" issue a \vrit such as a writ of certiorari nohvith.:;f:indinc:
the
L1ct
that the statutory -remedies have not hcen exhansted. f'.522 Cl '
G
State of Utfar Pradrsli v. Mo'1a111111ad Noolt. f19581 S.C.R. 596. 605.
relied on.
111erc arc at lca.<;t t\\'O v.·ell reco!!niscd exception<: to !he doctrine ,,-ith
reeard to the exhaustion o'f st:itutorv reme,li('s.
Jn the fir.c:t place ii i'i
\\.·Cll-o;cttled that where procc<'din!!S a·rc taken hcforc a Trihun:-il under a
orovision of la\Y. which ic; ultra
vire.~. it i<: open to a
p:-irt~·
aggriC\'Cd
H
therchv to move the J-tigh Court under Art. '.!:!6 for issuing appr0priatc
"'·rits for qu;"tshin~ them on the .!!round that they arc incomoetent. \~'ithout
hi.(, hcing ohligcd to \Vait until thO"c proceeding.:;
run their
full
c(1u~c.
[521 CJ
A
B
c
D
E
,.
F
G
H
BABU RAM v. ZILA PARISHAD (Ramaswami, J.)
519
Carl Still G. M. B. H. v. State of Bihar, A.LR. 1961 S.C. 1615 and
The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603,
relied on.
In the second place the doctrine bas no application in a case \Vhere
the impugned order has been made in violation of the principle of natural
justice. [523 DJ
State of Uuar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, [1958] S.C.R. 596, 605,
referred to.
In the present case in view of the allegations- of the apJ?ella~t that the
taxing provisions were ultra vires and that there was a v1olat1on of the
principles of natural justice the High Court was in err

## Text

BABU RAM PRAKASH CHANDRA MAHESHW ARI
A
v.
ANTARIM ZILA PARISHAD MUZAFFAR NAGAR
August 2, 1968
(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM! A!'ID A. N. GROVER, JJ.)
Constitution of India, Art. 2'26--Altcr11a1ive retncdies 1101 availed of1/i,::h (.'ourt can still rnterrain writ petition and issue writ. of certiorari
'vhere Tribunal has acrt•d on a provision ol law u·hic:h i.<; ulira vircs and
where natural ju.Y1ice is denied.
The appellant \\'a..; a partncr.;;hip firn1 carrying on the bu..,incss of n1anuB
facturing Khandsari Sugar in the District of ~1uzaffarnagar, U.P.
Under
C
s. l 14 of the U.P. l)L~lrict Ho:1nt.; Act X of 1922 .1 Oi_c;lric1 Board had
J>Q\\'cr to levy a taX on circumstances and propcrtv suhjcct 10 certain conditions and restrictions.
ll1c pov:crs of Dio;tnct Board..;, under the aforesaid Act \\'Crc by virtue of the U.P. Antarim Zila Parishad Act, 1958 conferred on the Parishads formed under the latter Act. The U.P.
Anlarim
Zila Parishad Act 1958 expired on 31st December.
1959
but its
life
was extended to 3 lst December. 1960 bv
.<\menclin~ Act
No
1 of
1960 \vhich rccei\'ed the aS-"iCnt of the G0vemor on
Januarv 5,
1960.
\Vhcn the taxing olliccr of the Antarim Zila P<irishad ~fuzaff1irnagar suhD
jectcd the appefl<1nt to circumstances and property tax for 1959-~6()
the
appellant filed a writ petition in the Jligh Court contending inter
afio
that Amending Act J\;o. I of 1960 could not continue the Act of 1958
hecause the latter had already expired on 31st December, 1959 \Vhile the
former received the consent of the Governor on January 5. 1960.
The
con'\tit111ionali1v of the taxing provisions Y•;is aho challenged.
The \\'ri:
petilion \\'Js tfir,;,mi<:scd hy the High Court on the "olc ground that
the
E
rcmedv hy \Vav of appeal under s. 128 t)f the District Bo:ird<: Act J 922.
had not heen exhausted. The U.P. Kshetra Samitis and
Zila
Parishads
Adhiniyam of 1961 (U.P. Act ~2 of 1961) was
passed
in
November.
1961.
Acting under it the tax.ing officer of 1he Zila Parishad suhjected
the appellant to circumstances and properl'y lax for the year 1961-6:!
'vithout givin!! anv notice or inviting objections.
In respect of this asse'\<;-
mcn1 also the appellant filed a \vrit petition in the Hi!!h Court pleading
denial of natural ju~ticc as \\"ell :t'i challeng:in,g the con..,titution;.ility of the
F
taxing. provisions.
This petition \'."as :ilso dismtssccl on the san1e ~ound
:is the c:irlicr one. The ;1ppellant came to thi'i Court.
HFIJ) : The rul(' of exh~Hl''\lion o'f st1tutorv rcmedicc; brf(1rc a \\'rit
ic; gr,1nted is n n1le of self impO<\cd limitation. a "n1le of policy :-ind dio;crc·
tion rather than a rule of la\\1 and the court may therefore in cxception<ll
ca(,e" issue a \vrit such as a writ of certiorari nohvith.:;f:indinc:
the
L1ct
that the statutory -remedies have not hcen exhansted. f'.522 Cl '
G
State of Utfar Pradrsli v. Mo'1a111111ad Noolt. f19581 S.C.R. 596. 605.
relied on.
111erc arc at lca.<;t t\\'O v.·ell reco!!niscd exception<: to !he doctrine ,,-ith
reeard to the exhaustion o'f st:itutorv reme,li('s.
Jn the fir.c:t place ii i'i
\\.·Cll-o;cttled that where procc<'din!!S a·rc taken hcforc a Trihun:-il under a
orovision of la\Y. which ic; ultra
vire.~. it i<: open to a
p:-irt~·
aggriC\'Cd
H
therchv to move the J-tigh Court under Art. '.!:!6 for issuing appr0priatc
"'·rits for qu;"tshin~ them on the .!!round that they arc incomoetent. \~'ithout
hi.(, hcing ohligcd to \Vait until thO"c proceeding.:;
run their
full
c(1u~c.
[521 CJ
A
B
c
D
E
,.
F
G
H
BABU RAM v. ZILA PARISHAD (Ramaswami, J.)
519
Carl Still G. M. B. H. v. State of Bihar, A.LR. 1961 S.C. 1615 and
The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603,
relied on.
In the second place the doctrine bas no application in a case \Vhere
the impugned order has been made in violation of the principle of natural
justice. [523 DJ
State of Uuar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, [1958] S.C.R. 596, 605,
referred to.
In the present case in view of the allegations- of the apJ?ella~t that the
taxing provisions were ultra vires and that there was a v1olat1on of the
principles of natural justice the High Court was in error in summarily
dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the appellant had an alternative remedy of statutory appeal. The High Court was no doubt vested
with a discretion but in the present case the discretion had
nC>t
been
exercised in accordance with law. [523 C-524 Al
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 605 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
March 27, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal
No. 322 of 1964.
E. C. Agarwala and E. Udayarathnam, for the appellant.,
M. C. Chagla and P. C. Agrawala, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J.
The appellant is a partnership firm consisting of two brothers Lala Baburam and Shri Prakash Chandra,
carrying on the business of manufacturing Khandsari sugar in the
district of Muzaffarnagar.
The partnership firm carries O]l its
business through its two units (1) one located in the village Basera
and run under the name and style of M/s. Baburam Ashok
Kumar and (2) the other located in village Morna and run under
the name and style of M/s. Baburam Prakash Chandra, both in
the district of Muzaffarnagar. The case of the appellant was that
the business of manufacturing Khandsari was seasonal and was
carried on at both the places for less than 5 months in a year,
i.e., from the month of November to the beginning of April.
Under the U.P. District Boards Act No. X of 1922, the District
Board of Muzaffarnagar was empowered to levy tax under ss. 108
and 114 in the rural area.
Section 114 was to the following
effect :
"The power of a board to impose a tax on circumstances and property shall be subject to the following
conditions and restrictions namely :-
(a) The tax may be imposed on any person residing
or carrying on business in the rural area provided that
such person has so resided or carried on business for a
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969) I s.C.R.
total period of at least six months in the year under
A
assessment.
(b) The total amount of tax imposed on any person
shall not exceed such maximum (if any) as may be
prescribed by rule.
"
........................................
Under s. 123 of that Act the matters relating to the assessment
and collection of taxes were to be governed by rules framed under
s. 172 of that Act. On March I, 1928, the Government of U.P.
issued notification no. 315/IX-413 notiiying the rules
for
the
rules for the assessment and collection of a tax on circumstances
and property in the rural area of the M u1.affarnagar district. The
rules provided, among other matters, that all the activities of an
assesi;ee within the district, wl~~ther carried on under the same or
different name, shall be considered in calculating the total amount
to be assessed; and the tax shall be assessed by an Assessing Officer
appointed by the District Board. and the list of assessment of the
preceding year ending December 31, shall be completed on or
before January 20, :md shall be submitted to the Board which
will return it by February 15 to the Assessing Officer for being
revised and thereafter the Assessing Officer shall give notice of
a date not less than one month when he will proceed to consider
the objection.
The assesscc may file objections before the date
fixed and thereafter the Assessing Officer shall allow the assessee
an opportunity to be heard. Rule 16 read with Rule 2 fixed the
maximum limit of the total amount of tax assessed on any person
not to exceed Rs. 2,000/- in any year, having regard to all the
activities of an assessee within the district whether carried ·on
under the same or a different name. In the year 1950 the Constitution of India was promulgated and under cl. 2 of Art.
276
the total amount payable in respect of any one person to the district board, local Board or other local authority in the State by
way of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments shall
not exceed two hundred and fifty rupeei; per annum. On August
22. 1958, the U.P. Antarim Zila Parishad Act of 1958 (U.P.
Act no. XXII of 1958) passed by the U.P. Legislature received
the assent of the Governor and was published in the U.P. Ga7.ette
dated August 23, 1958. Clause (3) of s. 1 of the U. P. Antarim
Zila Parishad Act, 1958 runs as follows:-
"It shall be deemed to have come into force on the
29th day of April, 1958, and shall expire on the 31st
day of December, 1959."
c
I>
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F
G
But the Amending Act (U.P. Act no. I of 1960) received the
H
assent of the Governor on January 5, 1960 whereby the figure
1960 was substituted in place of 1959 in cl. (3) of s. I of U.P.
Act XXJI of 1958. The case of the appellant is that the original
A
B
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D
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BABU RAM v. ZILA PARISHAD (Ramaswami, I.)
521
Act no. XXII of 1958 had expired on December 31, 1959 and,
as such could not be revived on January 5, 1960 when the Amending Act no. 1 of 1960 received the assent of the Governor and
that fresh legislation was necessary. On March 20, 1960, a copy
of the Assessment Order assessing the appellant to the maximum
amount of Rs. 2,000/- as circumstances and property tax for the
assessment year 1959-60 was issued by the Antarim Zila Parishad
Muzaffarnagar. The assessment order was issued by Shri 0. P.
Varma purporting to act as a Taxing Officer of the Antarim Zila
Parishad. Aggrieved by the assessment order, the appell~t filed
a Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition no. 1780 of 1960 m the
Allahabad High Court challenging the authority of the respondent
Antarim Zila Parishad to impose the tax and praying for the grant
of a writ to quash the said assessment order. The writ petition
was summarily dismissed on July 21, 1960 by Jagdish Sahai, J.
on a preliminary point that the appellant had a right to appeal
to the prescribed authority under s. 128 of U.P. Act no. X of
1922.
The appellant thereafter preferred a Special Appeal no.
452 of 1960 in the Allahabad High Court against the order of
Jagdish Sahai, J. which was also dismissed on the ground that the
appellant had an alternative remedy of appeal. During the pendency of the Special Appeal no. 452 of 1960, another new Act,
namely the U.P. Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam
of 1961 (i.e., the U.P. Act no. XXXIl of 196l)_was passed by
the U.P. Legislature and on November 29, 1961 received the
assent of the President of India. The case of the appellant is that
on January 15, 1962, without giving any notice or inviting any
objections, the Taxing Officer Shri 0. P. Verma passed the assessment order for 1961-62 in respect of the circumstances and prop'erty tax regarding the Basera Unit.
Being aggrieved by the
two separate assessment orders of Rs. 2000 / - each in respect of
the two units of Morana and Basera for the years 1961-62, the
appellant filed again in the Allahabad High Oourt a writ petition
no. 2371 of 1962 under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The writ
petition was summarily dismissed by S.
N.
Dwivedi,
J.
on
February 13, 1964. The appellant took the matter in appeal in
Special Appel no. 322 of 1964 but the Special Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench on March 27, 1964 on the ground
that the appellant had not availed himself of the alternative
remedy by way of appeal. The present appeal is brought to this
Court by special leave from the judgment of the Division Bench
of the A1lahabad High Court dated March 27, 1964 in Special
Appeal no. 322 of 1964.
The sole argument presented on behalf of the appellant is
that the High Court was in error in holding that an appeal under
the U.P. District Boards Act no. X of 1922 was an adequate and
efficacious remedy and that the appellant should have exhausted·
the statutory remedy before applying for a writ under Art. 226
of the Constitution.
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f 1969] I S.C.R.
lt is a wdl-establishcd proposition of law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant he
should be required to pursue that remedy and not to invoke the
special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ.
It is true that the existence of a statutory remedy docs not affect
the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ.
Rut, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. The Municipal Board.
Kairana('), "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing
to be taken into consideration in the matter of gr~nting writs" and
whCTc such a remedy exists it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ petition unless there arc good
grounds therefor.
But it should be remembered that the rule of
exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ is granted is a
rule of self imposed limitation. a rule of policy, and discretion
rather than a rule of law and the court may therefore in exceptional cases issue a writ such as a writ of certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted.
In The State of VIiar Pradesh v. Moharnmad Noah('), S. R. Das,
C.J.. speaking for the Court. observed :
•·Jn the next place it must he home in mind that
there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is
with mandamus. that it will lie onlv where there is no
other equally effective remedy.
1t' is well cstahlished
that. provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will
lie although a right of appeal has been conferred hy
statute.
(Halshury's Laws of En~Jand. 3rd Ed., Vol.
II. p. 130 and the cases c;hi there).
The fact that the
aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may
he taken into consideration hy the superior court in
arriving at a conclusion a~ •n whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash
the nrocccdings and dcci<ions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted
his other statutory remedies, if any.
But this rule requiring the exhaustion of. statutory remedies before the
writ will be granted is a rule of policy. convenience and
discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are
numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in
spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.
Jn the King
v.
Postmal'terGenera/ Ex parte Carmichael [ 1928 (I) K.B. 291] a
certiorari was issued although the aggrieved party had
and alternative remedy by way of appeal.
It has been
held that the superior court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been. a denial of natural
j_usticc before a court of summary jurisdiction.
The
(I)
[19501 S.C.R. 566.
(2)
Jt958] S.C.R. 595, 605.
A
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A ,
B
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E
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BABU RAM v. ZILA PAR!SHAD (Ramaswami, !.)
523
case of Rex v. Wandsworth Justices Ex parte Read
[1942 0) K.B. 281] is an authority in point. In that
case a man had been convicted in a court of summary
jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being
heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case
stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions but
by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction."
There are at least two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine
with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first
place, it is well-settled that where proceedings are taken befo~e
a Tribunal under a provision of law, which is ultra vires,
it is
open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court under
Art. 226 for issuing appropriate writs for quashing them on the
ground that they are incompetent, without his being obliged to
wait until those proceedings run their full course.-(See the decisions of this Court in Carl Still G. m. b. H. v. The State of
Bihar(') and The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of
Bihar(2).
In the second place, the doctrine has no application
in a case where the impugned order has been made in violation
of the principles of natural justice (See The State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Mohammad Nooh(').
·
It is manifest in the present case that the appellant had alle--
ged in the writ petition that the Taxing Officer had no authority
to impose the tax and there was no validly constituted Antarim
Zila Parishad after December 31. 1959. It was further alleged
that ss. 114 and 124 of the U.P. District Boards Act no. X of
I 922 violated Art. 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary power was
granted to District Boards as well as the State Government to
exempt any person or class of persons or any property or class
of properties from the scope of the Act.
There is also an allegation that the imposition of the tax violated the provisions of
Art. 276 of the Constitution and that the Antarim Zila Parishad
could not impose the tax beyond the maximum limit of Rs. 250/-
per annum prescribed in that Article. It was further contended
on behalf of the appellant that the procedure for assessment of
the tax wa~ n~t followed and there was violation of the principles
of natu~al 1ust1ce. In view of the allegations of the appellant that
the taxmg provisions are ultra vires and that there was violation
of the principles of, natural justice, we think that the High Court
was m error in summarily dismissing the writ petition on the
ground that the appellant had an alternative remedy of statutory
appeal.
It was contended by Mr. Chagla on behalf of the respondent that in dismissing the writ petition the High Court was
acting in its discretion. But it is manifest in the present case that
(I)
A.l.R. 1961 S.C. 1615.
(2)
[1955] 2 S.CR. 603.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 595.
524
SUPREME cm;RT REPORTS
[l 969] I S.CR
the discretion of the High Court has not been exercised in accordance with law and the judgments of the Division Bench dated
March 27, 1964 and of the learned Single Judge dated February
13, 1964 summarily dismissing the writ petition are defective
in law.
For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal must be
allowed, the judgments of the Division Bench in Special Appeal
no. 322 of I 964 dated March 27, 1964 and of the learned Single
Judge dated February 13, 1964 should be set aside and Civil
Miscellaneous Writ no. 2371 of 1962 should be restored to file
and dealt with in accordance with law.
There will be no order
with regard to the costs of this appeal in this Court
G.C.
Appeal allowed.
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