# BABULAL PARATE v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 605
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1956
- **Bench:** S. R. Das, s. K. DAS, A. K.. Sarkar, 605 K. N. W Anchoo, M. Hidayatullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/babulal-parate-v-the-state-of-bombay-and-another-1800
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

States, Reorganisation of-Modification of Bill by ParliamentSuch modification, if must be ref erred to State Legislature-ConsUtution of India, Art. 3, proviso-States Reorganisation Act, z956,
tXXXVII of z956), s. 8(z).
A Bill introduced in the House of the People on the report
of the States Reorganisation Commission and as recommended by
the President under the proviso to Art. 3 of the Constitution,
contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units,
viz., (1) Union territory of Bombay, (2) Maharashtra, including
Marathawada and Vidarbha and (3) Gujrat, including Saurashtra
·and Cutch. This Bill was referred by the President to the State
Legislatures concerned and their views obtained. The Joint
Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and the
Council of States (Rajya Sabha) considered the Bill and made its.
report. Subsequently, Parliament amended some of the clauses
and passed the Bill which came to be known as the States
RE~organisation Act, 1956. That Act by s. 8(1) constituted a
composite State of Bombay instead of the three separate units as
originally proposed in the Bill. The petition, out of which the
present appeal has arisen, was filed by the appellant under
Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Bombay. His
contention was that the said Act was passed in contravention
of the provisions of Art. 3 of the Constitution, since the Legislature of Bombay had not been given an opportunity of expressing
its views on the formation of the composite State. The High
Court dismissed the petition.
Held, that the proviso to Art. 3 lays down two conditions
and under the second condition therein stated, what the President
has to·reier to the State Legislature for its opinion is the proposal
contained in the Bill. On a true construction, the proviso does
not contemplate that if Parliament subsequently modifies that
proposal, there must be a fresh bill or a fresh reference to the
State Legislature.
The word 'State' in Art. 3 of the Constitution has obvious
reference to Art. ,I and the States mentioned in the First Schedule
to the Constitution, and the expression 'Legislature of the State'
means the. Legislature of such a State. TJ:iere are, therefore, no
reasons for the application of any special doctrine of democratic
theory or practice prevalent in other countries in interpreting
those words ; nor any justification for giving an extended meaning
to the word 'State' in determining the true scope and eftect of the
proviso.
'11
z959
Aucust 118.
r959
Babulal Parate
v.
Tiu State of
Bombay
and Another
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
The requirements of Art. IV, s. 3 of the American Constitution are materially different from those of the second proviso to
Art. 3 of the Indi&n Constitution and, consequently, decisions
based on the former are not in point.
State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi, (1905) 202 U.S. l
and State of Washington v. State of Oregon, (1908) 2II U.S. 127,
held inapplicable.
State of ;Texas v. George W.
White, (1869) 74 U.S. 700
referred to.
It is not correct to contend that the word 'Bill' in the proviso
must be interpreted to include an amendment of any of the clauses
of the Bill or at least a substantial amendment thereof, and that
any proposal contained in such amendment must be referred
back to the State Legislature. Such an interpretation of Art. 3
will nullify the effect of Art. 122(1) and is untenable in view of
the provisions in Arts. II7 and II8 of the Constitution.
Although the formation of a composite State in terms of s. 8
of the Act was without doubt a substantial modification of the.
proposal as originally contained in the Bill, it could not be said
that the said modification was not germane to the subject mafter
of the original proposal or was a direct negative thereof, so as to
be beyond the scope of an amendment.
T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd., (1944) 47
Born. L.R. 428, applied.
Therefore, the Act could not be held to have been enacted in
vi

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
BABULAL PARATE
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER
(S. R. DAS, C.J., s. K. DAS, A. K.. SARKAR,
605
K. N. W ANCHOO, and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
States, Reorganisation of-Modification of Bill by ParliamentSuch modification, if must be ref erred to State Legislature-ConsUtution of India, Art. 3, proviso-States Reorganisation Act, z956,
tXXXVII of z956), s. 8(z).
A Bill introduced in the House of the People on the report
of the States Reorganisation Commission and as recommended by
the President under the proviso to Art. 3 of the Constitution,
contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units,
viz., (1) Union territory of Bombay, (2) Maharashtra, including
Marathawada and Vidarbha and (3) Gujrat, including Saurashtra
·and Cutch. This Bill was referred by the President to the State
Legislatures concerned and their views obtained. The Joint
Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and the
Council of States (Rajya Sabha) considered the Bill and made its.
report. Subsequently, Parliament amended some of the clauses
and passed the Bill which came to be known as the States
RE~organisation Act, 1956. That Act by s. 8(1) constituted a
composite State of Bombay instead of the three separate units as
originally proposed in the Bill. The petition, out of which the
present appeal has arisen, was filed by the appellant under
Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Bombay. His
contention was that the said Act was passed in contravention
of the provisions of Art. 3 of the Constitution, since the Legislature of Bombay had not been given an opportunity of expressing
its views on the formation of the composite State. The High
Court dismissed the petition.
Held, that the proviso to Art. 3 lays down two conditions
and under the second condition therein stated, what the President
has to·reier to the State Legislature for its opinion is the proposal
contained in the Bill. On a true construction, the proviso does
not contemplate that if Parliament subsequently modifies that
proposal, there must be a fresh bill or a fresh reference to the
State Legislature.
The word 'State' in Art. 3 of the Constitution has obvious
reference to Art. ,I and the States mentioned in the First Schedule
to the Constitution, and the expression 'Legislature of the State'
means the. Legislature of such a State. TJ:iere are, therefore, no
reasons for the application of any special doctrine of democratic
theory or practice prevalent in other countries in interpreting
those words ; nor any justification for giving an extended meaning
to the word 'State' in determining the true scope and eftect of the
proviso.
'11
z959
Aucust 118.
r959
Babulal Parate
v.
Tiu State of
Bombay
and Another
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
The requirements of Art. IV, s. 3 of the American Constitution are materially different from those of the second proviso to
Art. 3 of the Indi&n Constitution and, consequently, decisions
based on the former are not in point.
State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi, (1905) 202 U.S. l
and State of Washington v. State of Oregon, (1908) 2II U.S. 127,
held inapplicable.
State of ;Texas v. George W.
White, (1869) 74 U.S. 700
referred to.
It is not correct to contend that the word 'Bill' in the proviso
must be interpreted to include an amendment of any of the clauses
of the Bill or at least a substantial amendment thereof, and that
any proposal contained in such amendment must be referred
back to the State Legislature. Such an interpretation of Art. 3
will nullify the effect of Art. 122(1) and is untenable in view of
the provisions in Arts. II7 and II8 of the Constitution.
Although the formation of a composite State in terms of s. 8
of the Act was without doubt a substantial modification of the.
proposal as originally contained in the Bill, it could not be said
that the said modification was not germane to the subject mafter
of the original proposal or was a direct negative thereof, so as to
be beyond the scope of an amendment.
T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd., (1944) 47
Born. L.R. 428, applied.
Therefore, the Act could not be held to have been enacted in
violation of Art. 3 of the Constitution.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
342 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 14, 1956, of the Bombay High Court, in Special
Civil Application No. 2496of1956.
R. V. S. Mani, for the appellant.
O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. Sen,
and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1959. August 28. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
s. K. Das J,
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
granted by the High Court of Bombay under Art.
132 (1) of the Constitution, and the question involved
in the appeal is the true scope and effect of Art. 3 of
the Constitution, particularly of the proviso thereto
as it stands after the Oollstitution (Fifth Amendment)
Act, 11155,
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
On December 22, 1953, the Prime Minister of India
made a statement in Parliament to the effect that a
Commission would be appointed to examine "objectively and dispassionately " the question of the reorganisation of the States of the Indian Union "so
that the welfare of the people of each constituent unit
as well as the nation as a whole is promoted". This
was followed by the appointment of a Commission
under a resolution of the Union Government in the
Ministry of Home Affairs, dated December 29; 1953.
The Commission submitted its report in due course
and on April 18, 1956; a Bill was introduced in the
House of the People (Lok Sabha) entitled The States
Reorganisation Bill (No. 30of1956). Clauses 8, 9 and
10 of the said Bill contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units, namely, (1) Union
territory of Bombay; (2) State of Maharashtra including Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3) State of
Gujarat including Saurashtra and Cutch. The Bill
was introduced in the House of the People on the recommendation of the President, as required by the proviso
to art. 3 of the Constitution. It was then referred
to a Joint Select Committee of the House of the
People (Lok Sabha) and the Council of State (Rajya
Sabha). The Joint Select Committee made its report
on July 16, 1956. Some of the clauses of the Bill
were amended in Parliament and on being passed by
both Houses, it received the President's assent on
August 31, 1956, and became known a.s the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) hereinafter
called the Act.
It is necessary to read heres. 8(1) of 'the Act which
instead of constituting three separate units as originally proposed in the Bill constituted a. composite
State of Bombay as stated therein.
"S.8 (1): As from the appointed day, there shall
be formed a new Part A State to be known as the
State ofBombay comprising the following territories,
namely:-
(a) the territories of the existing State of Bombay,
excludingr959
Babulal Parat•
v.
Th• State of
Bombay
and another
s. K. Das].
I959
Babulal Parate
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
and A notlur
S. K. Das].
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
(i) Bijapur, DharWar and Kanara districts and
Belgaum district except Chandgad taluka ; and
(ii) Abu Road taluka of Banaskantha district;
(b) Aurangabad, Parbhani, Bhir and Osmanabad
districts, Ahmadpur, Nilanga and Udgir taluks of
Bidar district, Nanded district (except Bichkonda
and Jukkal circles of Deglur taluk and Modhol,
Bhiansa and Kuber circles of Modhol taluk) and
Islapur circle of Boath taluk, Kinwat taluk and
Rajura taluk of Adilabad district, in the existing
State of Hyderabad;
(c) Buldana, Akola, Amaravati, Yeotmal, Wardha, Nagpur, Bhandara and Chanda districts in
the existing State of Madhya Pradesh ;
(d) tl:1"e territories of the existing State of Saurashtra; and
(e) the territories of the existing State of Kutch;
and thereupon the said territories shall cease to form
part of the existing States of Bombay, Hyderabad,
Madhya Pradesh, Saurashtra and Kutch, respectively."
The appointed day from which the new State of
Bombay came into existence was defined in the Act
as meaning November 1, 1956. But before that date,
to wit, on September 12, 1956, the appellant herein
filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in which he
alleged, in substance, that the formation of the composite State of Bombay as one· unit instead of the three
separate units as originally proposed in the Bill
contravened Art. 3 of the Constitution, inasmuch as
the Legislature of the State of Bombay had no opportunity of expressing its views on the formation of such
a composite State. The appellant asked for a declaration that s. 8 and other consequential proYisions of
the Act were null and void and prayed for an
appropriate writ directing the State Government of
Bombay and the Union Government not to enforce
and implement the same. This writ petition was
heard by the Bombay High Court on September 14,
1956, and by its judgment of even date, the High
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
Court dismissed the petitfon, holding that there was
no violation or contravention of Art. 3 of the Constitution. The appellant then obtained the necessary
certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, and
filed his appeal in this Court on October 18, 1956 on
the strength of that certificate.
Now, it is both convenient and advisable to read at
this stage Art. 3 of the Constitution, as amended by
the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955, the
alleged violation of which is the main ground of attack
by learned counsel for the appellant.
"Art. 3 : Parliament·niay by law-
(a) form a new State by separation of territory
from any State or by uniting two or more States or
parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part
of any State ;
(b) increase the area of any State;
(c) diminish the area of any State;
(d) alter the boundaries of any State; and
· (e) alter the rftl.me of any State ;
Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be
introduced in either House of Parliament except on
the recommendation of the President and unless,
where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the
a.rel!., boundaries or na.:me of any of the States the
Bill has been referred by the President to the
Legislature of that State for expressing its views
thereon within such period as may be specified i:o.
the reference or within such further period as the
President miloy allow and the period so specified or
allowed has expired. "
It is clear that by its substantive pa.rt the 1\rticle
gives a certain power to Parliament, viz., the power to
make a law in respect of any of the five matters mentioned in els. (a) to (e) thereof. This power includes
the making of a. law to increase the area. of any State;
diminish the area. of any State ; and alter the name of
any State. The substantive pa.rt is followed by a
proviso, which lays down certain conditions for the
exercise of the power. It states that no Bill for the
purpose (the word " purpose" obviously has reference
I959
Babula! Parale
v.
The State cf
Bombay
and 4nothiw
S. K. Das].
I959
Babulal Parate
...
The State of
Bombay
and Another
S. K. Das].
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
to the power of making law in respect of the matters
mentioned in the substantive part) shall be introduced
in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the
proposal contained in the Bill affects the area,
boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has
been referred by the President to the Legislature of
that State for expressing its views thereon. Thus, the
proviso Jays down two conditions : one is that no Bill
shall be introduced except on the recommendation of
the President, and the second condition is that where
the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area,
boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has
to be referred by the President to the Legislature of
the State for expressing its views thereon. The period
within which the State Legislature must express its
views has to be specified by the President; but the
President may extend the period so specified. If,
however, the period specified or extended expires and
no views of the State Legislature ,are received, the
second condition laid down in the proviso is fulfilled
in spite of the fact that the views of the State Legislature have not been expressed. The intention seems
to be to give an opportunity to the State Legislature
to express its views within the time allowed; if the
State Legislature fails to avarJ itself of that opportunity, such failure does not invalidate the introduction
of the Bill. Nor is there anything in the proviso to
indicate that Parliament must accept or act upon the
views of the State Legislature. Indeed, two State
Legislatures may express totally divergent views. All
that is contemplated is that Parliament should have
before it the views of the State Legislatures as to the
proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to
deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit, following
the usual practice and procedure prescribed by and
under the rules of business. Thus the essential content
of the second condition is a reference by the President
of the proposal contained in the bill to the State
Legislature to express its v.iews thereon within the
time allowed. It is worthy of note, and this has been
properly emphasised in the judgment of the High
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
C~urt, that what has to be referred to the State Legislature by the President is the proposal contained in
the Bill. The proviso does not say that if and when
a proposal contained in the Bill is modified subsequently
by an amendment properly moved and accepted
in Parliament, there must be a fresh reference to
the State Legislature and a fresh bill must be
introduced. It was pointed out in the course of
arguments that if the second condition required a fresh
reference and a fresh bill for every amendment, it
might result in an interminable process ; because any
and every amendment of the original proposal
contained in the Bill would then
necessitate a
fresh Bill and a fresh reference to the State Legislature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a
construction were put on the proviso; fpr example,
in a. case where two or three States were involved, different views might be expressed by the Legislatures of different States. If Parliament were to
accept the views of one of the Legislatures and not of
the other; a fresh reference would still be necessary by
reason of any amendment in the original proposal
contained in the Bill.
We are referring to these difficulties not because we
think that a forced meaning- should be given to the
words of the proviso to avoid certain difficulties which
may arise.
We are of the view that the words of the
proviso are clear enough and bear' their ordinary plain
meaning. According to the accepted connotation of
the words used in the proviso, the second condition
means what it states and what has to be referred to
the State Legislature is the proposal contained in tLo
Bill ; it has no such drastic effect as to require a fresh
reference every time an amendment of the proposal
contained in the Bill is moved and accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure of Parliament.
That in the present case the States Reorganisation
Bill was introduced on the recommendation of the
President has not been disputed ; nor has it been disputed that the proposal contained in the Bill was
referred to the State Legislatures concerned and their
views were received, According to learned counsel for
x959
Babulal Parale
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
and .A nolher
S. K.Das j.
I959
Babulal Parate
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Another
S. K. Das].
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
the appellant, however, this was not enough compliance with the second condition of the proviso. He has
put his argument in several ways. Firstly, he has contended that the word " State " in Art. 3 should be
given a larger connotation so as to mean and include
not merely the geographical entity called the State, but
its people as well : this, according to learned counsel
for the appellant, is the "democratic process" incorporated in Art. 3 and according to this democratic process,. so learned counsel has argued, the" representatives
of the people of the State of Bombay assembled in the
State Legislature should have been given an opportunity of expressing their views not merely on the proposal originally contained in the Bill, but on any
substantial modification thereof. Secondly and following the same line of argument, he has contended that
the word " Bill" should be given an extended meaning so as to include any amendment, at least any
substantial amendment, of the proposal contained in
the Bill; and thirdly, he .has contended that in the
present case the formation of a new Bombay State as
one unit was so different from the three units originally
proposed in the Bill that it was not really an amendment of the original proposal but a new proposal
altogether for which a fresh Bill and a fresh reference
were necessary.
We proceed now to consider these contentions. It
is necessary to state at the outset that our task is to
determine on a proper construction the true scope
and effect of Art. 3 of the Constitution, with particular
reference to the second condition laid down by the
proviso thereto. We bring to our task such considerations as are germane to the interpretation of an organic instrument like the Constitution ; but it will be
improper to import into the question of construction
doctrines of democratic theory and practice obtaining
in other countries, unrelated to the tenor, scheme and
words of the provisions which we have to construe. In
plain and unambiguous language, the proviso to Art. 3
of the Constitution states that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name
of any of the States, the Bill must be referred by the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
President to the Legislature of the State for expressing
its views. It does not appear to us that any special or
recondite doctrine of" democratic process" is involved
therein. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited
our attention to Art. IV, s~ 3, of the American Constitution which says inter alia that " no new State shall
be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any
other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of
two or more States or parts of /States without the
consent of the Legislatures of the State concerned as
well as of the Congress." That provision is quite
different from the proviso we are considering : the
former requires the consent of the State Legislature
whereas the essential requirement of our proviso is a
reference by the President of the proposal contained
in the Bill for the expression of its views by the State
Legislature. For this reason we do not think that the
decisions relied on by learned counsel for the appellant
(State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi (1), and State of
Washington v. Staie of Oregon (2) ) are in point. The
expression ' State ' occurs in Art. 3, and as has been
observed.in the State of Texas v. George W. White (8),
that expression may have different meanings: it may
mean a territorial region, or people united in political
relation living in that region or it may refer to the
government under which the people live or it may even
convey the combined idea of territory, people and
government. Article 1 of our Constitution says that
India is a Union of States and the States and the
territories thereof are specified in a Schedule. There
is, therefore, no Q.ifficulty in understanding what is
meant by the expression 'State' in Art. 3. It obviously
refers to the States in the First Schedule and the
' Legislature of the State ' refers to the Legislature
which ea.ch State has under the Constitution. That
being the 'position we see no reasons for importing into
the construction of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration
of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for
giving an extended meaning to the expression ' State '
occurring therein. None of the constituent units of the
(1) (1905) 202 U.S. I.
(2) (1908) UJ U.S. 11.7.
(3)(1869)74 U.S. 700,
I9$9
Babulal Paral1
v.
The State of
Bombay
and A no I her
S.K. Das ].
I959
Babulal Parate
v.
The Slate of
Bombay
and Another
S. K. Das j.
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the
sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were
before they formed their federal unions. The Constituent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the
sovereign people, was unfettered by any previous
commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the genius and requirements of the Indian
people as a whole. U;nlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as
a whole,. has been vested with the exclusive power of
admitting or establishing new States, increasing or
diminishing the area of an existing State or altering
its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the
States concerned having only the right to an expression
of views on the proposals. It is significant that for
making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary
even to invoke the provisions governing constitutional
amendments.
The second line of argument presented on behalf of
the appellant is that the word 'Bill' in the proviso
must be interpreted to include an amendment of any
of the clauses of the Bill, at least any substantial
amendment thereof, and any proposal contained in
such amendment must be referred to the State Legislature for expressioμ of its views. We do not think
that this interpretation is correct. Wherever the
introduction of an amendment is subject to a condition
precedent, as in the case of financial bills, the Constitution has used the expression ' A bill or amendments ',
e.g. in Art. 117. No such expression occurs in art 3.
Secondly, under Art. 118 Parliament has power to
make rules of its own procedure and conduct of business, including the moving of amendments etc. Rule
80 of the rules of procedure of the House of the People
(Lok Sabha) lays down the conditions which govern
the admissibility of amendments to clauses or schedules
of a Bill, and one of the conditions is that an amendment shall be within the scope of the Bill and relevant
to the subject matter of the clause to which it
relates. Article 122 (1) of the Constitution says that
the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall
not be called in question on the ground of any alleged
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
irregularity of procedure. In view of these provisions,
we cannot accept an interpretation of Art. 3 which
may nullify the effect of Art. 122, an interpretation
moreover which is based not on the words used therein
but on certain abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of
what learned counsel for the appellant has characterised as the democratic process.
We recognise that the formation of a new composite
State of Bombay as ins. 8 of the Act was a substantial
modification of the original proposal of three units
contained in the Bill. That, however, does not mean
that it was not a proper amendment of the original
proposal or that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views on all aspects of the subject
matter of the proposal. The High Court rightly pointed
out that in the debates in the State Legislature several
members spoke in favour of a composite State of
Bombay. The point to note is that many different
views were expressed in respect of the subject matter
of the original proposal of three units, and as a matter
of fact it cannot be said that the State Legislature had
no opportunity of expressing its views in favour of
one composite unit instead of three units if it so
desired. It cannot be said that the proposal of one
unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to
the subject matter of the original proposal.
In
T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd. (1),
a decision on which learned counsel for the appellant
has relied, the question arose of the power of the
chairman of a club to rule an amendment out of order.
It was said therein that (1) an a.niendment must be
germane to the subject-matter of the original proposition and (2) it must not be a direct negative thereof.
Judged by these two conditions, it cannot be said that
the proposal of one unit instead of three was not germane to the subject-matter of the original proposal or
was a direct negative thereof.
We are unable, thereJ
fore, to accept the third contention of learned counsel
for the appellant to the effect that the formation of a
new Bombay St.ate as envisaged in s. 8 of the Act was
so completely divorced from the proposal contained in
(I) (1944) 47 Born. L.R. 428.
I959
Babu/al Parale
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Another
S.K.Das].
'959
Babulal Parate
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Another
S. K. Das ].
I959
August 28.
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
the Bill that it was in reality a new bill and therefore
a fresh reference was necessary.
It is advisable, perhaps, to add a few more words
about Art. 122( 1) of the Constitution. Learned counsel
for the appellant has posed before us the question as
to what would be the effect of that Article if in
any Bill completely unrelated to any of the matters
referred to in Cls. (a) to (e) of Art. 3 an amendment
was t!l be proposed and accepted changing (for example)
the name of a State. We do not think that we need
answer such a hypothetical question except merely to
say that if an amendment is of such a character that
it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative
of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of
proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a consitutional provision. That, however, is not the position
in the present case.
For these reasons, we hold that there was no violation of Art. 3 and the Act or any of its provisions are
not invalid on that ground.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
RM. NL. RAMASW AMI CHE1'TIAR AND OTHERS.
v.
THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER,
RAMANATHAPURAM AT MADURAI & OTHERS
(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Insolvency--Decree-holder assigning decree-Adjudication as
insolvent on ground of assignment being fraudulent preference-Whether upon adjudication decree vests in Official Receiver-Order
annulling assignment-If relates back to date of assignment-Execution applications made by assignee before annulment order, whether
incompetent-Official Receiver making application for execution
after annulment order-Limitation- -Whether limitation saved by
applications made by assignee-Indian Limitation Act, r908 (V of
r908)--Provinciat Insolvency Act r920 (V of r920), ss. 28 and 54.
On May 9, 1935, one V obtained a decree against R and
later assigned the same in favour of his mother M. M made an
application for an order recognising her as the assignee and for