# BACHHARAM DATTA PATIL AND ANOTHER v. VISHW ANATH PUNDALIK PATIL AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 675
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-09-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 249 of 1953
- **Bench:** Jagannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha, S. K. Das
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bachharam-datta-patil-and-another-v-vishw-anath-pundalik-patil-and-others-1256
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Watan lands-Resumption by Government-Dispensing with the
services and levying of full assessment-Lands subsequently described
as J apti Sanadi I nam lands-Whether retain character of W atan
lands.
Certain lands which were originally Watan lands were resumed
by the Government after dispensing with the services that were
being rendered and full assessment was levied thereon.
The lands
were subsequently described as "Japti Sanadi Inam" lands.
Held, that the lands had lost their character as Watan lands
and had become ryotwari lands of the holder.
Ramijyabi Mi~ktum Saheb v. t;tudusaheb, (54 Bom, L.B. 405),.
a.pproved.
The very description of the lands as Japti Sana.di Inam lands
means that the lands were once the subject matter of an Inam grant
by virtue of a Sanad and have been i·esumed or confiscated by the
Government and have been left in the hands of the holder as ryotwari holding.
The Government may commute the services to be rendered and
it will then depend on the terms of the agreement between the bolder
of the We.tan lands and the Government entered into at the time of
the commutation whether the lands are to retain their character as
We.tan lands or not.

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
BACHHARAM DATTA PATIL AND ANOTHER
v.
VISHW ANATH PUNDALIK PATIL AND
OTHERS.
[JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAS JJ.]
Watan lands-Resumption by Government-Dispensing with the
services and levying of full assessment-Lands subsequently described
as J apti Sanadi I nam lands-Whether retain character of W atan
lands.
Certain lands which were originally Watan lands were resumed
by the Government after dispensing with the services that were
being rendered and full assessment was levied thereon.
The lands
were subsequently described as "Japti Sanadi Inam" lands.
Held, that the lands had lost their character as Watan lands
and had become ryotwari lands of the holder.
Ramijyabi Mi~ktum Saheb v. t;tudusaheb, (54 Bom, L.B. 405),.
a.pproved.
The very description of the lands as Japti Sana.di Inam lands
means that the lands were once the subject matter of an Inam grant
by virtue of a Sanad and have been i·esumed or confiscated by the
Government and have been left in the hands of the holder as ryotwari holding.
The Government may commute the services to be rendered and
it will then depend on the terms of the agreement between the bolder
of the We.tan lands and the Government entered into at the time of
the commutation whether the lands are to retain their character as
We.tan lands or not.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 249 of 1953.
On appeal from the judgment and decree dated
the 1st day of September, 1949, of the Bombay High
Court in Appeal No. 23 of 1947 from original decree
arising out of the decree dated the 28th September
1946 of the Civil Judge, Session Division at Belgawn
in Suit No. 360 of 1945.
K. R. Bengeri, J.B. Dadachanji and Sri Narain
Andley for A. C. Dave for the appellants.
H.B. Datar and Naunit Lal for respondent No.1.
66
1956
September 20
1956
Bachharam Datta
Patil and another
v.
Vishwanath
P11ndalik Patil
and others
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956. September 20.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SINHA J.-This is an appeal by leave of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay from the decision of
a Division Bench of that Court reversing that of the
trial court in respect of items 3, 4 and 6 in the list of
the properties attached to the plaint as the subjectmatter of the dispute.
In respect of the other items
of property in dispute the courts below have given
concurrent decisions and that part of their judgments
is no more in controversy at this stage.
The three
items aforesaid of the property along with the others
in dispute had been decreed in favour of the original
plaintiffs 2 and 3 as Watan property. But on appeal
by the third defendant, the High Court·reversed the
decisiou of the trial court only in respect of those
three items and confirmed the decision of the trial
court in respect of the rest of the plaint properties.
The proposi~us was one Shreemant who died on the
23rd November, 1941 lea.ving him surviving his wife
Radhabai. Radhabai died on the 9th May 1945 and
on her death the dispute arose between the reversioners on the one hand including the plaintiffs 2 and
3, appellants in this Court, and the defendants on
the other who claimed by virtue of alleged adoptions
said to have been made by Radhabai aforesaid. The
first plaintiff is out of the picture now on the concurrent finding by the courts below that he had no
right to the estate left by the propositus by virtue of
the adoption found in his favour, inasmuch as before he was adopted the estate had already vested in
the actual reversioners, plaintiffs 2 and 3, the agnatic
relations of Shreemant.
The estate of Shreemant,
so far as it related to Watan lands, vested in plaintiffs 2 and 3 aforesaid under the provisions of Bombay
Act V of 1886. If either defendant 2 or defendant 3
had proved his alleged adoption by Radhabai aforesaid, he would have been entitled to the estate as the
adopted son of the propositus, thus excluding the
agnatic relations, namely, plaintiffs 2 and 3.
But
both the c.ourts below have concurrently found that
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
neither of the two defendants 2 and 3 had succeeded
in proving the adoption respectively pleaded by them.
The trial court had substantially decreed the suit in
respect of all the items of property in dispute including the three items which, as indicated above, are the
only properties now in controvei:ay in this Court, on
the finding that these also were Watan properties
which like the rest of the plaint properties were
inherited by the reversioners aforesaid, namely,
plaintiffs 2 and 3.
The High Court on appeal held
that the three items of property now in dispute,
though originally Watan properties, had lost their
character as such by reason of the fact that they had
been resumed by Government after dispensing with
the service and after levying full assessment on those
lands.
Those lands have been called "Japti Sanadi
Inam lands" in the records of the courts below and
it is by that name that we shall refer to the disputed
lands in the course of this judgment.
It would thus appear that the controversy has narrowed down to the question whether the Japti Sanadi
Inam lands still retain their character as W atan lands
as held by the trial court, or have lost their character
as such in view of the events that had happened as
decided by the High Court. It is not disputed that
in the former case the plaintiff-appellants will be entitled to them also even as they have been adjudged
to be entitled to the rest of the properties in dispute
which were admittedly Watan lands.
It is equally
undisputed that if the Japti Sanadi Inam lands are
no more Watan lands, this appeal must fail. On this
question both the courts below have been rather
cryptic in their remarks.
The trial court held them
to be Watan lands, with the following observations:-
"The lands at serial Nos. 3, 4 and 6 are Japti
Sanadi lands.
They still retain the character of
Sanadi lands in spite of the fact that services have
been temporarily dispensed with and full assessment
levied.
Sanadi lands have been held to be Watan
lands governed by the Watan Act".
The trial court has made no attempt to support its
conclusions with reference to any statutory rules.or
1956
Bachharam Datta
Patil and another
v.
Vishwanath
Pundalik Patil
and others
Sinha].
1956
Bachharam Datta
Patil and another
v.
Vishwanath
Pundalik Patil
and others
Sinha],
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
precedents.
The lower appellate court has disposed
of this question in these words:-
"Now it is conceded before us that there is no
evidence to support the observation made by the
learned trial Judge, that the services were temporarily
dispensed with by the Government. If, therefore, the
Record of Rights show that the full assessment is
being levied in respect of these lands, and that services are not required to be performed and they are
described as Japti Sanadi Inam lands, meaning thereby that they were once Sanadi lands, but in respect
of which there has been resumption by the Government, the conclusion must inevitably follow that
these lands have ceased to be lands held on Sanadi
tenure and are held in ordinary occupancy rights".
The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the High Court was in error in
concluding that the lands in question had ceased to
be Watan lands simply because the service attaching
to them had been dispensed with and full assessment
levied by Government. This argument was based on
the provisions of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act
(Bombay Act III), 1874. Apart from authority,
therefore, we have to examine the relevant provisions
of that Act in order to determine whether those provisions support the conclusions of the High Court.
In section 4, "Watan property", "Hereditary office"
and "Watan" .have been defined as follows:-
" 'Watan Property' means movable or immovable
property held, acquired or assigned for providing
remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to an hereditary office. It includes a right
to levy customary fees or perquisites, in money or in
kind, whether at fixed times or otherwise. It includes
cash payments in addition to the original watan property made voluntarily by Government and subject
periodically to modification or withdrawal.
'Hereditary office' means every office held hereditarily for the performance of duties connected wi~h
the administration or collection of the public revenue,
or with the village police, or with the settlement of
boundaries, or other matters of civil administration.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
The expressfon includes such office even where the
1956
services originally appertaining to it have ceased to 8
hh
D tt
ac
at'a1n
a a
be demanded.
Patil and another
The watan-property, if any, and the hereditary
v.
office and the rights and privileges attached to them
Vishwanath
together constitute the watan".
Pundalik Patil
and others
From these definitions it is clear that in order that
there may be a W a tan it is necessary that there should
Sinha J.
be a hereditary office and Watan property which is
assigned to the "Watandar" by way of remuneration
for the performance of the duty appertaining to his
office. But it has been argued on behalf of the appellants that it is common ground that the Sanadi Inam
lands were once Watan property and that once the
property is impressed with the character of inam
lands, they continue to bear that character, because
the Government have not been authorised by any law
to change their character. No precedent o:r statutory provisions directly supporting this wide proposition have been brought to our notice. But our attention was called to the provisions of section 15 which
make it permissible for the Collector to commute the
service and relieve the holder of the W atan and ,his
heirs and successors in perpetuity of their liability to
perform the service on such conditions as may be
agreed upon. If we have been able correctly to appreciate the argument based upon section 15, it was
sought to be made out that the service in respect of the
Watan lands in question may have been commuted,
but even after the commutation of the service the
Watan remained and the lands continued to retain
the character of Watan lands. This argument assumes
that even upon the service being entirely dispensed
with in perpetuity, the Watan character of the land
continued. That is begging the question. Furthermo,.~, clause (1) of section 15 contemplates commuto.tion "upon such conditions, whether consistent
with the provisions of this Act or not, as may be
agreed upon by the Collector and such holder". Thus
the conditions to be agreed upon between the holder
of land which was once part of a Watan and the Government at the time of the commutation may be of
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
so many varieties that·in some cases the Watan cha8
hh -
Datt racter of the land may be maintained, whereas in
P:;il :::;:..,h.; others the conditions agreed between the parties may
v.
themselves contemplate the cessation of that chaVishwanath
racter. In the present case, apart from the entries
PrmdalikPatil in the Record of Rights, we have ·no other evidence
•n4 others
to indicate as to on what terms the service had been
SinhaJ.
completely dispensed with in perpetuity and the full
assessment levied upon those lands. It is not therefore clear upon the findings of the courts below that
.there were any such conditions attaching to the
holding of the lands in question which could be consistent with the continuance of the original Watan
tenure. It is possible to conceive of a case where
the conditions agreed upon provide for the continuance of the Watan tenure in spite of the fact that the
holders have been excused the performance of the
customary service. On the other hand, it may be
.that there were no conditions agreed between tb.e
parties continuing the Watan character of the land
. after dispensing with the service.
On the findi.ngs of the courts below there was no
hereditary office any more and therefore the question
of remunerating any service with the usufruct of
Watan property or otherwise did not arise. On the
other hand, the ptovfsions of section 22 of the Act
clearly predicate that a Watan may lapse in part or
in whole or may be confiscated or otherwise lawfully
resumed by Government and that in such cases it is
lawful for Government to attach such land to a newly
created Watan in favour of such persons as may be
appointed by Government. That being so, it is impossible to contend that Government have not the
power to destroy the Watan character of a Watarr
land. Such an argument completely ignores the legal
position that an authority which has the power to
create an office and to provide for its remuneration
in cash or in kind has also the power to revoke the
grant, and upon such revocation, if any land has been
assigned for remunerating the office so abolished it
must revert to the source from which it came; that is
to say, ryotwari land subject to land revenue assess-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
ment. That is what appea:rs to have happened in the
19S6
Present case. The very description of the land as 8 hh- D tt
.
.
h
h
h• h
ac
aram
a a
Japt1 Sanad1 Inam land would meant at t at w .IC
Patil ana another
was once the subject matter of an inam grant by virtue
v.
of a sanad has been resumed or confiscated by GovVishwanath
ernment and the land left in possession of the holder
Pundalik Pa~a
as ryotwari holding. As pointed out by the courts
andothers
below, there is no evidence as to the original character
Sinha J.
of the grant or as to how and when the grant was
resumed and the land thus became subject to ordinary occupancy rights. But they have proceeded on
the basis that it was the subject matter of a Watan
by sanad which has been subsequently resumed by
Government as service was no more required and the
necessity for the grant was no more there. They h!We
only differed on the legal result of the resumption.
A similar question arose for decision in the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramijyabi Muktum
Saheb v. Gudusaheb(1) after the present case had been
decided by that Court. In that case property which
was originally Watan was continued with the holder
thereof but without the obligation to render any
service and with the full levy of assessment in respect
of the land. The question arose whether such land
continued to be Watan land with its special incidents
as regards alienation, etc., or whether it was ordinary
occupancy holding. A single Judge of that Court who
heard the appeal in the first instance came to the
conclusion that the land continued to be Watan land.
On Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench 'after
a very elaborate examination of the i.-elevant rules
and p:i:ecedents came to the contrary conclusion and
held that the land had ceased to have the character
of Watan and was subject to the ordinary law of land
tenures in that State. We are in agreement with the
conclusion reach"d by the Letters Patent Bench in
that case, the facts of which were similar to those
of the present case. Hence it must be held that there
is neither authority nor principle in favour of the
contention raised on behalf of the appellants.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
(1) 54 Bom: L R. 405,