# BACHHITTAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangab, J. R. Mudholkab, T. L. Venkatarama Aiyab
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bachhittar-singh-v-the-state-of-punjab-2489
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Public Servant-Disciplinary
Proceeding-DismissalAppeal--Minister passing order on file-Order not communicated-Whether binding-If order can be varied-Oh.ief Minister
passing .final order-Validity-Rules of Business of Punjab
Government,
rr. 4, 8, 25,
28-0onstitution
of
India
Arts. 166, 311.
The appellant was appointed a qanungo in Pepsu and
latter as Assistant Consolidation Officer.
Complaints having
been received against him, an enquiry was held as a result of
which he was dismissed by the Revenue Secretary. Against
this order he preferred an appeal to the State Government.
The Revenue Minister Pepsu wrote on the file that dismissal
would be too hard and instead he should be reverted as
qanungo but no written order to that effect was served upon the
appellant. After merger of. Pepsu with Punjab, the Revenue
Minister Punjab sent up the file to the ChiefMinister with the
remarks "C.M. may kindly advise". The Chief Minister
passed the order confirming the dismissal. and the order was
duly
communicated
to the appellant.
The
appellant
challenged
the order of the Chief 'Minister
Punjab
on the grounrl
that the Chief Minister
Punjab could
not sit in review on the order of the Revenue· Minister
Pepsu and that the Chief Minister was not competent to deal
with the matter as it pertained to the portfolio of the Revenue
Minister.
Held, that the order of the Revenue Minister Pepsu
could not amount to an order by the State Government unless
it was expressed in the name of Rajpramukh as required by
Art. 166(1) of the Constitution and was then communicated to
the appellant.
Until the order was so communicated it was
only of a provisional character and could be reconsidered
over and 8Ver again.
Before communication the order was
binding neither on the appellant nor on the State Government.
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukdev Singh A.l.R. (1961)
f S.C.R~ 371, referred to.
1962
1962
Boehhiuar Singh
••
Thr Slalr of Punjab
1tt111iholk1t .T.
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
Held, further, that the Chief Minister Punjab
wa'
competent to deal with the appeal and to pass the order which
he did. Under r. 25 of the Rules of Business of the Punjab
Government the matter undoubtedly related to the portfolio
of the Revenue Minister, But since under r. 28(1 )(ii) and I xix)
which
provide
that cases
involving
questions \ of
policy
and
cases
of
administrat.ivc
importance
and
such other
cases
or
classes of cases
as
the
t!:hief Minister may consider necessary shall be referred to the
Chief Minister, the case wa• properly referred to the Chief
Minister.
Under r. 4 the order passed by the Chief :Vlinistor,
r.ve11 though it pertained to the portfolio of the Revenue
Minister, would be dcen1cd to be an order of tlic Council of
i\:finistcrs.
It would be the Chief Ministers advice to the
Governor,
for which the Council of ~finistcrs \\'Ottlrl be
collectively responsible and action taken thereon v.·otild be the
action of the Government.
'~
Departmental proceedings cannot be dividerl into t\vo
parts : (i) enquiry and (ii) taking Of acdon ; there is one con ti·
nuous proceeding though there are
t~vo stages.
Any action
decided to he taken a!lainst a public servant found guilty e
misconduct is a judicial order and as such it cannot be varierlf
at the will of the authority.
Crvrr, Arrm.r,ATE JumsnICTION : Civil Appeal
1'\o. 155 of 1961.
Appeal by the special Ieavo from t.ht~ judgment
and order dated JamH\r.I' 5, 1959, of tl:e PunjBb
High Court in Civil \Vrit Application No. 4fi0 of
1957.
I. M. !Ail, and M. L. Armarwal, for the appellant.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate·G'eneral }or the State of
Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
1!162. ;\farch 7. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MenHOLKAH, .J.-This i;: an appeal by special
leave against tho judgment of the Punjab High
Court 1lismissing the appellant's petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution.
3 S.C~R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
The appellant was appointed a qanungo in the
former Stato of PEPSU in t

## Text

3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
BACHHITTAR SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAB, J. R. MUDHOLKAB and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAB, JJ.)
Public Servant-Disciplinary
Proceeding-DismissalAppeal--Minister passing order on file-Order not communicated-Whether binding-If order can be varied-Oh.ief Minister
passing .final order-Validity-Rules of Business of Punjab
Government,
rr. 4, 8, 25,
28-0onstitution
of
India
Arts. 166, 311.
The appellant was appointed a qanungo in Pepsu and
latter as Assistant Consolidation Officer.
Complaints having
been received against him, an enquiry was held as a result of
which he was dismissed by the Revenue Secretary. Against
this order he preferred an appeal to the State Government.
The Revenue Minister Pepsu wrote on the file that dismissal
would be too hard and instead he should be reverted as
qanungo but no written order to that effect was served upon the
appellant. After merger of. Pepsu with Punjab, the Revenue
Minister Punjab sent up the file to the ChiefMinister with the
remarks "C.M. may kindly advise". The Chief Minister
passed the order confirming the dismissal. and the order was
duly
communicated
to the appellant.
The
appellant
challenged
the order of the Chief 'Minister
Punjab
on the grounrl
that the Chief Minister
Punjab could
not sit in review on the order of the Revenue· Minister
Pepsu and that the Chief Minister was not competent to deal
with the matter as it pertained to the portfolio of the Revenue
Minister.
Held, that the order of the Revenue Minister Pepsu
could not amount to an order by the State Government unless
it was expressed in the name of Rajpramukh as required by
Art. 166(1) of the Constitution and was then communicated to
the appellant.
Until the order was so communicated it was
only of a provisional character and could be reconsidered
over and 8Ver again.
Before communication the order was
binding neither on the appellant nor on the State Government.
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukdev Singh A.l.R. (1961)
f S.C.R~ 371, referred to.
1962
1962
Boehhiuar Singh
••
Thr Slalr of Punjab
1tt111iholk1t .T.
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
Held, further, that the Chief Minister Punjab
wa'
competent to deal with the appeal and to pass the order which
he did. Under r. 25 of the Rules of Business of the Punjab
Government the matter undoubtedly related to the portfolio
of the Revenue Minister, But since under r. 28(1 )(ii) and I xix)
which
provide
that cases
involving
questions \ of
policy
and
cases
of
administrat.ivc
importance
and
such other
cases
or
classes of cases
as
the
t!:hief Minister may consider necessary shall be referred to the
Chief Minister, the case wa• properly referred to the Chief
Minister.
Under r. 4 the order passed by the Chief :Vlinistor,
r.ve11 though it pertained to the portfolio of the Revenue
Minister, would be dcen1cd to be an order of tlic Council of
i\:finistcrs.
It would be the Chief Ministers advice to the
Governor,
for which the Council of ~finistcrs \\'Ottlrl be
collectively responsible and action taken thereon v.·otild be the
action of the Government.
'~
Departmental proceedings cannot be dividerl into t\vo
parts : (i) enquiry and (ii) taking Of acdon ; there is one con ti·
nuous proceeding though there are
t~vo stages.
Any action
decided to he taken a!lainst a public servant found guilty e
misconduct is a judicial order and as such it cannot be varierlf
at the will of the authority.
Crvrr, Arrm.r,ATE JumsnICTION : Civil Appeal
1'\o. 155 of 1961.
Appeal by the special Ieavo from t.ht~ judgment
and order dated JamH\r.I' 5, 1959, of tl:e PunjBb
High Court in Civil \Vrit Application No. 4fi0 of
1957.
I. M. !Ail, and M. L. Armarwal, for the appellant.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate·G'eneral }or the State of
Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
1!162. ;\farch 7. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MenHOLKAH, .J.-This i;: an appeal by special
leave against tho judgment of the Punjab High
Court 1lismissing the appellant's petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution.
3 S.C~R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
The appellant was appointed a qanungo in the
former Stato of PEPSU in the year 1950. On December l, 1953 he was appointed Assistant Consolidation Officer. Certain complaints having been
received regarding tampering with official records
he was suspended and an enquiry was held against
him by the Revenue Secretary of PEPSU Government. As a result of that enquiry the Revenue
Secretary dismissed him by order dated August 30,
1956; on the ground that the appellant was not
above board and was not fit to be retained in
service. This order was duly communicated to the
appellant.
Thereupon the appellant preferred an
appeal before the State Government.
It would appear that he had submitted an
advance copy of his appeal to the Revenue Minister of PEPSU who called for the records of the
case immediately. After perusing them he wrote
on the file that the charges against the apptillant
were serious and that they were proved. He also
observed that it was necessary to stop the evil with
a strong hand. He, however, expressed the opinion
that as the appellant was a refugee and had a
large family to snpport. his dismissal would be too
hard and that instead of dismissing him outright he
should be reverted to his original post of qanungo
and warned that if he does not behave properly in
future he will be dealt with severely. On the next
day the State of PEPSU merged in the State of
Punjab.
According to the appellant the aforesaid remarks amount to an order of the State Government
and that they were orally communicated to him by
the Hevenue Minister. This is denied on behalf of
the State. It is, however, common ground that the
aforesaid remarks or order, whatever they be, were
never comwunicated officially to the appellant.
After the merger of PEPSU with the State of
1962
Bachhittrir Singh
v.
The State of Punjab
M u<lholkar J.
1961.
8'1clthittar Singh
v.
'
'he Stal< of PunJalJ
M udMlk.;. J .
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Punja.b tho file was put up before the RP.venue
Minister of Punjab, Mr.Darbara Singh.
On December 1/4, 1956, Mr. Darbara Singh remarked on the
filo "Scrio11; charges have boon proved by tho
Revenue Secrot;1r.Y' and Shri Bachhittar Singh was
dismissed.
I wou lei. like tho Secretary i/c to clisc11ss
the case personally on 5th December, 19.5G."
Then
on April 2/8, 1957 tho Minister noted on the file
"C.M. may kindly arlviso." With this remark thr.
file went up before the Chief :llinister, Punjab, who
on April lfi/18, 19;ii, passed an order, the concluding portion of whfoh rearls thus :
"Having regard to tho gravity of the
charges proved against this offici<d, I am
definitely or the opinion that his dismissal
from service is a correct punishment and no
leniency should he shown to him merely ')n
the ground of his being a displaced person or
having a large family to support.
In• the
circumstances, the order of dismissal should
stand.''
This order was communicated to the appdlant on
May l, 1957.
Thereafter he preferred a pPtition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution which, as already
stated, was di8missed by the Punjab High Court.
The validity of the order of tho Revenue
Secretary dismissing the appellant was not challenged before us.
The point urged hcforn us is that
the order of the Revonun :'lfinister of the PEPS\;
having reduced the punishment from dismissal to
reversion, tho Chief Minist"r of Punjab could not
sit in review over that order and set it aside.
Two
grounds arti urged in Aupport of this point.
fhc
first is t.hat the order of tho Revenue ,\finister of
PEPSU was the ordor of the State Government and
was not open to review. The second ground is that
iu any case it was not within the competence of the
Chief Minister of Punjab to doal with tl:\e matter
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1i1
inasmuch as it pertained to the portfolio of the
Revenue Minister.
Before we deal with the grounds we may
state that the High Court was of the opinion that
proceedings taken against the appellant were made
up of two parts : (a) the enquiry (which involved a
decision of the question whether the allegations
made against the appellant were true or not) and
(b) taking action (i.e., in case the allegations were
found to be true, whether the appellant ·should be
punished or not and if so in what manner.) According to the High Court the first point involved a
decision on the evidence and may in its nature be
described as judicial while the latter was purely
an administrative decision and that in so far as
this was concerned there was no reason why the
State Governrn,ent was incompetent to change its
decision "if it thought ,administratively advisable
to do so". We 'canno't accept the view taken by
the High Court regarding the nature of what it
calls the second part of the proceedings.
Departmental procee.dings .taken against a .Government servant are not divisible in the sense "in which the High
Court understands them to be. There is just one
continuous proceeding though there are two stages
in it. The first is coming to a conclusion on the
evidence as to whether the charges alleged against
the Government servant are established or not and
the second is reached only if it is found that they
are so established. That stage deals with the action
to be taken against the Government servant concer-
. ned. The High Court aocepts that the first stage is
a judicial proceeding and ind\)ed it must be so because charges have to be fr;uned, notice has to be
given and .the person concerned has to be given an
opportunity of being heard. Even so far as the
second stage is concerned Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution requires a notice to be given to the person
concerned as also an opportunity of being heard.
1962
Bachhittar_ Singh
" v . .
Th _State oj Punjab
'
'-
''
.i.l1.ud/wlkar J.
1962
Bachhittor Sin6Ji
v.
Tiu Stall of P11rajah
M urlholkar J.
•I
I
•
• , I
f(
718 SUPRmME G'OURT REPORTS (1962) SlJPl'·
Therefore, this stage of thll proceeding is no less judioial than the earlier "one. Consequently any action
decided to be taken against a Government servant
found guilty of misconduct is a judicial order :tnd
as such it cannot be varied at the will of tho authority who is empowered to impose the punishment.
Indeed, the very object with which notice is required to be given on the question of punishment is to
ensure that it will be such a.s would be justified
upon t.he charges established and upon the other
attendant circumstances of the oase. It is thus
wholly erroneous to characterise the taking of
action against a person found guilty of any charge at a departmental enquiry as an administrative
order.
What we have now to consider is the effect of
tho note recorded by the Revenue '.\iinistcr of
PEPSU upon the file.
We will assume for the
purpose of this case that it i,i an order. Even so
the question is whether it can be regarded as the
order of the State Gov<•rnment which alone, as
admitted by the appellant, was competent to hear
and decide il-n appeal from the order of the Revenue
Seoretary.
Art.
166( I) of the
Constitution
requires that all executive act ion of the Government
of a State shall be exprei;aed in the namo of the
Governor.
Clause (2) of Art. 166 provides for the
authentication of orders and other instruments
made and executed in the name of the Governor.
Clause ( :l) of that Article enables the Governor to
make rules for the more convenient transaction of
tho buHiness of the Government and for the allocation among the ~1inistcrs of the said business. 'What
the appellant c1llle an ordor of tho State Government is admittedly not expressed to be in the n11me
of the Governor. But with that point we shall deal
later. What we must first ascertain is whether the
order of the Revenue l\Iinister is an order of the
State Government i.e., of the Governor. In this
3 S.C.R.
SOPREME COURT REPORTS
719
connection we may refer tor. 25 of the Rules of
Business of the Government of PEPSU which reads
thus:
"Except as otherwise provided by any
other Rule, cases shall ordinarily be disposed
of by or under the authority of the Minister
incharge who may by means of standing orders
give such directions as he thinks fit for the
disposal of cases in the Department. Copies
of such standing orders shall be sent to the
Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister."
According to learned counsel for the appellant his
appeal pert3ins to the department which was in
charge of the Revenue Minister and, therefore, he
could deal with it.
His decision and order would
according to him, be the decision and order of the
State Geverriment. On behalf of the State reliance
was, however, placed on r. 34 which required cer·
tain classes. of cases to be submitted to the Raj.
pramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of
orders. But it was conceded during the course of
the argument that a case of the kind before us does
not fall within that rule. No other provision bearing on the point having been brought to our notice
we would, therefore, hold that the Revenue Minis·
ter could make an order on behalf of the State
Government.
The question, therefore, is whether he did in
fact make such an order. Merely writing something
on the file does not amount to an order. Before
something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be
expressed in the name of the Governor as required
by cl. (1) of Art. 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order
modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary
was ever made.
Until such an order is drawn up
the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be
1962
BachhiUar Singh
v.
The State of Punjab
' Mudholka' J.
/
IH:
BaoAhitlar Singh
..
Tit, · 1.ie of 1:•nj•b
MtulliolkOT J,
,720 SUPRE.'\fE COuRT REPOiiTS (1962] sui>:P.
regarded as bound by what was stated in tho file.
Aa along as the matter rosted withhim the Revenue
Minister could well sooro out his remarks o; minutes
on the file and write fresh ones.
The business of State is a complicated one and
has necessarily to be conducted th1\mgh the agency
of a large number of officials and authorities. The
constitution, therefore, . requires and so did the
Rules of Ilusiness framed by the Rajpramukh of
PEPSU provide, that the action must be taken by
the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh. It is not till this formality is observed
that tho action can lie regarded as that of the State
or here, by tho Rajpramukh.
We may further observe thiit, constitutionally speaking, the Minister
is no more than an adviser and that the head of the
State, the Governor or Rajpramukh, * is to act with
thl'I aid and advil'e of his Council of Mir.1isters. Therefore, until such adviee is accepted by the Govemor
whatever the Minister or tho Council of .\Iinisters
may say in regard to a particular matter does not
become the action of the State until the advice of
the Council of Ministern is accepted or deemed to
be a.cct>pted by the Head of the State. Indeed, it
is possible that after exprc88ing one opinion a.bout a
particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or
the Council of Ministers mi>y express quite a different
opinion, one which may be completely opposed to
the earlier opinion. Whioh of them can be regarded
as the 'order' of the ~tate Government? Therefore
to make the opinion amount to a decision of tbe
Government it must be communicated to tho person
concerned. In this connection we may quote the
following from the judgment of this Court in the
SW.re of Punjab v. Sodhi Snkhdev Singh ( ')-
"}Ir. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that
before the final order was passed the Council
•Till the abolition of that office by the Amendment of the C.Onstitutioo in 1956.
'
(I) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 371. 4-09.
I
.,
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
of Ministers had decided to accept the respondent's representation and to reinstate him,
and that, according to him, the respondent
seeks .to prove by calling the two original
orders. We are unable to understand this
argument. Even if the Council of Ministers
had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council
from reconsidering the matter and coming to
a contrary conclusion later on, until a final
decision is reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice
and acted upon by him by issuing an order in
that behalf to the respondent."
Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be
communicated to the person who would be affected
by that order before the State and that person can
be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be
open to the Council of . Ministers to consider the
matter over and over ag~in and, therefore, till its
communication the order cannot be regarded as
anything more than provisional in character.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the order of the Revenue Minister,
PEPSU are of no avail to the appellant.
Now as regards the next contention,· Learned
counsel for the appellant contends that since his
appeal was not decided by the Revenue Minister of
Punjab, Mr. Darbara Singh but by the Chief
Minister Mr. Pratap Singh Kairon, who had no
jurisdiction to deal with it, the appeal must be deemed to he still pending. In this conneetion he
relied upon r. 18 of the Rules of Business framed
by the Governor of Punjab which corresponds to
r. 25 of the PEPSU rules, which reads thus:
"Except as otherwise provided by any
other Rule, cases shall ordinarlly be disposed
1962
Bachhittar Yin:h
..
.
The State of Panj•b
Mudhoikor J.
1962
~-
Baclihillar Sin1h
v.
The StaU of PunjaS
Mudlwtbr J.
722 SUPREllIB COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
of by or under the authority of the Ministerin-chargo who may, by means of standing
orders, give such directions as ho thinks fit for
the dispos:>l of cases in the Department. Copies
of such standing ordern shall be sent to the
Chief ;\Iinister and the Governor."
.!\ow, unquestionably the matter here did pertain to
the portfolio of the Revenue Minister.
But it was
he himself who, aft-Or seeing the fi!<., submitted it to
the Chief '.\Iinister for advice.
Leiirned counsel,
however, contends that tho Chief Minister could,
therefore, only give him advice and not usurp
tho jurisdiction of the Revenue Minister and decide
the case himself.
But this argument ignores r .28
(I) of the Punjab Rules of Business, the relevant
portions of which run thus:
"28 (I) The following classes of cases shill I be
submitted to the Chief Minister before tho issue of orders :-
(ii)
(vii)
x
x
x
Cases raising questions of policy and
cases of administrative importance
not alroady covored by the Schedulo.
x
x
x
Proposals for the prosecutions, dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of any gazetted officer.
X,
x
(xix) Such other cases or classes of cases
as the chief Minister may consider
necessary.
The learned Advocate-General contends that the
case would be covered by every one of these clauses.
In our opinion, cl.( vii) cannot assist him because it
is not the contention of the State that the appellant
is a gazetted officer.
We, however, think that
3 S.C.R.
SUPR:F!ME CODRT REPORTS
723
cl. (ii) would certainly entitle the Chief Minister to
pass an order of the kind which he has made here.
The question to be considered was whether though
grave charges had been proved against an official
he should be removed from service forthwith or
merely reduced in rank. That unquestionably
raises a question of policy which would affect many
cases all and the departments of the State.The Chief
Minister would, therefore, have been within his
rights to call up the file of his own accord and pass
orders thereon. Of course, the rule does riot say
that the Chief Minister would be entitled to pass
orders but when it says that he is entitled to call
for the file before the issue of orders it clearly implies that he has a right to interfere and make such
order as he thinks appropriate. ·Finally there is cl.
(xix) which confers a wide discretion upon the Chief
Minister to call for an}' file and deal with it himself.
Apart from that we may refer to r. 4 of the Rules
of Business of the Punjab Government, which reads
thus:
"The Council shall be collectively responsible for all executive orders issued in the
name of the Governor in accordance with
these Rules whether such orders are authorised by an individual Min~ater on a matter
pertaining to his portfolio or as the result of
discussion at a meeting of the Council, or ·
howsoever otherwise."
Thus the order passed by the Chief Minister,
even though it is on a m.atter pertaining to the
portfolio of the Revenue Minister, will be deemed
to be an order of the Council of Ministers. So
deemed its contents would be the Chief Minister's
advice to the Governor, for which the Council
of Ministers would be collectively
responsible,
The action taken thereon in pursuance of r. 8
of
the
Rules of
Business made
by
the
Governor under Art. 166(3) of the Constitution
1962
BacHitlaf' Sinth
v.
The SIGe of Punjab
MrdhoJkar J.
1962
Bochliit14r Sfogh
v.
Tru Stak of Punjab
.M udholkat J.
1962
March 7.
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTs [l96ZJ SUPP.
would then be the action of the Government. Horo
one of the Under Secretaries to the Government
of Punjab informed the appellant by his letter dated
!\fay, 1, 1957 that his representation '•had been
considered 1tnd rejected", evidently by the State
Government.
Thh; would show that appropriate
action had been taken under the relevant rule.
Tho appeal is thus without substance and is
dismissed. In view of the fact that the appellant
is a displaced person with heavy responsibilities
and with limited or possibly hardly any means we
diroct that the costs shall be borntl by the parties
concerned.
BHAURAY
v.
B. BAIJNATH SINGH
(P. B.
GAJB!'!DltAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUP'l'A and N. RAJA·
GOl'ALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Pre-eniption-Stalt1tes entitling neighbours, co-sharera et.c.
to pre-empt-C<msti!utionality of-If offend right to properlyWhethtr discriminatory-Rewa Stale Pre-emption Act, JY4G,
s, 10-l'unjab Pre-emption Act, 1913(Punj. 1 of 1913), •· !GBerar Land Revenue Code, 192S, Ch. X/V-Conatitution of
/ndia,Art...14, 19(1)(!), 19(5).
Section IO of the Rewa State !'re-emption Act, 1946,
conferred the right of pre-emption on the ground, inter alia
of vicinage. The proviso to s. 10 provided that among preemptors of the same class the nearer in relationship
t<:> . the
vendor will exclude the more remote.
There were prov1s1ons
in the Act for giving notice of an intended sale . to .persons
having a right of pre.emption, for the loss of die
~1ght of
pie-emption in case no action \vas taken on the notice and
for fixation of a fair price by the Courl. It was contended