# BADRI LAL v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF INDORE

- **Citation:** [1973] 3 S.C.R. 15
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-12-06
- **Bench:** A. ALAGIRISWAMl, I. D. Dua, C. A. VAID!ALlNGAM
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/badri-lal-v-municipal-corporation-of-indore-5794
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Madh,va Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, s. SO-Terms of leas•
accepted by Commissioner-Resolution of Corporation not to grant lease
-Effect of.
Tenant by sufferance-It should be given n·otice before eviction.
The appellant was a lessee of a plot of land belonging to the respon·
dent-corp~ration. When the respondent issued notice t0 the appe1lant dir·
ecting him to vacate the land on the date of expiry of the lease, the appel·
!ant applied for a grant to him of a lease for 99 years or at least for 10
years. The respondent passed a resolution that the land would be given
to the appellant if he deposited certain amount as upset price and paid a
higher rent, and that otherwise possession of the -land should be taken
back. The appellant did ll<lt comply with the terms but made a counter
offer., Having failed in his appeal to the Minister, 7 years after the resolu·
tion passed by the respondent, he offered to pay a part of the amount
fixed by the resolution and the balance in instalments. This was accepted by the Municipal Commissioner.
The appellant
did not pay any
amount and the respondent filed a suit for eviction. During the pendency
of the suit the appellant offered to pay the full upset price, the rent that
may be found due, as well as costs of the suit and requested that perma•
nent lease for 9!> years may be granted to him, He also sent a cheque for
part of tho amount (tho rent having been calculated at the old rate) but
after receiving reminders from the Commissioner paid the balance a few
days later.
The respondent however passed another resolution refusing
to grant the lease to the appellant.
The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit holding
that the appellant was a tenant holding over. The High Court in second
appeal decreed the suit of the respondent-Corporation.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: ( 1) No contract was concluded between the parties as a result of the payments by the appellant. [18 G]
The Commissioner cannot enter into a contract by himself and can do
so only if it is sanctioned by the Corporation under s. 80 of the Madhya
Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act.
Nor was it open to the Commis~
sioner to make any offer to the appellant or to accept any offer from
the sppellant in respect of the land except with the sanction of the muni·
cipal council.
Even the offer made by the respondent·Corpo•ation by its
resolution came to an end with the filing of the suit by the Corporation
and the Corporation cannot be deemed to have kept it open. The appel·
!ant's offer, after the suit was filed, was a new offer and it was rejected
by the only authority competent to accept it namely, the Corporation. [18 G-H; 19 D-G]
(2) The deposit of the rent by the appellant and acceptance of it by
the Commisssioner cannot be deemed to make the sppellant a tenant hold·
ing over. (20 BJ
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 s.c.R.
A
The payment was at the old rate by the appellant and its acceptance
by the Commissioner was not an acceptance of rent as .such and in clear
recognition of the tenancy right of the appellant. It cannot amount to
the Corporation consenting to the appellant continuing as a tenant by
paying the old rates of rent.
T_here is thus no question of the appellant
being a tenap.t holding over.
He had become only a tenant by sufferance and hence there was no need for any notice before he could be
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evicted. f20 A-CJ
Kai Khusl1roo Bezonjee Cavadia v. Bai .Terhai
Hirjibhoy Warden &
Anr. [1949-50] F.C.R. 262 at 270 and Bhawanji Lakhmshi v. Himat/a/
Jamtl£o'das Dani [1972] I S.C.C. 388 followed.

## Text

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BADRI LAL
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF INDORE
December 6, 1972
15
[A. ALAGIRISWAMl, I. D. DUA AND C. A. VAID!ALlNGAM, JJ.]
Madh,va Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, s. SO-Terms of leas•
accepted by Commissioner-Resolution of Corporation not to grant lease
-Effect of.
Tenant by sufferance-It should be given n·otice before eviction.
The appellant was a lessee of a plot of land belonging to the respon·
dent-corp~ration. When the respondent issued notice t0 the appe1lant dir·
ecting him to vacate the land on the date of expiry of the lease, the appel·
!ant applied for a grant to him of a lease for 99 years or at least for 10
years. The respondent passed a resolution that the land would be given
to the appellant if he deposited certain amount as upset price and paid a
higher rent, and that otherwise possession of the -land should be taken
back. The appellant did ll<lt comply with the terms but made a counter
offer., Having failed in his appeal to the Minister, 7 years after the resolu·
tion passed by the respondent, he offered to pay a part of the amount
fixed by the resolution and the balance in instalments. This was accepted by the Municipal Commissioner.
The appellant
did not pay any
amount and the respondent filed a suit for eviction. During the pendency
of the suit the appellant offered to pay the full upset price, the rent that
may be found due, as well as costs of the suit and requested that perma•
nent lease for 9!> years may be granted to him, He also sent a cheque for
part of tho amount (tho rent having been calculated at the old rate) but
after receiving reminders from the Commissioner paid the balance a few
days later.
The respondent however passed another resolution refusing
to grant the lease to the appellant.
The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit holding
that the appellant was a tenant holding over. The High Court in second
appeal decreed the suit of the respondent-Corporation.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: ( 1) No contract was concluded between the parties as a result of the payments by the appellant. [18 G]
The Commissioner cannot enter into a contract by himself and can do
so only if it is sanctioned by the Corporation under s. 80 of the Madhya
Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act.
Nor was it open to the Commis~
sioner to make any offer to the appellant or to accept any offer from
the sppellant in respect of the land except with the sanction of the muni·
cipal council.
Even the offer made by the respondent·Corpo•ation by its
resolution came to an end with the filing of the suit by the Corporation
and the Corporation cannot be deemed to have kept it open. The appel·
!ant's offer, after the suit was filed, was a new offer and it was rejected
by the only authority competent to accept it namely, the Corporation. [18 G-H; 19 D-G]
(2) The deposit of the rent by the appellant and acceptance of it by
the Commisssioner cannot be deemed to make the sppellant a tenant hold·
ing over. (20 BJ
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 s.c.R.
A
The payment was at the old rate by the appellant and its acceptance
by the Commissioner was not an acceptance of rent as .such and in clear
recognition of the tenancy right of the appellant. It cannot amount to
the Corporation consenting to the appellant continuing as a tenant by
paying the old rates of rent.
T_here is thus no question of the appellant
being a tenap.t holding over.
He had become only a tenant by sufferance and hence there was no need for any notice before he could be
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evicted. f20 A-CJ
Kai Khusl1roo Bezonjee Cavadia v. Bai .Terhai
Hirjibhoy Warden &
Anr. [1949-50] F.C.R. 262 at 270 and Bhawanji Lakhmshi v. Himat/a/
Jamtl£o'das Dani [1972] I S.C.C. 388 followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No, 1243 of
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Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
May 7, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench
in Second Appeal No. 475 of 1962.
S. V. Gupte and Rameshwar Nath for the appellant.
V. M. Tarkunde, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadacharji and
Ravinder Narain .. for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Alagiriswami, J.
This is an appeal by special leave against
the judgment of the High Couri of Madhya Pradesh in Second
Appeal No. 475 of 1962 on the files of that Court.
The appellant became a lessee of a plot of land measuring
10,375 sq. feet (72! Chasmas) situate at 28, Parsimohalla Street
No. 5, Sanyogtaganj, Indore belonging to the Municipal Corporation for a period of 10 years in 1919. This lease was renewed
from time to time and the last of such renewals was in the year
1939 for a period of 10 years. The lease expired on 30th September, 1949. On 24-5-1949 the respondent, Municipal Corporation of Indore, issued a notice to the appellant directing him to
vacate the land on 30-9'-1949. Thereupon he applied to the Municipal Commissioner either to grant him a lease for 99 years and if
it was not possible to renew it at least fdr a period of I 0 years. On
19-12-1949 the Municipal Council passed a resolution to the following effect :
"Opinion of the Lease
Committee
is
accepted.
The land, situated in Parsimohalla, Sanyogitaganj, be
given to applicant Badrilal Bholaram only in case he
is ready .to deposit Rs. 16,212 of the lease refit and
upset price as per Schedule rate in accordance with
letter No. 3239 dated 26-10-49 sent to him by the
Municipal Commissioner otherwise the said land be
taken back into possession."
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BADRI LAL v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (A.Jagiriswami, J.)
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On 31-12-1949 the Municipal Commissioner wrote Ex. P.20 to the
aypellant informing him that the land would be given to him on
long lease on condition that he paid an upset price of Rs. 16,212
and an annual lease rent at Rs. 9 per Chasma. He was further
informed that if he accepted the said condition. he should deposit
the upset price within 15 days an4 submit an application giving his
consent, ana that otherwise steps would be taken to take back possession of the land. The appellant wrote (Ex. P.18 on 9-1-1950)
that the upset price and rent claimed by the Municipal Council
was too much and requested that the rent and upset price be modified and during the pendency of his petition proceedings before the
Commissioner be stayed. He then seeffi to have filed a petition for
revision before the Minister incharge of municipalities and this was
dismissed on 7-9-1952. Almost 4 years later on 14-5-1956 he.wrote
Ex. D. 2 to the Commissioner requesting that an amount of
Rs. 8212 may be accepted and he may be permitted to pay the
balance in annual instalments of Rs. 1000 each. On 20-6-1956
the appellant was informed by the Commissioner .by letter Ex. D.3
that he should deposit the sum of Rs. 8212 within two days and
thereafter the balance would be realised in instalments. The appellant not having paid the amount the Municipal Commissioner ·
again wrote on 30-7-1956 giving him two days time t9 deposit the
amount of Rs. 8212. On 20-2-1957 the Commissioner again wrote
to the appellant directing him to· deposit the whole of Rs. 16,212
within two days telling him that on his failnre to do so steps would
be taken for evicting him from the land
The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed on 16th September, 1957. The appellant filed his written statement on 20th
January, 1958 and the issues were framed on 24th March, 1958.
At this stage the defendant wrote Ex. D.4 on 17-3-1959 in the folluwing terms :
"I lx'g to say that it has been approved by you to
give me the plot of land at H.N. 85 Parsimohalla on
permanent lease of 99 years after having received the
upset price from ine. I agree to pay whatever lease rent
found due against nie upto 31-3-1951 besides reasonable costs of the suit and I have depOSited tJday vide
cheque number E/2/104221
dated 17-3-59 fo the
Indore Bank, Sanyogitaganj and I undertake to pay in
cash any amount found due against me at the time of
execution of the lease deed."
H
The Commissioner wrote Ex. D.5 to the defendant on 23·4-1959
asking him to deposit the upset price of Rs. 16,212, rent according to the new rates after deducting a sum of Rs. 824-6-0 already
paid by the appellant up to 31-3-54, as also the court expenses.
3-L631Sup.C. I. 173
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
Along with his letter dated 17-3-1959 the appellant had apparently
sent a cheque for Rs. 16,601.93. The balance not having been
paid, as demanded in the letter Ex. D.5, the Commissioner wrote
again on 28-5-1959 and sent a further reminder on 19-8-1959
giving the appellant four days" time for paying the balance which
was actually paid only on 22-9-1959. The Municipal Council
passed a resolution on 31-5-1960 refusing to grant the lease to the
appellant and directing the Municipal Commissioner to take back
possession of the land.
Curiously the appellant somehow pleaded that he was a permanent lessee of the land but ·that claim o!Wiously could npt be and
was not seriously pressed before this Court by Mr. Gupte, learned
counsel appearing for him. The Trial Court surprisingly held that
he became a permanent tenant, the Trial Court as well as the Ist
Appellate Court held that the appellant was a tenant holding over.
Both of them decided in favour of the appellant. The High Court
observes at one place that the appellant's position after 30-9-1949
was that of a lessee holding over and not that of a trespasser, but
there is no discussion as to whv it considers that the appellant was
a lessee holding over. We shall later point out that the appellant
cannot be deemed to be a lessee holding over. The High Couri also
held that there was no compromise of the suit by any person
authorised to do so on behalf of the Corporation. It also held
that there was no acceptance of rent with the
san~tion of the
Council. As a consequence it allowed the appeal and decreed the
plaintiff's suit.
Before this Court Shri Gupte appearing for the appellant did
not contend that there was a compromise of the suit. His contention
on the other hand was that a concluded contract emerged when the
appellant paid a sum of Rs. 5697.93 on 22-9-59 pursuant to the
letter of the Commissioner and therefore the suit could not continue. He also argued that the appellant would be entitled to the
benefit of the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of the
Property Act, and that i'n any case he was a tenant holding over
and would be entitled to the benefit of provisions of Section l 06
and 116 of the Transfer of the Property Act.
We may straight away say that we find ourselves unable to
agree with the contention that there was a concluded contract between the Municipal Council and the appellant on· 22-9-1959.
There is no dispute that in this case the Commissioner cannot enter
into a contract by himself and can do so only if it is sanctioned by
the Municipal Corporation under section 80 of the Madhya
Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act. The resolution of the Corporation dated 9-12-1949 was specific that the land would be given
to the appellant if he deposited the upset price and rent fa accor•
dance with the letter dated 26-10-1949 sent by the Municipal
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BADRI LAL v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (Alagiriswami, J.)
19
Commissioner to the appellant and otherwise the land should be
taken back into possession. That letter is not on record. Apparently, it was on the same terms as Ex.P. 20 dated 31-12-1949.
It could no~ be otherwise. The appellant did not comply with the
terms of that letter. He went on to make a counter offer by Ex.
P.19 dated 9-1-1950. He appealed to the Minister and having failed there, he waited nearly 7 years after the Corporation's resolu-
~ion to pay a part of the amount and pay the balance in instalments.
This was accepted by the Municipal Commissiqner on 20-6-1956.
But we must make it clear that the Municipal Commissioner had
no power in view of the resolution of tne Corporation to accept the
appellant's offer. He was given a specific mandate and was not
authorised to enter into negotiations with the appellant regarding
the lease. The amount was not paid in spite of two further letters
and the suit was filed on 16-9-1957. Tlie Municipal Commissioner
had· no power to go on accepting the offers from the appellant
more than 15 days after his letter to him on 31-12-1949; nor
could he accept any terms other than those mentioned in the
Corporation's resolution either within those 15 days or later. Even
the offer made by the Corporation's resolution came to an end with
the filing of the suit, which was a clear and unequivocal revocation of the resolution. Thereafter the Corporation cannot be
deemed to keep open its offer of the year 1949. Nor was ii open to
the Commissioner either to make any offer to the appellant or to
accept any offer from the appellant in respect of the I.and except
with the sanction of the Municipal Council. The appellanl's offer
made on 17-3-59, a year and a half after the suit was filed, was a
new offer. and it was rejected by the only authority competent to
accept it i.e. the Corporation on 31-5-1960. The correspondence
carried on by the Commissioner with the appellant was wholly
beyond his powers.
The offer made by the appellant in 1959 cannot have anything
to do with the resolution passed by the Municipal Council in 1949.
The offer was of a different set of terms and included an offer to
pay the costs of the suit and that also had in fact been deposited
by the appellant at the instance of the CommiSBioner. That indicates the new situation that had come into exisrence and establishes beyond doubt that this was a fresh offer. We therefore hold
that no contract came into existenc~ between the parties on
22-9-1959.
It was then urged bv Mr. Gupte that the appellant having
deposited the rent up to 31-'.l-1954 and the Municipal Commissioner having accepted
it he should be deemed to be
a tenant holding over.
Leavine aside for the moment the
contention put forward on behalf of the Corporation that this payment was made behind its back, it has to be noted that the payment
was at the rate prevailing before 30-9-1949 and on that date the
20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
Corporation having passed a resolution specifying a new rate df
rent of Rs. 9 per Chasma the payment at the old rate by the appellant and its acceptance by the Municipal Commissioner was not
an acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the
tenancy right of the appellant. It cannot amount to the Corporation
consenting to the appellant continuing as a tenant by paying the
old rates of rent. There is thus no question of the appellant being
a tenant holding over. But a person who was lawfully in occupation does not become a trespasser, even if he does not become a
tenant holding over but is a tenant by snfferance. The position at
law was explained in Kai. Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai
Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden & Anr.( 1 ) ·as follows:
"On the determination of a lease, it is the duty of
the lessee to deliver up possession of the demised premises to the lessor. If the lessee or a sub-lessee under
him continues in possession even after the determination of ·the lease, the landlord undoubtedly has the
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right to e.iect him forthwith; but if he does not, and there
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is neither assent nor dissent on his part to the continuance of occupation of such person, the latter becomes
in the language of English law a tenant on sufferance
who has no lawful title to the land but holds ii merely
through the !aches of the landlord. If now the landlord
accepts rent .from such person or otherwise expresses
assent to the continuance of his possession,
a new
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tenancy comes into existence as is contempla~ by s.
116, Transfer of Property Act, and unless there is an
agreement to the contrary, such tenancy would be regarded as one from year to year or from month to month
in accordance with the provisions of s. 116 of the Act."
At page 272 it was pointed out :
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"It can scarcely be disputed that the assent of the
landlord which is founded on, acceptance of rent must
be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of
the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays·it."
The same position was explained in a recent decision of this Court
to which one of us was a party in Bhawanji Lakhamshi v. HimatG
la/ Jamnadas Dani('). At page 391 it was observed:
"The act of holding over after the expiration of the
term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant
remains in possession after the determination of the
lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on
sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a
tenant continuing in possession after the determination
(1)[1949-50] F.C.R. 262 at 270.
(2) [1972) I S.C.C. 388.
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BADRI LAL v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (A/agiriswami, J.)
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of the term with the consent of the landlord and a
tenant doing so Without his consent. The former is a
tenant at sufferance in English Law and the latter a
tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the
concluding words of Section 1 J 6 of the Transfer of
Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position
than a tenant at will. The assent of the landlord to the
continuance of possession after the determination of
the tenancy will create a new tenancy. What the section
contemplates is that on one side there should be an
offer of taking a new lease evidenced by the lessee or
sub-lessee remaining in possession of the property after
his term was over and on the other side there must be
a definite consent to the continuance of possession by
the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. In Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai Jerbai
Hirjibhoy Warden and Another, the Federal Court had
occasion to consider the question of the nature of the
tenancy created under section 116 of- the Transfer of
Property Act and Mukherjea, J., speaking for tW:
majority said that the tenancy which is created by the
"holding over" of a lessee or under-lessee is a new tenancy in law even though many of the terms of the old
lease might be continued in it, by implication; and that
to bring a new tenancy into existence, there must be a
bilateral act. It was further held that the assent of the
landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must
be acceptance of rent as such. and in clear recognition
of the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it."
The appellant being merely a· tenilllt by sufl!erance there is no
need for any notice before he could be evicted. Thus the .iudgment
of the High Court is correct, in so far as it held the appellant was
liable to be ·evicted.
The appeal is dismissed with costs. The petition for reception
of additional evidence is also dismissed.
V.P.S.
A. p peal dismissed.