# BADRI PRASAD v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 380
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-10-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1966
- **Bench:** S. M. Sikri, R. S. Bachawat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/badri-prasad-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr-4506
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates, Mahals Alienated Lands)
Act, (M.P. 1 of 1951)-Forests and trees in Jagir-If vest in Stal'.
Contract to cut timber-If sale of ascertained goods-Sale of Goods
Act (3 of 1930), s. 19---0[fer' and acceptance-Reservation in
acceptance-If concluded contract.
The appellant entered into a contract in respect of certain forests in
a Jagir in Madhya Pradesh. Under cl. 1 of the contract, he was entitled
to cut teak trees of more than 12 inches girth.
Under cl. 5, the stumps
of trees after cutting, had to be 3 inches high. After the passing of
the Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals. Alienated Lands)
Act, 1950 a notification was issued vesting the estate in the State. and
the appellant was prohibited from cutting timber in exercise of his rights
under the contract After some negotiations, a letter was written on
February 1, 1955, to the appellant, on behalf of the State, that
the
appellant's claim to cut trees under the contract would be considered
only if he gave up his claim to a sum of Rs. 17 ,000 which he had already
paid under tho contract and was willing to pay a further sum
of
Rs. 17,000. The appellant, by his letter dated February 5, 1955 expressed his willingness to pay the additional sum but reserved his right
to claim a refund of the first sum. The State Government rejected the
appellant's right to cut trees.
He then filed a suit claiming specific
performance of the contract on the grounds : ( 1) The forest and trees
did not vest in the State under the Act; (2) Even if they vested, the
standing timber, having been sold to the ·appellant,. did not vest in the
State; and (3) In any event a new contract was completed on February
5, 1955, and the appellant was entitled to its specific performance.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : (I) The forest and trees vested in the State under the Act.·
(390 F----0]
Mahadeo v. State of Bombay, (1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 339; State of
M.P. v. Yakinuddin, (1963] 3 S.C.R. 13 and Mulamchand v. State of
M.P., C.A No 393 of 1965 dated February 20, 1968, followed.
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(2) Under the contract the appellant had not become the owner of
tho trees as goods. The property in the timber could pass to the apG
reliant only when the trees are felled, but before they were felled, the
trees had vested in the State. [391 B]
Under cl. 5 of the contract there was no sale of the whole of the
trees, and', under cl. 1 it had to be ascertained which trees fell within
the description of trees which the appellant was entitled to cut.
Till
that was done they were not 'ascertained goods' within s. 19 of the Sale
of Goods Act 1930. [391 A-Bl
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(3) Even if .the Jetter of !st February could be treated as an offer,
there was no tinconditional acceptance of the offer, because, there was
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BADRI PRASAD JI. M. P. STATE (Sikri, /.)
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a reservation by the appellant of his right to claim refund in. his letter
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dated 5th February and hence there. was no concluded contract.
[391
C-D)
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## Text

BADRI PRASAD
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
October 11, 1968
[S. M. SIKRI AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.)
Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates, Mahals Alienated Lands)
Act, (M.P. 1 of 1951)-Forests and trees in Jagir-If vest in Stal'.
Contract to cut timber-If sale of ascertained goods-Sale of Goods
Act (3 of 1930), s. 19---0[fer' and acceptance-Reservation in
acceptance-If concluded contract.
The appellant entered into a contract in respect of certain forests in
a Jagir in Madhya Pradesh. Under cl. 1 of the contract, he was entitled
to cut teak trees of more than 12 inches girth.
Under cl. 5, the stumps
of trees after cutting, had to be 3 inches high. After the passing of
the Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals. Alienated Lands)
Act, 1950 a notification was issued vesting the estate in the State. and
the appellant was prohibited from cutting timber in exercise of his rights
under the contract After some negotiations, a letter was written on
February 1, 1955, to the appellant, on behalf of the State, that
the
appellant's claim to cut trees under the contract would be considered
only if he gave up his claim to a sum of Rs. 17 ,000 which he had already
paid under tho contract and was willing to pay a further sum
of
Rs. 17,000. The appellant, by his letter dated February 5, 1955 expressed his willingness to pay the additional sum but reserved his right
to claim a refund of the first sum. The State Government rejected the
appellant's right to cut trees.
He then filed a suit claiming specific
performance of the contract on the grounds : ( 1) The forest and trees
did not vest in the State under the Act; (2) Even if they vested, the
standing timber, having been sold to the ·appellant,. did not vest in the
State; and (3) In any event a new contract was completed on February
5, 1955, and the appellant was entitled to its specific performance.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : (I) The forest and trees vested in the State under the Act.·
(390 F----0]
Mahadeo v. State of Bombay, (1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 339; State of
M.P. v. Yakinuddin, (1963] 3 S.C.R. 13 and Mulamchand v. State of
M.P., C.A No 393 of 1965 dated February 20, 1968, followed.
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(2) Under the contract the appellant had not become the owner of
tho trees as goods. The property in the timber could pass to the apG
reliant only when the trees are felled, but before they were felled, the
trees had vested in the State. [391 B]
Under cl. 5 of the contract there was no sale of the whole of the
trees, and', under cl. 1 it had to be ascertained which trees fell within
the description of trees which the appellant was entitled to cut.
Till
that was done they were not 'ascertained goods' within s. 19 of the Sale
of Goods Act 1930. [391 A-Bl
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(3) Even if .the Jetter of !st February could be treated as an offer,
there was no tinconditional acceptance of the offer, because, there was
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BADRI PRASAD JI. M. P. STATE (Sikri, /.)
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a reservation by the appellant of his right to claim refund in. his letter
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dated 5th February and hence there. was no concluded contract.
[391
C-D)
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
18
of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree, dated
October 9, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First
Appeal No. 94 of 1959.
G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.
l. N. Shroff, for respondent No. l.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing
the appeal of the State of Madhya Pradesh and dismissing the suit
brought by the appellant, Badri Prasad-hereinafter referred to as
the plaintiff .
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The relevant facts for determining the po~ts raised before us
are these.
On December 27, 1950, a contract was entered into
between Kumar Bharat Shah, ininor, through his guardian, and the
plaintiff, in respect of forests in Mouza Sunderpani Jagir.
The
terms were reduced to writing and an agreement was signed on
January 21, 19 51. It is necessary to reproduce the agreement in
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extenso as it would be necessary to interpret it carefully.
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"Deed of agreement executed by Shri Kumar Bharat
Shah minor, guardian Shrimati Rani Umakuar Sahiba,
Jagirdar of Mouza Sunderpani.
Conditions of contract, area, forest Mouza Sunderpani.
1. Out of the area of 1704.46 acres of Mouza
Sunderpani Jagir contract of all the teak trees of more
than 12 inches girth standing in the 1,000 acres of the
forest of big trees and excluding those teak trees which
have girth upto 12 inches is given to contractor Badri
Prasad Moolchand firm of Timarni for a sum of
Rs. 17,000 (seventeen thousand rupees), on payment
of the amount in a lump-sum.
2. In respect of the teak trees mentioned in paragraph No. 1 contractor Shri Badri Prasad deposited with
me the total amount of Rs. 17,000 (seventeen thousand
rupees) , as under :-
Rs. 6,000 (Six thousand rupees) on 27-12-1950.
Rs. 11,000 (Eleven thou.sand rupees) on 21-1-1951.
Receipts have been passed for depositing the above
amount.
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SUPREME cOURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R..
3. The transfer of the forest shall not be done without consent of the owner. The contractor shall have to
pay Rs, 100 (One hundred rupees), for transfer.
4. For the proper execution of work of the forest the
felling of the forest shall have to be done from one side.
Excluding the_ teak trees upto the girth of 12 ;inches the
cutting of those teak trees which are above that girth
shall have to be serially done.
5. After felling, the stumps of teak trees should be 3
inches high from the ground and slanting so as to drain
the water off. It shall be necessary to prepare the stumps
within a week.
Till the stumps are passed the wood
cannot be removed. Only the paring can be done. The
coupe guard shall make a hammer mark of passing on
the stump and end of the pared wood.
6. The contractor shall have to get the transit of
goods done by the coupe guard. The contractor shall ·
have to do the transit of goods through the licence book
and submit the monthly accounts. Without licence no
goods shall be transported out of the forest.
7. The contractor shall have to take care of the teal::
trees of 12 ;inches girth standing in the forest. If damage
is caused proper penalty shall be charged.
8. The contractor can appoint an agent with permission.
9. The contractor shall have to deposit Rs. 100
(One hundred rupees) for
properly preparing the
stumps of the teak trees of the forest before starting the
work.
This amount shall be returned on completion
of the work if the stumps are properly prepared; otherwise the expenses which may be incurred shall
be
deducted.
10. The contractor shall be responsible for any
damage caused to the forest by the contractor or his agent
and he shall have to pay the penalty.
11. The period of the contract shall be 3 years, i.e.,
from 27-12-1950 to 27-12-1953 ..
Hence the agreement in execution and the same is
genuine.
The contractor and the owner of the forest
shall be bound by this."
On January 22, 1951, the Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Madhya Pradesh
Act 1 of 19 51)-hereinafter referred to as the Act-received the
:assent of the PresidC!llt and was published in the Gazette on
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BADRI PRASAD v. M. P. STATE (Sikri, J.)
'383
January 26, 19 51. The plaintiff started working under the contract in March 1951.
On March 31, 1951, a notification was
issued vesting the estates in the State and the State Government
prohibited the plaintiff from cutting timber in exercise of the rights
under the contract. Apparently negotiations took place between
the State Government and the plaintiff, and on February 1, 1955,
the Divisional Forest Officer wrote to the plaintiff as follows :
Subject :-Contract of big trees of Sunderpani village of Makrai State.
Reference :-Memo No. 5424-4339-11, dated 21st
October, 1954 of the Forest Department of Madhya
Pradesh Government.
Kindly inform whether you are ready to pay further
Rs. 17,000 (seventeen thonsand rupees), for the contract
of big trees of Sunderpani village of Makrai Circle which
(contract) is under dispute at present.
This contract
can be given to you on this compromise only. If you do
not wish to pay this amount you may, in future, take any
action you deem fit·
2. You may express your desire within seven days
of the receipt of this letter. If you fail to do this it will
be presumed that you are not inclined to make a mutual
compromise.
3. On receipt of your reply the State Government
will be informed."
It is this Jetter which the plaintiff contends was an offer and which
he accepted by the following Jetter, dated February 5, 1955 :
"Subject :-Contract of sale of teak-trees in Sunderpani Forest in Makrai Range.
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Reference :-Your letter No. 180, dated !st Feb.
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1955 .
Dear Sir,
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I am ready to pay Rs. 17,000 provided my claim to
have the refund of Rs. 17,000 already paid, from Shri
Bharat Shah, the owner of the village or any other relief
consequential to the judgment of that case remains unaffected.
I reserve my right to claim the said or like
amount.
Subject to these conditions I shalf pay
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Rs. i 7 ,000 as required in your above referred Jetter."
By memorandum, dated October 24, 1956, the Government wrote
to the pl~intiff as follows :
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384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196912 S.C.R.
"Reference :-Your application, dated 12th SeptemA
ber, J 956, addressed to the Minister for Forests, Madhya
.,
Pradesh.
Government regret that the request made in your
application under reference cannot be acceded to. Your
application has, therefore, been rejected."
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The application, dated September 12, 1956, is not included in the
printed record but the plaintiff states that it is by this memorandum
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that the Government finally repudiated its obligations under the
contract·
Thereupon the plaintiff filed the snit praying for a declarac
tion that the rights granted to the plaintiff under the licence, dated
January 21, 1951, had not been affected by the vesting of the
estates in the State under the Act. ln the alternative he prayed
that he was entitled to specific performance and delivery of the
contract which was completed on February 5, 1955. He further
prayed that in case he was not entitled to these reliefs, Rs. 50,000
<
damages be awarded against .the State.
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Three points have been raised before us :
( 1) that the forest and trees did not vest in the State under
the Act;
(2) that even if they vested, the standing timber having
been sold to the plaintiff did not vest in the State under
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the Act;
(3) that a new contract was completed on February 5,
1955, and the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the contract.
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The Act and the rights of persons holding contracts. to cut and
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take away timber and fruits of the trees have been the subjectmatter of consideration by this Court on several occasions. But
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the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that none of those
cases cover the case of the plaintiff because, according to him, none ,
of those cases dealt with standing timber. He says that the plain-
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tiff's contract is a contract for the sale of goods and the property
in the goods had vested in him and, therefore, it stands on a
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different basis from the contracts construed in the earlier cases.
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The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, maintains that the plaintiff's case is covered by the earlier decisions and
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all the arguments which he has advanced have been rejected by
this Court in those cases.
The relevant statutory provisions of the Act are these :
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. "Section 3. Vesting of proprietary rights in the
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State.--( 1 1 Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on
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BADRI PRASAD v. M. P. STATE (Sikri, J.)
and from a date to be specified by a notification by the
State Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights in
an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land, as
the case may be, in the area specified. in the notification,
vesting in a proprietor of such estate, mahal, alienated
village, alienated land, or in a person having interest in
such proprietary right through the proprietor, shall pass
from such proprietor or such other person to and vest
in the State for the purposes of the State free of all encumbrances.
(2) After the issue of a notification under sub-section ( 1), no right shall be acquired in or over the land
to which the said notification relates, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or
entered into by or on behalf of the State; and no fresh
clearing for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be
made in such land except in accordance with such rules
as may be made by· the State Government in this behalf
Section 4. Consequences of the vesting·--( 1) When
the notification under sec. 3 in respect of any area has
been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in any contract, grant or document
or in any other law for the time being in force and save
as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as
hereinafter setforth shall, from the begi~ng of the date
specified in such notification (hereinafter referred to as
the date of vesting) ensue, namely :-
(a) all rights, title and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person hav lng interest in such proprietary
right through the proprietor in such area including land
(cultivable or barren), grass land, shrub jungle, forest,
trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds, water channels,
ferries, pathways, village sites, hats, bazars and melas;
and in all sub-soil, including rights, if any, in mines and
minerals, whether bein!.! worked or not shall cease and
be vested in the State for purposes of the State free
of all encumbrances; and the mortgage debt or charge on
any proprietary right shall be a charge on the amount of
comp~nsation payable for such proprietary right to the
propnetor under tlie provisions of this Act ......... .
. Section s,. Certain properties to continue in possess~on o~ propr~et0r or other person.---Subject to the provisions Ill Secl:Ions 4 7 and 63-
( a) all open enclosures used fot
agricultural or
domestic purposes and in continuous posses~ion for twelve
385'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
years immediately before 1948-49; all open house-sites
purchased for consideration; all buildings, places of
worship; wells situated in and trees standing on lands
included in such enclosures or house-sites or land appertaining to such buildings or places of ownership; within
the li~its of a. village-site belonging to or held by the
· outgomg propnetor or any other person shall continue
to belOlllg to or be held by such proprietor or other person,
as the case may be, and the land therenf with the areas
appurtenant thereto shall be settled with him by the State
Government on such tenns and conditions as it may
·determine;
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(b) all private wells and buildings on occupied land
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belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or· any
other person shall continue to belong to or be held by
such proprietor or other person;
( c) all tree8 standing on land comprised in a homefarm or homestead and belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to
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belong to or held by such proprietor or other person;
( d) all trees standing on occupied land c>ther than
land comprised in home-farm or homestead and belonging
to or held by a person other than the outgoing proprietor
shall continue to belong to or be held by such person;
( e) all tanks situate on uccupied land and belonging
to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any oilier person shall continue to belong to or held by such proprietor
or other person;
( f) all tanks, belonging to or held by the outgoing
1Jroprietor which are situate on land other than village
site or occupir.d land and in which no person other than
such proprietor has any rights of irrigation, shall belong
to or be held by such proprietor.
(g) all tanks and embankments (bandhans) belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other
person which are situate on land other than village site
or occupied land and the beds of which are under cultivation of such proprietor or such other person shall
belong to or be held by such proprietor or such other
person and the land under such tanks and embankments
shall be settled with such proprietor or such other person
on such terms and conditions ns the State Government
may determine;
(h) all groves wherever situate and recorded in
village papers in the name of the outgoing proprietor or
:any other person shall continue to belong to or be held
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BADRI PRASAD V. M. P. STATE (Sikri, J.)
by such proprietor or such other person and the land
under such groves shall be settled with such proprietor
or such other person by the State Government on such
terms and conditions as it may detennine.
Section 6. Certain transfern to l:>e void. ( l) Except as
provided in sub-section (2), the transfer of any right in
the property which is liable to vest in the State under this
Act made by the proprietor at any time after the 16th
March, 1950, shall, as from the date of vesting, be void."
367
Let us now look at the decisions of this Court and see what
has been laid down therein. In Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh,(1 ) which we may mention has since been
overruled, the contract was in respect of the right to pluck, collect
and carry away tendu leaves, to cultivate, culture and acquire lac,
and to cut and carry away teak and timber and other ~ics of
tree and bamboos. The Court observed :
"It is clear from the provisions in the impugned Act
that only those rights of the proprietor vest in the State
which the proprietor had on the specified date. . ... The
scheme of the Act as can be gathered from the provisions
referred to above makes it reas()nably clear that whatever was done before 16th March, 1950, by the proprietors by way of transfer of rights is not "' be disturbed or
affected, and that what vests in the State is what the
proprietors had on the vesting date. If the proprietor·
had any rights after the date ()f vesting which he could
enforce against the transferee such as a lessee or a
licensee, those rights would no doubt vest in the State.
In all these petitions, the several contracts and agreements were before the date of vesting, and many of them
were prior even to the 16th March, 1950. The petitioners
had taken possession of Llie subject matter of the contracts, namely, tendu leaves, lac pal!:adies, teak, timber
and hardwood, bamboos and miscellaneous forest
produce."
The Court construed the contracts in that case thus :
"The contracts and agreements appear to be in
essence and effect licences granted to the transferees to
cut. gather and carry away the produce in the shape of
tendu leaves, or Jae, or timber, or wood."
The Court further held that the rights of the petitioners were not
encumbrances within the meaning of the expression "free from encum~rances''. ~- s. 3 (I) of the Act. The Court accordingly issued
a wnt proh1b1tmg the State from interfering in any manner with
(1) [1953] S.C.R 476, 479, 481, 483.
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] 2 S.C.R.
the enjoyment of those rights by. the petitioner. It may be mentioned that in that case the Court was dealing with an application
under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
Chhotabhai's(') case was distinguished in Ananda Behera v.
The State of Orissa( 2 ) which again dealt with a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. In Anand Behara v. The State of
Orissa( 2 ) the subject-matter of licence was fishery rights and the
Act which was construed was the Orissa Estates Abolition Act,
1951. The Court held that the right sought to be acquired by the
petitioners by their several purchases was not in respect of any
future goods as claimed by them but was a license to enter on the·
land coupled with a grant to catch and carry away the fish, in
other words, a profit a prendre which is immovable property within the meaning of the Trans.fer of Property Act read with s. 3 (25)
of the General Clauses Act. The Court further held that as it was
an oral licence it contravened s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,
and therefore, no title or interest therein passed to the petitioners
in that case.
The Court distingu!sl:ed Chhotabhai's(') case on
the following grounds :
"It is necessary to advert to Firm Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel & Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') and
explain it because it was held there that a right to 'pluck,
col.Ject and carry away' tendu leaves does not give the
owner of the right any proprietary interest in the land and
so that sort of right was not an 'encumbrainc;e' within the
meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary
Rights Act. But the contract there was to 'pluck, collect
and carry away' the leaves. The only kind of leaves that
can be 'plucked' are those that are growing on trees and
it is evident that there must be a fresh crop of leaves
at periodic intervals.
That would make it a growing
crop and a growing crop is
expressly exempted
from the definitiQI} of 'immovable property'
in the
Transfer of Property Act.
That case is distinguishable
and does not apply here.''
In Mahadeo v. The State of Bombay,( 3 ) which was again a
petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, Chhotabhai's(') case
was not fo!lowed. In this case some of the proprietors had granted
to the several petitioners rights to take forest produce, mainly tendu
leaves, from the forests included in the Zamindaris belonging to
the proprietors. The agreements conveyed to the
pe.tition~rs in
addition to the tendu leaves otl1er forest produce like timber,
bamboos, etc., the soil for making bricks, and the right to build
on and occupy land for the purpose of their busi1ness. These rights
(!) [1953! S.C.R. 476.
(2) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 919.
(3) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 339.
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BADRI PRASAD V. M. P. STATE (Sikri, /.)
389
were spread over many years but in the case of a f~w ~e period
during which the agreements were to operate exprred m 1955.
This Court held that the agreements required registration and
pointed out that some aspects had not been brought to the notice
of the Court in Chhotabhai's(') case.
Hidayatullah, J., as he
then was, speaking for the Court observed :
"But what was the nature of those rights of the petitioners ? It is plain, that if they were merely contractual
rights, then as pointed out in rhe two later decisions, in
Ananda Behera v. The State of Orissa( 2 ), Shantabai's
case(') the State has not acquired or taken possession of
those rights but has only declined to be bound by the
agreements to which they were not a party. If, on the
other hand, the petitioners were mere licensees, then also,
as pointed out in the second of the t_wo cases cited, the
licences came to an end on the extinction o~ the title of
the licensors. In either case there was no question of
the breach of any fundamental rights of the petitioners
which could support the petitions which were presented
under Art. 32 of the Constitution."
The Court then construed the agreements in question and came t0
the conclusion that the agreements could not be said to be contracts of sale of goods simpliciter. Then the Court examined the.
provisions of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and came
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to the following conclusion :
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"From this, it is quite clear that forests and trees
belonged to the proprietors, and they were items of proprietary rights. The first of the two questions posed by
us, therefore, admits of none but an affirmative answer·
If then the forest and the trees belonged to the proprietors as items in their 'proprietary rights', it is quite
clear that these items of proprietary rights have been
transferred to the petitioners. The an:;wer to the second
question is also in the affinnative. Being a 'proptietary
right', it vests in the State under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.
The decision in Chhotabhai's( 1 ) treated these rights as
bare licences, and it was apparently given per incuriam,
and cannot therefore be followed."
It seems to us that this decision concludes the controversy before us. This decision was followed in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Yakinuddin( 4 ). Various agreements were construed in that case;
one. agreement was to propagate lac, another agreement was 10
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 476. ·
(3) [1959] S.C.R. 265.
(2) [195512 S.C.R. 919.
(4) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 13,
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 s.c.R.
collect tendu leaves, and another agreement was with respect to a
right to collect fruits and· flowers of .Ma1:1ua leaves. It was contended that these rights were saved m View of the proV1S10ns (If
s. 6 of the Act, but this contention was negatived. Sinha, C.J .,
speaking for the Court, observed that the distinction between a
bare licence and a licence coupled with grant or profit a prendre
was irrelevant because "whatever may have been the nature of the
grant by the outgoing proprietors in favour of the respondents,
those grants had no legal effect as against the State, except iii so
far as the State may have recognised them.
But the provisioas
of the Act leave no manner of doubt that the rights claimed by
the respondents could not have been enforced against the State,
if the latter was not prepared to respect those rights and the rights
created by the transactions between the respondents and their
jrantors did not come within any of the saving clauses of s. 5."
Earlier he had observed that "any person claiming some interest
· as a proprietor or as holding through a proprietor in respect of
any proprietary interest in an estate has got to bring his interest
within s. 5, because on the date of vesting of the
estate~ the
Deputy Commissioner takes charge of all lands other than occupied lands and homestead, and of all interests vesting in the State
under s. 3.
Upon such taking over of possession, the State loecomes liable to pay the compensation provided for in s. 8 and the
iucceeding sections.
The respondents have not been able to
show that their interest comes under any of the clauses aforesaid
of s. 5."
·
The last case in which this Act was construed was Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh('). In that case Mulamchand
had purchased a right to pluck, collect and remove forest produce like lac, tendu leaves, etc., from the proprietors
of
the
different Malguzari
jungles.
This
Court followed State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Yakinuddin( 2 ) and negatived the claim of
Mulamchand to exercise his rights under the agreement.
In view of . these cases it is too late in the day to contend
that the forest and the trees did not vest in the State under the
Act.
There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel
that under the contract the plaintiff had become owner of trees
as goods.
It is true that trees which are agreed to be severed
before sale or under the cQ!ltract of sale are "goods" for the
purposes of the Sale of Goods Act. But before they cease to be
"proppetary" rights or interest in proprietary _rights within the
mearnn.g d ss. 3 and 4(a) of the Act they must be felled under
the contract. It will be noticed that under cl. 1 of the contract
(I) Civil Appeal No. 393 of 1965 dated February 20, 19'8.
(2) (U63] 3 S.C.R. 13.
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BADRI PRASAD v. M. P. STATE (Sikri, J.)
391
A the plaintiff was entitled to cut teak trees of more than 12 inches
girth· It had to be ascertained which trees fell within that description.
Till this was ascertained, they were not "ascertained
goods" within s. 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. Clause 5 of the
contract contemplated that stumps of trees, after cutting, had to
be 3 inches high. In other words, the contract was not to sell
B the whole of the trees.
In these circumstances property in the
cut timber would only pass to the plaintiff under the contract at
the earliest when the trees are felled.
But before that happened
the trees had vested in the State.
This brings us to the last point, namely, whether a new contract was concluded between the Government and the plaintiff.
C It is extremely doubtful whether the letter, dated February 1,
1955, is an offer.
It seems to be an :invitation to the plaintiff
to make an offer. Be that as it may, even if it is treated as an
offer there was no unconditional acceptance by the Jetter, dated
February 5, 1955. The plaintiff expressly reserved his right to
claim a refund of Rs. 17 ,000. ,According to the letter of the
D Divisional Forest Officer, dated February 1, 1955, the plaintiff
had to give up his claim to Rs.
17,000 which he had already
paid and had to pay a further sum of Rs . 17,000.
The High
Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the alleged acceptance
of the offer made on February 1, 1955; was conditional and
qualified.
E
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs·
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed' ..