# BADRI RAI & ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF BIHAR

- **Citation:** [1959] 1 S.C.R. 1141
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1956
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/badri-rai-another-v-the-state-of-bihar-1459
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

1141
Evidence-Conspiracy to bribe a public servant-Statements of
co-conspirator-When admissible against others-Indian Penal Code
(Act 45 of I86o), ss. I20B, I65A-Indian Evidence Act (I of I872),
s. IO.
The appellants were prosecuted on charges under s. 120B
read with s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code, for having conspired
to commit the offence of bribing a public servant in connection
with the discharge of his public duties. The case against them
was that on August 24, 1953, when the Inspector of Police who
was in charge of the investigation of a case in which the second
appellant was involved, was on his way to the police station, the
appellants accosted him on the road and the second appellant
asked him to hush up the case for valuable consideration. Some
days later, on August 31 the first appellant offered to the Inspector at the police station a packet containing Rs. 500 in currency
notes and told him;that the second appellant had sent the money
through him in pursuance of the talk that they had with him on
August 24, as a consideration for hushing up the case. The
courts below accepted the evidence adduced. on behalf of the
prosecution and convicted the appell-.:tnts.
On appeal by special
leave it was contended that the court had no reasonable grounds
to believe that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to
commit the offence and that the statement of Augu~t 31 was not
admissible against the second appellant because (1) the charge
under s. r20B had been deliberately added in order that the act
or statement of the one would be admissible against the other,
and (2) the object of the conspiracy, namely the payment of the
hush money, had lbeen accomplished before the statement in
question W'as madb :
Held, (1) that the incident of August 24 was evidence that
the intention to commit the offence had been entertained by
both the appellants on or before that date showing a clear indication of the existence of the conspiracy, and that the statement
made by the first appellant on August 31 was admissible not
only to prove that the second appellant had constituted the first
appellant his agent in the perpetration of the crime but also to
prove the existence of the conspiracy ; the court was therefore
justified in drawing up the charge under s. 120B along with that
under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code.
•
•
(2) that the payment of the bribe and the statement of
August 31 accompanying it,\ were part of the same transaction, '
having been made in the course of the conspiracy, and the
•
August z8.
•
Bndri Rai
v.
l
•
1142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
statement in question was therefore admissible under s. 10 of
the Indian Evidence Act.
State of Bihar
Mirza Akbar v. The King Emperor, (r940) L. R. 67 I. A. 336
and R. v. Blake, (r844) 6 Q. B. r26, relied on.
Sinha J.
•
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 79 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 7, 1955, of the Patna High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 370 of 1954, arising out
.of the judgment and order dated July 26, 1954, of
the Court of the Special Judge at Bhagalpur in Special
Case No. 14 of 1954.
B. R. L. Iyengar, for appellant No. I.
S. P. Sinha and P. G. Agarwala, for appellant
No. 2.
R. C. Prasad, for the respondent.
1958. August 18. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
•
SINHA J.-This appeal by special leave is directed
against the concurrent judgments and orders of the
courts below, convicting the two appellants under
s. 120B read with s. 165A, Indian Penal Code, and
sentencing, them to rigorous imprisonment for 18
months, and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 each, and in
default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months. A separate conviction·
under s. l 65A has been recorded in respect of the first
appellant, Badri. Under this head, he has peen sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months, the
sentence to run concurrently with the sentence under
the common charge.
The facts as found by

## Text

•
-·
'
S.C.R.
I
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
BADRI RAI & ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
(B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.)
1141
Evidence-Conspiracy to bribe a public servant-Statements of
co-conspirator-When admissible against others-Indian Penal Code
(Act 45 of I86o), ss. I20B, I65A-Indian Evidence Act (I of I872),
s. IO.
The appellants were prosecuted on charges under s. 120B
read with s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code, for having conspired
to commit the offence of bribing a public servant in connection
with the discharge of his public duties. The case against them
was that on August 24, 1953, when the Inspector of Police who
was in charge of the investigation of a case in which the second
appellant was involved, was on his way to the police station, the
appellants accosted him on the road and the second appellant
asked him to hush up the case for valuable consideration. Some
days later, on August 31 the first appellant offered to the Inspector at the police station a packet containing Rs. 500 in currency
notes and told him;that the second appellant had sent the money
through him in pursuance of the talk that they had with him on
August 24, as a consideration for hushing up the case. The
courts below accepted the evidence adduced. on behalf of the
prosecution and convicted the appell-.:tnts.
On appeal by special
leave it was contended that the court had no reasonable grounds
to believe that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to
commit the offence and that the statement of Augu~t 31 was not
admissible against the second appellant because (1) the charge
under s. r20B had been deliberately added in order that the act
or statement of the one would be admissible against the other,
and (2) the object of the conspiracy, namely the payment of the
hush money, had lbeen accomplished before the statement in
question W'as madb :
Held, (1) that the incident of August 24 was evidence that
the intention to commit the offence had been entertained by
both the appellants on or before that date showing a clear indication of the existence of the conspiracy, and that the statement
made by the first appellant on August 31 was admissible not
only to prove that the second appellant had constituted the first
appellant his agent in the perpetration of the crime but also to
prove the existence of the conspiracy ; the court was therefore
justified in drawing up the charge under s. 120B along with that
under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code.
•
•
(2) that the payment of the bribe and the statement of
August 31 accompanying it,\ were part of the same transaction, '
having been made in the course of the conspiracy, and the
•
August z8.
•
Bndri Rai
v.
l
•
1142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
statement in question was therefore admissible under s. 10 of
the Indian Evidence Act.
State of Bihar
Mirza Akbar v. The King Emperor, (r940) L. R. 67 I. A. 336
and R. v. Blake, (r844) 6 Q. B. r26, relied on.
Sinha J.
•
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 79 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 7, 1955, of the Patna High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 370 of 1954, arising out
.of the judgment and order dated July 26, 1954, of
the Court of the Special Judge at Bhagalpur in Special
Case No. 14 of 1954.
B. R. L. Iyengar, for appellant No. I.
S. P. Sinha and P. G. Agarwala, for appellant
No. 2.
R. C. Prasad, for the respondent.
1958. August 18. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
•
SINHA J.-This appeal by special leave is directed
against the concurrent judgments and orders of the
courts below, convicting the two appellants under
s. 120B read with s. 165A, Indian Penal Code, and
sentencing, them to rigorous imprisonment for 18
months, and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 each, and in
default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months. A separate conviction·
under s. l 65A has been recorded in respect of the first
appellant, Badri. Under this head, he has peen sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months, the
sentence to run concurrently with the sentence under
the common charge.
The facts as found by the courts below, which could
not be successfully challenged before us, are as follows :
The second appellant, Ramji Sonar, is a goldsmith
by profession and runs a shop on the main road in the
village N aogachia. In that village there is a police
station and the shop in question is situated in between
fue police station building and the residential quarters
' of the Inspector of police, who was the First Informant in the case, resulting in the conviction and
•
•
' "".,
•
' •
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1143
sentences of the appellants as s~ated above. The first
appellant, Badri, runs a school for small boys in the
Badri Rai
same village about 50 yards away from the shop a.forev.
said of the second appellant. On August 22, 1953, the
state of Bihar
First . Informant, who, holding the position of an
Inspector of police, was in charge of the police station,
made a seizure of certain ornaments and molten silver
from a vacant building in front of the house of the
second appellant, Ramji. Those omaments were being
melted by six strangers coming from distant places,
with implements for melting, said to have been
supplied by Ramji. The seizure was made on the
suspicion that the ornaments and the molten silver
were stolen property, which were to be sold to Ramji
in a shape which could not be identified with any
stolen property.
After making the seizure-list of the
properties, thus seized, the police officer arrested
Ramji, as also the other six strangers. Ramji was
released on bail that very day. Police investigations
ints;i the case, thus started, followed.
During that
period, on August 24, 1953, at about 7-30 p.m., the
Inspector was on his way from his residential quarters
to the police station, when both the appellants accosted
him on the road, and Ramji asked him to hush up the
case for a valuable consideration. The Inspector told
them that he could not talk to them on the road, and
that they should come to the police station. Thereafter, the Inspector reported the matter to his superior
officer, the D.S.P. (P.W. 8), and to the sub-inspector,
P.W. 9, jl.ttached to the same police station.
On
August 31, the same year, the first appellant, Badri,
came to the police station, saw the Inspector in the
central room of the thana, and offered to him a packet
wrapped in a piece of old newspaper, containing
Rs. 500 in currency notes. He told the Inspector,
(P. W. 1), that the second appellant, Ramji, had sent
the money through him in pursuance of the talk that
they had with him in the evening of August 24, as a
consideration for hushing up the case that was pending
against Ramji. At the time the offer was made, a
1 number of police officers besides a local merchant, '
(P.W. 7), were present there.
The Inspec"tor at once
•
Sinha ].
•
l
•
1144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
drew up the first information report of the offer of the
bribe on his own statement and prepared a seizure-list
BadYi Rai
v.
of the money, thus offered, and at once arrested Badri
stat• of Bihar and put him in the thana lock-up.
After the usual
Sinha ].
•
investigation the appellants were placed on their trial,
with the result indicated above.
Both the courts below have found that the prosecution case, a summary of which has been given above,
has been proved by good and reliable evidence, and
that the defence case that the prosecution was started
by the inspector out of spite and in order to deferid
himself against the consequences of wrongfully arresting Ramji, was unfounded. We are not impressed
with the halting criticism of the evidence adduced in
this case on behalf of the prosecution and accepted by
the courts below. Ordinarily, this Court does not
interfere with concurrent findings of fact.
The only serious question raised in this appeal is
the point raised on behalf of the second appellant,
Ramji, as to whether the statement made by the j;irst
appellant, Badri, on August 31, 1953, that he had been
sent by the second appellant with the money to be
offered by way of bribe to the police officer, was
admissible against him. The learned counsel for the
appellant was not able clearly to formulate his grounds
of objection to the admissibility of that piece of
evidence, which is the basis of the charge against both
the accused persons. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, is a complete answer to this contention.
The section is in these terms :-
•
"10. Where there is reasonable ground to believe
that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an . actionable wrong,
anything said, done or written by any one of such
persons in reference to their common intention, after
the time when such intention was first entertained by
any one of thei:n, is a relevant fact as against each of
the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the
purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as
for the purpose of showing that any such person· was
' a party to it. "
The incidenb of August 24, when both the appellant~
•
•
• ..
r
\
'
•
J
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1145
approached the inspector with the proposal that he
should hush up the case against the second appellant,
Badri Rai
for which he would be amply rewarded, is clear
v.
evidence of the two persons having conspired to comstat• of Bihar
mit t4e offence of bribing a public servant in connection with the discharge of his public duties. There
cannot, therefore, be the least doubt that the court
had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants
had entered into a conspiracy to commit the offence.
Therefore, the charge under s. 120B had been properly
framed against both of them. That being so, anything
said or done by any one of the two appellants, with
reference to the common intention, namely, t,he conspiracy to offer bribe, was equally admissible against
both of them. The statement made by the first appellant on August 31, that he had been sent by the
second appellant to make the offer of the bribe in
order to hush up the case which wasJthen under
investigation, is admissible not only against the mij>ker
of the statement-the first appellant-but also against
the second appellant, whose agent the former was, in
pursuance of the object of the conspiracy. That statement is admissible not only to •prove that the second
appellant had constituted the first appellant his agent
in the perpetration of the crime, as also to. prove the
existence of the conspiracy itself. The -incident of
August 24, is evidence that the intention to commit
the crime had been entertained by both of: them .on or
before that date. Anything said or done or written by
any one of the two conspirators on and after that date
until the "object of the conspiracy had been accomplished, is evidence against both of them.
It was faintly suggested on behalf of the second
appellant, that the charge under s. 120B of the Indian
Penal Code, had been deliberately added by the prosecution in order to make the first appellant's statement
of August 31, admissible against the second appellant,
as otherwise it could not have been used as evidence
against him.
As already indicated, the iRcident of
August 24, is a clear indication of the existence of the
conspiracy, and the court \vas perfectly justified in •
drawing up the charge under s. 120B''al-so, It is no
•
Sinha ].
•
t
•
•
1146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
Badri Rai
v.
Stale of Bihar
answer in Jaw to say, that unless the charge under
that section had been framed, the act or statement of
one could not be admissible against the other.
Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, has been deliberately enacted 'in order to make such acts and stateSinha ].
•
ments of a co-conspirator admissible against the' whole
body of conspirators, because of the nature of the
crime.
A conspiracy is hatched m secrecy and
executed in darkness. Naturally, therefore, it is not
feasible for the prosecution to connect each isolated
act or statement of one accused with the acts or statements of the others, unless there is a common bond
linking all of them together. Ordinarily, specially in
a criminal case, one person cannot be made responsible
for the acts'or statements of another. It is only when
there is evidence of a concerted action in furtherance
of a common intention to commit a crime, that the
law has introduced this rule of common responsibility,
on the principle that every one concerned in a conspiracy is acting as the agent of the rest of them.
As
·soon as the court has reasonable grounds to believe
that there is identity of interest or community of purpose between a number.of persons, any act done, or
any statement or declaration made, by any one of the
co-conspir31tors is, nalturally, held to be the act or
statement of the other conspirators, if the act or the
declaration has any relation to the object of the conspiracy. Otherwise, stray acts done in darkness in
prosecution of an object hatched in secrecy, may not
become intelligible without reference to the common
purpose running through the chain of acts 'or illegal
omissions attributable to individual members of the
conspiracy.
It was also suggested that the statement made by the
first appellant on August 31, about the purpose of the
payment, having been made after the payment, was
not admissible in evidence because the object of the
conspiracy had been accomplished before the statement in question was made.
Reliance was placed in
this connection upon the decision of their Lordships of
• the Judicial Committee in Mirza Akbar v. The King
\
,
Emperor.('). ·But'that decision is itself an answer to the
(1) (1940) L.R. 67 I.A. 336. ,
•
r
•
I
J
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1147
contention raised. The paymertt was made, and the
statement that it was being made with a view to hushing up the ca.se against the second appellant is a part
of the same transaction, that is to say, the statement
accompanied the act of payment of the bribe. Hence,
it cannot be said that the statement was made after
the object of the ~JOnspiracy had already been accomplished. The object of the conspiracy was the hushing
up of the criminal case against the second appellant ·
by bribing the public servant who was in charge of the
investigation of the case. The object of the conspiracy
was yet far from being accomplished when the statement in question was made. The leading case on
the subject is that of R. v. Blake (1).
That decision is
·an authority both for the positive and the negative
aspects of the question. It lays down what is admissible and what is not admissible. It held that the
documents actually used in effectuating the objects of
the conspiracy, were admissible, and that .those docume11ts which had been created by one of the conspirators after the object of the conspiracy had been
achieved, were not admissible.
Section 10 of the
Indian Evidence Act is on the ~ame lines. It is manifest that the statement in question in the present case
was made by the first appellant in the colil.rse of the
conspiracy, and accompanied the act of the payment
of the money, and is G!early covered by the provisions
of s. 10, quoted above. It must, therefore, be held
that there is no substance in the only question of law
raised in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
(r) (1844) 6 Q.B. ~26; 115 E.R. 49 .
•
Badri Rai
v.
State of Bihar
Sinha ].
•
•
•