# BADRIDAS DAGA v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX

- **Citation:** [1959] 1 S.C.R. 690
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Bench:** Venkatarama Aiyar, Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/badridas-daga-v-the-commissioner-of-income-tax-1538
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Income Tax-Deduction-Misappropriation by employee-Loss
incidental to the conduct of the business--Indian Income-tax Act,
I922 (II of I922), s. IO(I), (z)(xi), (z)(xv).
The appellant engaged an agent for the purposes of carrying
on his business and conferred on him large powers of manage~
ment including authority to operate on bank accounts.
While
acting under such authority the agent \vithdrew moneys from
the bank and used them for the discharge of his personal debts.
The appellant was able to recover from the agent only a parl of
the amount misappropriated by him, and the balance had to be
written off at the end of the accounting year as irrecoverable.
The question ~as \vhether the amount which was misappropriated and found~·irrecoverable was allowable as a deduction under
the Indian Income-tax Act in determining the profits of the
appellant:
Held, that the amount in question is not allowable either as
a bad debt under s. 10(2)(xi) or as a business expenditute under
. s. 10(2)(x") of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It can, however,
be deducted in computing the profits of the appellant under
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
s. 10(1) of the Act as a loss incidental to the carrying on of his
r958
busin~ss.
Badridas Daga
Where an agent or an employee of a businessman in charge
of the business is given authority to operate on the bank accourits Th C v. . .
d
· h
·
.
e ommissioner
an wit draws moneys m the purported exercise of that authof 1
1
rity, his action is referable to his character as such authorised
0
ncome- ax
agent or employee and any loss resulting from misappropriation
of the money by him would be one incidental to the carrying on
of the business, and it is not necessary to show that the money
was withdrawn for the conduct of the business.
Curtis v. ]. & G. Oldfield, (1925) 9 Tax Cas. 319 and Ramaswami Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, (1930)
I.LR. 53 Mad. 904, explained and distinguished.
Venkatachalapathy Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1951)
20 I.T.R. 363, Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incometax, (1955) 27 l.T.R. 700 and Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1955) 28 I.T.R. 128, approved.
Cr;IL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
149of1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December 22, 1954, of the former Nagpur
High Court in Misc. Civil Case No. 36 of 1954.
R. J. Ko"lah, J. M. Thakar, Ramesh A. Shroff, J. B.
Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for
the appellant.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
K. N. Rajagopa"la Sastri and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
1958. April 25.
The Judgment of the Court W!tS
delivered by
VENKATARAMA ArYAR J.-This is an a.Ppeal against
the judgment of the High Court of Nagpur in a refe.rence under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, hereinafter referred to as the Act. •
l'he appellant is the sole proprietor of a firm called
Bansilal Abirchand Kasturchand, which carries on
b11siness as money-lenders, dealers in shares and bullion
i1nd .ccmimission agents ~n B0m4ay, Calcutta a:r;i.d other
:Places. .He is a resident of ]3ik11.1:u:~r, a:r;i.d m!l>?J.ages tht:?
SS
Venkatarama
Aiyar ].
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959]
, 95s
business at the several places through agents. During
the relevant period, the agent of the firm at Bombay
Badridas Daga was one Chandratan, who held a power-of-attorney
... . .
dated May 13, 1944, conferring on him large powers
The Commissioner of management including authority to operate on
of Income-tax
·
· d
N
bank accounts. Durmg the per10 ,
~ ovember 15,
venkatarama
1944, to November 23, 1944, the agent withdrew from
Aiyar J.
the firm's bank account sums aggregating
to
Rs. 2,30,636-4-0, and applied them in satisfaction of
his personal debts incurred in speculative transactions.
On November 25, 1944, the cashier of the firm sent a
telegram to the appellant informing him of the true
state of affairs.
Thereupon, the appellant went to
Bombay on D

## Text

690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
z958
As regards the Madhya Pradesh Act we likewise
declare that it is constitutionally valid in so far as it
Mnhd. Hanij
Quareshi
prohibits the slaughter of cows of all ages and calves
v.
of cows, male and female, but that it is void in so far
The State of Biha• as it totally prohibits the slaughter of breeding bulls
-
and working bullocks without prescribing any test or
Da' c. J.
requirement as to their age or usefulness.
W c also
hold that the Act is valid in so far as it regulates the
slaughter of other animals under certificates granted
by the authorities mentioned therein.
In the premises we direct the respondent States not
~
April :15.
to enforce their respective Acts in so far as they have
'
just been declared voitl by us. The parties will bear
and pay their own costs of these applications.
Petitions partly allowed .
•
BADRIDAS DAGA
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
(VENKATARAMA AIYAR, GAJENDRAGADKAR and
A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Income Tax-Deduction-Misappropriation by employee-Loss
incidental to the conduct of the business--Indian Income-tax Act,
I922 (II of I922), s. IO(I), (z)(xi), (z)(xv).
The appellant engaged an agent for the purposes of carrying
on his business and conferred on him large powers of manage~
ment including authority to operate on bank accounts.
While
acting under such authority the agent \vithdrew moneys from
the bank and used them for the discharge of his personal debts.
The appellant was able to recover from the agent only a parl of
the amount misappropriated by him, and the balance had to be
written off at the end of the accounting year as irrecoverable.
The question ~as \vhether the amount which was misappropriated and found~·irrecoverable was allowable as a deduction under
the Indian Income-tax Act in determining the profits of the
appellant:
Held, that the amount in question is not allowable either as
a bad debt under s. 10(2)(xi) or as a business expenditute under
. s. 10(2)(x") of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It can, however,
be deducted in computing the profits of the appellant under
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
s. 10(1) of the Act as a loss incidental to the carrying on of his
r958
busin~ss.
Badridas Daga
Where an agent or an employee of a businessman in charge
of the business is given authority to operate on the bank accourits Th C v. . .
d
· h
·
.
e ommissioner
an wit draws moneys m the purported exercise of that authof 1
1
rity, his action is referable to his character as such authorised
0
ncome- ax
agent or employee and any loss resulting from misappropriation
of the money by him would be one incidental to the carrying on
of the business, and it is not necessary to show that the money
was withdrawn for the conduct of the business.
Curtis v. ]. & G. Oldfield, (1925) 9 Tax Cas. 319 and Ramaswami Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, (1930)
I.LR. 53 Mad. 904, explained and distinguished.
Venkatachalapathy Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1951)
20 I.T.R. 363, Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incometax, (1955) 27 l.T.R. 700 and Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1955) 28 I.T.R. 128, approved.
Cr;IL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
149of1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December 22, 1954, of the former Nagpur
High Court in Misc. Civil Case No. 36 of 1954.
R. J. Ko"lah, J. M. Thakar, Ramesh A. Shroff, J. B.
Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for
the appellant.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
K. N. Rajagopa"la Sastri and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
1958. April 25.
The Judgment of the Court W!tS
delivered by
VENKATARAMA ArYAR J.-This is an a.Ppeal against
the judgment of the High Court of Nagpur in a refe.rence under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, hereinafter referred to as the Act. •
l'he appellant is the sole proprietor of a firm called
Bansilal Abirchand Kasturchand, which carries on
b11siness as money-lenders, dealers in shares and bullion
i1nd .ccmimission agents ~n B0m4ay, Calcutta a:r;i.d other
:Places. .He is a resident of ]3ik11.1:u:~r, a:r;i.d m!l>?J.ages tht:?
SS
Venkatarama
Aiyar ].
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959]
, 95s
business at the several places through agents. During
the relevant period, the agent of the firm at Bombay
Badridas Daga was one Chandratan, who held a power-of-attorney
... . .
dated May 13, 1944, conferring on him large powers
The Commissioner of management including authority to operate on
of Income-tax
·
· d
N
bank accounts. Durmg the per10 ,
~ ovember 15,
venkatarama
1944, to November 23, 1944, the agent withdrew from
Aiyar J.
the firm's bank account sums aggregating
to
Rs. 2,30,636-4-0, and applied them in satisfaction of
his personal debts incurred in speculative transactions.
On November 25, 1944, the cashier of the firm sent a
telegram to the appellant informing him of the true
state of affairs.
Thereupon, the appellant went to
Bombay on December 3, 1944-, and on the 4th, cancelled the power-of.attorney given to the agent, and
by notice dated December 6, 1944, called upon him to
pay the amounts witr.drawn by him. The "agent
replied on December 8, 1944, admitting the misappropriation of the amounts and pleading for mercy. On
January 16, 1945, the appellant filed a suit against
him in the High Court of Bombay for recovery of
Rs. 2,30,636-4-0 and that was decreed on February 20,
1945. A sum of Rs. 28,000 was recovered from
Chandratan and adjusted towards the decree and the
balance of Rs. 2,02,442-13-9 was written off at the end
of the accounting year as irrecoverable.
Before the Income-tax authorities, the dispute
related to the question whether this amount of
Rs. 2,02,442-13-9 was an admissible deduction. The
Tribunal found that the amount in question represented the loss sustained by the appellant owing to
misappropriation by his agent, Chandratan, but held
on the authority of the decision in Curtis v. J. & G.
OUfield, Limited (') that it was not a trading loss and
therefore copld not be allowed.
On the application of
the appellant, the Tribunal referred the following
question of law for the decision of the High Court,
Nagpur:
. "Whether the said sum of Rs. 2,02,442-13-9 being
part of the amount embezzled by the assessee's Munim
· is allowable as a deduction under the Indian Income-
(•) (1925). 9 Tax, Cas. 319.
.•
•
I
l
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
tax Act either under Section 10( I) or under the general
x958
principles of determining the profit and loss of the
.
assessee or Section 10(2)(xv)? "
Badridas Da&a
The learned Judges held that the case was governed The c0.:;;..issio
by the decision in Curtis v. J. &: G. Oldfield, Limited (1),
of Income-ta:''
and answered the question against the appellant. An
application under s. 66(A)(2) for a certificate was also
Venkatarama
dismissed and thereafter, the appellant applied for
Aiyar J,
and obtained leave to appeal to this Court under Art.
136, and that is how the appeal comes before us.
The question whether moneys embezzled by an
agent or employee are allowable as deduction in computing the profits of a business under s. 10 of the Act
has come up for consideration frequently before the
Indian courts, and the decisions have not been quite
uniform. Before discussing them, it is necessary that
we sliould examine the principles that are in law
applicable to the determination of the question. Three
grounds have been put forward in support of the claim
for deduction: (1) that the loss sustained by reason of
embezzlement is a bad debt allowable under s. l0(2)(xi)
of the Act; (2) that it is a business expense falling
within s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act; and (3) that it is a trading loss, which must be taken into account in computing the profits under s. 10(1) of the Act. As regards
the first ground, the authorities have consistently held
that the deduction is not admissible under s. 10(2)(xi)
of the Act, and that, in our view, is correct. A debt
arises out of a contract between the parties, express
or implied, and when an agent misappropriates monies
belonging to his employer in fraud of him and in
breach of his obligations to him, it cannot be said that
he owes those monies under any agreement. He is no
doubt liable in law to make good that amount, but
that is not an obligation arising out of a contract,
express or implied. Nor does i1; make a difference that
in the accounts of the business the amounts embezzled
are shown as debits, the amounts realised · towards
them, if any, as credits, and the balance is finally
written •off. They are merely journal entries adjusting
the accounts and do not import a contractual !iability ..
(1) (1925) 9 Tax Cas. 319.
•
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
'958
Nor can a claim for deduction be admitted under
.
s. 10(2)(xv), because moneys which are withdrawn by
Badridas Daga the employee out of the business till without authority
The co,;:;,.issioner and in fraud of the proprietor can in no sense be said
of Income-tax
to be " an expenditure laid out or expended wholly
and exclusively " for the purpose of the business. The
Venkatarama
controversy therefore narrows itself to the question
Aiyar J.
whether amounts lost through embezzlement by an
employee are a trading loss which could be deducted
in computing the profits of a business under s. 10(1).
It is to be noted that whiles. 10(1) imposes a charge
on the profits or gains of a trade, it does not provide
how those profits are to be computed. Section 10(2)
enumerates various items which are admissible as
deductions, but it is well settled that they are not
exhaustive of all allowances which could be mllde in
ascertaining profits taxable under s. 10(1). In Incometax Commissioner v. Ohitnavis (1 ), the point for decision
was whether a bad debt could be deducted under
s. 10( 1) of the Act, there having been in the Act, as it
then stood, no provision corresponding to s. 10(2)(xi)
for deduction of such a debt. In answering the question in the affirmative, Lord Russel observed :
•
"Although the Act nowhere in terms authorizes
the deduction of bad debts of business, such a deduction is necessarily allowable.
What are chargeable
in income-tax in respect of a business are the profits
and gains of a year; and in assessing the amount of
the profits and gains of a year account must necessarily be taken of all losses incurred, otherwise you
would not arrive at the true profits and gains."
It is likewise well settled that profits and gains which
are liable to be taxed under s. 10(1) are what are
understood to be such according to ordinary commercial principles. "The word ' profits ' ...... is to be
understood", observed Lord Halsbury in Gresham
Life Assurance Society v. Styles('), "in its natural and
proper sense-in a sense which no commercial man
would misunderstand ". Referring to these observa-
(1) (1932) L. R. 59 I.A. 290, 296, 297 .
(2) (1892) A.C. 309, 315; 3 Tax Cas. 185, 188.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
tions, Lord Macmillan said in Pondicherry Railway Co.
r95B
v. Income-tax Commissioner (1):
Badridas Daga
" English authorities can only be utilized with
v.
caution in the· consideration of Indian income-tax The Commissioner
cases owing to the differences in the relevant · legislaof Income-tax
tion, but the principle laid down by Lord Chancellor
Halsbury in Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Styles (2),
Venkatarama
Aiyar J.
is of general application unaffected by the specialities
of the English tax system. "
The result is that when a claim is made for a deduction for which there is no specific provision· in s. 10(2),
whether it is admissible or not will depend on whether,
having regard to accepted commercial practice and
trading principles, it can be said to arise out of the
carrying on of the business and to be incidental to it.
If tbat is established, then the deduction must be
allowed, provided of course there is no prohibition
against it, express or implied, in the Act.
These being the governi11g principles, in deciding
whether loss resulting from embezzlement by an employee in a business is admissible as a deduction
under s. 10(1) what has to be considered is whether it
arises out of the carrying on of the business and is
incidental to it. Viewing the question as a businessman would, it seems difficult to maintain that it does
not.
A business especially such as is calculated to
yield taxable profits has to be carried on through
agents, cashiers, clerks and peons. Salary and remuneration paid to them are admissible under s. 10(2)(xv)
as expenses incurred for the purpose of the business.
If employment of agents is incidental to the carrying
on of business, it must logically follow that losses
which are incidental to such employment are also
incidental to the carrying on of the business. Human
nature being what it is, it is impossible w rule out the
possibility of an employee taking advantage of his
position as such ·employee and misappropriating the
funds of his employer, and the loss arising from such
misap.!Jropriation must be held to arise out of the
carrying on of business and· to be inciden~al t() it~
(1) (1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 239, 252.
(2) (1892) A.C. 309, 315; 3 Tax Cas. 185, 188,' •
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
And that is how it would be dealt with according to
ordinary commercial principles of trading.
Badridas Daga
v.
At the same time, it should be emphasised that the
The Commission" loss for which a deduction could be made under s. 10(1)
of Income-ta•
must be one that springs directly from the carrying
on of the business and is incidental to it and not any
V enkalaratua
Aiyar ].
•
loss sustained by the assessee, even if it has some ·
connection with his business. If, for example, a thief
were to break overnight into ~.he premises of a moneylender and run away with fonds secured therein, that
must result in the depletion of the resources available
to him for lending and the loss must, in that sense,
be a business loss, but it is not one incurred in the running of the business, but is one to which all owners of
properties are exposed whether they do business or
not. The loss in such a case may be said to foJl on
the assessee not as a person carrying on business but
as owner of funds.
This distinction, though fine, is
very material as on it will depend whether deduction
could be made under s. 10(1) or not.
We may now examine the authorities in the light of
the principles stated above.
In Jagarnath Therani v.
Commissioner of Income-tax (1), the facts were that the
assessee who was carrying on business entrusted a
sum of Rs. 25,000 to his gumastha for payment to a
creditor, but he embezzled it. The question referred
for the opinion of the High Court was whether that
sum could be allowed as deduction in the computation
of profits. In answering it in the affirmative, the
learned Judges observed that according to the practice
obtaining in England, sums embezzled by employees
were allowed as deductions and referred to statements
of the law to that effect from Sanders' Income-tax and
Super-tax, Murray and Carters' Guide to Income-tax
Practice and• to the following passage in Snellings'
Dictionary of Income-tax and Super-Tax Practice:
" If a loss by embezzlement can be said to be
necessarily incurred in carrying on the ·trade it is
allowable as deduction from profits. In an ordinary
case it springs directly from the necessity of deputing
(r) (1925) I.L.R.
04 Pat. 385.
.
....,
•
• ..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
certain duties to an employee, and should therefore be
allowed."
Badridas Daga
They accordingly allowed the deduction as "a loss
v.
incidental to the conduct of the business".
The Commissioner
In Ramaswami Ohettiar v. Commissioner of Jn.
of Income-ta:¥
come-Tax, Madras (1), the assessee was carrying on
Venkatarama
banking business in several places in India and in
Aiy11r 1.
Burma. On October 21, 1926 thieves broke into the
strong room in the business premises at Moulmiengyum
and stole cash and currency notes of the value of
Rs. 9,335.
The question was whether this amount
could be allowed as a deduction. It was held by the
majority of the Judges that it could not be. In the
judgment of the learned Chief Justice, the law was
thus stated:
:' If any one is paid a sum due to him as profits
and he puts that in his pocket and on his way home
is robbed of it, it would be, I think, difficult to contend that such a loss was incidental to his business.
Still more so when he has reached his home and put
those profits in a strong room or some other place
regarded by him to be a place of safety. I can well
understand that, in cases where the collection of profits or payment of debts due is entrusted to a gumas.
tha or servant for collection and that person runs
away with the money or otherwise improperly deals
with it, the assessee should be allowed a deduction
because such a loss as that would be incidental to his
business. He has to employ servants for . the purpose
of collecting sums of money due to him and there is
the risk that such servant may prove to be dishonest
and instead of paying the profits over to him, convert
them to his own use.
But I cannot distinguish the
present case from the case of any professional man or
trader who, having collected his profits, i~subsequently
robbed of them by a stranger to his business. In this
case, none of the thieves were the· then servants of
the assessee, although one of them had formerly been
his cook."
These "observations, while they support the right of
the assessee to deduction of loss resulthig J'roni •
(1) (1930) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 904. 9o6, 907.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
z95B
embezzlement by an employee, also show the extent
and limits of that right.
Badridas Daga
v.
In Bansidhar Onkarmal v. Commissioner of IncomeThe commission" tax (1), there was a theft of money by an accountant,
of Income-tax
but it took place after the office hours, and it was held,
following the decision in Ramaswami Chettiar v. ComVenkatarama
missioner of Income-tax(') that it could not be allowed
Aiyar f.
as a deduction under s. 10(1) of the Act, as it was not
incidental to the carrying on of the trade. But it was
observed by Narasimham J. who delivered the lead-
•
ing judgment that it might have. made a difference if
c
the theft had been by the accountant during the office
<
hours. In Venkatachalapathy Iyer v. Commissioner of
Income-tax('), the assessees were a firm of merchants
engaged in the business of selling yarn. Its accountant
was one Rajarathnam Iyengar, whose duty it was to
receive cash on sales, make disbursements and maintain accounts.
He duly entered all the transactions
in the cash book but when striking the balance at the
end of each day he short-totalled the receipts and overtotal!ed the disbursements and misappropriated the
difference. The question was whether the amounts
thus embezzled could be deducted. On a review of the
authorities, Satyanarayana Rao and Raghava Rao JJ.
held that the loss was incidental to the carrying
on of the business and should be allowed. The appellant contends that this decision is decisive in his
favour ; but the learned Judges of the Court below were
of the opinipn that on the facts it was distinguishable
and that the present case fell within the decision in
Curtis v. J. & G. Oldfield, Limited (').
It is necessary to examine the decision in Curtis v.
J. & G. Oldfield(') somewhat closely, as the main controversy in the Indian courts has been as to what was
precisely determined therein. There, the facts were
that the managing director of a company who was in
exclusive control of its business, had, availing himself of his position as such managing director, withdrawn large amounts from time to time and applied
them to his own personal affairs. This wen't on for
(!) [1949] 17 I.T.R. z47.
(3) [1951] zo I.T.
0R. 363.
(z) (1930) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 904. 906, 907 .
(4) (19z5) g Tax Cas. 319.
•
.,.,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
several years prior to his death, and thereafter, the
z958
fraud was discovered, and the amounts overdrawn by
h•
'tt
ff
'
bl
Th
t'
Badridas Daga
im were wn en o
as irrecovera e.
e ques 10n
v.
was , whether these amounts could be allowed , as a The Commissioner
deduction, and it was answered in the negative by
of Income-tax
Rowlatt J. Now, it should be observed that the learned Judge did not say that· amounts embezzled by an
Venkatarama
employee in the course of business would not be
Aiyar J.
admissible deductions. On
the other
hand,
he
observed:
"I quite think, with Mr. Latter, that if you have
a business ..... .in the course of which you have to
employ subordinates, and owing to the negligence or
the dishonesty of the subordinates some of the receipts
of the business do not find their way into the till, or
some of the bills are not collected at all, or something
of that sort, that may be an expense connected with
and arising out of the tmde in the most complete sense
of the word."
He went on to observe :
"I do not see that there is any evidence at all
that there was a loss in the trade in that respect. It
simply means that the assetfl of the Company, moneys
which the Company had got and which had got home
to the Company, got into the control of the Managing
Director of the Company, and he took them out. It
seems to me that what has happened is that he has
made away with receipts of the Company de hors the
trade altogether in virtue of his position as Managing
Director in the office and being in a position to do
exactly what he likes.''
Thus, what the learned Judge really finds is that the
embezzlement was not connected with the carrying on
of the trade but was outside it, and on that finding,
the decision can only be that the deducti<ln should be
disallowed. But the learned Judges in the Court below
would appear to have read the above observations
as meaning that, as a rule of law, embezzlements
made prior to the receipts of the amounts by the
assessees would be incidental to the carrying on of the
trade and therefore admissible, but that embemlementS'
89
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
r958
made after receipt are not connected with the carrying on of the trade and are therefore inadmissible.
Badrida-< Daga W d
t
d th
b
t'
It .
t'
e o no so rea
. ose o serva mns.
is a ques 10n
7'ht Com';;,issioner turning on the facts of each case whether the
of Income-tax - embezzlement in respect of which deduction is claimed
took place in the carrying qn of the business, and the
Venkatarama
observations of the learned Judge that it did not so
Aiyar J.
take place have reference to the facts of that case, and
can afford no assistance in deciding whether in a
given case the embezzlement was incidental to the
conduct of the business or not.
Now, in Curtis v. J. & G. Oldfield Limited (1), the
company was doing business in wine and spirit, and in
such a business it is possible to hold that when once
the price is realised and put into the bank, the trading
has ceased and that the subsequent operatiops on
the bank account are not incidental to the carrying
on of the trade. But here, we are dealing with a
banking business, which consists in making advances,
realising them and making fresh advances, and for
that purpose, it is necessary not merely to deposit
amounts in ba.nks but also to withdraw them. That is
to say, a continuous operation on the bank account is
incidental to the conduct of the business. The theory
that when once moneys are put into the bank they
have "got home" and that their subsequent withdrawal from the bank would be de hors the business,
will be altogether out of place in a business such as
banking. It will be a wholly unrealistic view to take
of the matter, to hold that the realisations have
reached the till when they are deposited in the bank,
and that that marks the terminus of the business
activities in money-lending.
It should also be mentioned that in Curtis v. J. & G.
Oldfield (1)
t~ough the assessee was a company, it
was found that the shares were all held by the
members of the Oldfield family, that the company
had no auditor and no minutes book, that there was
" an almost entire absence of balance sheets", and that
one of the members, Mr. J.E. Oldfield, was in manage-
. ment with wide powers. In view of the fact that he
(1) (1925) 9 T"'i Cas. 319.
'
S.C.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
had a large number of shares in the company and that
r958
it was in substance a private company, his withd
1
ld b
l'k
t
d
.
h'
Badridas Daga
rawa s wou
e more .1 ea par ner over rawmg
is
account with the firm than- an agent embezzling the The co,;;,.issioner
funds of his employer, and it could properly be held
of Income-tax
that such overdrawing has nothing to do with the
trading activities of the firm, whose profits are to
Venkatarama
be taxed. It would, therefore, be an error to suppose
Aiyar J.
that the observations made by Rowlatt J. in the
above context could be regarded as an authority for
the broad proposition that as a matter of law, and
irrespective of the n.ature of business, there could be
no business activities with reference to moneys
after they have been collected, and that, in consequence, embezzlement thereof could not be incidental
to the carrying on of business. And we should further
add "that it would make no difference in the
admissibility of the deduction whether the employee
occupies a subordinate position in the establishment
or is an agent with large powers of management.
Subsequent to the decision now under appeal, the
Bombay High Court had occasion to consider this
question in Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (1). On a review of the authorities including
the decision in Curtis v. J. & G. Oldfiekl, Limited (2),
Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J. held that loss caused
to a business by defalcation of an employee was a
trading loss, and that it could be deducted under
s. 10(1). In Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Commissioner
of Income-tax (3), an emplOyee who had been entrusted
with the funds of a company for purposes of distribution among sugarcane growers in accordance with
statutory rules, was robbed of them on the way. It
was held by Hiamaswami and Sahai JJ. that the loss
was incidental to the conduct of the· trade, and must
be allowed. we . agree
with
the
aecisions
in
Venkatachalapathy Iyer v. Commissioner of Incometax (4), Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (1) and Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd. v.
Oommi1;sioner of Income-tax (3).
(1) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 700.
(3) [1955] 28 I.T.R. 128.
(2) (1925) 9 Tax Cas. 319.
(.i) [1951] 20 I.T.R. 363.
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
'958
It was argued for the respondent that there was no
evidence, much less proof, that when Chandratan
Bad•idas Dag« withdrew funds from the bank, he did so for the
The comv;.ission" purpose of making any advance, and that, therefore,
of Income-tax
the withdrawal could not be held to have been for the
conduct of the trade. That, in our opinion, is not
Venkatarama
necessary. When once it is established that Chandra tan
Aiya. f.
was in charge of the business, that he had authority
to operate on the bank accounts, and that he withdrew the moneys in the purported exercise of that
authority, his action is referable to his character ;,,s
agent, and any loss resulting from misappropriation
of funds by him would be a loss incidental to the
carrying on of the business. It was also contended
that the power-of-attorney dated May 13, 1944, under
which Chandratan was constituted agent related not
only to the business of the appellant but also to his
private affairs, and that there was no proof that the
embezzlement was in respect of the business assets of
the appellant and not of his private funds. No such
question was raised before the Income-tax authorities,
and their finding assumes that the moneys which were
misappropriated were business funds.
We are also
not satisfied that, on its true construction, the
authority conferred on the agent by the power-of.
attorney extended to the personal affairs of the
appellant.
•
In the result, we are of opinion that the loss sustained by the appellant as a result of misappropriation
by Chandratan is one which is incidental to the carrying on of his business, and that it should therefore be
deducted in computing the profits under s. 10(1) of the
Act. In this view, the order of the lower court must
be set aside and the reference answered in the
affirmative. The · appellant will get his costs of
this appeal and of the reference in the Court below.
Appeal allowed .
•
,