# Baij Nath Prasad Tripalhi v. Tht State of Bhopal

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 657
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-10-18
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1956
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/baij-nath-prasad-tripalhi-v-tht-state-of-bhopal-1358
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
before, the point is
really concluded by decisions of
the highest
tribunal, · decisions
which correctly lay
down the law.
The result therefore is that these petitions are devoitl of all merit and must be dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
NISAR ALI
v.
THE ST ATE OF JJTT AR PRADESH
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR
First information repo1·t-Repon made by accused-Use ofBurden of proof in criminal ,·ases-Witness disbelieved as to part of
his testimony...:... Whether should be 1·ejected in tote>.
A first information
report is not a substantive
piece of
evidence and can onlv be used to corroborate the statement of the
maker under s. 157 ~£ the Evidence ·Act or ID contradict it under
s. 145 of that Act.
It ·cannot be used as evidence against the
maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses.
It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
innocence of an accused person is presumed till otherwise proved.
It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
subject to any statutory exception.
·
The ma~im falsus in uno, falms in omnibus has
not received
general
acceptance in different · jurisdictions in India, nor has it
come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule
of caution.
All that it amounts to is tha~ in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded.
The doctrine merely invoh-es the question of weight of evidence
which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but ·it is
not a mandatory rule of e,·idencc.
CtttMINAL
APPELLATE
JultlsDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 150 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
order dated October 18, 1955, of the
Allahabad
High
Court in
Government Appeal No. 60•of 1953 arising
out of the
judgment and order dated July 8, 1952, of
the Court of
Sessions Judge at Bareilly in
Criminal.
Sessions Trial No. 27 of 1952.
Daul•t Ram Prem and P. C. Agarwa/a, for the
appellant.
5-79 S. C. India/59
1957
Baij Nath Prasad
Tripalhi
v.
Tht State of Bhopal
S. ti. Dass J.
1957
F1bruary 14.
1957
Nii"ar Ali
v
Tiu Sl6teof
Uttar Prad~sh
Ka;.r J.
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1957]
Cyan Clzand Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondtnt.
1957. February 14.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
KAPUR /.-The appellant
along
with one Qudrat
Ullah was tried for the
murder on one Sabir.
The
latter was tried under s. 302 read with s. 114 of the
Indian Penal Code for ahetment, and the former under
s. 302 I.P .C.
Both the accused were acquitted by the
learned Sessions Judge of Bareilly. But the
State took
an appeal to the
Allahabad
High
Court against the
appellant only and the
judgment of acquittal
in his
case was reversed and
he was convicted under s. 302
l.P.C. and sentenced
to
'transportation
for
life'.
Against the judgment of the High Court the appellant
has brought this appeal hy Special Leave.
The facts which have given rise to the appeal arc that
Sabir was murdered on the 11th May, 1951, at about
6-30 p.m.
The First Information
Report was made by
Qudrat Ullah the other accused at 6-45 p.m. the same
day, i.e., within about 15 minutes of the occurrence.
The pcosccution case was shat there was an exchange of
abuses between the deceased and the appellant
near
the shop of the
First Informant,
Qudrat Ullah.
The
cause of the quarrei was that on the evening of
the
occurrence while Qudrat Ullah was sitting in his shop
and the deceased was sitting just' below
the shop, the
appellant came out of his 'house an<l on seeing him, the
deceased
asked him as to why he
was in
such a
"dishevelhl condition", which
annoyed
the appc11ant
and gave rise to an
exchange of abuses.
On hearinl'l
this noise, the prosecution witnesse< arrived at the spot
and saw the appellant and the deceased grappling with
each
othe1".
The appellant
is
stated to have asked
Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which Qudrat
Ullah did ; this
knife is
Ex. 'II',
with
which the
appella

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
before, the point is
really concluded by decisions of
the highest
tribunal, · decisions
which correctly lay
down the law.
The result therefore is that these petitions are devoitl of all merit and must be dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
NISAR ALI
v.
THE ST ATE OF JJTT AR PRADESH
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR
First information repo1·t-Repon made by accused-Use ofBurden of proof in criminal ,·ases-Witness disbelieved as to part of
his testimony...:... Whether should be 1·ejected in tote>.
A first information
report is not a substantive
piece of
evidence and can onlv be used to corroborate the statement of the
maker under s. 157 ~£ the Evidence ·Act or ID contradict it under
s. 145 of that Act.
It ·cannot be used as evidence against the
maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses.
It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
innocence of an accused person is presumed till otherwise proved.
It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
subject to any statutory exception.
·
The ma~im falsus in uno, falms in omnibus has
not received
general
acceptance in different · jurisdictions in India, nor has it
come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule
of caution.
All that it amounts to is tha~ in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded.
The doctrine merely invoh-es the question of weight of evidence
which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but ·it is
not a mandatory rule of e,·idencc.
CtttMINAL
APPELLATE
JultlsDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 150 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
order dated October 18, 1955, of the
Allahabad
High
Court in
Government Appeal No. 60•of 1953 arising
out of the
judgment and order dated July 8, 1952, of
the Court of
Sessions Judge at Bareilly in
Criminal.
Sessions Trial No. 27 of 1952.
Daul•t Ram Prem and P. C. Agarwa/a, for the
appellant.
5-79 S. C. India/59
1957
Baij Nath Prasad
Tripalhi
v.
Tht State of Bhopal
S. ti. Dass J.
1957
F1bruary 14.
1957
Nii"ar Ali
v
Tiu Sl6teof
Uttar Prad~sh
Ka;.r J.
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1957]
Cyan Clzand Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondtnt.
1957. February 14.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
KAPUR /.-The appellant
along
with one Qudrat
Ullah was tried for the
murder on one Sabir.
The
latter was tried under s. 302 read with s. 114 of the
Indian Penal Code for ahetment, and the former under
s. 302 I.P .C.
Both the accused were acquitted by the
learned Sessions Judge of Bareilly. But the
State took
an appeal to the
Allahabad
High
Court against the
appellant only and the
judgment of acquittal
in his
case was reversed and
he was convicted under s. 302
l.P.C. and sentenced
to
'transportation
for
life'.
Against the judgment of the High Court the appellant
has brought this appeal hy Special Leave.
The facts which have given rise to the appeal arc that
Sabir was murdered on the 11th May, 1951, at about
6-30 p.m.
The First Information
Report was made by
Qudrat Ullah the other accused at 6-45 p.m. the same
day, i.e., within about 15 minutes of the occurrence.
The pcosccution case was shat there was an exchange of
abuses between the deceased and the appellant
near
the shop of the
First Informant,
Qudrat Ullah.
The
cause of the quarrei was that on the evening of
the
occurrence while Qudrat Ullah was sitting in his shop
and the deceased was sitting just' below
the shop, the
appellant came out of his 'house an<l on seeing him, the
deceased
asked him as to why he
was in
such a
"dishevelhl condition", which
annoyed
the appc11ant
and gave rise to an
exchange of abuses.
On hearinl'l
this noise, the prosecution witnesse< arrived at the spot
and saw the appellant and the deceased grappling with
each
othe1".
The appellant
is
stated to have asked
Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which Qudrat
Ullah did ; this
knife is
Ex. 'II',
with
which the
appellant stabbed the deceased and then fled away. As
a result of the injuries the deceased fell down in front
of Qudrat Ullah's shop ; son1e
witnesses
have
stated
that he fell on the wooden plank in front of the shop.
Qudrat Ullah picked
up the knife
which
had been
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
dropped by
the appellant, put the deceased in a rickshaw and took him to the hospital from where he went
to the Police Station and made the
First
Information
Report.
An objection has been taken to the admissibility
of this report as it was made by a person
who
was a
co-accused.
A First
Information
Report is
not a
substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to
corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157 of
the Evidence Act or to contradict it
under ·s. 145 of
that Act.
It cannot be used as evidence
against
the
mdker at the trial if he himself
becomes an accused,
nor to corroborate or
contradict other witnesses.
In
this case, therefore, it is not evidence.
The Sub-Inspector went to the spot, started investigation and arrested the appellant the same evening at
his house. The post-mortem examination of the deceased
showed injuries on the person of the deceased
and,
according to the doctor, death was due to.shock and
haemorrhage on account of the punctured
wound in
the chest,
causing
injuries to
the lungs
and thc>se
injuries could be caused with a sharp-edged weapon.
The appellarn and the deceased both belong to a sect
of Jogis.
Evidence discloses that the deceased and the
appellant were quite friendly
with each other, and so
were the deceased and Qudrat Ullah,
who is a butcher
and had a shop which is a part of his house.
Adjacent
to the shop is the house of the appellant. Eye witnesses
of the occurrence were Yad Ali, P.W. 1, Banne, P.W. 2
and Mohd. Ahmed, P.W. 3.
Having been told by the
sister of the deceased as to the
occurrence,
Ashraft,
P.W. 4 came to the spot later and found the deceased
lying
unconscious.
Shakir, P.W. 5,
younger
brother
of the deceased, on arriving near the shop of Qudrat
Ullah heard the appellant and the deceased exchanging
abuses, but was not a witness of the assault as just at
that time he had gone, at the reque.::t of Qudrat Ullah,
to fill his Chillum for the hookka and when he came
back he found the deceased lying unconscious and the
appellant running away towards his house.
The evidence of Yad Ali, P. W. 1, is that he heard
an exchange of abuses between
the deceased and the
-appellant and when he moved about 4 or 5 paces he
1957
.Nisar Ali
v.
T 1" State •f
Uttar Praduh
Kapur J.
1957
Nisar Ali
v.
Tiu State of
Uttar Pradesh
Kapur].
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
saw them grappling with each
other.
The appellant
had
the deceased "in his grip",
he asked
Qudrat
Ullah to hand
over a knife to him
which the latter
did and with it the
appellant stabbed
the
deceased
and then went away to his house.
The
statement of
Banne is similar
and so is the statement of
Mohd.
Ahmed, P. W. 3.
This evidence was not accepted by
the learned
Sessions Judge and he acquitted both the
accused.
The
State took an appeal only against the
appellant which was allowed by the High Court. It held
"We may
concede
that
the eye-witnesses
have
falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah
by deposing
that he
handed over his knife to the respondent on his demand.
There was no enmity between him and
Sabir
and he
had no motive to get him killed by the respondent.
It does not at all appear probable that after abetting
the murder of Sabir he at once took him on a rickshaw
to the hospital and from there went at once to the
police station and lodged a report against the respondent.
This conduct of Qudrat Ullah is so inconsistent
with the part said to have been played by him in the
occurrence
that we have
little hesitation in rejecting
the evidence about the part played by him."
The High Court, however, accepted the testimony
of the eye-witnesses as against
the appellant's
guilt
and observed :
"We are satisfied that the prosecution
has
fully
established the
case against the
respondent.
There
is not
the
slightest
doubt
about
his
guilt.
The
presumption of innocence has been fully rebutted by
the
prosecution.
The
case against
him
does
not
become doubtful
merely because the learned
Sessions
fudge ·said that there was a doubt about his guilt."
The learned Judges also
came to the conclusion
that the view taken by the learned trial
Judge was
one "which no reasonable
person could
have taken.
It was a wholly erroneous view of the evidence
which
has
resulted in gross
miscarriage of justice
inasmuch
as a murderer escapes punishment".
In the circumstances of the case and considering that there was some
provocation, the
High Court sentenced the appellant
to 'transportation for life.'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
There is a passage in the
Judgment of the
High
Court which appears to
us to be disconsolate
and
indicative of a wrong approach in deciding the guilt
of an accused person.
Although the learned
Judges
recognised the principle that the onus was not on the
accused, yet one of
the observations is
such that it
comes perilous! y near to putting the burden on the
accused if it does not actually do so.
The High Court
has said:
"The respondent himself did not have the courage
to say that he did not find them at the spot. If he
were innocent, he must
have come out of his house
immediately on hearing
the noise
and
must
have
known who was present there and who was not."
This passage is so destructive of the cardinal principle of
criminal
jurisprrnknce as to the
presumed
innocence of an accused person till otherwise
proved
that it
has
become
necessary to reiterate
the rule
stated by eminent authorities " .... that it is the duty
of the prosecution to prove
the prisoner's guilt ..... .
subject to any statutory exception." (1)
It was next contended that the witnesses had falsely
implicated Qudrat Ullah and because of that the Court
should have rejected the
testimony of these witnesses
as against the appellant also. The well-known maxim
f alsus in uno f alsus in omnibus was relied upon by the
appellant.
The argument raised was that because the
witnesses who had also deposed against Qudrat Ullah
by saying that he had handed over the knife to the
appellant had not been believed by the Courts below
as against
him, the
High
Court
should
not have
accepted the evidence of these witnesses to convict the
appellant.
This maxim
has
not
received
general
acceptance in different jurisdictions in
India ; nor has
this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule
of
law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts
to is that in such cases
the
testimony
may be disregarded anJ not that' it must be disregarded.
One
American author has stated :
(1) Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A. C. 462.
1957
Nisar Ali
v.
Tiu Sta4 of
Uttar Pradtsh
Kapur].
1957
Nisar .Ali
v.
Tht Stat1 of
Uttar Pradtth
Kapur J,
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
" .... the maxim
is in itself
worthless ;
first in
point of validity ........ and secondly,
in point
of
utility because it merely .tells the jury what they may
do in any event, not what they must do or must not
do, and therefore, ·it is a superfluous form of words.
It is also in practice pernicious ...... " ( 1 )
The doctrine merely involves the question of weight
of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of
circumstances but it is
not
what
may be called "a
mandatory rule of evidence".
Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a
passage from an unreported
judgment of the
Privy
Council, Chaubaria Singh v. Bhttneshwari Prasal Pal.
"The defendants own evidence and that of several
of his witnesses is of no use to him. He cannot contend
that any court of law can place reliance
on the oath
of people
who have admittedly given
false evidence
upon the other branches of the case."
This passage is a very slender foundation, if at all,
for conferring on the doctrine the status of anything
higher than a rule of caution ;md the Privy
Council
cannot be said to have given their weighty approval
to any such controversial rule
which has
been termed
as
"worthless",
"absolutely
false
as a
maxim
of
life" and "in practioe
pern1c10u,"
in
works
of
undoubted authority on the law of evidence(').
The High Court was not unmindful
of what the
witnesses
stated
as to Qudrat
Ullah"s part
in
the
commission of the offence and having taken that
into
consideration, it said :
"While the learned
Sessions
Judge wa.-; right in
acquitting Qudrat Ullah, he was completely wrong in
acquitting the respondent of whose guilt there was not
the slightest doubt.
The direct evidence
made
out a
clear case against him and there was no sound reason
for disregarding it."
After discnssing the eviden,:e of the witnesses and
the
discrepancies pointed
out hy the appellant
the
High Cmrt
held "there is
11ot the slightest
doubt
(1) Wign1ore on Evide11cc Vol. III para Ioog.
(2) '"'igntor{' Vol. III para 1009.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
It was because of the above two contentions raised
by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case
of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed
counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and
drew our attention· to its salient features and to the
discrepancies in the
statements of
witnesses and the
improbabilities of the case ; but we are satisfied
that
the learned Judges were justified in
coming to the
conclusion
they
did
and
the
view
of the trial
judge was rightly displaced.
Upon a review
of the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have come
to
the conclusion
that
the appellant
was
rightly
convicted.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment
of the High . Court is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD.
ti.
THE
REGIONAL
TRANSPORT
AUTHORITY,
COIMBATORE.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR. s. K. DAS AND
GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Road Transport-Permit for stage
carriage-Renewal-W he th er
a continuation of the original permit-Whether subject to implied
condition of validity of the original permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(IV of 1939), ss. 57, 58.
The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the
Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate
authority, the
Central Road Traffic Board, by
the unsuccessful applicants the
order granting
the permit
was set aside and the order of the
Central Road Traffic Board was appro\'ed hy the Government in
re"ision.
The appellant. thereupon. moved the
High Court for a
writ of certi01'<1ri to quash the proceedings
of the
Central Road
Traffic Board an<l the Gowrnment.
During the pen<lency of these
proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside
the grant of the permit to the appellant. with the result that he
continued to run his buses notwithstanding the cancellation of his
permit.
Before the expiry of the
perio<l
fixed in the original
1957
Nisar Ali
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Kapur].
'95'/
February 19.