# BALRAJ IWANNA & ORS v. MOTi RAM

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 447
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-04-22
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 1971
- **Bench:** C. A. Vaidialingam, A. N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/balraj-iwanna-ors-v-moti-ram-5264
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

8
Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 499-Necessity of complainant
stating -actual words used by accused-When arises.
Codt of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 202 and 203-lurisdictiOJI of magistrate holding preliminary enqrary-Scope of.
Practice and Procedure-Applicability of exceptions to s. 499 to a case
-If may be considered at the preliminary stage.
C
.
The respondent filed a complaint against the appellants under s. 500
l.P.C. alleging that they made certain defamatory allegations against him.
According to him the appellants passed a resolution suspending him from
municipal service, that in the course of the discussion relating to the pas·
sing of the resolution, all the appellants made wild and baseless allegations
involving moral turpitude against the respondent, and after passing the
resolution the appellants with the ulterior motive of maligning the respon·
D
dent, gave publicity to the resolution in the local newspapers with large cir·
ailation. A report containing the allegations which was sent by tho Secre·
tary of the Corporation to the Commissioner was given in evidence.
The Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s. 203, Cr. P.C. on two
grounds, namely, (1) there was no evidence on record as to which of the
appollailts made which allegations against the respondent, and in the
absence of such an important ingredient no prima facie case against any
of the appellants could be said to have been made out, and (2) the resolu·
tion passed by. the Standing Committee and the discussion proceding it
were covered by the exceptions to s. 499, I.P.C. The sessions Judge dis-··
missed the revision of the complainant summarily.
Tho High Court set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed
further inquiry on the grounds that: (!) it could not be said that there
was no evidence as to which member of the Standing Committee made al·
legations against the respondent, as the evidence implicated all the members
of the Standing Committee including the appellants in the charge of male·
ing the defamatory allegations contained in the report and (2) the appellants
were not protected by the Exceptions to •· 499.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (!) While it is desirable that the actual words •lated to have
·been used by the accused which are alleged to be defamatory should be
reproduced by the complainant, in cases where the words spoken are too
many or the statements are too long, it will be the height of technicality to
insist that tho actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced
verbatim. The object of having the actual words before the court is to
·enible it to consider whether tho words are defamatory. That purpoao
.,.;n be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint
or evidence, in a substantial measure, the words of imputation alleged
to have been uttered. From the point of view of the accused also it is
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necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must
be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations they
have to meet. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that
the actual words spoken had not been stated in the complaint. It is only
if the case of a complainant is that each of the accused made different
statemei;rts that it would be necessary for the complainant to specify the
actual words spoken by each of the accused.
[4578-F]
In the present case, on the averments made in the complaint which
refel'.8 to various matters referred to in the report, the complainant bad
furnished in a substantial measure the words of imputation, whlch according to him were defamatory. When the case of the complainant' was.
that all the appellants made the statements referred to in the report. and·
he was prepared to go to trial on that footing, the question of the complainant stating the words alleged to have been used
by the individ11al
accused did not arise. [457G-H; 458B]
E

## Text

BALRAJ IWANNA & ORS.
v.
MOTi RAM
April 22, 1971
07
[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
8
Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 499-Necessity of complainant
stating -actual words used by accused-When arises.
Codt of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 202 and 203-lurisdictiOJI of magistrate holding preliminary enqrary-Scope of.
Practice and Procedure-Applicability of exceptions to s. 499 to a case
-If may be considered at the preliminary stage.
C
.
The respondent filed a complaint against the appellants under s. 500
l.P.C. alleging that they made certain defamatory allegations against him.
According to him the appellants passed a resolution suspending him from
municipal service, that in the course of the discussion relating to the pas·
sing of the resolution, all the appellants made wild and baseless allegations
involving moral turpitude against the respondent, and after passing the
resolution the appellants with the ulterior motive of maligning the respon·
D
dent, gave publicity to the resolution in the local newspapers with large cir·
ailation. A report containing the allegations which was sent by tho Secre·
tary of the Corporation to the Commissioner was given in evidence.
The Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s. 203, Cr. P.C. on two
grounds, namely, (1) there was no evidence on record as to which of the
appollailts made which allegations against the respondent, and in the
absence of such an important ingredient no prima facie case against any
of the appellants could be said to have been made out, and (2) the resolu·
tion passed by. the Standing Committee and the discussion proceding it
were covered by the exceptions to s. 499, I.P.C. The sessions Judge dis-··
missed the revision of the complainant summarily.
Tho High Court set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed
further inquiry on the grounds that: (!) it could not be said that there
was no evidence as to which member of the Standing Committee made al·
legations against the respondent, as the evidence implicated all the members
of the Standing Committee including the appellants in the charge of male·
ing the defamatory allegations contained in the report and (2) the appellants
were not protected by the Exceptions to •· 499.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (!) While it is desirable that the actual words •lated to have
·been used by the accused which are alleged to be defamatory should be
reproduced by the complainant, in cases where the words spoken are too
many or the statements are too long, it will be the height of technicality to
insist that tho actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced
verbatim. The object of having the actual words before the court is to
·enible it to consider whether tho words are defamatory. That purpoao
.,.;n be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint
or evidence, in a substantial measure, the words of imputation alleged
to have been uttered. From the point of view of the accused also it is
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necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must
be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations they
have to meet. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that
the actual words spoken had not been stated in the complaint. It is only
if the case of a complainant is that each of the accused made different
statemei;rts that it would be necessary for the complainant to specify the
actual words spoken by each of the accused.
[4578-F]
In the present case, on the averments made in the complaint which
refel'.8 to various matters referred to in the report, the complainant bad
furnished in a substantial measure the words of imputation, whlch according to him were defamatory. When the case of the complainant' was.
that all the appellants made the statements referred to in the report. and·
he was prepared to go to trial on that footing, the question of the complainant stating the words alleged to have been used
by the individ11al
accused did not arise. [457G-H; 458B]
English decisions dealing with libel, held not applicable on all fours.
[457A·8]
Sarai Chandra Das & Anr. v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 351, Krishnarao v. Firm Radhakisan Ramsahai & Anr., [1956] I.LR. Nag. 236, Emperor v. Col. Bholanath, 51 I.LR. 1929 All. 313, K. S. Namjtmdaiah v.
Setti Chikka Thippanna, (1952]
Cr. L J. Mysore
1633 and
Dhruba
Charan Khandal v. Dinabandhu Patri, A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 15, referred to.
(2) Under ss. 202 and 203 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate has to see whether
a prima facie case is made out against the accused on the materials and
evidence placed before him by the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. [4520-H ; 453A-8]
In the present case, the approach of the Magistrate was fallacious in
the face of the allegations by the respondent that all the appellants made
the statements referred to in the report. [458F]
Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, [1964] 1 S.C. R. 639,
followed.
(3) It was also unnecessary for the High Court to consider the applicability of the Exceptions to s. 499 I.P.C., at this stage. All the oefencethat may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during
the trial of the complaint. (4598-C]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
14 of 1971.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 26, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision
No. 138 of 1968.
C. K. Daphtary and B. P. Moheshwari, for the appellants.
The respondent appeared in person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is directed
a2ainst the judgment and order dated August 26, 1970 of the Delhi
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 138 of 1968 dismissing under
B. KHANNA v. MOTill.AM (Vaidia/ingam,J.)
Section 203 Cr. P. C. the complaint filed by the respondent under
Section 500 I. P. C.
The respondent Moti Ram filed a complaint in the court of
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi against the seven appellants
under section 500 I. P C. alleging that they made certain allegations against him which were defamatory in character and had also
passed a resolution placing the respondent under suspension.
The complaint filed by the respondent is a fairly lengthy one
and refers to various matters.
But the relevant facts which could
be gathered from the same appear to be as follows :
The respondent during December, 1964 was serving as a.
Liaison Officer, Municipal Corporation, Delhi.
The appellants
were among the members of the Standing Committee of the Corporation at that time.
The first appellant Balraj Khanna was bitterly
inimical towards the respondent and was bent upon causing harm
to him.
He wielded considerable influence over the members of
the Standing Committee.· At his instance a requisition was given
by the members of the Standing Committee to its Chairman to
summon a meeting of the Committee to enable them to move
a resolution for the immediate suspension of the respondent from
his office.
Aro:irdingly a meeting of the Standing Commjttee
was held on December 10, 1964.
The said meeting was attended.
not only by the Commissioner and other officers of the Corporation, but also by the press reporters.
In that meeting the appellants made very serious allegat;!ons of a defamatory nature against
the respondent and passed unanimously a resolution placing him
under immediate suspension.
The allegations made against the
respondent and the fact of his suspension from office were given
wide publicity, with the result that it brought down the respondent in the estimation of his friends causing harm to his reputation.
P. W. 3, who was the Secretary of the Corporation, and
who attended the meeting of the Standing Committee on December 10, 1964 sent a report the next day Ex. P. w. 3/B to the Commissioner regarding the allegations stated to have been made
against the respondent by the appellants.
The allegations referred to in P. W. 3/B are as follows :
"l. Since its inception in 1958 the Corporation has
executed a very heavy programme of works for improving
the sanitation of the Corporation and provide other civic
amenities, but no publicity was given to these activities
and the public has remained more or Jess in the dark.
On the other hand the Corporation is adversely criticised
even for minor omissions and commissions. The L. 0.
has, thus not performed the duties which are required of
the post he has been holding and has been deficient in
the performance of his duties.
2!1-1 S.C. Inc!ia/71
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i. 'J1k: L. 0. is not working in harmony with the
representatives of the Pr_ess who attend the Corporation
office ~o ~over the meetings of the Corporation and its
Committee, so much so that these repres11Rtatives have
desired that he be not required to come to their rooms in
the Corporation office.
3. Instead of applying himself seriously to his official
work he indulges in estranging one member from the
other, one officer for the other and one political party for
the other.
He has even been trying to sow seeds of
estrangement between the Mysore and the Commissioners.
4. In the days when he was Chief Reporter to the
Hindustan Times, he resorted to undesirable means to
achieve bis desired ends.
·
5. His association with some of the non Official Presidents of the erstwhile Delhi Municipal Committee has
bro11ght nothing but slur to their good names.
6. He is known for indulging in acts of moral t11rpitude and for seducing unsuspecting girls and women."
In the complaint it is further stated that in October, 1964, all
the seven appellants entered into a conspiracy to defame the respondent and remove him from the municipal service and passed
a resolution on December 10, 1964 placing him under suspension.
It is further stated that apart from the seven appellants,
three other members of the Standing Committee were also parties
to this resolution.
In particular, it is alleged in the complaint that
in the course of discussion relating to the passing of the resolution, all the seven appellants made wild and baseless allegations
involving moral turpitude against the respondent.
After passing
the resolution the appellants with the ulterior motive of maligning the respondent and lowering him in the estimation of the
public, gave publicity to the resolution in the local newspapers
with large circulation.
The allegations stated to have been made
by the appellants are those referred to in Ex. P. W. 3 /B. The
respondent alleged that the appellants knowingly and maliciously
made false and defamatory allegations against him and prayed for
taking action against them.
Before the Magistrate the respondent and five other witnesses
were examined under Section 202, Cr. P. C. and after consideration of the evidence, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint under
Section 203, Cr. P. C.
The dismissal of the complaint by the
Magistrate is rested on two grounds, namely, (l) there is no evidence on record as to which of the appellants made which allegation against the respondent Q.lld in tile absen~ of Slll:h an important ingredient, no prima facie ~
~
ll!ly of the appellants
B. KHANNA v. MOTi RAM (Vaidlalingam, J.)
can be said to have been made out, and (2) the resolution passed
by the Standing Committee and the discussion preceding it are
covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 I. P. C. and hence the
appellants were well within their rights in passing a resolution
recommending suspension of the respondent.
The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dismissed the revision
of the respondent summarily stating that the material on record
was not sufficient to justify any direction being given to the trial
Magistrate to make further
inquiry into the complaint.
The
Sessions Judge has further stated that the evidence produced by
the respondent is too ,general to make out a case to summon any
one of the appellants.·
The High Court, after a reference to the material evidence
on record, as well as the allegations stated to have been made by
the appellants, has held that the approach made by the Magistrate
for dismissing the complaint was erroneous.
In the view of the
High Court the evidence on record goes to show that the case of
the respondent is that all the members of the Standing Committee
including the appellants had made the allegations against the respondent, which had been reproduced by the Municipal Secretary
in Ex. P. W. 3/B.
On this reasoning the High Court held that
it cannot be said that there is no evidence as to which member
of the Standing Committee made the allegation against the respondent.
According to the High Court the evidence as it stands
implicates all the members of the Standing Committee including the
appellants herein ih the charge of making the defamatory allegations against the respondent.
The High Court has further held
that if at a later stage when witnesses are examined, it is found
that only some of the appellants made the allegations and also
what those allegations are, it will be open to the trial Magistrate
to discharge such of the accused against whom there is no evidence of having made any defamatory allegation.
The High Court
is also of the view that the reasoning of the Magistrate that the
appellants are protected by the Exceptions to Section 499 I. P. C.
is also not correct.
Ultimately, the High Court set aside the order
of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under Section 203 Cr.
P. C. and directed further inquiry to be made into the complaint
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Delhi or by any Magistrate subordinate to him, and to dispose of the same in accordance with law.
Mr. C. K. Daphtary. learned counsel for the appellants, contended that in cases of defemation it is essential that the actual
words used should be set out in· the complaint and a reproduction
of the gist or substance of the words used is not enough.
He
further contended that a general allegation that the appellants and
other members of the Standing Committee made defamatory statements referred to in Ex. P. W. 3/B is not a sufficient compliance
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with the requirement of law to enable the Magistrate to take 'further action.
On the other hand, according to the learned counsel.
the complainant must specifically aver which particular allegation
was made by which of the accused, in which case alone the indivi-
~ual a~used will have an opportunity of effectively meeting the
~putations alleged to have been made by him.
In this connec-
!10n Mr. Daphtary referred us to certain English decisions governmg the law of Libel and he also invited our attention to certain
decisions of the High Courts.
On the other hand, the respondent, who appeared in person,
has urged that at this stage the Court is concerned only with the
question whether he has prima facie made out a case for his complaint being inquired into by the Magistrate and not whether he will
be able to obtain a conviction of all or any of the appellants. That
stage~ he pointed out, will arise only during the course of the
trial.
He urged that in his complaint he has made a categorical
statement that all the appellants have made the statements referred
to in Ex. P. W. 3iB. As to whether the statements have been
properly recorded by the Municipal Secretary, is again a matter
which will arise only during the course of the trial.
According
to him the allegation made by him in the complaint regarding the
statements said to have been made by the appellants is sufficient
for further action being taken by the Criminal Court. He further
contended that the statements alleged to have been made by the
appellants have been substantially reproduced in Ex. P. W. 3 /B
and it has been placed before the Court in the complaint and that
is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of Jaw.
He pleaded that the principles laid down by the English Courts regarding
the law of Libel are not applicable when considering a case of
defamation under the Indian Penal Code.
He has also referred
us to certain decisions in support of his contentions.
Before we refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Daphtary and
the respondent on merits, it is necessary to clear the ground by
appreciating the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate under Sections 202 and 203 Cr. P. C.
In Chnndra Deo
Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose and another ('), it has been held
by this Court that the object of the provisions of Section 202 Cr.
P. C. is to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether
process should be issued or not.
At that stage what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made in the complaint and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction.
It has been further pointed out
that the function of the Magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry
is only to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against
(I} [1!164) l S.C.R. 639
B. KHANNA •• MOTi RA)! (Vaidialingam, J.)
453
the accused on the materials placed before him by the complainant.
Where a prima fade case has been made out, even though much
can be said on both sides, the committing Magistrate is bound
to commit the accused for trial and the accused does not come
into the picture at all till the process is issued.
The question arises whether in an action for defamation under
Section 500 I. P. C., it is necessary that the actual statements containing the words alleged tc have been used by the accused must
be before the court or whether it is enough that the statements
alleged to have been made are substantially reproduced in the
complaint.
The further question is whether the complaint in this
case is defective in the sense that the actual statements alleged to
have been made by the individual accused have not been stated in
the complaint.
We will now refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Daphtary.
He has referred us; in the first instance, to the passage in Halsbury's
Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 24, page 90 para 161
that for the statement complained of as being a libel or slander to
be construed or interpreted, it is essential that the actual words
and not merely their substance should be set forth verbatim in
the statement of claim or indictment. Again he has referred us
to another passage in the same volume as follows :
"As it is necessary in actions for libel or slander to
set forth the actual words complained of in the statement
of claim with proper innuendoes, so also it is necessary
to do so in an indictment where words are of the essence
of the offence." (Page 135 para. 249).
In Charles Bhedlaugh and Annie Besant v. The Queer (') the
Court of Appeal was dealing with an indictment for publishing
an obscene book.
Bramwell, L. J., observes as follows :
/
"In some instances, words are the subject-matter of
an indictment; and it follows from this principle, which
I have mentioned that wherever the offence consists of
words written or spoken, those words must be stated in
the indictment ; if they are not, it will be defective upon
demurrer, in arrest of judgment or upon writ of error .....
........ In like manner, there can be no doubt that in an
indictment for defamtory libel it was necessary to set out
the words complained of, so that the Court might judge
whether they were or could amount to a libel ............. it is
manifest that where words constitute the offence, they
must be stated in the indictment.
(I) 3 Q.B.D. 607
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In. The Capital ,and Counties Bank Limited v. George Henty
and sons (') Lord Blackburn in dealing with an action for libel
states as follows :-
"The words themselves must have been set out in the
declaration or indictment, in order that the Court might
be able to judge whether' they were a libel or not. And
Uris still remains the law."
In Collins v. Janes (,, Lord Denning quoted with approval
the observations of Lord Coleridge, C. J. in Harris v. Waree (') as
follows:
"In libel and slander everything may turn on the
form of words, and in olden days plantiffs constantly
failed from small and even unimportant variance between
the words of the libel or slander set out in the declaration and the proof of them ....... In libel and slander the
very words complained of are the facts on which the
action is grounded.
It is not the fact of the defendant
having used defamatory expressions, but the fact of his
having used those defamatory expressions alleged, which
is the fact on which the case depends."
It is clear by a reference to the above English Law. that is
an action for libel it is essential that the words themselves must
be set out in the indictment and that requirement is insisted to
enable the Court to judge whether those words published in writing amount to libel or not
Mr. Daphtary referred us to certain decisions dealing with
the nature of proof reguired in a prosecution for sedition under
Section 124A I. P. C. 1 But we do not think it necessary to refer
to those decisions as we are not at this stage concerned with the
proof of the statements attributed to the appellants and whfoh.
according to the respondent, are defamatory.
Mr. Daphtary also referred us to the decisions in Sarai
Chandra Das and· another v. The State (') and Krisl111arao "·
Firm Radhakisan Ramsahai and another ('). In the Orissa High
Court decision two accused were being tried for an offence under
Section 500 I. P. C.
It is m> doubt stated in: the said decision
that in a trial for defan\atil'>ll it is essential that the words alleged
(I) 7 Appeal Cases 741
(2) [195'1 2 AlU~ngland Reports 145
(3) [1879] 4 C.P.D. 125
(4). A.tit. 1952 Ot!Ssa 351
(5) 1956 1.i..R. Nagpur 236
B. KHANNA v. MOTi RAM (Vaidialingam,J.)
. to be defamatory in character should be precisely set out and the
accused should be individually given notice of what he is charged
with, as the words so set out will constitute the foundation for
defamation.
It is further laid down that it is also essential that
the words in question should be proved.
A perusal of this decision will show that two accused were being prosecuted for defamation.
In the complaitit in that case it was stated that both
the a~cused were alle$ed to have made _certain stat~ments. .However. m the sworn. statement the complamant had given a shghtly
different version.
In his evidence before the court the complainant attributed to the different accused different statements. It
was, under those circumstances, that the court laid down the proposition referred to earlier.
Understood in that context, it is clear
that according to the High Court when different statements are
attributed to different accused, the statements alleged to have been
made by each of the accused must be set out as the individual
accused must have noticed as to what is specifically alleged against
him.
In the second case, the Nagpur High Court dealing with a
claim for damages for defamation observed as follows :
"We may point out that in a suit for damages for
defamation the law requires that the plaint ought to allege
the publication of the dafamtory statement, set out the
actual wotds used and also state that they were published
or spoken to some named individuals and specify the
time and place when and where they were published."
On the other hand, the respondent has invited our attention
to the decisions reported in Emperor v. Col. Bho/anath (1), K. S.
Namjundalah v .. Sett/ Chikka Tippanna (') and Dhruba Charan
Khandal v. Dlnabandhu Patri (').
In the first decision of the Allahabad High Court, Mukherji, J.
observed :
"While I am not prepared to lay down, as a universal
proposition, that in no case where the actual wotds used
have not been ptoved a conviction for defamation by
wcrd of mouth cannot be maintained, it must be conceded that in the majatity of cases it should be so. Defamation is define(! as follows :-"-"Whoever by words ..... .
makes or pUbllshes any imputation concern.ing any person intended to harm, or knowing or haYi.ilg reason to
(I) SI I.L.R. 1929 All. 313 (2) 1952 Criminal Law Journal Mysore 1633
(3) A.1.R. 1966 OflSSa 15.
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believe that such imputation will hann, the reputation .....
is said ......... to defame that person". When the question
arises as to whether the words used were intended to
harm or had the effect of harming the reputation, the
court must be put in possession not only of the words
used, but also of the context in which they were used ... "
King J., the other learned Judge of the bench observes :
"I may here remark that in my opinion it is unnecessary to prove the exact words used by the accused, for
the purpose of supporting a conviction for oral defamation. It is sufficient to prove the purport or substance of
the defamatory imputations.
No honest witness would
profess to remember the exact words used by a person who
has been speaking for even 15 minutes.
At the most he
may remember some striking phrase or expression. But a
witnesse's failure to recalf the exact words used or the
exact context in which they were spoken is immaterial,
provided that he can give a sufficiently clear account of
the purport of the defamatory remarks.
Although the
learned counsel for the appellant argued that no conviction could be sustained unless the exact words were proved, he was unable to quote any authority for his proposition, and I am not prepared to accept it.
English rulings
on the English Law of libel seem beside the point when
the task before us is to apply the provisions of section
499 of the Indian Penal Code to a case of alleged defamation by spoken words."
In the second case the Mysore High Court has laid down that
it is sufficient for the purpose of Sections 499 and 500 I. P. C. that
if witnesses are agreed in a substantial measure on the words of
imputation uttered as it is bardly possible or necessary to reproduce every word or expression used.
In the fast decision, the Orissa High Court has laid down
that for the purpose of an offence under Section 500 I. P. C. it is
enough if the witnesses are agreed in a substantial measure on the
words of imputation uttered, for it is not possible even for a most
honest witness to reproduce every such word or expression. This
decision has also distinguished the earlier decision in Sarat
Chandra Das and another v. The State (1) on the ground that the
observations contained in that judgment that the precise words
uttered against the complainant should find a place in the charge
were made in the context of the court dealing with two accused,
each of whom was alleged to have made different statements.
(I) A. I. R. 19S2 Orissa JS!
B. KHANNA V. llOTIRAM (Vaidlalingam,J.)
After a consideration of the various decisions referred to
above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down in
English decisions dealing with libel that the-actual words alleged
to be used must be stated in the indictment cannot be applied on
all fours when dealing with the cases of defamation by spoken
words under Section 499 I. P. C. It will be highly desirable no
doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to be defamatory are reproduced by the
complainant. The actual words used or the statements made may
be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few
and the statement is very brief.
But in cases where the words
spoken are too many or the statements made are too long, in our
opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual
words and the entire statements should be reproduced verbatim.
The object of having, if possible, the actual words or the statements before the court is to enable it· to consider whether those
words or the statements are defamatory in nature.
That purpose
or object will be. served if the complainant is able to reproduce
in his complaint or evidence in a substantial measure the words
of imputation alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or
the words placed before the court by the complainant are held
to be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will have
to lose.
Therefore it is to his interest to get a proper adjudication from the court that as far as possible the words spoken or
the statements actually made and which he alleges to be defamatory are before the court.
But a complaint cannot be thrown out
on the mere ground that the actual words spoken or the statements
made have not been stated in the complaint.
From the point of
view of accused also it is necessary that the matters 11lleged to be
defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable them
to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet.
In this case we have already referred to Ex. · P. W. 3 I B.
which, according to the complainant, contains the statements made
by the appellants durin_g the discussion of the resolution leading
to his suspension on December 11. 1964. The High Court, in
this connection, has averted to the evidence of P. Ws. I, 3 and
457
A
B
c
D
E
F
4 on this aspect. As to how far the evidence of those witnesses
G
is to be accepted, is a matter which will arise only during the trial
.of the complaint
From the averments made in the complaint,
which refers to various matters referred to in Ex. P. W. 3 I B, we
are of the opinion, that the. c0mplainant has furnished in a substantial mea5ure the words of imputation, which, according to him,
are defamatory .. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Daphtary that
H
the cO!llplaint is defective jnasn:iuch as· it does not contain the
actual words ·aneged to have been spoken by the appellants has
to be rejected.
458
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
The further question is whether the complaint is defective for
the reason that the actual statements alleged to have been made
by the individual accused have not been stated therein.
So far as
this aspect is concerned, if the case of the complainant is that
each of the appellants made different statements or spoke different
words, which are 'defamatory, then it is absolutely necessary that
the complaint must specify the words spoken or the statements
made by each of the appellants.
But that is not the allegation
in the complaint.
We have already referred to the fact that it is
specifically stated in the complaint that during the course of the
discussion of the resolution, all the seven appellants made a wild
and baseless allegation against the complainant involving moral
turpitude.
According to him those statements are contained in
Ex. P. W. 3 / B. The evidentiary value of Ex. P. W. 31 B does not
arise for consideration at this
stage.
The further question
whether the complainant will be able to prove his allegation that
all the seven appellants made all or any of the statements cont~in
ed in Ex. P. W. 3/B, is again a matter which does not arise for
consideration at this stage.
We are only concerned to find out
what are the allegations made by the respondent in his complaint
against the appellants. When the case of the complainant is that
the seven appellants made the statements
~eferred to in Ex.
P. W. 3/B and he is prepared to go to trial on that footing, the
question of the complainant being· made to state the statements
alleged to have been made by the individual accused does not at
all arise.
Such a situation will arisi: only when the case of the
complainant is that different statements were made by cfifferent
accused, who are before the court.
The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that
there is no evidence on record as to which of the appellant made
which allegation against the respondent and in the absence of
such an important ingredient, no prima facie case against any of
the appellants can be said to have been made out. . This, in our
opinion, is a fallacious approach made by the Magistrate in the
face of the allegation made by the respondent •that all the seven
appellants made the statements referred to in Ex. P. W. 3/B. In
our opinion, the High Court has made a correct approach when
it held that the evidence, as it stands implicates all the members
of the Standing Committee, including the appellants in the charge
of making the statements alleged to be defamatory and contained in Ex. P. W. 3 / B.
We are in entire agreement with the reason·
ing of the High Court on this aspect.
Before concluding the discussion, it is to be stated that the
trial Magistrate has given an additional reason for dismissing the
complaint. That reason is that the resolution passed by the Standing Committee on December I J, 1964 and the discussion preced·
ing it by the members of the Standing Committee including the
B. KHANNA v. MOTi R;.M (Vaidialingam, J.)
459
appellants is covered by tbe Exceptions to Section 499 I. P. C.
A
Unfortunately, the High Court also has touched upon this aspect
and made certain observations.
In our opinion, tbe question of
the application of the Exceptions to Section 499 I. P. C. does not
arise at this stage. Rejection of the complaint by the Magistrate
on the second ground mentioned above cannot be sustained. It was
also unnecessary for tbe High Court to have considered this aspect
B
and differed from the trial Magistrate.
It is needless to state
tbat the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499
I. P. C. as well as all other defences· that may be available to the
appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint.
To conclude we are satisfied that tbe High Court's order
C
setting aside tbe order of tbe Magistrate dismissing the complaint
under Section 203 Cr. P. C. and directing further inquiry to be
made in the complaint of tbe respondent is correct.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
D
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
,