# BALWANT RAI SALUJA &ANR. ETC. ETC v. AIR INDIALTD. &ORS

- **Citation:** [2014] 14 S.C.R. 1512
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-08-25
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 10264-10266 of 2013
- **Bench:** H. L. Dattu, R. K. Agrawal, Arlin Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/balwant-rai-saluja-anr-etc-etc-v-air-indialtd-ors-29705
- **Pages:** 52

## Headnote

Facfories Act, 1948- S. 46- Deihl Factory Rules, 1950
- rr. 65-70-A Company (principal establishment) required
C to run a canteen in compliance of s. 46-.,. Canteen employees
employed by the contractorcompany-Whetherthe workmen
engaged in the statutory canteen through the contractor could
be treated as employees of the principal establishment -
Held: The contractor company is a separate legal entity and
D its primary objects have not direct relation with the principal
establishment - The principal company established also
does not have effective and absolute control over the workmen
of the canteen - The contractor company is not a $ham or
camouflage created by the principal establishment -
E
Therefore, the workmen of the statutory canteen would be
workmen of the principal establis~ment only for the purpose
of 1948 Act, and not for all other purposes - Hence the
workers cannot claim regularization in their employment from
the principal establishment- LabourLaws.
F
Precedence - Precedent value of a decision - Extent
of- Held: Binding nature of a decision would extend to only
observations on points raised and decided - The observation
on a legal point which arose in a manner not requiring any
decision, has to ·be considered merely as an obiter dictum
G · - In order to have binding effect, a decisio(J ne.ed n·ot be
rendered by a Full Court or Constitution Bench of Supreme
Court-A pronouncement by a Division Bench is binding on
1512
BALWANTRAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIRINDIA
1513
LTD.&ORS.
· a Division Bench or a smaller number of Judges -
A
Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 141.
Doctrines/Principles:
Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil - Applicability
of- Discussed.
s
Answering the referred question and dismissing the
appeals, the Court ·
HELD: 1.1. The workmen of a statutory canteeh
would be the workmen of the establishment for the C
purpose of the Factories Act, 1948 only and not for all
other purposes. The statutory obligation created under
_Section 46 of the Act, 1948, although establishes certain·
liability of the principal employer towards the. workers
employed in the given canteen facility, this must be 0
restricted only to the Act, 1948 and it does not govern
the rights of employees with reference to appointment,
seniority, promotion, dismissal, disciplinary actions,
retirement benefits;·etc., which hare the subject matter
of various other legislations, policies, etc. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the employees of the statutory E
Canteen ipso-facto become the employees of the
principal employer. [Para 38][1540-B-F]
Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. v. Shramik
Sena (1999) 6 sec 439:1999 (1) Suppl. SCR
47; Hari Shankar Sharma v. Artificial Limbs Mfg.
Corpn. (2002) 1 SCC 337; Reserve Bank of
India v. Workmen (1996) 3 SCC 267: 1996 (2)
SCR 1176; Haldia Refinery Canteen Employees
Union v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 5 SCC 51:
2005 (3) SCR 972; Indian Overseas Bank v. ·
1.0.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union &Anr. (2000) .
4 SCC 245 : 2000 (2) SCR 1212; Barat Fritz
Werner Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 2001 (4) SCC .
498 : 2001 (1) SCR 835 - relied on.
F
G
H
1514
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014]14 S.C.R.
Saraspur Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raman/al Chiman/a/
(1974)
3 sec 66:1973 (3) scR 967;
Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thezhila/i Union
(1978) 4 sec 257: 1978 (3) SCR 1073; M.M.R.
Khan v. Union of India 1990 Supp SCC 191distinguished.
' Parimal Chandra Raha v. UC 1995 Supp (2) SCC
611 : 1995 (3) SCR 34; Workmen v. Coates of
··
India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 547; · Basti Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar and Ors. (1964) 2 SCR 838;
Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., .
v. Their Workmen (1953) II LLJ 647 - referred
. · to.
1.2 .. The said workers, to be called the employees
0
of the factory for all ·purposes, they would need to
satisfy the test of employer-employee relationship and ·
it must be shown"tfiat the employer exercises absolute
and effective
control over the said workers.
[Para 87][1563-A-B]
.
,
. I
.
.
E
. t.3. To. ascertain

## Text

_Characters 0–39,817 of 97,159. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39817 for what follows._

[2014] 14 S.C.R. 1512
A
BALWANT RAI SALUJA &ANR. ETC. ETC.
v.
AIR INDIALTD. &ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10264-10266 of 2013)
I
AUGUST 25, 2014
B
[H. L. DATTU, R. K. AGRAWAL AND ARLIN MISHRA, JJ.]
Facfories Act, 1948- S. 46- Deihl Factory Rules, 1950
- rr. 65-70-A Company (principal establishment) required
C to run a canteen in compliance of s. 46-.,. Canteen employees
employed by the contractorcompany-Whetherthe workmen
engaged in the statutory canteen through the contractor could
be treated as employees of the principal establishment -
Held: The contractor company is a separate legal entity and
D its primary objects have not direct relation with the principal
establishment - The principal company established also
does not have effective and absolute control over the workmen
of the canteen - The contractor company is not a $ham or
camouflage created by the principal establishment -
E
Therefore, the workmen of the statutory canteen would be
workmen of the principal establis~ment only for the purpose
of 1948 Act, and not for all other purposes - Hence the
workers cannot claim regularization in their employment from
the principal establishment- LabourLaws.
F
Precedence - Precedent value of a decision - Extent
of- Held: Binding nature of a decision would extend to only
observations on points raised and decided - The observation
on a legal point which arose in a manner not requiring any
decision, has to ·be considered merely as an obiter dictum
G · - In order to have binding effect, a decisio(J ne.ed n·ot be
rendered by a Full Court or Constitution Bench of Supreme
Court-A pronouncement by a Division Bench is binding on
1512
BALWANTRAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIRINDIA
1513
LTD.&ORS.
· a Division Bench or a smaller number of Judges -
A
Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 141.
Doctrines/Principles:
Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil - Applicability
of- Discussed.
s
Answering the referred question and dismissing the
appeals, the Court ·
HELD: 1.1. The workmen of a statutory canteeh
would be the workmen of the establishment for the C
purpose of the Factories Act, 1948 only and not for all
other purposes. The statutory obligation created under
_Section 46 of the Act, 1948, although establishes certain·
liability of the principal employer towards the. workers
employed in the given canteen facility, this must be 0
restricted only to the Act, 1948 and it does not govern
the rights of employees with reference to appointment,
seniority, promotion, dismissal, disciplinary actions,
retirement benefits;·etc., which hare the subject matter
of various other legislations, policies, etc. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the employees of the statutory E
Canteen ipso-facto become the employees of the
principal employer. [Para 38][1540-B-F]
Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. v. Shramik
Sena (1999) 6 sec 439:1999 (1) Suppl. SCR
47; Hari Shankar Sharma v. Artificial Limbs Mfg.
Corpn. (2002) 1 SCC 337; Reserve Bank of
India v. Workmen (1996) 3 SCC 267: 1996 (2)
SCR 1176; Haldia Refinery Canteen Employees
Union v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 5 SCC 51:
2005 (3) SCR 972; Indian Overseas Bank v. ·
1.0.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union &Anr. (2000) .
4 SCC 245 : 2000 (2) SCR 1212; Barat Fritz
Werner Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 2001 (4) SCC .
498 : 2001 (1) SCR 835 - relied on.
F
G
H
1514
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014]14 S.C.R.
Saraspur Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raman/al Chiman/a/
(1974)
3 sec 66:1973 (3) scR 967;
Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thezhila/i Union
(1978) 4 sec 257: 1978 (3) SCR 1073; M.M.R.
Khan v. Union of India 1990 Supp SCC 191distinguished.
' Parimal Chandra Raha v. UC 1995 Supp (2) SCC
611 : 1995 (3) SCR 34; Workmen v. Coates of
··
India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 547; · Basti Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar and Ors. (1964) 2 SCR 838;
Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., .
v. Their Workmen (1953) II LLJ 647 - referred
. · to.
1.2 .. The said workers, to be called the employees
0
of the factory for all ·purposes, they would need to
satisfy the test of employer-employee relationship and ·
it must be shown"tfiat the employer exercises absolute
and effective
control over the said workers.
[Para 87][1563-A-B]
.
,
. I
.
.
E
. t.3. To. ascertain whether the workers of the
Contractor can be treated as the employees of the
.
.
I
factory or company on whose premises they run the
said statutory canteen, this Court must apply the test of
complete administrative control. Furthermore, it would
F be necessary to show that there exists an employeremployee relationship between the factory and - the, .
workmen working in the canteen. the relevant factors
to be taken into consideration to establish an
employer-employee relationship would include, inter.
G alia, (i) 'who appoints the workers; (ii) who pays the
salary/remuneration; (iii) who has the authority to
dismiss; (iv) who can take disciplinary action; (v)
whether there is continuity of service;· and (vi)
extent of control and supervision. [Paras 49 and
H 61][1546-8-C; 1552-C-D]
'
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
LTD.&ORS ..
Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of
Saurashtra AIR 1957 SC 274 Ram Singh v.
Union Territory, Chandigarh (2004) 1 SCC 126:
2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 357; Bengal Nagpur Cotton
Mills v. Bharat Lat (2011) 1 SCC 635; National·
Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout & Ors.
(2014) 6 sec 756 - relied on.
International Airport _Authority of India v.
International Air Cargo Workers' Union (2009) 13
SCC 374: 2009 (8) SCR 1; Workmen of Nilgiri
Coop. Mkt. Society Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 3
sec 514 - referred to.
Ready Mix Concrete (South East) Ltd v. Minister
of Pensions and National/nsurance (1968) 2 QB
1515
A
B
c
497; Short v. J. and W. Henderson Ltd. (1946)
0
62 TLR 427; JGE v. The Trustees of Portsmouth
Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust [2012) EWCA
· Civ 938 - referred to.
1.4. The doctrine of piercing the veil allows the
Court to disregard the separate legal personality of a E
company and impose liability upon the persons
exercising real control over the said company. However,
this ·principle has been and should be applied in a
restrictive manner, that is, only in scenarios wherein
it is evident that the company was a mere camouflage F
or sham deliberately created by the. persons exercising
control over the said company for the purpose of ·
avoiding liability. The intent of piercing the veil must be ·
· such that would seek to remedy a wrong done by the
persons controlling.the company. The application would G
thus depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances
of each case. [Para 71)(1556-G-H-; 1557-A-B]
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd.
& Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 264: (1985) 1 Suppl. SCR
909 - relied on.
·
H
1516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A
B
c
·Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of.
India (2012) 6 sec 613:2012 (1) SCR 573 -
referred to.
·
United States v. Bestfoods [141 L Ed 2d 43: 524
US 51 (1998) Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd.
[1897) AC 22; Bel} Hashem v. Ali Shayif [2008]
EWHC 2380 (Fam) Lord Neuberger in Prest v.
Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013)
UKSC 34 ~referred to.
'
1.5. For piercing the veil of incorporation, mere
ownership and control is not a sufficient ground. It
. should be established that the control and impropriety
by the Air India resulted in depriving the Appellantsworkmen of their legal rights. [Para 80][1560-B-C]
D
1.6. The doctrine of piercing the veil cannot be
applied in the given factual scenario of the present case.
Respondent No. 2, despite being a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Respondent No. 1 they both are
distinct legal entities. The management of business of
E Respondent No. 2 is under its own Board of Directors.
The issue relating to the appointment of the Board of .
Directors of Respondent No. 2 by respondent No.1
. would be a consequence of statutory obligations of
a wholly owned subsidiary· under the Act, 1956.
F [Para 79][1559-G-H; 1560-A]
.
.
1. 7. It is evident from the Memorandum of
Association and Articles of Associatio.n of respondent
No.2 {the subsidiary company) that the primary objects
of respondent No. 2 have no direct relation with
G respondent No.1. It is only one of the many incidental
or ancillary objects of the HCI that make a direct
reference to assisting respondent No.1. Respondent No.
2 has several primary objects, which include the running
of hotels, motels, etc., in addition to establishing
.. ;_ H
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1 S17
LTD.&ORS.
shops, kitchens, canteens and refreshment rooms: A
Respondent No.1 only finds mention under ancillary
objects of Respondent No. 2. It cannot be said that the
Memorandum of Association of respondent No.2
provides that it functions only for respondent No.1. Nor
can it be said that. the fundamental activity of B
Respondent No. 2 is to run and operate the said
statutory canteen for respondent No.1. [Para 77][1558G-H; 1559-A-B]
1.8
In the present case, respondent No.2 is a
separate legal entity incorporated under the Companies C
Act, 1956 and is carrying out the activity of operating
and running of the given canteen. The Articles of
Association of respondent No.2 in no way give control
of running: the said canteen to respondent No.1. The
functions of appointment, dismissal, disciplinary action, D
etc. of the canteen staff, are retained with respondent
No.2. Thus, the exercise of control by respondent No.1
clearly indicated that the said respondent No. 2 is not a
sham or camouflage created by respondent No. 1 to
avoid certain statutory liabilities. [Para 82][1560-H; E
1561-A-C]
1.9. The . mere fact that respondent No,·1 has a
certain degree of control over respondent No.2 does
not mean that the employees working in the canteen are F
the employees of respondent No.1. It exercises control
that is in the nature of supervision. The said
supervision or control would appear to be merely to
ensure due maintenance of standards and quality in the
said canteen. [Para 84][1561-H; 1562-A-C]
G
1.10. Therefore, the appellants-workmen could not
be said to be under the effective and absolute control
of respondent No.1. Issues regarding appointment of
the said workmen, their dismissal, payment of their
salaries, etc. are within the control of respondent No.2. H
151a
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 14 S.C.R.
A It cannot be then said that the appellants are the
workmen of respondent No.1 and therefore are entitled
to regularization of their services. There is no parity in
the nature of work, mode of appointment, experience,
qualifications, etc., between the regular employees of
B respondent No.1 and the workers of the given canteen.
[Paras 85 and 86][1561-H; 1562-A-C]
2.1. The binding nature of a deCision would extend
to only observations on points raised and 'decided by
the Court.and neither on aspects which it has not decided
C nor had occasion to express its .opinion upon. The
observation made in a prior decision on a legal question
which arose in a manner not requiring any decision and
which was to an extent unnecessary, ought to be
considered merely as an obiter dictum. A ratio of the
D judgment or the principle upon which the question
before the Court is decided· must be considered as
binding to be applied as an appropriate precedent.
[Para 25][1532-G-H; 1533-A-B]
E
F
State of Punjab v. Baladev Singh (1999) 6 SCC
172: 1999 (3) SCR 977 - followed.
The
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun
Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363:
(1992) (1) Suppl. SCR 732; Punjab Land
Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd.,
Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Chandigarh and Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1990
(3) SCR 111 ~relied on.
2.2. The pronouncement of law by a Djvision
G Bench of the Supreme Court is binding on a Division
Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges and
in order that such decision is binding, .it is not necessary
that it should be a decision ·rendered by a Full Court
or a Constitution Bench of the· Supreme Court.
H [Para 30][1535-A-B]
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1519
LTD.&ORS.
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh 178 ITR 548
A
(SC) - followed.
Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union
Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1 : 2001 (2)
Suppl. SCR 343 - distinguished.
B
CASE LAW REFERENCE
~995 (3) SCR 34
referred to
Para 11
2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 343 distinguished
Para 12
(2014) 6 sec 756
relied on
Para 15
c
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579 distinguished
Para 21
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 732 relied on
Para 21' ·
1990 (3) SCR 111
relied on
Para 22
1901AC495
relied on
Para 23
D
(1968) .2 SCR 154
relied on
Para 23
1999 (3) SCR 977
followed
Para 24
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 47
relied on
Para 29
E
(2002) 1 sec 337
relied on
Para 30
2005 (3) SCR 972
relied on
Para 30
178 ITR 548 (SC)
followed
Para 30
1996 (2) SCR 1176
relied on
Para 31
F
2000 (2) SCR 1212
relied on
Para 31
2001 (1) SCR 835
relied on
Para 33
2006 (1) SCR 93
relied on
Para 33
(2004) 3 sec 547
referred to
Para 34
G
1973 (3) SCR 967
distinguished
Para 40
(1964) 2 SCR 838
referred to
Para 40
H
1520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS '
[2014) 14 S.C.R.
A (1953) II LlJ 647
referred to
Para 40
1978 (3) SCR 1073
distinguished
Para 42
1990 Supp sec 191
distinguished
Para 44
(1968) 2 QB 497 ·
referred to
. Para 50
B . (1946) 62 TLR 427
referred to
Para 52
(2012] EWCA Civ 938
referred to
Para 53
AIR 1957 SC 274
relied on
Para 54
c 2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 357 relied on
Para 55
(2011) 1 sec 635
relied on
Para 56
2009 (8) SCR 1
referred to
Para 57
(2004) 3 sec 514
referred to
· Para 59 ·
D 2012 (1) SCR 573
referred to
Para 64
524 us 51 (1998)
referred to
Para 65
(1897] AC 22
referred to
Para 66 .
(2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) referred to
Para 68
E (2013] UKSC 34
referred to
Para 69.,
(1985) 1 Suppl. SCR 909 relied on
Para 70
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
F
10264-10266 of 2013.
~
,.,
From the judgment and order dated 02.05.2011 in LPA
No. 388/2010, LPA No. 390/2010, LPA No. 391/2010 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.
• Jayant Bhushan, Sr.Adv., Praveen K. Singh, Sanjeev Kr.
G Choudhary, Santosh Kumar Pandey, Ms. Swastika Kumari
Navlendu Kumar Mishra and Aniruddha P. Mayee, Advs., for
the Appellants.
H
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1521
LTD.&ORS.
Chander Uday Singh, Sr. Adv., Praveen Jain, Tavinder A
Sidhu, SumitGupta, Mrs. Gunjan S. Jain (For M/s. M.V. Kini &
Associates), Ms. Sangeeta Bharti, KrishanuAdhikary, Shalin
Arthwan, Rishi K.S. Gautam and Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Advs., for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H. L. DATTU, J. 1. In view of the difference of opinion by
two learned Judges, and by referral order dated 13.11 .2013
B
of this Court, these Civil Appeals are placed before-us for
our consideration and decision. The question before this c
bench is JNhether the workmen engaged in statutory canteens,
through a contractor, could be treated as employees of the
principal establishment.
2. At the outset, it requires· to be noticed that the
learned Judges differed in their opinion regarding the liability · D
of the principal employer running statutory.canteens and further
regarding the status of the workmen engaged thereof. The
learned Judges differed on. the aspect of supervision and
control which was exercised by the Air India Ltd. (for short,
''the Air India")- respondent No. 1, and the Hotel Corporations
E
of India Ltd. (for short, "the HCl")-respondent No. 2, over the
said workmen employed in these canteens. The learned
Judges also had varying interpretations regarding the status
of the HCI as a sham and camouflage subsidiary by the Air
India created mainly to deprive the legitimate statutory and
F
fundamental rights of the ~onc~rned workmen and the
necessity to pierce the veil to ascertain their relation with the
principal employer. ·
3. The Two Judge bench has expressed contrasting
opinions on the prevalence of an employer-employee G
relationship between the principal employer and the workers
in the said canteen facility, based on, inter aiia,-iss.1,1es
surrounding the economic dependence of the subsidiary role
in management and maintenance of the· canteen premises,
H
1522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A representation of workers, modes of appointment and
termination as well as resolving disciplinary issues among
workmen. The Bench also differed on the issue pertaining
to whether such workmen should be treated as employees
of the principal employer only for the purposes of the Factories ·
B Act, 1948 (forshort, "theAct, 1948")orforotherpurposesas
well.
FACTS:
4. The present set of appeals came before a two-Judge
c Bench of this Court against a judgment and order dated
02.05.2011 of a Division Bench of the High Courtaf Delhi in
LPA Nos. 388, 390 and 391 of 2010. The present dispute
finds origin in an industrial dispute which arose between the
Appellants-workmen herein of the statutory canteen and
D Respondent No. 1- herein. The said industrial dispute was
referred by the Central Governmein.t, by its order dated
23.10.1996 to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court (for short "the CGIT"). The question referred was
whether the workmen as employed by Respondent No. 3.-
E herein, to provide canteen services at the establishment of
Respondent No. 1-herein, could be treated as deemed·
employees of the said Respondent No. · 1. Vide order
dated 05.05.2004, the CGIT held' that the workmen .were
employees of the Respondent No .. 1-Air India itnd therefore
'
F their claim was justified. Furthermore, the termination of
services of the workmen during the pend ency of the dispute
was held to be illegal.
5. By judgment and order dated 08.04.2010, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi set aside and
G quashed the CGIT's award and held that the said workmen
would not be entitled to be treated as or deemed to be the
employees of the Air India. The Division Bench of the High
Court of Delhi vide impugned order dated 02.04.2011 found
no error in the ord~r passed by the learned Single Judge of
H
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1523
LTD. &ORS. [H. L. DATTU, J.]
the High Court. The appeal was dismissed by the Division A
. Bench confirming the order of the learned Single Judge who
observed that the responsibility to run the canteen was
absolutely with the H.Cl and that the Air India and the HCI
shared an entirely contractual relationship. Therefore, the claim
of the appellants to be treated as employees of the Air India B
and to be regularized was rejected by the learned Single
Judge.
6. In the present set of appeals, the appellants are
workers who claim to be the deemed employees of the
management of Air India on the grounds, inter alia, that C
they work in a canteen established on the premises of the
respondent No. 1-Air India and that too, for the benefit of the
employees of the said respondent. It is urged that since the
canteen is •maintained as a consequence of a statutory
obligation under Section 46 of the Act, 1948, and that since D
by virtue of notification dated 21.01.1991, Rules 65-70 of the
Delhi Factory Rules, 1950 (for short, "the Rules, 1950") have
become applicable to the respondent No. 1, the said workers
·-(
.
.
should be held to be the employees of the management of
the corporation, on which such statutory obligation is placed,
E
that is, Air India.
7. Respondent No. 1 is a company incorporated under
the Companies Act, 1956 and is owned by the Government of
India. The primary object oflhe said respondent is to F
provide international air transport/travel services. It has
Ground Services Department at Indira Gandhi International
Airport, Delhi. The Labour Department vide its notification
dated 20.01.1991 under sub-rule (1) of Rule 65 of the Rules,
1950, has enlisted the said M/s. Air India Ground Services G
Department, thereby making Rules 65 to 70, of the Rules,
1950 applicable to the same.
8. Respondent No. 2-HCI is also a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 arid is a
H
1524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A
separate legal entity from the Air India. As per the
Memorandum of Association of Respondent No. 2, the same
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of theAir India. The main objects
of the said respondent, inter alia, are to establish refreshment
B
C>
rooms, canteens, etc. forthe sale of food, beverages, etc.
, 9. Respondent No. 2 has various units and Respondent
No. 3, being Chefair Flight Catering (for short, "the Chefair''),
provides flight catering services to various airlines, including
Air India. It is this Chefair unit of HCI that operates and runs
the canteen. It requires to be noticed that the appellantsworkmen are engaged on a casual or temporary basis by
the' respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to render canteen services on
the premises of respondent No.1 -Air India.
·ISSUE:
D
., 10. The main issue for consideration before. this Court
in the present reference is "whether workers, engaged on a
casual or temporary basis by a contractor (HCI) to operate
and run a statutory canteen, under the provisions of the Act,
1948, on the premises of a factory- Air India, can be said to
E · be the workmen of the said factory or corporation".
'
SUBMISSIONS:
11. Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel forthe
appellants-workmen has two alternative submissions; firstly,
F · that in the event of a statutory requirement to provide for a
canteen or any other facility, the employees of the said facility
would automatically become employees of the principal
employer, irrespective of the existence of any intermediary
that may have been employed to run that facility. Secondly,
G the test of sufficient control by the principal employer over
the operation of the· canteen and consequently over the
appellants-workmen, should prevail. Therefore, the Court
should pierce the veil and take note of the. fact that the
contractor was a mere camouflage, and the principal employer
H was in real control of the canteen and its workmen. Reference
BALWANTRAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIRINDIA - 1525
LTD. & ORS. [H. L. DATTU, J.]
is made to the following cases in support of his submissionsA
SaraspurMills Co. Ltd. v. Raman/al Chimanlal, (1974) 3
SCC 66; Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union, -
(1978) 4 SCC 257; M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India, 1990
Supp SCC 191; and Parimal Chandra Raha v. UC, 1995
supp (2) sec 611.
B
12. Shri Jayant Bhushan also submits that the Issue raised
-in these appeals is squarely covered by the observations
made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Steel Authority
of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001)
1sec1.
c
13. While supporting the judgment in the Steel Authority
of India's case (supra), Shri C.U. Singh, learned Senior
Counsel for Respondent No. 1-Air India would contend that
the issue that came up for consideration before the 0
Constitution Bench is entirely different and, therefore, the
said decision has no bearing on the facts and the question of -
law raised in the present set of appeals.
14. Shri C.U. Singh would then refer to the various case
laws cited by the learned counsel for the appellants to show E -
that they are not only distinguishable on facts, but are
inapplicable to the facts of the present case. He would also
refer to the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the
case of Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. v. Shramik Sena,
(1999) 6 SCC 439, and then would submit that the proposition
F -
of law enunciated in the Indian Petrochemicals case (supra)
is followed by this Court in Hari Shankar Sharma v. Artificial
Limbs Mfg. Corpn., (2002) 1 -sec 337; Workmen v. Coates
of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 547; Haldia Refinery Canteen
-Employees Union v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC G
51; and Karnataka v. KGSD Canteen Employees' Welfare
Assn., (2606) 1 sec 567.
-
_ 15. In so far as the second submission of the learned
counsel forthe appellants is concerned, Shri C.U. Singh would
H
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(2014] 14 S.C.R.
A submit that it is not the test of sufficient control, but the test
of effective and absolute control which would be relevant,
and that if.the said test, in the given facts is applied, the
appellants would fail to establish the employer and employee
relationship. In aid of his submissions, he refers to Bengal.
B Nagpur Cotton Mills v. Bharat Lal, (2011) 1 SCC 635;
International Airport Authority of India v. International Air
Cargo Workers' Union, (2009) 13 SCC 374; and National
Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Anania Ki shore Rout & Ors., (2014) 6
sec 756.
C
RELEVANT PROVISIONS:
16. To appreciate the point of view of the parties to the
present lis, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions.
17. Section 46 of the Act, 1948 statutorily places an
D obligation on the occupier of a factory to provide and maintain
a canteen in the factory where more than two hundred and
fifty workers are employed. There is nothing in the said
provision which provides for the mode in which the factory
must set up a canteen. It appears to be left to the discretion
E of the concerned factory to either discharge the said obligation
of setting up a canteen either by way of direct involvement or
through a contractor or any other third party. The provision
reads as under:
F
G
H
"46. Canteens.-(1) The State Government may make
rules requiring that in any specified factory wherein
more than two hundred and fifty workers are ordinarily
employed, a canteen or canteens shall be provided and
maintained by the occupier for the use of the workers.
(2) Without prejudice in the generality of the foregoing
power, such rules may provide for -
(a) the date by which such canteen shall be provided;
(b) the standard in respect of construction,
accommodation, furniture and other equipment of the
canteen;
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1527
LTD. & ORS. [H. L. DATTU, J.]
(c) the foodstuffs to be served therein and the charges A
which may be made therefor;
(d) the constitution of a managing committee for the
canteen
and representation of the workers in the
management of the canteen;
( dd) the items of expenditure in the running of the canteen
which are not to be taken into account in fixing the cost
of foodstuffs and which shall be borne by the employer;
B
(e) the delegation to Chief Inspector subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed, of the power to make C
rules under clause (c)."
18. By virtue of Notification No .. 27(12)89-CIF/Lab/
464 dated 21.01.1991, rules 65 to 70 of the Rules, 1950
were made applicable to Mis. Air India Ground Services
Department. The rules impose obligations upon the occupier D
of the factory as regards providing for and maintaining the
said canteen.
19. Rules 65 to 70 of the Rules, 1950 are in furtherance
of the duty prescribed on the State Government to run statutory E
canteens as per Section 46 of the Act, 1948. Rule 65, inter
alia, provides for an official notification and approval of the
occupier canteen facility as well as additional gutdelines
regarding the construction,· accommodation, hygiene,
ventilation, sanitation and other maintenance works. Rule 66
F
prescribes for setting up a dining hall, with adequate space
and furniture along with reservation of dining space for women
employees. Rule 67 enumerates the requisite equipment
such as utensils, furniture, uniforms for the canteen staff and
other equipment to be purchased and maintained in a G
hygienic manner. Rule 68 prescribes that the prices to be
charged on foodstuffs and other items will be on a non-profit
basis, as approved by the Canteen Managing Committee.
Rule 69 illustrates the procedure for handling the auditing
of accounts, under the supervision of the Canteen Managing
H
.
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[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A Committee as well as Inspector of Factories. Lastly, Rule 70
enumerates the consultative role of the Managing Committee
regarding, inter alia, the quality and quantity of foodstuffs
served, arrangement of menus, duration for meals, etc. It
also prescribes that such a Committee must have equal
B representation of persons nominated by the occupier and
elected members by the workers of the factory. The Manager
is entrusted with determining and supervising the procedure
for conducting such elections and dissolving the Committee
at the expiry of its two year statutory term.
C
DISCUSSION :
.20. Before we deal with the issue that arises for
consideration, it would be necessary to consider the
applicability of the Constitution Bench decision in the Steel
0
Authority of India case (supra). Learned counsel refers to
paragraphs 106 and 107 qf the said judgment to contend that
the observations made therein is the expression of the Court
on the question of law and since it is the decision of the.
Constitution Bench, the same would be binding on this Court.
E To appreciate the submission, of the learned counsel, we
notice the aforesaid paragraphs:
"106. We have gone through the decisions of this Court
in VST Industries case (2001) 1 SCC 298, GB. Pant
University case (2000) 7 SCC 109 and M. Aslam
F
case (2001) 1 SCC 720. All of them relate to statutory
liability to maintain the canteen by the principal
employer in the factory/establishment. That is why in
those cases, as in SaraspurMillscase(1974)3SCC
66 the contract labour working in the canteen were
G
treated as workers of the principal employer. These
cases stand on a different footing and it is not possible
to deduce from them the broad principle of law that on
the contract labour system being abolished under subsection (1) of Section 10 of the CLRAAct the contract
H
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v. AIR !NOIA
1529 ·
LTD. & ORS. [H. L. DATTU, J.]
labour working in the establishment of the principal A
employer have to be absorbed as regular employees
of the establishment
. "
107. An analysis of the cases, discussed above, shows
that they fall in three classes: (i) where contract labour
is engaged in or in connection with the work of an
B
establishment and employment of contract labour is
prohibited either because the industrial adjudicator/
court ordered abolition of contract labourer because
the appropriate Government issued notification under
Section 10(1) of the CLRAAct, no automatic absorption C
of the contract labour working in the establishment was
ordered; (ii) where the contract was found to be a sham
and nominal, rather a camouflage, in which case the
contract labour working in the establishment of the
principal employer were held, in fact and in reality, the
D
employees of the principal employer himself. Indeed,
such cases do not relate to abolition.of contract labour
but presentinstances wherein the Court pierced the veil
and declared the correct position as a fact at the stage •
after employmentof contract labour stood prohibited;
E·
(iii) where in discharge of a statutory obligation <?f
maintaining a canteen in an establishment the
principal employer availed the services of a contractor
the courts have held that the contract labour would
indeed be the employees of the principal employer." F
21. By placing his fingers on Clause (iii) of paragraph
107, the learned counsel would contend that the said
observation is the ratio of the Court's decision and, therefore,
it is binding on all other Courts: We do not agree. The .
Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India's case (supra) G
. was primarily concerned with the mea_ning of the
expression "appropriate Government" in Section 2(1 )(a) of
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970
and in Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and H
'~
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A the other issue was automatic absorption of the contract
labour in the establishment of the principal employer as a
consequence of an abolition notification issued under Section
10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)Act.
The Court while over-ruling the judgment in Air India Statutory
B Corporation vs. United Labour Union (1997) 9 SCC 377,
prospectively, held that neither Section 1 O of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition)Act nor any other provision
in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication,
provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issue
C of notification under the said section; prohibiting contract
labour and consequently the principal employer is not
required to absorb the contract labour working in the
concerned estpblishment.
l
In the aforesaid decision, firstly, the issue whether
D contract labourers working in statutory canteen(s) would fall
within the meaning of expression "workmen" under the Act,
1948 and therefore they are.· employees of the principal
employer and secondly,· whether th~.,P~in.cipal employer to
fulfil . its obligation under Section 46 of the Act, 1948
E engages a contractor, the e.mployees of the contractor can
claim regularisation and extension of the service conditions
extended to the employees of the principal employer did
not remotely arise for consideration of the Court.
F .
Secondly, fn our considered view, the observations
_ made by the Constitution Bench in paragraph 107 of the
Judgment by no stretch of imagination can be considered
'the law declared' by the Court. We say so for the reason,
the Court after noticing several decisions which were
brought to its notice, has summarised the view expressed in
G · those decision in three categories. The caiegorisation so
made cannot be said the declaration of law made by the
Court which would be binding on all the Courts within the
territory of India as envisaged under Article 141
of the
Constitution of India. This Court in the case of The
H
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1531
LTD. & ORS. [H. L. DATTU, J.]
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works A
(P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363, has observed:
"39.
It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out
a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court
divorced from the context of the question under
consideration and treat it to be complete 'law' declared
8 .
by this Court. The Judgment must be read·as a whole
and the observations from the judgment have to be
considered in the light of the questions which were before
this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from c
the questions involved in the case in which it was
rendered and while applying the decision to the later
case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true
principle laid down by the decision of this C9urt and not
pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced
from the context of the questions under consideration
D
by this Court, to support their reasonings"
22. Further, this Court in Punjab Land Development and
Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC
E
682, observed as follows:
"44. An analysis of judicia.1 precedent, ratio decidendi
· and the ambit of earlier and later decisions is to be
found in the House of Lords' decision in F.A. &A.B. Ltd.
v. Lupton (Inspector of Taxes), Lord Simon concerned
F
with the decisions in Griffiths v. J.P. Harrison (Watford)
Ltd. and Finsbury Securities Ltd. v . .Inland Revenue
Commissioner with their interrelationship and with the
question whether Lupton's case fell with-in the precedent
established by the one or the other case, said:. (AC p.
G ·
658) .
'. .. what constitutes binding precedent is the ratio
decidendi of a case, and this is almost always to be
ascertained by an analysis of the material facts of
H
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 .S.C.R.
A
the case-that is, generally, those facts which the
·tribunal whose decision is in question itself holds,
expres~ly or implicitly, to be material.'"
23. It is stated therein that a judicial decision is the
abstraction of the principle from the facts and arguments of
B the c13se.
It was further observed in the Punjab Land
Development case (supra), that:
c
D
E
"5.3. Lord Halsbury's dicta in Quinn v. Leatham, 1901 AC
495: (AC p. 506)
" ... every judgment must be read as applicable to
the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved,
since the generality of the expressions which may
be found there are not intended to be expositions of
the whole Jaw, but governed and qualified by the.·
particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found. The other is that a case
is only an authority for what it actually decid~s.;, ·
This Court held in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar
Misra (1968) 2 SCR 154, that a decision is only an
authority for what it actually decides. What is of the
essence in a decision is its ratio and not other
observation found therein nor what logically follows from
the various observations made in it. .. .''
F
24. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
State of Punjab v. Baladev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172, held
that a judgment has to be considered in the context in which
it was rendered and that a decision is an authority for what it
decides and it. is. not everything said therein constitutes a
G precedent.
H
25. In our view, the binding nature of a decision would
extend to only observations on points raised and decided by
the Court and neither on aspects which it has not decided nor
had occasion to express its opinion upon. The observation
BALWANT RAI SALUJA&ANR. ETC. ETC. v.AIR INDIA
1533
LTD. & ORS. [H. L. DATTU, J.]
made in a prior decision on a legal question which arose in
A
a manner not requiring any decision and which was to an
extent unnecessary, ought to be considered merely as an
obiter dictum. We are further of the view that a ratio of the
judgment or the principle upon which the question before
the Court is decided must be considered as binding to be
B
applied as an appropriate precedent.
26. The Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India's
case (supra), decided on the limited issue surrounding the
absorption of contract workers into the
principal
establishment pursuant to
a notification issued by the C
appropriate Government under Section 1 O of the Contract
Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1970. The conclusion
in paragraph 125 of Steel Authority of India's case (supra),
inter alia, states that on issuance of a notification under
Section 10(1) of Coritract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) D
Act, 1970 passed by the appropriate Government would
not entail the automatic absorption of contract workers
operating in the establishment and the principal employer
will not be burdened with any liability thereof. The issue
surrounding workmen employed in statutory canteens and the E
liability of principal employer was neither argued nor subject
of dispute in the Steel Authority of India's case (supra).
Therefore, in our considered view the decision on which
reliance was placed by learned counsel does not assist him
in the facts of the present case.
F
27. The Act, 1948 is a social legislation and it provides
for the health, safety, welfare, working hours, leave and
other benefits for workers employed in factories and it also
provides for the improvem·ent of working conditions within G
the factory premises. Section 2 of the Act, 1948 is the
interpretation clause. Apart from others, it provides the
definition of worker under Section 2(1) of the Act, 1948, to mean
a person employed', directly or through any other agency,
whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing or cleaning H
1534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A
process. Section 46 of the Act, 1948 requires the
establishment of canteens in factories employing more than
two hundred and fifty workers. The State Government have
been given power under the Section to make Rules requiring
that such canteens to be provided in the factory under Sub
B Section (2), the items for which rules are to be framed have
been specified. The Sub Section also contemplates the
delegation by the State Government the power to the Chief
Inspector to make rules in respect of .the food to be· served in
such canteens and their charges.