# BANARASI DEVI v. INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 539
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-07-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 142 and 143 of 1963
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J. C. Shah, S. M. Snau
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/banarasi-devi-v-income-tax-officer-calcutta-3161
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Income-tax Act, (11 of 1922), as amended by Income-tax
(Amendment) Act (1 of 1959) s. 4-Fiscal enactments-Interpretation of-"lssued" in s. 4 of the Amending Act-Meaning
of.
For the assessment year 1947-48 the appellant in the fust
case field a return of her income and the assessment was completed sometime in 1948 as a result whereof it was found that
no tax was payable by her. On April 2,1956, the appellant was
,;erved with a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922, on the ground of escaped assessment.
The date of the notice fell within' 8 years from the end of the
relevant assessment year i.e. March 31, 1948, but it was served
beyond 8 years from the date and therefore was clearly out
of time under the provisions of the said section. In the second
case, the appellant was assessed for the assessment year 1947-48
and the tax thereon was deposited on his behalf. On April 2,
1956, the appellant was also served with a similar notice as
aforesaid. The appellants filed two petitions under Art. 22~
for .quashing the said notices and the learned Judge of th•
High Court issued rules nisi to the Income-tax Officer, the
Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India. On September 11, 1958, the rules were made absolute. The respondents then preferred appeals to a Division Bench of that ·Court
Pending the appeals, on March 12. 1959, s. 34 of the Act wa,;
amended by s. 2 of the Amending Act, 1959. After the said
amendment the appeals were heard and relying uPOn the said
amendment the learned judges held that the. said notices,
though served on the appellants after the prescribed time,
w<ere served under s. 4 of the . Amending Act. On appeal by
Special Leave it was urged on behalf of the appellants that
s. 4 of the Amending Act only saved a notice issued after the
prescribed time, but did not apply to a situation where notice
was issued within but served out of time. The respondents
contended that the expression "issued" means "served" and
that, in any view, it was comprehensive enough to take in the
entire process of giving and serving of notice.
Held: To the present case the general rule of construction
of fiscal Acts would apply, and not the exception engrafted on
the rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act, cannot he described
as a provision laying down the machinery for the calculation
of tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a person's income which has escaped assessment, though
the time within which he could have so assessed had expired
under the Act before the amendmei!t of 1959. · It resuscitates
barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent . rules of construction appropriate to a chargilig section shill! also apply to
such a provision.
Case law discussed.
On a true construction of s. 4 of the Amending Act, it must
be held that the clear intention of the legislature was to save
the validity of the notice as well as the assessment from an
lgf4
Jlarcli.31
540
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
[I964J
1964
attack on the ground that the notice was given beyond the
.
. prescribed period. That intention would be effectuated if the
Banara.ti. DevJ wider meaning is given to the expression "issued".
The die-·
lncotRe-,:;
Offictr, tionary meaning of the expression "issued" takes in the entire
·
Caktitta
'process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof.
The said word used in s. 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted
by courts to mean 'served". The limited meaning, namely,
"sent" will exclude from the operation of the provision a class
cl cases and introduce anomalies. In the circumstances, by
interpretation, the wider meaning of the word "issued"
must be accepted. In this view, though the notices were served
beyond the prescribed time, they were saved under s. 4 of the
Amending Act.

## Text

7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
BANARASI DEVI
v.
INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA
[K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. Snau, JJ.J
Income-tax Act, (11 of 1922), as amended by Income-tax
(Amendment) Act (1 of 1959) s. 4-Fiscal enactments-Interpretation of-"lssued" in s. 4 of the Amending Act-Meaning
of.
For the assessment year 1947-48 the appellant in the fust
case field a return of her income and the assessment was completed sometime in 1948 as a result whereof it was found that
no tax was payable by her. On April 2,1956, the appellant was
,;erved with a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922, on the ground of escaped assessment.
The date of the notice fell within' 8 years from the end of the
relevant assessment year i.e. March 31, 1948, but it was served
beyond 8 years from the date and therefore was clearly out
of time under the provisions of the said section. In the second
case, the appellant was assessed for the assessment year 1947-48
and the tax thereon was deposited on his behalf. On April 2,
1956, the appellant was also served with a similar notice as
aforesaid. The appellants filed two petitions under Art. 22~
for .quashing the said notices and the learned Judge of th•
High Court issued rules nisi to the Income-tax Officer, the
Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India. On September 11, 1958, the rules were made absolute. The respondents then preferred appeals to a Division Bench of that ·Court
Pending the appeals, on March 12. 1959, s. 34 of the Act wa,;
amended by s. 2 of the Amending Act, 1959. After the said
amendment the appeals were heard and relying uPOn the said
amendment the learned judges held that the. said notices,
though served on the appellants after the prescribed time,
w<ere served under s. 4 of the . Amending Act. On appeal by
Special Leave it was urged on behalf of the appellants that
s. 4 of the Amending Act only saved a notice issued after the
prescribed time, but did not apply to a situation where notice
was issued within but served out of time. The respondents
contended that the expression "issued" means "served" and
that, in any view, it was comprehensive enough to take in the
entire process of giving and serving of notice.
Held: To the present case the general rule of construction
of fiscal Acts would apply, and not the exception engrafted on
the rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act, cannot he described
as a provision laying down the machinery for the calculation
of tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a person's income which has escaped assessment, though
the time within which he could have so assessed had expired
under the Act before the amendmei!t of 1959. · It resuscitates
barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent . rules of construction appropriate to a chargilig section shill! also apply to
such a provision.
Case law discussed.
On a true construction of s. 4 of the Amending Act, it must
be held that the clear intention of the legislature was to save
the validity of the notice as well as the assessment from an
lgf4
Jlarcli.31
540
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
[I964J
1964
attack on the ground that the notice was given beyond the
.
. prescribed period. That intention would be effectuated if the
Banara.ti. DevJ wider meaning is given to the expression "issued".
The die-·
lncotRe-,:;
Offictr, tionary meaning of the expression "issued" takes in the entire
·
Caktitta
'process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof.
The said word used in s. 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted
by courts to mean 'served". The limited meaning, namely,
"sent" will exclude from the operation of the provision a class
cl cases and introduce anomalies. In the circumstances, by
interpretation, the wider meaning of the word "issued"
must be accepted. In this view, though the notices were served
beyond the prescribed time, they were saved under s. 4 of the
Amending Act.
Case law referred to
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 142
and 143 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated July 13, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court
in Appeals from Original Orders No. 41 and 69 of 1959.
S. Chaudhury and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants
(in C.A. No. 142/63).
M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. R.
Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 143/1963) ..
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in b,oth the appeals).
March 31, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JMba Rae, J,
SUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals filed by special leave
raise the question of the true construction of the provisions
of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959
(Act No. I of 1959), hereinafter called the Amending Act.
The material facts lie in a small compass and they are as
follows.
For the asseSGment year 1947-48 the appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1963 filed a return of her income
before the Income-tax Officer, District IV, Calcutta, and the
assessment was completed
sometime in 1948 as a result
whereof it was found that no tax was payable by her. On
April 2, 1956, the Income-tax Officer served on her a notice
dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(7) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922. hereinafter called tire Act, on the ground of
escaped assessment. The date of the notice fell within 8 years
from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e., March 31,
1948; but it was served beyond'8 years from that date and.
therefore, was clearly out of time under the provisions of the
said section.
In Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1963, for the assessment
year 1947-48 the appellant was a~sessed on a total .income
-- ---
r
78.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
of Rs. 28,993 /- on December 30, 1948, by the Income-tax
1964
Officer and the tax thereon amounting to Rs. 4,747-13-0 was
Bat1a,...i Deri
deposited on behalf of the appellant in the Reserve Bank of 1 ..,._,;,;
OJli
India. On April 2, 1956, the appellant was served with a ., aa1e11ua
"'•
notice dated March 19, 1956, by the Income-tax Officer purporting to be under s. 34 of the Act on the ground of escaped
Svllba Rao, J
assessment. The date of the notice fell within 8 years from
the end of the relevant asses1iment year, i.e., March 31, 1956;
but it was served beyond 8 years from that date and was,
therefore, clearly out of time under the provisions of the said
section.
The appellants in the two appeals filed two petitions in
the High Court of Calcutta under Aft. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said notices and for_ other appropriate
reliefE. On March 20, 1957, Sinha, J., of that Court issued
rules nisi on the said two · applications to the Income-tax
' Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of
India. On September 11. 1958, the said Judge made the
rules absolute. The respondents to the applications preferred appeals from the judgment of Sinha, J., to a Division
Bench of that Court. Pending the appeals, on March 12.
1959, s. 34 of the Act was amended bys. 2 of the Amending
Act. After the said amendment the appeals were heard by a ..
Division Bench of the High Court, consisting of Bose, C. J .,
and G. K. Mitter. J. Relying upon the said amendment the
learned Judges held that the said notices, though served on
the appellants after the prescribed time, were saved unc!cr
s. 4 of the Amending Act In that view they set aside the
orders of Sinha, J ., and dismislled the writ petitions. Hence
the appeals.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the
notices under s. 34(1) of the Act were served on the appellants
beyond 8 years from the end of the assessment year and,
therefore, were barred and that on a true construction of
the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act, the said notices
were not saved thereunder. To appreciate the contention il
is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Act, before
and after the amendment.
Section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, before
it was amended by the Finance Act No. XVIII of 1956:
If-
(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that
by reason of the omission or failure on the part
of an assessee to make a return of hirl income
under Section 22 for any year or to disclose fully
1964
Banarcui
Devi
v .
.Income-tax
Officer,
OalcuUn
S11bba
Rao, J.
542
(b)
•
SUPRE"'IE COURT REPORTS
(1964]
and truly all material facts necessary for his
assessment for the year, income, profit or gairi
chargeable to incon1e-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed,
or assessed at too low a rate or have been made
the subject of excessive relief under the Act or
exce"ivc· loss or depreciation allowance has been
comp1·l<·r.l. or
he may in cases falling under clause (a) at ·any
time within eight years .................. serve on the
assessee ............... a notice containing all or any
of the requiretrients which may be included in a
notice under sub-section 2 of Section 22 and may
proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or re-compute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act
shall, so far as may be applied accordingly as if
the notice were a notice issued under that subSeclion . •
•
•
•
Provided that where a notice under sub-Sectio11 (])
has been issued within the time therein limited,
the assessment or re-assessment to b~ made in
pursuance of such notice may be made before the
expiry of one year from the date of the service
of the notice even if such period exceeds the
period of eight years or four years, ari the case
may be.
Section 4 of the Amending Act, (Act l of 1959)
No notice issued under clause (a) of sub-section
(]) of section 34 of the principal Act at any time
before the commencement of this Act and no
assessment, re-assessment or settlement made or
other proceedings taken in consequence of such
notice shall be called in question in any Court.
tribunal or other authority merely on the ground
that at the time the notice was issued or at the
time the assessment or re-assessment was made, the
time within which such notice should have been
issued or the assessment or re-assessment should
have been made under that section as in force before its amendment by clause (a) of section 18 of
the Finance Act, 1956, and expired.
Section 34(1) (a) of the Act empowered the Incom~·tax
'Officer to assess concealed income which escaped asse>sment
by serving a notice on the assessee at any time within 8 years
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
of the end of the assessment year in respect whereof the said
1964
income has escaped assessment.
Section 4 of the Amending
Banam•i Devi
Act debars the court from questioning the validity of notice
v.
issued or the assessment or re-assessment made under sub-s.
1""(J~:':'//!"'··
(!) (a) of s. 34 of the Act on the ground that the time for the
· u
issue of such notice or the making of such assessment or
Bubba Rao, J •.
re-assessment had expired under the said sub-section before
it was amended by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends that s. 4 of
the Amending Act only saves a notice issued after· the prescribed time, but does not apply to a situation where notice
is issued within but served out of time.
Learned counsel for
the respondents argues that the expression "i~sued" means
"served" and that, in any view, it is comprehensive enough
to take in the entire process of giving and serving of notice.
Before constrn~ng the section it will be useful to notice
the relevant rules of construction of a fiscal statute.
Jn
Oriental Bank v. Wright(') the Judicial Committee held that
if a statute professed to impose a charge, the intention to impose a charge upon a subject must be shown by clear and
unambiguous language.
In Canadian Eagle Oil Co. v. R.,(')
Viscount Si:non L. C. observed:
"In the words of Rowlatt J ................................ .
in a taxing Act one has to look at what is clearly
said. There is no room for any intendment. There
,
is no equity about a tax.
There is no presumption as to a tax.
Nothing is to be read in. nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at
the language used."
In other words, a taxing statute must be couched in express
and unambiguous language. The same rule of construction
has been accepted by this Court in Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab ("), wherein it was stated:
"It is well recognized that the rule of construction
that if a case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of a taxing statute, no tax
can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by
trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering wltat was the substance
of the matter applies only to a taxing provision
has no application to all provisions -in a taxing
statute. It does not
apply to a provision not
creating a charge for the tax but laying down
the machinery for im calculation or procedure-
(') (1880) 5 A.C. 842, 856.
(') [1946] A.C. 119, 140.
· (') 1868 Punj. Rec. Cr!. Case No. 6.
1964
Banaraa' Devi
••
,.,,,,,.,.t<u Ofli-,
Calc.,Ua
Sabha Rao, J.
544
SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS
(1964]
for its collection. The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have
to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that is to. say, in accordance with the clear
intention of the legislature, which is to make a
charge levied effective.
In that case, the court was called upon to constru.e the provisions of s. ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922, which laid down
the machinery for assessing the
amount of interest and,
therefore, this court did not apply the stringent rule of construction. Apart from the emphasis on the letter of the law,
the fundamental rule of construction of a taxing statute is
not different from that of any other statute and that rule is
stated by Lord Russell of Killowen C. J. in Attorney-General
v. Calton Ban('), thus:
"The duty of the court is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to give
effect to the intention of the legislature, as that '
intention is to be gathered from the language employed, having regard to the context in connection with which· it is employed."
To the present case the general rule of construction of fiscal
Acts would apply, and not the e:tception engrafted on that
rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act cannot be described as a
provision laying down the machinery for the calculation of
tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a peraon's income which has escaped assessment, though
the time within which he,could have so assessed had expired
under the Act before the amendment of 1959. It resuscitates barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent rules of
construction appropriate to a charging section ·Shall also
apply to such a provi6ion.
Before the Amending Act of 1959 was passed, lncometax Officers issued notices before April l, 1956, and also
after that date for reopening assessments made beyond !!
years from the issue of such notices. The validity of such
notices was questioned. To save the validity of such notices
the Amending Act was passed. This Court in S. C. Prashar v.
Vasantsen Dwarkadas(') held, on a construction of s. 4 of the
Amending Act. that it operated and validated the notices
issued under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act, as amended in 1948, even
earlier than April l, 1956. In other words, notices issued
under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act before or after April l, 1956,
could not be challenged on the ground that they were issued
beyond the time limit of 8 years from the respective assessment years prescribed by the 1948 amendment Act. Section
( ') (1899] 2. Q.B. 158, 164.
(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 29.
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
4 of the Amending Act of 1959, therefore, was enacted for
1964
the sole purpose of saving the validity of such notices in Banamsi
D<oi
respect of all escaped incomes relating to any year commencT.
ing from the year ending on March 31, 1941, though theyln'°"O.%':uta Offer.er,
were issued beyond the prescribed time. If the construction
sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellants
Sll1Jba Rao, J.
be accepted, it would defeat the purpose of the amendment
in some cases. If the words were clear and exclude the class
of cases where the notices we~e sent before 8 years from the
date of assessment, but served thereafter, this Court has to give
them the said meaning.
This bring us to the question of ~onstruction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act:
The crucial word in
the said section is "i&5ued".
The section says that though
a notice was issued beyond the time within" which such notice
· should have been issued, its validity could not be questioned.
If the word 'issued" means "sent", we find that there is no
prov1>ion in the Act prescribing a time limit for sending a
notice, for, under s. 34( !)(a) of the Act a notice could be
served only within 8 years from the relevant assessment year ..
It does not provide any period for sending of the notice.
Obviously, therefore, the expression "issued" is not used in
the narrow sense of "sent". Further, the said expression has
received, before the amendment, a clear judicial interpretation. Under s. 34(l)(a) of the Act the Income-tax Officer may
in cases falling under cl. (a) at any time within 8 years serve
on the assessee a notice. The proviso to that section says that
where the notice under s. 34(l)(a) is within time therein
limited, the assessment or re-assessment to be made in pursuance of such notice may be made before the expiry of one
year from the date of the service of the notice even if such
period exceeds the period of 8 years or 4 years, as the case
may be. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South v.
D. V. Ghurve('), it was argued that a notice sent before 8
years though served beyond 8 years was in compliance with
the section; and in support of that argument the expression
"issued" in the proviso was relied upon to limit the meaning
of the word "served" in the substantive part of the section.
Rejecting that argument, Chagla, C. J., speaking for the
Court, observed:
"In other words, the attempt is to equate the expression "served" used in section 34 with the expression "issued" used in the proviso to sub-section
(3). Now we must frankly confess that we find it
difficult to understand why the Legislature has
used in the proviso the expression "where a notice
under sub-section (!) has been issued within the
(') (1957) 31 I.T.R. 683, 686.
LP(ll)ISCJ-18
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
I964
Banarasi
Devi
v.
l11<om<.taz
Ojjker,
time therein limited".
In sub-section (1) no time
is limited for the issue of the notice: time i;; only
limited for the service of the notice; and therefore it is more appropriate that the expression
"issued" used in the proviso to sub-section (3)
should be equated with the expression "served"
rather than that the expression "served" used in
sub-section (1) should be equated with the expression "issued" used iu the proviso to sub-section
Oakutta
Bubba Rao J.
(3)."
'
.
This decision equated the expression "issued" with expression "served". The Allahabad High Court in Sri Niwas v.
Income-tax Officer(') has also interpreted the word "issued"
to mean "served". The rele.vant rule of construction is clearly
stated by Viscount Buckmaster in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam
Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd.(') thus:
"It has long been a well established principle to be
applied in the consideration of Act of Parliament
that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word
or the same phrase in a similar cQntext, must be
corntrued so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously assigned to it."
Section 4 of the Amending Act was enacted for saving the
validity of notices issued under s. 34 (I) of the Act. When
that section used a word interpreted by courts in the context
of such notices, it would be reasonable to assume that the
expression was designedly used in the same sense. That
apart, the expressions "issued" · and "served" are used as
interchangeable terms both in dictionaries and in other statutes. The dictionary meaning of the word "issue" is "the
act of sending out, put into circulation, delivery with authority or delivery". Section 27 of the General Clauses Act
(Act X of 1897) reads th us :
"Where any Central Act or Regulation made after
the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any
document to be served by post,
whether the expression "serve" or either of the
expression, "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected
by properly addressing, prepaying and posting
(') (1956) 30 I.T.R. 381.
(') [1933) A.C. 402, 411.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
by registered post, a letter containing the docu1964
ment, and unless the contrary is proved, to have B•narasi Devi
been effected at the time at which the letter
v.
would be delivered in the ordinary course of Income0:_'f" Officer•
post."
iMC'Utfa
It would be seen from this provL>ion that Parliament used
the words "serve", "give" and "send" as interchangeable
words. So too, in ss. 553, 554 and 555 of the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1951, the two expressions "issued to" or
"served upon" are used as equivalent expresiions.
In the
legislative practice of our country the said two expressions
are sometimes used to convey the same idea .. In other words,
the expression "issued" is used in a limited as well as in a
wider sense.
We must,
therefore, give the expression
"issued" in s. 4 of the Amending Act that meaning which
carries out the intention of the Legislature in preference to
that which defeats it.
By doing so we will not be departing
from the accepted meaning of the expression, but only giving
it one of its meanings accepted, which fits into the context
or setting in which it appears.
With this background let us give a closer look to the
provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act. The object of the
section is to save the validity of a notice issued beyond the
prescribed time. Though the time within which such notice
should have been issued under s. 34(1) of the Act, as it stood
before its amendment by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956,
had expired, the said notice would be valid. Under s. 34(1)
of the Act, as we have already pointed out, the time prescribed was only for service of the notice. As the notice mentioned in s. 4 of the Amending Act is linked with the time
prescribed under the Act, the section becomes unworkable if
the narrow meaning is given to the exprer,sion "issued". On
the other hand, if we give wider meaning to the word, the
section would be consistent with the provisions' of s. 34(1) of
the Act. Moreover, . the narrow meaning would introduce
anomalies in the section: while the notice, assessment or
re-assessment were saved, the intermediate stage of service
would be avoided. To put it in other words, if the proceedings were only at the stage of issue of notice, the notice could
not be questioned, but if it was served, it could be questioned;
though it was served beyond time, if the assessment was
·completed, its validity could not be questioned. The result
would be that the validity of an assessment proceeding would
depend upon the stage at which the assessee seeks to question
it. That could not have been the intention of the Legi>lature. All these anomalies would disappear if the expression
was given the wider meaning.
L!'(D)I<CI-!S{•)
Subba Rao, .J.
I
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
To summarize: the clear intention of the Legislature is
B<111orari
DtfJi to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment
...
from an attack on the ground that the notice was given beJ~
OJ!iar, yond the prescribed period. That intention would be effec-
-
tuated if the wider meaning is given to the expression
S.bbo Boo, J. "issued" takes in the entire process of sending the notice as
well as the service thereof. The said word used in s. 34(1)
of the Act itself was interpreted by courts to mean "served".
The limited meaning, namely. "sent" will exclude from the
operation of the provision a class of cases and introduce an<>-
malies.
In the circumstances, by interpretation, we accept
the wider meaning the word "issued" bears.
In this view,
though the notices were served beyond the prescribed time,
they were served under s. 4 of the Amending Act. No other
point was raised before us.
Iii the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with
costs. There will be one hearing fee.
·
Appeals dismissed.