# BANARSI DAS AHLUWALIA v. l'HE CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY, DELHI

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 685
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 53 of 1965
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, S. M. Sikri, J. M. Shf.Lat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/banarsi-das-ahluwalia-v-l-he-chief-controlling-revenue-authority-delhi-4158
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Sq1tember 28, 1967
Indian Stamp Act, 1899, s. 57(1) and (2)-App!ication to Ret>enue Authority to state a case for opinion of High Court-Substantial question of law involved-If Authorit11 bound to state a case
whether there is a 'pending case or not'.
A
B
The appellant executed a deed of trust on December 20, 1961,
in respect of certain properties on a stamp paper of Rs. 30 /- on
the footing that the . deed was a declaration of tr!-'st. . The SubC
Registrar to whom it was presented for reg1strat10n, impounded
the deed and forwarded it to the Collector for action under sec. 38
(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 2 of 1899. The Collector thereafter
directed the appellant to deposit additional stamp duty and penalty
amounting to Rs. 36,685/- but the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
Delhi, reduced the amount in revision to Rs. 3,780/-. Tho
appellant then applied to that Authority to state .a case to the D
High Court under section 57(1) but this application was rejected
and a writ petition filed by the appellant challenging this rejection
was dismissed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the Authority was, under section 57(li), bound to
refer the case to the High Courtr even though there was no pending case before it and by its refusal to do so the Authority failed
to discharge its statutory duty; that the High Court was in the cirE
cumstances competent to direct the reference and the summary
dismissal of the writ petition by it was wrong, On the other hand
the respondent's contention was that section 57(1) postulates the
existence of a pending case; that the word "case" in the sub-section
means a case which has not been finally decided by the revenue
authorities and which is capable of being disposed of, where a reference is made to the High Court, in accordance with the opinion of F
the Court as provided by sec. 59(2).
He!<l: When a reference has been made to the Authority or
the case has other\.vise come to his notice. if an application is made
under s. 57(1) and it involves a substantial question of law whether
the case is pending or not, the Authority is bound to stat~ the case
in compliance with its obligation. [695 A-Bl
Section 57 aflords a remedy to the citizen to have his case referred to the High Court against an order of a revenue authority impos-
-mg stamp . duty and I or penalty provided the application involves
G
•. substantial quest!on of law and imposes a corresponding obligat,ion on the Authonty ~o ~efer it to the High Court for its opinion.
Such a njlht and .obhgat10n cannot be construed to depend upon
any
subs1d1ary
circumstance such as the pel)dency of the case
before the Authority, [694 F-G]
, Th~ Authority. therefore was in error in refusing to state the H
ca~e. and the. tligh .C.ourt was equally in error in summarily dism1>Smg .the \U.t pel!t10n as the question whether the document was
a declaration of trust or was a deed of settlement was ·1 substantial
question of law. [695 CJ
· ' ·
·
li85
SUPllE!olE OOUllT RliPOllTB
(1968) 1 S.C,R,
A
Chief Contro!ling Revenue Authoritu v.
Maharashtra S1tgar
Mills Ltd., [1950] S.C.R. 536; relied upon and explained.
B
c
Case law reviewed.

## Text

BANARSI DAS AHLUWALIA
v.
l'HE CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY,
DELHI
[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND J. M. SHF.LAT, JJ.]
Sq1tember 28, 1967
Indian Stamp Act, 1899, s. 57(1) and (2)-App!ication to Ret>enue Authority to state a case for opinion of High Court-Substantial question of law involved-If Authorit11 bound to state a case
whether there is a 'pending case or not'.
A
B
The appellant executed a deed of trust on December 20, 1961,
in respect of certain properties on a stamp paper of Rs. 30 /- on
the footing that the . deed was a declaration of tr!-'st. . The SubC
Registrar to whom it was presented for reg1strat10n, impounded
the deed and forwarded it to the Collector for action under sec. 38
(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 2 of 1899. The Collector thereafter
directed the appellant to deposit additional stamp duty and penalty
amounting to Rs. 36,685/- but the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
Delhi, reduced the amount in revision to Rs. 3,780/-. Tho
appellant then applied to that Authority to state .a case to the D
High Court under section 57(1) but this application was rejected
and a writ petition filed by the appellant challenging this rejection
was dismissed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the Authority was, under section 57(li), bound to
refer the case to the High Courtr even though there was no pending case before it and by its refusal to do so the Authority failed
to discharge its statutory duty; that the High Court was in the cirE
cumstances competent to direct the reference and the summary
dismissal of the writ petition by it was wrong, On the other hand
the respondent's contention was that section 57(1) postulates the
existence of a pending case; that the word "case" in the sub-section
means a case which has not been finally decided by the revenue
authorities and which is capable of being disposed of, where a reference is made to the High Court, in accordance with the opinion of F
the Court as provided by sec. 59(2).
He!<l: When a reference has been made to the Authority or
the case has other\.vise come to his notice. if an application is made
under s. 57(1) and it involves a substantial question of law whether
the case is pending or not, the Authority is bound to stat~ the case
in compliance with its obligation. [695 A-Bl
Section 57 aflords a remedy to the citizen to have his case referred to the High Court against an order of a revenue authority impos-
-mg stamp . duty and I or penalty provided the application involves
G
•. substantial quest!on of law and imposes a corresponding obligat,ion on the Authonty ~o ~efer it to the High Court for its opinion.
Such a njlht and .obhgat10n cannot be construed to depend upon
any
subs1d1ary
circumstance such as the pel)dency of the case
before the Authority, [694 F-G]
, Th~ Authority. therefore was in error in refusing to state the H
ca~e. and the. tligh .C.ourt was equally in error in summarily dism1>Smg .the \U.t pel!t10n as the question whether the document was
a declaration of trust or was a deed of settlement was ·1 substantial
question of law. [695 CJ
· ' ·
·
li85
SUPllE!olE OOUllT RliPOllTB
(1968) 1 S.C,R,
A
Chief Contro!ling Revenue Authoritu v.
Maharashtra S1tgar
Mills Ltd., [1950] S.C.R. 536; relied upon and explained.
B
c
Case law reviewed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 53 of 1965
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 16, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi
in Civil Writ No. CW-267-D of 1963.
I. M. Lall, E. C. Agrawala and P. C. Agrawa/a, for the
appellant.
N. S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sbelat, J. This appeal by special leave is
directed against
the 1Jrder of the High. Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) dismissing
the appellant's petition for an appropriate writ directing the Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi, to state the case to the High
Cou~t under sec. 57(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 2 of 1899.
the facts leading to the said petition may be briefly stated:
D On December 20, 1961 the appellant executed a deed of trust in
respect of certain properties on a stamp paper of Rs. 30 on the
footing that the said deed was a declaration of trust. The SubRegistrar to whom it was presented for registration, impounded it
and forwarded it to the Collector for action under sec. 38(2). The
Collector served a notice on the appellant to show cause why he
E should not be charged with deficient stamp duty of Rs. 3,365
and a penalty of Rs. 33,650. After hearing Counsel the Collector
directed the appellant to deposit the aggregate amount of
Rs. 36,685. The appellant filed a revision before the Chief. Con·
trolling Revenue Authority, I)elhi, who reduced the amount of
deficit duty and penalty to Rs. 630 and Rs. 3,150 respectively. On
r December 9, 1962 the appellant applied to the said Authority to
state the case to the ~iigh Court under section 57(1). That was
rejected and the appellant filed a writ petition but the High Court
dismissed it in liinine.
The appellant's contention is that the Authority was under
section 57(1) bound to refer the case to the High Court even
G though there was no pending case before it, that by its refusal to
do so the Authority failed to discharge its statutory duty, that the
High Court was in the circumstances competent to direct the
reference and therefore the High CIJurt's summary dismissal of
the writ petition was wrong. The respondent's contention, on the
other hand, is tha:t section 57(1) postulates the existence of a
pending case, that the word "case" in the sub-section means a
R case which has not been finally decided by the revenue authorities
and which is capable of being disposed of, if a reference is made
and the High Court prbnounces its opinion on such reference, in
accordance with such opinion as provided by sec. 59(2).
Tt
is
contended that therefore the High Court cannot direct the Autho-
liANAllSI DAS v. m~VENOE AUTHORITY (S/wlat, J.)
68i
rity to state the case except where the case is still .pending
A
before the Revenue Authorities. How can the Authority, it was
argued, dispose of the case conformably to the High Court's
opinion when there is no case pending before it which it can
dispose of?
To appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to read at
this stage the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 56(1) provides
that the powers exercisable by a Collector under Chapter IV and B
Chapter V and under clause (a) of the first proviso to section 26
shall in all cases be 1mbject to the control of the Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority. Sub-section 2 provides:--
"If any Collector. acting under section 31, section 40 or
section 41 feels doubt as to the amount of duty with which
any instrument is chargeable. he may draw up a statement of the case, and refer it, with his own opinion thereon, for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority."
Section 57(1) provides:
c
"The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may state
D
any case referred to it under section 56, sub-section (2),
or otherwise coming to its notice, and refer such case,
with its own opinion thereon ...... ".
Section 59 provides that the High Court upon the hearing of any
such case, shall decide the questions raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon conta;ning the grounds on which such E
decision is founded. Section 59(2) provides that the High Court
shall send to the Revenue Authority by which the case was stated
a copy of such judgment and the Revenue Authority shall, on
receiving such copy, dispose of the case conformably to such
judgment.
Some of the earlier decisions of the High Courts of Madras F
and Calcutta took the view that though the words "otherwise coming to its notice" in sec. 57(1) are of wide import apparently enabling the Authority to state a case, sub-section I bf that section has
to be construed in such a manner as to harmonise with the provisions of section 59(2) so tha.t those provisions can be worked out. G
Therefore unless section 57(1) is construed to mean that it is only
when there is a pending case which the Authority can state and
can dispose of in conformity with the opinion of the High Court
that a reference can be made by it under that sub-section. Thus,
in the Reference Under the Stamp Act, Section 57(1) the High
Court of Madras held that &n adjudication by a Collector under
section 31 of the Act as to the duty with which art ·instrument is H
chargeable is by section 32 made final and such a case cannot be
referred to the High Court under section 57. Two documents
purporting to be mortgages of crops to secure re-payment of
RB. 2.300 and odd and Rs. 2 lacs and odd containing also an
688
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1968] I s.o.a.
A ancilliary lien on lhe estates where the crops were to be grown
were adjudicated by the Deputy Collector as chargeable under
Arts. 40(c) and 41. The Deputy Collector levied duties amounting
to Rs. 70-12-0 and Rs. 688-12-0 respectively. The duties were
accordingly paid and the Deputy Collector certified and enaorsed
the documents under section 32. The mortgagees applied to the
Bmrrd of Revenue for a refund of duty stating that Art. 40(c) did
B not apply and thereupon the Board referred the case under section
57(1). The High Court held that on a reading of section 57(1) with
section 59(2) the word "case meant a matter which had yet to
be disposed of by the revenue authorities conformably to the
judgment of the High Court and that the effect of section 32 was
that once the Collector endorse(! the document the matter was
c finally determined. There be:ng no pending case, the Board could
not make a reference. The reason given in this decision for holding the reference incompetent was that the words "dispose of conformubly to the judgment of the High
Court" in section 59(2)
suggested that there must be a pending case before the authorities
which on a reference to the High Court and on the High Court
D pronouncing its judgment can be disposed of in conformity with
such judgment. A similar· queotion once again arose, in the Referl'llce Under Stamp Act, Section 57(1) reported in the same volume
at page 752. In this case the Sub·Reuistrar impounded the documents under section 33 and forwarde-d them to the Collector for
action under section 38(2). The Collector certified by his endorseE ment under section 40 that they were not chargeable with duty.
The matter was referred to the Board of Revenue which disagreed
with the Collector and referred the case to the High Court.
The question was whether this was a "case" which could be
referred? Arnold White. C.J. held that it was; because under
section 56(1) powers exercisable by a Collector were subject to the control of the Revenue Board, therefore a case
F brought to its notice would be a. "case otherwise coming to the
notice" of the Board and a case which has to be disposed of under
s. 59(2) conformably to the judgment which the High Court may
pronounce. He held that though the words in sec. 56(]) are powers
"exercisable" by the Collector they would also mean "exercised"
by the Collector. Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ. disagreed
G with the Chief Justice and held following the decision in 25 Mad.
751. that the reference was not competent and the High Court had
no jurisdiction to decide it. After analysipg the different sections,
Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. held that though section 56(]) gave wide
control to the Revenue Board over the action of the Collector,
it could be exercised only until the Collector had not yet exercised
his power under sec. 40 and issued his certificate. Once the certl
H ficate was issued and the document with his endorsement was
returned to the party as one either properly stamped or exempt
from duty there was no power in the Board to recall the document
from the party and to levy duty where the Collector had certified
it to be exempt and hence the Board had no power to refer such 11
nANARSI DAS v. REYENUE AU'fHO!U'fY (Shclt<I, J.)
689
case under sec. 57(]). The effect of this decision is that the CalleeA
tor by exercising his power and certifying the document exhausts
the Board's power of control under section 56(1). The case havin!l
been concluded there would also be no pending case which the
Board could refer to the High Court. He also disagreed with the
Chief Justice that the word "exercisable" in section 56(1) could
not mean "exercised" as the legislature
had
used the word
"exercisable" deliberately to mean that once such power was B
exercised, the Board's control over such a case was exhausted.
Following this decision, the Allahabad High Court in a Stamp
Reference by tile Board of Revenue(') held that once the Collector had taken action under sec. 40([) and had received the deficient
duty and penalty imposed by him and certified the document the
jurisdiction of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to refer c
such a case to the High Court was ousted. In that case a sale deed
was forwarded to the Collector under seo. 38(2) who held that it
was insufficiently stamped; the deficit according to him, amounted
to Rs. 41· and he levied penalty of Rs. 5/-. The deficit and the
penalty were paid and presumably the Collector endorsed the
document. Under s. 40(a) such a certificate is conclusive. The High D
Court in these circumstances held that the case before the Collec·
tor having been concluded and there being no pending case the
controlling power of the Revenue Board was exhausted and it had
no power to refer such a case under s. 57(1). The case In re. Cooke
and KalvayO was a case falling under sec. 56(2l, i.e .. a ca~e "otherwise coming to the notice" of the Board of Revenue. Rankin C.J. E
held in this case that though those words were wide, they could
be given effect to only in cases where the concluding words of
s. 59 could also be given effect to. He held, therefore, that if the
Collector had in that case impounded the document which he had
not but only decided the duty payable on it, the Board could interfere and refer the case under s. 57(1) provided such interference .F
was made before the Collector completed the case. In the Board
of Revenue v. Lakshmipat Sing/Jania(') certain share trnnsfer deeds
were filed in the Court. The Court impounded them and forwarded them to the Collector under sec. 38(2). The Collector passed an
order determining the duty payable. Both the duty and penalty
as decided by the Collector were paid and the Collector certified G
and endorsed the deeds. The matter having come to the notice of
the Revenue Board, it made the reference. The High Court held
that the purpose of section 57(1) was a practical one and that that
section could not apply unless there was a case pending before
the Authority whether it was a case referred to it under section
56(2) or otherwise coming to its notice and in respect of which
that Authority could give effect to the advisory opinion of the
High Court. Therefore the Collector having certified, the case B
( 1) [1913) I.L.R 40 All. 128.
(') I.L.R. (1958) 2 All. 246.
(') I.L.R. (1932) 59 Cal. 1171.
HUPnNMlo! ('OUH.T RRPORT8
[ 1968] I s.o.n.
A before him was concluded and there remained nothing. pending
in respect of which a reference could be competent. A similar
view has also been taken by the Mysore High Court in Shri Rama
Krishna Theatre v. Chief Revenue Controlling Authority.(')
The view first expressed in I.LR. 25 Mad. 752 appears to
ha\'C pr~vaiied unt;I the question arose whether sec. 57()) confers
B a discretion on the authority whether to state a case or not or
whether it casts an obligation on that Authority to state the case
when ;1 subject calls upon it to do so in a case involving a substantial question of law. Such a question was mooted in the Chief
Co11trolling Revenue Authority
v.
Maharashtra Sugar Mills
Ltd.\'). Jn that case the Mills executed on March 22. 1945 the
C document in question in favour of the Central Bank of India for
borrowing a certain amount and stamped it with a stamp of
Rs. 16·8·0 tin the bas;s that it was a deed of hypothecation. It
was sent to the Registrar of Companies and the Registrar sent
it to the Superintendent of Stamps. On April 4, 1945, thhe Assistant
Superintendent '.lf .Stamps informed the Mills that the document
D was a mortgage with possession and hence was not duly stamped.
On July 19, 1945. that officer informed the Mills of his
decision that the document being a mortgage with possession
was chargeable with a duty of Rs. 56,250 and called upon
the Mills to pay the deficit of R'!i. 56,23818/· and Rs. 5,000 as
pennlty. The Mills paid up the dmounts and on that the Assistant
E Supdt. of Stamps informed the Mills that the document would be
certified and returned to the Registrar. The Mills thereafter filed
a suit for rectification of the document. On December 9, 1945 the
Ass;stant Supdt. informed the Mills that the Collector had been
requested to recover the said tleficit duty and penalty and on
January 11, 1946 the Collector demanded the said amounts. On
F January 25, 1946, the High Court passed a deei'ee rectifying the
s'.lid document. On February I. 1946 the Mills requested
the
Assistant Superintendent to refer the case to the Authority under
section 56(2). The Mills applied to the Authority on February 5.
1946 that the s•iid order should either be rescinded or a case
should be stated to the High Court under section 57(1). On July
G 4, 1945 the Authority rejected the application. The Mills applied
to the High Court against the Authority for a direction that he
should be asked to state the case. The Trial Judge granted relief
under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act calling upon the Authority
to state the case on the ground that a substantial question of law
as to the effect of rectification had arisen. In the Letters Patent
Appeal by the Authority the Division Bench. of the High Court
B confirmed the said decree :111d held that the words "otherwise
( ') I.L.R. [1962) Mys. :l96.
('l A.I.R. 1948 Born. 2~4.
DANARS! nA~ V. REVEXUFl AUTHORl'l'Y (Snelat, J,)
691
comes to his notice" in section 57(1) were very wide and did not A
cover only the cases which the Revenue Authority wanted to move
the High Court at its own instance but also covered cases where
an application was made to it in that behalf by the citizen. The
High Court observed that looking to the scheme and the object
of the Act, the one solitary safeguard which the citizen had was
to get his liability to pay stamp duty cletermined by the High Court
in cases where important and substantial questions of law were in· B
volved. Consequently, where a serious question of law was involved
there was a duty cast on the Authority to state the case and the
citizen had a right to have such a case determined by the High
Court. There would be a breach of duty if the Authority fal]ed
to appreciate that there was a serious point of law involved and
such breach of duty could be enforced by an order under sec. 45 c
of the Specific Relief Act.
It will be noticed that when the Assistant Supdt. of Stamps
decided on July 19. 1945 that the document was a
mortgag!'.
chargeable with the duty of Rs. 56.250 and ordered the Mills to
pay the deficit and the penalty, the case before him was conclud·
ed. In fact he wrote to the Registrar of Companies returning the D
document that it would be certified by him on payment of the
said amounts. The Collector thereafter was requested to recover
the two amounts and a demand was also made on the Mills. It
is true that the application of the Mills dated February 1, 19'45
to the Collector under sec. 56(2) was not decided when the Mills
on February 5, 1946 asked the Authority to state the case. But
unlike section 57(1) the Collector under sec. 56(2) may refer the E
case, if he is in doubt. The duty of the Collector not being obligatory, the case was concluded long before the Mills' application
dated February 5, 1946. Jn any ewnt as the Collector did not
refer the case under sec. 56(2) to the Authority it cannot be said
that there was any pending case either before him or the Authority and yet the High Court ordered the Authority to state the F
case. The Authority appealed to this Court and as reported in
Chief Control/i11g Revenue Authority v. Malwrasll/ra Sugar Mills
Ltd.(') urged three points: (il whether under sec. 57 there is an
obligation on the Authority to state a case; (ii> whether having
regard to s. 226 of the Government of India Act. 1935 the High
Court had jurisdiction to order a reference. the matter being one of G
revenue and (iii) that the matter having proceeded beyond the
stage of assessment and having reached the stage of recovery the
High Court could not direct a reference of the case; in other words,
there being no case pending before the Authority a reference by it
would not be competent and the High Court therefore would
have no jurisdiction either to direct or to decide such reference
even if made. This Court after referring with approval to the deci- B
sion of the Privy Council in Alcock Ashdown v. Chief Revenue
Authority. Bombay(') and to section 51 of the Income-tax Act,
1918 which contained provisions similar to section 59 of the Stamp
(') [1950) S.C.R. 536
(') 50 I.A. 227.
L,l'P(N)7SCI~~
SUPRF.ME rouRT RF.PORTS
[1968] 1 s.c.R
A Act held that though sec. 57(1) used the word "may" the power to
state the case was coupled with the duty of the Authority as
a public officer to do the right thing and therefore the word "may" as
held by the Privy Council must mean '"shall". Though the case
had gllne beyond the stage of assessment a-nd even steps for
recovery were already taken and the case was therefore concluded
this Court upheld the High Court's decision to issue the mandaB mus. The decision thus establishes that the fact that the case is
concluded and is no longer pending cannot make a reference incompetent or disable the High Court from pronouncing its judgment thereon. This decision has since then been followed in
Appalamuasimha/11 v. Board of Revenue.(') Sha11mugha Muda/iar
v. Board of Revenue,(') Saradambal v. Board of Reven11e.(') and
c Sarup Singh v. Union of llldia<').
Two decisions to which our attention was drawn need consideration. In Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, U.P.(') the
High Court of Allahabad held that a reference under sec. 57 can
D be made only when a case is pending and in which the question
about the amount of stamp duty is yet to be decided. It also held
that once the Authority has decided the case the fact that proceedings for realisation of, duty remain pending would not make
the case a pending case. At page 321 of the report the High Court
observed that the language of sec. 57, viz .. that "the authority
may state any case referred to it under section 56(2) or otherwise
E coming to its notice", and "refer such case with its own opinion
thereon" made it clear that the reference has lo be made at the
stage when the case is still pending beforl it.
When the High
Court's attention was drawn to the decision in Maharashtra Sugar
Mills'(') case and Appalanarasimha/11 v. Board of Reven11e(') and
Shanmugha v. Board of Reven11e(') the High Court distinguished
F the Maharashtrn Sugar Mills'(") case on the ground that the application for reference made under s. 56(2) to the Collector had not
been decided when the Authority was asked to state the case under
section 57(1) and that therefore it was possible to say that the case
was still pending. As regards the two Madras decisions the High
Court agreed that the reference applied there was after the cases
G were concluded but observed that the Madras High Court had
not examined the question whether reference under s. 57(1) was
in such cases competent and that it relied on the decision in
Maharaslltra Sugar Mills'<') case without noticing that in that
case referenci: was applied for while the application asking the
B
(') A.LR 1952 Mad. 811.
(') A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 1086.
(') A.I.R. 1958 All. 320.
(') A.t.R. (1952] Mad. 8ll.
(') I.L.R. (1955] Mad. 1037.
(') I.L.R. [1965] Pun. 140.
(') [1950] S.C.R. 536.
(') I.L.R. (1955] Mad. 1037.
BANARBI DAB ~. REVENUE AUTHORITY (Sheial, J,)
883
Collector to refer the case under section 56(2) to the Authority A
had not been disposed of. In the Eastern Mangahese and Minerals
v. State of West Bengal(') the Calcutta High Court following In re
Cook and Kelvey(') refused to direct reference on the ground that
when an adjudication as to proper stamp has been made under
sec. 3.i and the duty is paid without the document having been
impounded or when the document is not sent to the Collector
under sec. 38(2) there is no case pending before the Authority and B
the Authority cannot state a case or cannot similiarly be asked
to state the case. With respect. the reasons given in these
two decisions for distinguishing the Maharashtra Sugar Mills(')
do not seem to· be correct. As aforesaid, it is clear from the
facts of that case that there was no case pending before the
Authority or any other Revenue Authority and yet mandamus 0
granted by the High Court was confirmed by this Court Therefore that decision was binding on both the High Courts.
Whatever may have been the view in the past on the scope
of section 57(1), the position after the decision in Maharashtra
Sugar Mills' crue(') is settled that sec. 57(1) imposes a duty on D
the Authority to state a case when it raises a substantial question
of law. As the Privy Council stated in Alcock Ashdown v. Chief
Revenue Authority, Bombay('), "To argue that if the legislature
says that a public officer, even a revenue officer, shall do a thing
and he without cause or justification refuses t.o do that thing. yet
the Specific Relief Act would not be applicable, and there would B
be no power in the Court to give relief to the subject, is to state
a proposition to which their lordships must refuse assent." It
also must now be taken as settled that that duty is not affected
by the question whether the case is pending before the Authority
or not. The principle underlying the decision is that sec. 57
affords a remedy to the citizen to have his case referred to the 1
High Court against an order of a revenue
authority imposing
stamp duty and/ or penalty provided the application involves a
substantial question of law and imposes a corresponding obligation on the authority to refer it to the High Court for its opinion.
Such a right and obligation cannot be construed to depend upon
any subsidiary circumstance such as the pendency of the case G
before the Authority. If the position is as held in I.L.R. 25 Mad.
752 the mere fact that the Collector has determined the duty and
closed the case would render nugatory not only the controlling
jurisdiction of the Authority but the remedy which
sec.
57(1)
gives to the citizen as also the obligation of the Authority to state
the case. The difficulty which the learned judges felt in I. L It
25 Mac1. 752 and repeated in subsequent decisions is not, in our B
view, a real one because as soon as a reference is made and tht
(') A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 340.
(') [1950] S.C.R. 536.
L!PiN)7RCl-6 (a)
(') I.L.R. [1932] 59 Cal. 1171.
(') 50 IA. 227, 233.
~--,,'
694
SuPREMJ!I COURT RlilPORTS
[1968] 1 s.c.R.
A hi&h ·Court pronounces its judgment the decision of the Authodly is it large and the Authority. as required by sec. S9(2) would
have to dispose of the case in confonnity with such judgment.
The position therefore is that when a. reference has been made to
the Authority or the case has otherwise come to his notice, if an
IJIPlication· is made under s. 57(1) and it involves a substantial
question of Jaw, whether the case is pending or not, the AuthoB rity is bound ta state the case in compliance with its obligation.
~
Authority is in a similar position a.s the Income-tax Tribunal
under analogous provisions in the Income-tax Act.
In our view, the Authority was in error in refusing to state
the case lind the High Court was equally in error in summarily
dismissing the writ petition as the question whether the· document
0 was a declaration of trust or was a deed of settlement is a substalltial question of law: The appeal is therefore allowed and the
High Court's order is set aside. We direct the Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority, Delhi, to state the case to the High Court
1lllder 11ee. S7(1). There will be no order as to costs.
R.K.P,S
·
Appeal allowed.
t