# BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS v. R. HANUMAIAH AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2005] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 901
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-10-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 97I of2003
- **Bench:** Ashok Bhan, S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bangalore-development-authority-and-ors-v-r-hanumaiah-and-ors-20740
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Mysore land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 4, 18-land Acquisition
Act, 1894, Sections 48, l 1, 16, 31-Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, Sections
A
B
29, 27A-Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, Sections 38, 65, C
76(3)-Bangalore Development Authority (3rd Amendment) Act 1993, Section
9, 38C.
land Acquisition-Re-conveyance of Acquired land-Whether
permissible Acquisition of respondent's land for development scheme-Cf TB
paying compensation and taking possession-CITE resolution to re-convey D
part of land out of the total land acquired to respondent-later BDA refi1sing
to re-convey in view of High Court decisions that Act and Rules did not
provide for re-conveyance-High Court decreeing respondent "s petitionSel/ing aside High Court decree, Held. under the Act and the Rules, BDA has
no power to re-convey the acquired land by withdrawing the acquisitionSection 38C and 9 having prospective application only would not validate E
a 1972 re-conveyance resolution of CJTB-State cannot direcl BDA to reconvey the land to owner.
Promissory Estoppel-Re-conveyance of acquired land--CITB resolution
of re-conveyance-Respondent acting on the resolution altered his position F
to his detriment in not pressing his claim for higher compensation and giving
up his right to withdraw compensation-EDA not acting upon the resolutionRespondent invoking principle of promisso1y estoppel-Held, the Government
cannot be compelled to do an act prohibited by law as there can be no
estoppel against the statute.
A Notification for acquisition of respondents land for a development
scheme was published. The amount of compensation paid and the possession
of the land was taken by the authority. Respondent sought a reference for
enhancement of compensation. Therefore his compensation· amount was
deposited in Civil Court. Later CITB passed a resolution to re-convey 6 acres,
G
WI
H
902
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 20 guntas and 44 square yards of land out of the total land acquired, to
respondent. Respondent withdraw his reference application and gave in writing
that he would not withdraw the compensation. In the layout plan approved by
CITB iii 1974, the said land was shown separately being reserved for reconveyance. In 1976, City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was repealed
and replaced by Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 thereby replacing
B CITB by BOA. BOA refused to give effect to re-conveyance resolution in view
of Karnataka High Court decision's that the Act and the rules did not enable
BOA to re-convey the acquired land. Respondent's Writ Petition to High Court
was ultimately decreed holding that , since there was change in judicial
thinking, it was permissible to restore the land to the owners. Hence this
C Appeal
Allowing the Appeal, the Court
HELD : I.I. On a conjoint reading of section 38C with Section 9 of the
Amendment Act it would be seen that Section 38C gives the authority to make
D allotment in certain cases. Section 9 validates the allotment made between
20.12.1973 to 08.05.1986. Section 38C only authorizes BOA to allot a site
in a development scheme to a person whose land has been acquired. It does
not give any power to the BOA to re-convey the land or a part of the land by
withdrawing the acquisition itself. [914-F, G; 915-Al
E
1.2. This apart Section 38C is prospective in its application except to
F
the extent of the allotment made between 20.12.1973 to 08.05.1986 which are
saved by Section 9. The resolution of CITB of 1972 agreeing to re-convey a
part of the land acquired is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 of the
Amendment Act. [915-B-C[
1.3. The present case falls in second part of Section 29 clause 2 of City
of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 which provides that the land which have
been acquired by the Board or has been vested in it shall be utilized for. the
purpose of improvement scheme for which the lands have been acquired. It
cannot be used for any purpose other than for which it has been acquire

## Text

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BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS.
v.
R. HANUMAIAH AND ORS.
OCTOBER 3, 2005
[ASHOK BHAN AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.)
Mysore land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 4, 18-land Acquisition
Act, 1894, Sections 48, l 1, 16, 31-Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, Sections
A
B
29, 27A-Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, Sections 38, 65, C
76(3)-Bangalore Development Authority (3rd Amendment) Act 1993, Section
9, 38C.
land Acquisition-Re-conveyance of Acquired land-Whether
permissible Acquisition of respondent's land for development scheme-Cf TB
paying compensation and taking possession-CITE resolution to re-convey D
part of land out of the total land acquired to respondent-later BDA refi1sing
to re-convey in view of High Court decisions that Act and Rules did not
provide for re-conveyance-High Court decreeing respondent "s petitionSel/ing aside High Court decree, Held. under the Act and the Rules, BDA has
no power to re-convey the acquired land by withdrawing the acquisitionSection 38C and 9 having prospective application only would not validate E
a 1972 re-conveyance resolution of CJTB-State cannot direcl BDA to reconvey the land to owner.
Promissory Estoppel-Re-conveyance of acquired land--CITB resolution
of re-conveyance-Respondent acting on the resolution altered his position F
to his detriment in not pressing his claim for higher compensation and giving
up his right to withdraw compensation-EDA not acting upon the resolutionRespondent invoking principle of promisso1y estoppel-Held, the Government
cannot be compelled to do an act prohibited by law as there can be no
estoppel against the statute.
A Notification for acquisition of respondents land for a development
scheme was published. The amount of compensation paid and the possession
of the land was taken by the authority. Respondent sought a reference for
enhancement of compensation. Therefore his compensation· amount was
deposited in Civil Court. Later CITB passed a resolution to re-convey 6 acres,
G
WI
H
902
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 20 guntas and 44 square yards of land out of the total land acquired, to
respondent. Respondent withdraw his reference application and gave in writing
that he would not withdraw the compensation. In the layout plan approved by
CITB iii 1974, the said land was shown separately being reserved for reconveyance. In 1976, City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was repealed
and replaced by Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 thereby replacing
B CITB by BOA. BOA refused to give effect to re-conveyance resolution in view
of Karnataka High Court decision's that the Act and the rules did not enable
BOA to re-convey the acquired land. Respondent's Writ Petition to High Court
was ultimately decreed holding that , since there was change in judicial
thinking, it was permissible to restore the land to the owners. Hence this
C Appeal
Allowing the Appeal, the Court
HELD : I.I. On a conjoint reading of section 38C with Section 9 of the
Amendment Act it would be seen that Section 38C gives the authority to make
D allotment in certain cases. Section 9 validates the allotment made between
20.12.1973 to 08.05.1986. Section 38C only authorizes BOA to allot a site
in a development scheme to a person whose land has been acquired. It does
not give any power to the BOA to re-convey the land or a part of the land by
withdrawing the acquisition itself. [914-F, G; 915-Al
E
1.2. This apart Section 38C is prospective in its application except to
F
the extent of the allotment made between 20.12.1973 to 08.05.1986 which are
saved by Section 9. The resolution of CITB of 1972 agreeing to re-convey a
part of the land acquired is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 of the
Amendment Act. [915-B-C[
1.3. The present case falls in second part of Section 29 clause 2 of City
of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 which provides that the land which have
been acquired by the Board or has been vested in it shall be utilized for. the
purpose of improvement scheme for which the lands have been acquired. It
cannot be used for any purpose other than for which it has been acquired.
G Since the land was acquired for the purpose of forming sites it could only be
used for that. There is no power as per this provision to re-convey the land
which have been acquired under a scheme forming sites. In the Rules framed
there is no provision for re-conveying the land, and therefore, power does not
vest in the Board to re-convey the land for formation of sites in an improvement
scheme. There is no material difference between Section 29of1945 Act and
H Section 38 of Amendment Act. [923-C-E; 923-E-Fl
. '
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AlJTHORITY 1·. R.HANUMAIAH
903
1.4. After the vesting of the land and taking possession thereof, the A
Notification for acquiring the land could not be withdrawn or cancelled in
exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Power under
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after vesting of
the land statutorily in the State Government. (925-D-E)
B.N. Sathyanarayana Rao v. State of Karnataka, ILR (1987) Kar 790; B
Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma, [1970) 2 SCC 149;
Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC l; Mohan Singh v. International
Airport Authority of India, [1997) 9 SCC 132 and Printers Mysore Ltd. v. MA.
Rasheed, (2004) 4 SCC 460, referred to.
Muniyappa v. Bangalore Development Authority, ILR (1992) Kar 125 C
and H.C. Venkataswamy v. BDA, [2001) 9 SCC 204, distinguished.
2.1. The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel is not based on principle of
estoppeL It is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent injustice. Where
a party by his word or conduct makes a promise to another person in D
unequivocal and clear terms intending to create legal relations knowing or
intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise
is made and it is so acted upon by the other party the promise would be binding
on the party making it. It would not be entitled to go back. (917-A-C)
2.2. There is no provision under Act or Rules framed thereunder E
enabling the BDA to re-convey the land acquired to implement a scheme for
forming the sites and their allotment as per rules. The rules do not provide
for re-conveyance. In the absence of any provision authorizing to re-convey
the land direction cannot be issued to BDA to re-convey a part of the land on
the ground that it had promised to do so. The rule of promissory estoppel
cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of law. It cannot be invoked to
compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law. It would be going against
the statute. The principle would under the circumstances be not applicable to
the instant case. [921-A-C[
F
Mis Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, G
(1979( 2 SCC 409; A.P. Pollution Control Board !Iv. M. V Nayudu, (200112
SCC 62; Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188; Pune
Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders Association, (20041 10
SCC 796; Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, 119921 2 SCC 411;
Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, (20051 4 SCC 272; Savitaben
Somabhai Bhatia v. State of Gujarat, (20051 3 SCC 636 and Devasahayam v. H
904
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A P. Savithramma, (2005) 7 SCALE 322, referred to.
State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd., [2004[ 6 SCC 465, distinguished.
3.1. Once the amount of compensation was tendered and paid the
acquisition process was complete. After making the award under Section 11
B the Collector can take possession of the land under Section 16. The
acquisition process stood completed. The subsequent development will not alter
the fact that the acquisition was complete. 1925-G-H; 926-A[
3.2. Power of the Government under Section 65 is not unrestricted. The
Government can issue directions which in its opinion are necessary or
C expedient to carry out the purposes of the Act. Directions have to be to carry
out the objective of the Act and not contrary to the provisions of the Act.
Directions issued by the Chief Minister to BDA to re-convey the land, run
counter to and are destructive of the purpose for which the BDA was created.
It is opposed to the object of the Act and therefore bad in law. The BDA has
D rightly refused to comply therewith. [927-B-C-DJ
E
F
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005)
7 SCALE 386, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 97I of2003.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9/10.7.2001 of the Karnataka High
Court in W.A. No. 727(GM) of 1989.
Altaf Ahmad, S.K. Kulkarni and Vijay Kumar with him for the Appellants.
K. Ramamurthy, V. Anand, B.K. Choudhary, Arul Muruganandham N.K.,
K. Lingaraja and E.C. Vidya Sagar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAN, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Division"
G Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No.727of1989 wherein
and whereunder the Division Bench while setting aside the judgment of the
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.15487of1987 issued a direction to
the Bangalore Development Authority (for short "the BOA"), the appellant
herein, to issue possession certificate to the writ petitioner i.e. the 1st
respondent herein in respect of 6 acres and 20 guntas of land as per its
H Resolution dated 19.4.1972 and to allot alternative plots/sites of equal size to
---"·
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY"· R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN, J]
905
the persons who had been allotted sites carved out of 6 acres and 20 guntas A
of land
The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was enacted by the then
Government of Mysore. Under Section 3 of the said Act a Board of Trustees
was constituted to implement the purposes of the Act. The Board (commonly
known as CITB) was given the power to draw the improvement scheme and B
for undertaking any work for improvement or development of any area in or
around the city of Bangalore. The Board was also given the power to acquire
land by agreement and was deemed to be a local authority for the purposes
of Section 50(2) of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act which was in pari
materia with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
C
On 28.1.1960 a preliminary notification dated 26.11.1959 was published
in the official Gazette proposing to acquire the land of the I st respondent for
formation of a scheme to set up a layout called the Koramangala Layout. Final
notification was published on 28.9.1965 and the award was made on 29.11.1966.
The amount of compensation was paid and in some cases it was deposited D
in the treasury. !st respondent sought a reference for enhancement of the
compensation. In the cases in which a reference had been sought by the I st
respondent the amount of compensation was deposited in the Civil Court.
Immediately after the passing of the award the possession of the land in
question was taken.
On 26.6.1968 a resolution was passed by the CITB Bangalore (wrongly
typed as 26.6.1969 in the impugned judgment) to re-convey an extent of 8
acres and 21 guntas of the land out of the total land acquired to the I st
respondent. On 19.4.1972 another resolution was passed by the CITB modifying
E
its earlier resolution and agreeing to re-convey 6 acres, 20 guntas and 44 F
square yards in favour of the I st respondent subject to the following
conditions.
"I. He should arrange to withdraw immediately the cases pending in
the civil court.
2. He should withdraw the compensation deposited in the court and G
State Huzur Treasury and re-deposit the same to the CJTB funds
within 30 days.
The details of compensation deposited are noted below. The Additional
Special Land Acquisition Officer (CITB) may be consulted if any H
906
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
difficulty arises in withdrawing the amounts in courts or State Huzur
Treasury.
I.
S. No.32/6
Rs.24,845.17
Civil Judge's Court
2.
S. No.32/8
Rs. 2,763.45
Civil Judge's Court
3.
S. No.32/9
Rs. 1,265.00
State Huzur Treasury
4.
S. No.32/11
Rs. 3,004.37
Civil Judge's Court
5.
S. No.32/12
Rs. 6,008.75
Civil Judge's Court
6.
S. No.32/10
Rs. 1,265.00
State Huzur Treasury
Rs. 39,151.74
Compensation paid in respect of Sy. No.32/17 amount to Rs. 3, 162.50
ps. may also be credited to the CITS funds, together with interest at
9% on the compensation amount drawn upto the date of repayment.
Possession of S.No.26/1 may be handed over to the Additional Special
Land Acquisition Officer immediately, and informed to take further
action. "
It is suffice to mention that in so far as the refund of compensation
E amount was concerned it was found to be neither feasible nor practicable for
the I st respondent to withdraw the amount and re-deposit it and he, therefore,
gave it in writing to the authority that these amounts would not be withdrawn
by him or claimed by him whereupon the amounts in question were ultimately
re-claimed by the authority. He withdrew his reference applications filed under
Section 18 of the Act.
F
On I 0. 7 .1974 layout plan was approved by the CITB in respect of the
land which had been acquired for the development of the area. In the layout
plan the land to the extent of 6 acres and 20 guntas was shown separately ·
being reserved for re-conveyance.
G
In the year 1976, The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was
H
repealed and in its place Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 was
enacted. Bangalore Development Authority constituted under the 1976 Act
succeeded to the City Improvement Trust Board.
The resolution passed by the CITS to re-convey 6 acres and 20 guntas
~-
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN, J.]
907
of land was not given effect to as the High Court of Kamataka in a series A
of judgment held that the land acquired for the development scheme could
not be returned or re-conveyed to the owner and that it must be applied for
the purpose for which it was acquired and the sites formed therein should be
distributed according to the allotment rules. In view of the declaration of law
made by the High Court the resolution was not given effect to by the BOA
and sites were formed by the appellant in ·the said 6 acres and 20 guntas of B
land and the sites were allotted sometime in the year 1985-86.
After the formation of sites in said 6 acres .and 20 guntas and their
allotment the 1st respondent approached the High Court of Kamataka at
Bangalore seeking a writ of mandamus directing the BOA to re-convey 6 C
acres and 20 guntas of land as per resolution of CITB dated 19.4.1972. A
learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition summarily
at the admission stage as being concluded by the decision of the High Court
in B.N. Sathyanarayana Rao v. State of Karnataka, !LR (1987) Kamataka 790.
The writ appeal filed by the I st respondent was also dismissed summarily at
the initial stage as being covered by the earlier decisions of the High Court. D
!st respondent thereafter approached this Court in CA.5165of1992 and this
Court by its order dated 31.1.200 I accepted the appeal and set aside the
orders impugned in the appeal and remitted the case back to the Division
Bench to reconsider the appeal on merits in view of the contentions raised
on behalf of the 1st respondent that in a later judgment in Muniyappa v.
Bangalore Development Authority, ILR (1992) Kamataka 125, the High Court E
of Karnataka had taken a view that re-conveyance was permissible.
The Division Bench after remand considered the matter afresh and set
aside the judgment of the Single Judge inter alia holding that there was
change in the judicial thinking and in Maniyappa 's, case (supra) the Division F
Bench taking a wider perspective of the entire case law had held that it was
permissible to restore or re-allot the land to the owners. That in the previous
judgments rendered, the High Court had failed to take into consideration
certain important factors such as that the State being the a~quiring authority
and the BOA being the beneficiary only, the State could withdraw the
acquisition or prune the area of acquisition. Drawing support from Section 21 G
of the General Clauses Act it was held that the authority vested with the
power to do a thing had a corresponding right to undo it as well. Since the
State was the acquiring authority it could withdraw the acquisition or prune
the area of acquisition. That the BOA was barred by doctrine of promissory
estoppel to withdraw/not act upon the resolution dated 19.4.1972 specially H
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A when the !st respondent in pursuance to the resolution passed had acted
prejudicially to his interest. That the decision of the CITS was binding on the
BOA being a successor. It was further held that land which was the subject
matter of the resolution of re-conveyance could not and should not have
allotted at all. That the acquisition proceedings in the process of vesting of
the land had not reached finality in respect of 6 acres and 20 guntas of land
B as !st respondent had re-deposited the amount of compensation as per
resolution dated 19.4.1972 and thus had not received the amount of
compensation. In view of the above findings the Division Bench held that
there was no necessity to· give a direction to re-convey the land but the
proper direction would be to direct the BOA to issue the possession certificate
C to I st respondent in respect of the land which is the subject matter of the
writ petition. It was further held that since the allottees of the sites out of 6
acres and 20 guntas were likely/bound to be affected by the order a direction
was required to be issued to BDA to allot equivalent sites/plots of land to
such allottees within 4 months of the passing of the order.
D
Learned counsels for the parties have been heard at length.
A Division Bench of the High Court ofKarnataka in Writ Appeal No.729
of 1983 (Sri. A. V. Lakshman v. B.D.A. and Ors.,) upheld the order of the Single
Judge by observing that the owners of the land did not have a right in law
to seek re-conveyance of the acquired )and. Another Division Bench in Writ
E Appeal No.581 of 1975. (Rachappa and Ors. v. State andOrs.,) held that the
lands acquired become the property of the Trust Board and it has to be dealt
with in accordance with the law and owners of the land in the absence of a
statutory provision entitling them to get the land re-conveyed would not be
entitled to seek relief from the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
F India. It was observed as under:-
"Assumfrig for the sake of argument that the other lands which have
been acquired by the Trust Board have been re-conveyed that by
itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants have a legal right in
their favour for getting the lands acquired from them re-conveyed to
G
them. When the lands are acquired by the Trust Board they become
the property of the Trust Board and the Trust Board has to deal with
its own sites in accordance with law. In the absence of a statutory
provision entitling the appellants to get re-conveyance they would
not be entitled to seek any relief from this Court under Article 226 of
H
the Constitution on the ground that the Trust Board has in similar
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v."R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN, J.]
909
cases re-conveyed lands in favour of persons from whom they were A
acquired. Hence this prayer cannot be granted."
A single Judge in Writ Petition No. 8321 of 1984 (H.N._Abdul Rehman
v. State and Ors.,) again held that Bangalore Development Authority had no
power.to pass a resolution of re-conveyance. It was observed that it was not
open to the BDA to pass a resolution to re-convey the property and create B
a right in favour of the owner-writ petitioner. In B.N. Satyanarayan Rao v.
State of Karnataka, a learned Single Judge, [which decision was later on
affirmed by the Division Bench] held that there was no provision in the Act
and the Rules framed thereunder enabling the BDA to re-convey the sites.
Re-conveyance was opposed to the scheme itself. The scheme was framed for C
forming of sites and allotting them as per rules. The rules did not provide for
re-conveyance and, therefore, it was not possible to hold that there is any
right to seek re-conveyance. It was also held that it was not possible to apply
the rule of promissory estoppel ori the facts of the case as there was no
provision in the Act, or in the Rules framed thereunder enabling the BDA to
allot or re-convey the sites in the manner proposed to be done by the D
Notification. Therefore, the BDA could not be directed to allot or re-convey
the sites on the ground that it had promised to allot or re-convey the sites.
It was observed in para 4:
"Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to place reliance
on any of the provisions in the Act or on the Rules framed thereunder E
which enable the B.D.A. to re-convey the site. Re-conveyance in a
way is opposed to the scheme itself. Scheme is formed for the purpose
of forming site for allotting them as per the Rules. The rules do not
provide for re-conveyance. Therefore it is not possible to hold that
the petitioners have a right to seek re-conveyance."
F
Plea of promissory estoppel noticed in para 5 of the order to the effect:
"However, the learned Coun~el for the petitioners has tried to take
refuge under the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel on the
basis of the notification issued by the then Chairman of the B.D.A. G
dated 14.7.76 as per Annexure-B. The petitioners claim that as per and
in pursuance of the notification (Annexure-B) they have filed the
·affidavits and have not challenged the acquisition and have altered
their position to their disadvantage, therefore, it is not now open to
the B.D.A. to resile from the notification and deny allotment of sites
to the petitioners by way of re-conveyance."
H
910
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
The said plea was rejected by observing thus:
B
"In addition to this it is not possible to apply the rule of promissory
estoppel in cases where there is no provision contained in the Act,
or in the Rules framed thereunder enabling the B.D.A. to allot or reconvey the sites in the manner proposed to be done by the notification.
(Annexure-B). Therefore I am of the view that the B.D.A. cannot be
directed to allot or re-convey a site to each of the petitioners on the
ground that it had promised to allot or re-convey a site to each one
of the petitioners."
,_
In Writ Petition No. 12119 of 1988 (Bangalore District Co-operative
C Central Bank Employees Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Bangalore Development
Authority and Anr.,), Justice Rama Jois expressed his agreement with the view
taken by Bopanna, J. to the following effect:-
D
E
F
"If the B.D.A. were to be given the power _to re-convey the land
vested in it by exercising the power under Section I 3 of the Act, that
would be self-defeating the destructive of the purpose of constituting
a special authority for the development of the City of Bangalore." In
view of the above quoted judgments and some other judgments of the
High Court from 1983 onwards holding that the acquired land cannot
be re-conveyed, the extent of 6 acres and 20 guntas which was
originally earmarked for re-conveyance was also developed and sites
were carved out and allotted.
In Muniyappa 's case (supra) on which reliance has been placed in the
impugned judgment to come to the conclusion that there was shift in the
judicial thinking regarding the power of the BOA, to re-convey the land
acquired to the owner, the facts were:-
A Writ Petition No. 2495 of 1979 was filed by the owners of the land ·
seeking issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the BOA to deliver
possession certificate in respect of I acre of land in Survey No.5/3 C of
Jadahalli. The Single Judge held that BOA had/has no power to re-convey
. G the land acquired to implement the scheme and negatived the plea of the writ
petitioner. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Single Judge the writ
petitioner filed the appeal which was accepted. It was held that no material
had been placed on record to hold that the land in question had in fact been
acquired for a scheme or that the allotment of site contravened the scheme.
H The Division Bench expressed its agreement with the proposition that BOA
t
...
...
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN, J.]
91 J
which is a statutory body working under the Act had no power under the Act A
or the Rules framed thereunder to re-convey the lands which had been
acquired for implementation of the scheme. The agreement-was expressed in
para 3 of the judgment in the following words:-
"The learned Single Judge has pointed out that the B.D.A. had or has
no power to re-convey the lands acquired to implement a scheme B
relying upon the decisions of this Court in B.N. Sathyanarayan Rao
v. State of Karnataka, ILR 87 Kar. 790, and in B. Venkataswamy
Reddy v. State of Karnataka, ILR (1989) Kar. 75. This proposition is
absolutely unexceptionable having regard to the provisions of the
B.D.A. Act as also the Rules of Allotment of Sites framed under the C
said Act."
[Emphasis supplied]
The Bench after going through the pleadings df the party came to the
conclusion that it was not a case of re-conveyance of the land but allotment D
of the site as contemplated under Rule 5 and the word "re-conveyance"
appears to have been used in a loose sense because the allottee happened
to be the owner of the land prior to its acquisition. It was held:-
" .. Further, the CITB had the power to allot site under Rule 5 without
following the procedure prescribed in Rule 3 provided the other E
requirements of Rule 5 are fulfilled. No serious contention could be
"urged on behalf of the respondent to rebut the contention urged on
behalf of the appellant that the word 'reconveyance' had been used
in the Resolution dated 12.1.1972 and all the subsequent
correspondence in a loose sense and in fact the said word meant F
allotment/grant of site within the meaning of Rule 5. As seen earlier
the earliest Resolution dated 7.8.1963 only spoke of grant and not reconveyance. When that is so, and when in fact the Resolution coupled
with the correspondence between the petitioner and the CITB shows
that what was done was an allotment as contemplated under Rule 5,
the contention the word 're-conveyance' appears to have been used G
in a loose sense because the allottee was the previous owner of the
said land prior to the acquisition, but in truth it is t case of allotment
. has to be accepted. If that be so, it has to be held that there was a
valid allotment of I acre of land in Sy. No.5/3C as per Resolution
No.646 dated 12.1.1972 by the CITB in favour of the petitioner-appellant. H
A
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
Further he had also complied with all other requirements impose.ct by
the CITB."
On close scrutiny it has to be held that in Muniyappa 's, case (supra)
the ~ench did not express an opinion contrary to the opinion which had been
expressed in the earlier decisions to the effect that there was no power under
B the Act or the Rules with the BOA to re-convey the acquired land, on the
contrary the Bench expressed its agreement with the view taken in B.N.
Sathyanarayana Rao's, case (supra) and other cases to_.the effect that the
BOA was not vested with the power under the Act or Rules to re-convey the
land which had been acquired for a scheme. On the facts of the case the
C Bench came to the conclusion that it was a case of allotment as contemplated
under Rule 5 and not that of re-conveyance. The Division Bench in the
impugned judgment has misread and misapplied Muniyappa's case (supra)
judgment to come to the conclusion that there was a shift in the judicial
thinking and that the land acquired could be re-conveyed to the owners. The
findings recorded which are based on misreading of the Muniyappa 's case
D (supra) are unsustainable and therefore set aside.
E
State of Karnataka amended the Bangalore Development Authority Act,
1976 by the Bangalore Development Authorities (3rd Amendment) Act, 1993
(for short "the Amendment Act") which came into force with effect from 3 lst
March, 1994. Section 5 of the Amendment Act introduced Section 38-C in the·
Act and Section 9 of the Amendment Act validated the allotments made
between 20.12.1973 to 8.5.1986 retrospectively.
Although the Divisi_on Bench in the impugned judgment held that
though the issue regarding applicability of Section 38-C after its incorporation
F
in the BDA Act lifting the ban on re-conveyance was irrelevant because the
l st respondent did not contend that he was entitled to any relief under this
provision but indirectly relying upon it the Division Bench held that in a
given case for good reasons it would be i>ermissible for the authority to alter
the terms of the acquisition and restore the lands that had been acquired
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act if the facts and circumstances
G so justified.
Section 38-C and Section 9 of the Amendment Act are reproduced
below:-
"38-C. Power of Authority to make allotment in certain cases. •
H
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law
I
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY». R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN. J.]
9 J 3
or any development scheme sanctioned under this Act, or City A
Improvement Trust Board Act, I 985 where the Authority or the
erstwhile City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore has already passed
a resolution· in favour of any persons any site formed in the land
which belong to them or vested in or acquired by them for the purpose
of any development scheme and on the ground that it is not practicable B
to include such site for the purpose of the development scheme, the
Authority may allot such site by way of sale or lease in favour of
such persons subject to the following conditions, -
(a) the allottee shall be liable to pay any charges as the Authority
may levy from time to time; and
(b) the total extent of the site a!Jotted under this section together
with the land already held by the allottee shall not exceed the
ceiling limit specified under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, I 976."
c
"9. Validation of certain allotment. - Notwithstanding anything D
contained in any law or any judgment, decree or order of any court
where in pursuance of any resolution passed by the Authority or the
erstwhile City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore to re-convey in
favour of any person any site out of the land which belonged to them
or vested in or acquired by them for the purpose of any development
scheme, the Authority has made allotment of such site by way of E
sale, lease or otherwise in favour of such person after the twentieth
day of December, 1973 and before eight day of May, 1986, such
allotment shall be deemed to have been validly made and shall have
effect for all purpose as if, it had been \made under Section 38-C of
the Principle Act as amended by this Act and accordingly -
p
(a) all acts, proceedings and things done or allotment made or action
taken by the authority shall for all purpose be deemed to be and
to have always been done or taken in accordance with law;
(b) no suit or other proceedings shall be instituted, maintained or
continued in any court for cancellation of such allotment or for G
questioning the validity of any action or things taken or done
under Section 38-C of the Principle Act as amended by this Act,
and no court shall enforce or recognize any decree or order
declaring such allotment made or any action taken or things
done under the Principle Act as invalid."
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
Section 3 8-C commences with non obstante clause. ft provides that
irrespective of anything contained in any law or any judgment, decree or
order of any Court where in pursuance of any resolution passed by the authority
or the erstwhile City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore in favour of any
person re-conveying the site formed in the land which belong to them or
vested in or acquired by them for the purpose of any development scheme
B and on the ground that it is not practicable to include such site for the
purpose of any development scheme, the Authority may allot such site by
way of sale or lease in favour of such persons subject to the allottee paying
such charges which the authority may levy from time to time and the extent
of site allotted under this provision together with the land already held by the
C allottee shall not exceed ceiling limit specified under Section 4 of the Urban
Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976.
Section 9 of the Amendment Act speaks of validation of certain
allotment. It also starts with the non obstante clause and provides that if a
resolution has been passed by the Bangalore Development Authority or the
D City Improvement Trust Board to re-convey in favour of any person any site
out of the land which belonged to him or vested or acquired from him for the
purpose of any development scheme, the Authority has already made allotment
of such site by way of sale, lease or otherwise in favour of such person after
20th of December, 1974 and before 8th of May, 1986, then such allotment
E shall be deemed to have been validly made and shall have effect for all'
purpose as if, it is \made under Section 38-C of the Principal Act as amended
by Act 17 of 1984.
On a conjoint reading of Section 38-C read with Section 9 of the
Amendment Act it would be seen that Section 38-C gives the authority to
p make allotment in certain cases. It gives the authority to the BDA to reconvey/allot in favour of any person any site formed in the land which
belonged to them or vested in or acquired by them for the purpose of any
development scheme and on the ground that it is not practicable to include
such site for the purpose of development scheme by way of sale or lease in
favour of such person whose land was acquired subject to his liability to pay
G any charges that the authority may levy from time to time and that the total
extent of site allotted under this Section together with the land already held
by the allottee would not exceed the ceiling limit under Section 4 of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Section 9 of the Amendment
Act validates the allotment made between 20th December, 1973 to 8th May,
H 1986. Section 38-C only authorises the BDA to allot a site in a development
'
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN, J.l
9 J 5
scheme to a person whose land had been acquired. It does not give any power A
to the BDA to re-convey the land or a part of the land by withdrawtng the
· 11cquisition itself. Observations made by the Division Bench in the impugned
judgment that Section 38-C enabled the BDA to re-convey the land which
had been acquired for a development scheme for a purpose other than
implementing the scheme are not sustainable.
This apart Section 38-C is prospective in its application except to the
extent of the allotment made between 20th December, 1973 to 8th May, 1986
which are saved by Section 9 of the Amendment Act. The resolution of CITB
of 1972 agreeing to re-convey the part of the land acquired is not covered by
B
the provisions of Section 9 of the Amendment Act. In the present case, the C
resolution of the CITB predecessor-in-interest is dated 19.4.1972 and it would
not be deemed to be validated by the deemed fiction created by Section 9 of
the Amendment Act to bring it within the provisions of Section 38 -C.
We may here notice the judgment of this Court in H.C. Venkataswamy
v. Bangalore Development Authority, [2001] 9 SCC 204, on which reliance D
has been placed by the counsel for the respondent to contend that Section 3 8C would be applicable to the present case. In this case the BDA had acquired
land for the development of the scheme called "Rajamahal Vilas II Stage."
BDA passed a Resolution on 26.6.1984 whereunder it was decided that each
of the owners of the land whose land had been acquired would be given a
site measuring 40' x 60' free of cost. BDA did not implement the decision on E
the ground that the Resolution was not approved by the State Government.
The appellants challenged the decision of the State Government by way of
a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the
Karnataka High Court. ·A Division Bench of the High Court by the judgment
dated 8.2.1991 dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved again'.st the decision of p
the High Court appeals were filed in this Court which were accepted. Taking
note of Section 38-C read with Section 9 of the Amendment Act it was held
that the provisions of Section 9 were fully applicable to the allotments made
to the appellants during the period 1984-85. It was observed in later part of
para 10 as under:-
" ... Even if it is assumed that the basis for the allotment of sites to the
appellants was not the same as has been provided by the Amendment
Act under Section 38-C, but that would not invalidate the allotments
because the deeming fiction crated by Section 9 of the Amendment
Act would bring the allotments within the purview of Section 38-C.
G
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
The effect of the deeming fiction is that even though these allotments
may not have been made under Section 38-C they would be saved by
Section 9 of the Amendment Act by virtue of the deeming fiction."
It was further observed in para 11 as under:-
B
"Even otherwise we are of the view that the resolution of BOA did
substantial justice to the appellants. A situation was created where it
may not have been possible for BOA to implement the scheme. The
BOA entered into a settlement with the farmers and took a conscience
decision to allot plots to them. It was neither fair nor just on the part
c
D
ofBDA and the State Government to have gone back on their decision
which was taken with an open mind and after discussion with the
farmers. BOA by passing the resolution, in a way, accepted the demand
of the farmers for enhanced compensation. The allotment of plots to
them was to further compensate them for acquiring their land for the
development scheme."
This decision is of no assistance to the !st Respondent as it was a case
of allotment of a site formed under the scheme and not of re-conveyance by
withdrawing from the acquisition itself. Moreover, Section 9 of the Amendment
Act would also be not applicable as the resolution of CITB does not fall
within the prescribed dates i.e. 20.12.1973 to 8.5.1986.
The Division Bench in the impugned judgment has taken the view that
the correspondence exchanged between the parties established that the
respondent acting on the representation or the promise held out to him to his
prejudice and altered his position to his detriment in not pressmg his claim
for higher compensation and withdrawing the legal proceedings. That the
F respondent had also not claimed the compensation that was offered to him,
which was re-deposited by him with the authority. That the appellant could
not be permitted to resile from the representation or promise made by it to
the respondent as the respondent had acted on the representation and altered
his position to its prejudice. Plea taken by the appellant that rule of promissory
G estoppel shall not apply to do or perform an act prohibited by law or not
authorised by law was rejected by observing that Act to re-convey the land
was not prohibited as there was a shift in the judicial thinking in Muniyappa 's
case (supra). It was held that the appellant was bound to re-convey the land
to the petitioner as per its resolution. That the appellant was debarred from
resiting from the promise/representation made especially in view of the fact
H that the respondent acting on the promise made to him had altered his position
<
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY r. R.HANUMAIAH [BHAN, l.l
917
to his prejudice.
A
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not based on the principle of
estoppel.