# BANK OF BIHAR v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 299
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-04-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1942 of 1966
- **Bench:** K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bank-of-bihar-v-state-of-bihar-ors-5245
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Contract Act, 1872, ss. 172, 173, 176, 180 and
ISi-Pledge-Special
prope1ty of pawnor-Pawnee's rights whether can be extinguished by lawful seizure of pawned goods by Government to satisfy its claims against
pawnor.
Certain sugar was pledged with the plaintiff bank (appellant herein)
by Defendant No. 2 under a cash credit agreement. Part of the said sugar
was seized under the Public Demands Recovery Act in connection with
a demand of sugar cess by the Cane Commissioner. The sugar was sold_
and the sale proceeds were attached towards the payment of cess.
No
payment was made to the plaintiff bank, which thereupon filed the present suit to enforce its claim. The trial court granted a decree against
the State of Bihar for the price of the sugar. The High Court however
held thd.t no decree could be granted against the State as the seizure Y.'as
lawful.
HELD: The pawnee had special property and a lien which was not
of ordinary nature on the goods and so long as his claim was not satisfied
no other creditor of the pa\\·nor had any right to take away the goods
or its price. After the goods had been seized by the Government it was
bound to pay the amount due to the plaintiff and the balance could have
been made available to satisfy the claim of other creditor of the pawnor.
But by a mere act of lawful seizure the Government could not deprive
the plaintiff of the amount which was secured by the pledge of the good<
to it. As the act of the Government resulted in deprivation of the amount
to which the plaintiff was entitled it was bound to reimburse the plaintiff for
such atnount which the plaintiff in ordinary course would have realized
by sale of the goods pledged with it on the pawnor making a default in
the payment of debt. [303E-G]
The trial court was right in holding that the plaintiff's right as a pawnee
could not be extinguished by the seizure of the---goods in its possession inas~
much as the pledge of the goods was not meant to replace the liability
under the cash credit agreement.
It was intended to give the plaintiff
a primary right to sell the goods in satisfaction of the liability of the
pawnor. The Cane Commissioner who was an unsecured creditor could
not have any higher rights than the pawnor and was entitled only to the
surplus money after satisfaction of the plaintiff's dues. [303G-304B]

## Text

BANK OF BIHAR
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
April 1, 1971
(K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ,)
Contract Act, 1872, ss. 172, 173, 176, 180 and
ISi-Pledge-Special
prope1ty of pawnor-Pawnee's rights whether can be extinguished by lawful seizure of pawned goods by Government to satisfy its claims against
pawnor.
Certain sugar was pledged with the plaintiff bank (appellant herein)
by Defendant No. 2 under a cash credit agreement. Part of the said sugar
was seized under the Public Demands Recovery Act in connection with
a demand of sugar cess by the Cane Commissioner. The sugar was sold_
and the sale proceeds were attached towards the payment of cess.
No
payment was made to the plaintiff bank, which thereupon filed the present suit to enforce its claim. The trial court granted a decree against
the State of Bihar for the price of the sugar. The High Court however
held thd.t no decree could be granted against the State as the seizure Y.'as
lawful.
HELD: The pawnee had special property and a lien which was not
of ordinary nature on the goods and so long as his claim was not satisfied
no other creditor of the pa\\·nor had any right to take away the goods
or its price. After the goods had been seized by the Government it was
bound to pay the amount due to the plaintiff and the balance could have
been made available to satisfy the claim of other creditor of the pawnor.
But by a mere act of lawful seizure the Government could not deprive
the plaintiff of the amount which was secured by the pledge of the good<
to it. As the act of the Government resulted in deprivation of the amount
to which the plaintiff was entitled it was bound to reimburse the plaintiff for
such atnount which the plaintiff in ordinary course would have realized
by sale of the goods pledged with it on the pawnor making a default in
the payment of debt. [303E-G]
The trial court was right in holding that the plaintiff's right as a pawnee
could not be extinguished by the seizure of the---goods in its possession inas~
much as the pledge of the goods was not meant to replace the liability
under the cash credit agreement.
It was intended to give the plaintiff
a primary right to sell the goods in satisfaction of the liability of the
pawnor. The Cane Commissioner who was an unsecured creditor could
not have any higher rights than the pawnor and was entitled only to the
surplus money after satisfaction of the plaintiff's dues. [303G-304B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1942 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 23, 1963
of the Patna High Court in First Appeal No. 420 of 1955.
Sarjoo Prasad and R. C. Prasad, for the appellant.
U. P. Singh, for respondent No. 8.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J.-This is an appeal by certifica.te from a decree of
the Patna High Court in a suit instituted by the appellant against
the State of Bihar which was impleaded as defendant No. l, the
other defendants being the Jagdishpur Zamindari Co. Ltd. (defendant No. 2) and some of its directors defendants 3 to 5.
According to the allegations in the plaint one of the methods
of making advances followed by the plaintiff Bank was that the
constituents pledged their merchandise on a cash credit system
with the Bank and took advances on the
pledged goods. The
Bank held the goods as security for the advances made and the
consituents either provided the Bank with godown or the Bank
kept the pledged goods in godowns of its own and charged rents
from the constituents.
The defendant No. 2 entered into a cash
credit system agreement with the plaintiff's Arrah Branch, the
arrangement being that the sugar would be pledged under the cash
credit system. On December 16, 1946 the advance made to defen·
dant No. 2 stood at Rs. 3,20,486-2-0 and the Bank held 6239 bags
of different varieties of sugar as security.
These bags were kept
in godowns provided by defendant No. 2.
The .key of the lock
of each godown was in the custody of the Bank.
It was alleged
that in December 1949 under cover of an illegal seizure order issued
by defendant No. I the Rationing Officer and the District Magistrate, Patna, got the locks of the godown broken open and forcibly
and illegally removed 1818 bags of 27D quality of sugar. They
total quantity removed weighed about 5,000 maunds. No payment
was made to the plaintiff Bank which held the bags of sugar as
pledgee under the cash credit agreement. It is unnecessary to refer to
other facts stated in the plaint except to mention that according to
the plaintiff it was entitled to recover the sugar which had been
seized illegally or to recover the price of that sugar as per schedule
2 of the plaint which the plaintiff would have got if the quantity
of sugar which had been seized had been sold in the market on
on the material, day.
The plaintiff prayed for a decree for the
retum of 1818 bags of 27D quality sugar and, alternatively for recovery ot Rs. 1.81.7()().9-3 with interest by way of damages for
illegal removal and detention of sugar or price thereof.
Alterna·
tively a decree for Rs. 93.910-10-9 was claimed against defendant
No. 2 and the other defendants.
The suit was resisted by defendant No. 1 on the ground that
the seizure bad been effected pursuant to lawful orders which bad
been made and that the sale proceeds of about 5000 mds. of sugar
were included in the sum of Rs. 1,50,039-10-9 which was depo<it·
ed in the treasury but which was later on attached under the
orders of Certificate Officer, Patna, under the Public Demands
BANK OF Bl!VJt v. BIHAI\ (Grover, J.)
301
Recovery Act on account of arrears of sugar cess amounting to
Rs. 2 lakhs due from the Bhita Sugar Factory with which defendant
No. 2 had entered into an arrangement pursuant to which the
entire quantity of sugar including 5000 maunds which had been
seized had come into possession of defendant No. 2. The other
defendant also resisted the suit on various grounds.
A number
of issues were framed on the pleadings of the parties. We may
only mention issue No. 6(a) which will be material for determination of the points which we have been called upon to decide : -
"Was the sugar seized by the government in possession of the Bank as a pledgee at the time of the seizure
and have the rights of the Bank as such pledgee been d1>-
termined by the seizure in question?"
The trial court held that the order of seizure in respect of
the stock of sugar was valid.
It was further held that the plaintiff's right as a pledgee could not be extinguished by seizure of
the sugar in its possession and though the attachment order of
the Certificate Officer was legal and binding on defendant No. 2
it was not binding on the Bank (plaintiff) and it could be effective
only in respect of that portion of the price which was not necessary for the liquidation of the dues of the plaintilf from defen·
dant No. 2. A decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff against
defendant No. I only for Rs. 93,910-10-9 with interest at 6% per
annum from the date of the suit till realisation.
Defendant No. 1
(State of Bihar) filed an appeal to the High Court. The High
Court was of the view that in the presence of the finding that the
plaintiff had not been wrongfully deprived of the sugar on account
of the lawful seizure or its price owing to the certificate proceedings started by the Cane Commissioner the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree against the State.
But it was entitled to a decree
against defendant No. 2 and the other defendants.
Consequently
a decree against defendant No. I was set aside and instead of
decree was granted against the other defendants.
Now it is common ground that the plaintiff (which is the
appellant before us) held the sugar which was seized from its custody as security for payment of the debts or advances made to
defe.ndant No. 2 in its cash credit account.
There were arrears
of certain cess due from defendant No. 2.
As stated before, the
Cane Commissioner took proceedings under the Public Demands
Recovery Act and attached the price of the sugar which had been
deposited by the appropriate authorities in the Government Treasury instead of being paid to the plaintiff.
The Cane Commissioner indisputably did not have any right of priority over the
other creditors of defendant No. 2 and, in particular, the secured
creditors.
Section 172 of the Contract Act defines a pledge to
mean the bailment of goods as security for payment of debt or
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perfonnance of a promise.
The bailor is called the "pawnor"
and the bailee is called the "pawnee". Section 173 of that Act
provides that the pawnee may retain the goods pledged not only
for the payment of the debt or perfonnance of the promise but
also for the interest of the debt etc. Section 176 is in the following terms :
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"If the pawnor makes default in payment of the debt,
or performance, at the stipulated time of the promise, in
respect of which the goods were pledged, the pawnee
may bring a suit against the pawner upon the debt or promise, and retain the goods pledged as a collateral security ; or he may sell the thing pledged, on giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale."
If the proceeds of such sale are less than the amount
due in respect of the debt or promise, the pawnor is still
liable to pay the balance. If the proceeds of the sale are
greater than the amount so due, the pawnee shall pay over
the surplus to the pawnor."
Section 180 is to the effect that if a third person wrongfully de·
prives the bailee of the use of the possession of the goods bailed or does him any injury the bailee is entitled to use such
remedies as the owner might have used in the like case if no bailment had been made and either the bailor or the bailee may bring
a suit against a third person for such deprivation or injury. According to Section 181 whatever is obtained by way of relief or
compensation in any such suit shall, as between the bailor and
bailee, be dealt with according to their respective interests. Relying on the above two sections the High Court came to the conclusion that a pawnee has merely the possession of the goods coupled with a power to sell them on default by the pawnor but the
latter retains the ownership subject to a lien to the extent of the
debt enforcible by exercise of the power of sale.
In the present
case the sugar had been seized and then sold.
The sale proceeds
would have been available to defendants 2 to 5 subject to the
claim of the plaintiff against them but it ceased to have any lien
on the pledged property or the sale proceeds against any third
party including the State as soon as it was legally deprivell of
the possession of the pledged goods.
According to the Statement in Halsbury's Laws of England
"pawn" has been described as a security where by contract a
deposit of goods is made a security for a debt and the right to tb.e
property vests in the pledgee so far as is necessary to secure the
debt ; in this sense it is intermediate between a simple lien anti a
,.
BANK OP BIHAR •• BIHAR (Grover,J.)
303'
mortgage which wholy passed the property in the thing conveyed('). "The pawnee has a special property or special interest
in the thing pledged, while the general property therein continues
in the owner.
That special property or interest exists so that the
pawnee can compel payment of the debt or can sell the goods
when the right to·do so arises. ·This special property or interest
is to be distinguished from the mere right of detention whiCh the
holder of a lien possesses, in that it is transferable in the sense that
a pawnee may assign or pledge his special property or interest in
the goods". (') "Where judgment has been obtained against the
pawnor of goods and execution has issued thereon, the sheriff
cannot seize the go\Jds pawned unless he satisfied the claim of the
pawnee". (based mainly on Rogers v. Kennay('). "On the bankruptcy of the pawnor the pawnee is a secured creditor in the
bankruptcy with respect to things pledged before the date of the
receiving order and without notice of a prior available act of bankruptcy.(') It has not been shown bow the law in India is in
any way different from the English law relating to the rights of
the pawnee vis-a-vis other unsecured creditors of the pawnor.
In our judgment the High Court is in error in considering that
the rights of the pawnee who had parted with money in favour of
the pawnor on the security of the goods can be defeated by the
goods being lawfully seized by the Government and the money
being made available to other creditors of the pawnor without the
claim of the pawnee being fully satisfied.
The pawnee bas special
property and a lien which is not of ordinary nature on the goods
and so long as his claim is not satisfied no other creditor of the
pawnor has any right to take away the goods or its price'. After the
goods had been seized by the Government it was bound to pay !he
amount due to the plaintiff and the balance could have been made
available to satisfy the claim of other creditors of the pawner. But
by a mere act of lawful seizure the Government could not deprive
the plaintiff-of the amount which was secured by the pledge of the
goods to it. As the act of the Government resulted in deprivation of the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled it was bound
to reimburse the plaintiff for such amount which the plaintiff in
ordinary course would have realized by sale of the goods pledged
with it on the pawnor making a default in payment of debt.
The approach of the trial court was unexceptionable. The
plaintiff's right as a pawnee could not be extinguished by the
seizure of the go<ids in its possession inasmuch as the pledge of the
(I) J~d Edn. Vol. 29 page 211.
(2) Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Ed. Vol. 29 p. 218-219.
(3} [ 1846) 9 Q. B. 592.
(4) Halsbury's L.:ws of England Jrd Ed. Vol. 29 p. 222.
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goods was not meant to replace the liability under the cash credit
agreement.
It was intended to give the plaintiff a primary right
to sell the goods in satisfaction of the liability of the pawnor. The
Cane Commissioner who was an unsecured creditor could not have
any higher rights than the pawnor and was entitled only to the
surplus money after satisfaction of the plaintiff's dues.
Defendants 3 to S did not file any appeal against the judgment
of the High Court.
The decree passed by the High Court against
them would, therefore, stand.
In the view that we have taken
the appeal is allowed, the Judgment and decree of the High Court
dismissing the suit against the State of Bihar is hereby set aside
and a decree is granted against the State of Bihar in the same terms
as was granted by the trial court.
The appellant will be entitled
to costs throughout.
G.C.
.Appeal allowed.