# BARI SINGH AND ORS v. THE MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 515
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-05-03
- **Bench:** S. M. Snou, J. M. Shelat, A. N. Ray, I. D. DuA, D. G. B Palekar, H. R. Khanna, M. H. Beg
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bari-singh-and-ors-v-the-military-estate-officer-and-anr-5687
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

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Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, ( 15 of
1971), ss. 15 and 20-Validation of eviction orders passed under 1958Act-Jf constitutionallv valid.
When the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1958, was in force, the Government had two alternative remedies of e~ic
tion of per ons in unauthorued occupation of public premises, ll&lllely,
one in 11 court of law by instituting a suit for evic1ion, and the other,
unoor s. 5 (1) of the Act, which conferred power on the Esta le Otlicec to
mue an order of eviction.
Orders were passed under s. 5 in 1961 and 1964, evicting the appellants, and, writ petitions filed by them in the High Court we1 e dismilsed.
While th.!ir appeals in this Court
were pend in~. the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupant ) Act, 1971, came into force.
t
repealed th1> 19~8-Act and had retrospective operation from 16th September, 1958. Under it, there is only one prooodure available for eviction
of persons in unautlwnsed occupation of public premises. Its scheme
is that it confers power on the F~tate Officer to issue notice to persons
who are in unauthorised occupation of any public premi es to show cause
why an order of eviction should not he made, and after considering the
gro1Jnds, to pass an order of eviction.
'Premises' are defined to include
anv land or any building or part of a building. Section 20 provides that
anything done or any action taken 01 purported to have been
done or
taken under the 1958-Act shall be deemed to he as valid and
effective
as if such thing or action was done or taken under the corresponding
provisions of the 1971-Act. Also, '· IS provichs a bar to the juris'iction
of the court to entertain a suit or oroceeding in resryect of eviction of
any person in unauthorised occupation of pubiic premises.
The aooPllants challenged the constitutionality of the 1971-Act aboo
in the appeals.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD: (Per S. M. Sik)'i, C. J. J. M. Shelat. A. N. Ray, I. D. Dua,
D. G. Palekar and H. R. Khanna, JJ.) : (1) The validity pf the 1971Act deoends on, (a) the legislative competence to Validate anythin~. dcme
or actioo taken under the 1958-Act; (b) whether the Legislature possesses competence over the subject m•tter; and (c) whether by validation the I..e~slature has remove;! the defect which the Court had found
in the previous Jaw. [523 D; 527 B-FJ
. (a) In Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1%7)
3 $.C.R. 399 this Court held that s. 5 of the Punjab Premises and
Land (Eviction and Rent Recoverv) Act, 1959, was v'olative of Art.
14 of th• Constituti"'l <'n the ground that, the •ection left it to the unguided d'scre'ion of tbt ~oJ,ertor 1<, taken .a<11o' either un~ the o·din~ry
Jaw or follow the drastic pro"edure pro'"ded by the section.
Assummg
that the t 958-Act is uncO..sFtution'l on the .. ame 1>:ro••nd it could not
be contended that the 1971-Act could not validate anything done under
ue
SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
the 1958-Act, because, Clld l!>?l-Ad is eft'ectivo from 16th Sep:ember
1958, and provides that the action taken under the 1958-Act is deemed
to be taken under the 1971-Act. It i's not a cas-> of the latter Act validating action taken nodei' die earlier Act, · bll! a caae ~. by a deeming
provision. acts or thin11s do~ under an. 1nrb'er Act were deemed to be
done uniter the latter validatln11 Acl. (522 D-F; 524 E-F; 525 E...,-0 I
Mis. Wen Ram11ad lttectrlc Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras,
[1963] 2 S.C.R. 147. followed.
Deputy Commisnoner and Collector, Kamrup & Ors. v. Dw1a Nillh
&nna, (1%8) I S.C.R. I S.C.R. 561, referred to.
(b) The Leg;slature bad legislative competence to enact the 1971-Act
and provide a speedy prooedure for eviction of persoos in unauthor'sed
occupation of public premises, and to pass the law with retrospective
operation. (527 F--GJ
( c) The Legislature can put out of ac•ion retrosnectiwly one of the
procedures 1"1!vin~ one !1focedure only availebl

## Text

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511
A
BARI SINGH AND ORS.
v.
THE MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER AND ANR.
May 3, 1972
[S. M. Snou, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, A. N. RAY, I. D. DuA, D. G.
B
PALEKAR, H. R. KHANNA AND M. H. BEG, JJ.J
c
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H
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, ( 15 of
1971), ss. 15 and 20-Validation of eviction orders passed under 1958Act-Jf constitutionallv valid.
When the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1958, was in force, the Government had two alternative remedies of e~ic
tion of per ons in unauthorued occupation of public premises, ll&lllely,
one in 11 court of law by instituting a suit for evic1ion, and the other,
unoor s. 5 (1) of the Act, which conferred power on the Esta le Otlicec to
mue an order of eviction.
Orders were passed under s. 5 in 1961 and 1964, evicting the appellants, and, writ petitions filed by them in the High Court we1 e dismilsed.
While th.!ir appeals in this Court
were pend in~. the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupant ) Act, 1971, came into force.
t
repealed th1> 19~8-Act and had retrospective operation from 16th September, 1958. Under it, there is only one prooodure available for eviction
of persons in unautlwnsed occupation of public premises. Its scheme
is that it confers power on the F~tate Officer to issue notice to persons
who are in unauthorised occupation of any public premi es to show cause
why an order of eviction should not he made, and after considering the
gro1Jnds, to pass an order of eviction.
'Premises' are defined to include
anv land or any building or part of a building. Section 20 provides that
anything done or any action taken 01 purported to have been
done or
taken under the 1958-Act shall be deemed to he as valid and
effective
as if such thing or action was done or taken under the corresponding
provisions of the 1971-Act. Also, '· IS provichs a bar to the juris'iction
of the court to entertain a suit or oroceeding in resryect of eviction of
any person in unauthorised occupation of pubiic premises.
The aooPllants challenged the constitutionality of the 1971-Act aboo
in the appeals.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD: (Per S. M. Sik)'i, C. J. J. M. Shelat. A. N. Ray, I. D. Dua,
D. G. Palekar and H. R. Khanna, JJ.) : (1) The validity pf the 1971Act deoends on, (a) the legislative competence to Validate anythin~. dcme
or actioo taken under the 1958-Act; (b) whether the Legislature possesses competence over the subject m•tter; and (c) whether by validation the I..e~slature has remove;! the defect which the Court had found
in the previous Jaw. [523 D; 527 B-FJ
. (a) In Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1%7)
3 $.C.R. 399 this Court held that s. 5 of the Punjab Premises and
Land (Eviction and Rent Recoverv) Act, 1959, was v'olative of Art.
14 of th• Constituti"'l <'n the ground that, the •ection left it to the unguided d'scre'ion of tbt ~oJ,ertor 1<, taken .a<11o' either un~ the o·din~ry
Jaw or follow the drastic pro"edure pro'"ded by the section.
Assummg
that the t 958-Act is uncO..sFtution'l on the .. ame 1>:ro••nd it could not
be contended that the 1971-Act could not validate anything done under
ue
SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
the 1958-Act, because, Clld l!>?l-Ad is eft'ectivo from 16th Sep:ember
1958, and provides that the action taken under the 1958-Act is deemed
to be taken under the 1971-Act. It i's not a cas-> of the latter Act validating action taken nodei' die earlier Act, · bll! a caae ~. by a deeming
provision. acts or thin11s do~ under an. 1nrb'er Act were deemed to be
done uniter the latter validatln11 Acl. (522 D-F; 524 E-F; 525 E...,-0 I
Mis. Wen Ram11ad lttectrlc Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras,
[1963] 2 S.C.R. 147. followed.
Deputy Commisnoner and Collector, Kamrup & Ors. v. Dw1a Nillh
&nna, (1%8) I S.C.R. I S.C.R. 561, referred to.
(b) The Leg;slature bad legislative competence to enact the 1971-Act
and provide a speedy prooedure for eviction of persoos in unauthor'sed
occupation of public premises, and to pass the law with retrospective
operation. (527 F--GJ
( c) The Legislature can put out of ac•ion retrosnectiwly one of the
procedures 1"1!vin~ one !1focedure only availeble and thus remove
the
vice of discrimination found in Northern India Cattrer9 case. (526 .E-GJ
State of Mysore & Anr. v. D. Achiah Chttty etc., [1963) 3 S.C.R.
SS. followed.
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Uunicipafity & Ors.
[1970)) S.C.R. 388, refe!Ted to .
... -;
(2} Since the word 'premises' means land which includes agticultural
land, the aJ)P'llant who W3S in unauthorised occup~tion of agricultu'al
land belonging to the Government, was validly evicted under the Act.
[528 Al
(3) A procedure for eviction may be available under the Pun'ab
Tenancy Act, 1887; but it could not, on that acco·Jnt, be conten~rd that
the procedure under the
197.1-Act
offended Art. 14.
The 1971-Act
provides only one procedure for ejec'ment of persons in unauthoris"d
occupation of public premises,
and there is no vice of discrimination
under it. [528 A-<:!
Per M. H. Beg J.: (!) Thi· Court had not dec'ared any part of the
1958-Act ,to b.i a void piec~ of legisl-ation, and therefore, no question of
applying Art. 141 of the Constitution arises because of the dec'so" of
thi• Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab,
11967] 3 S.C.R. 399. [529 Cl
(2) The assumption that the provisions of the 1958-Act were void
and that therefore action talren under it could not be legalised or validated
is erroneous .. [529 C-EJ
In the No.rthern India Caterers ca·e s. 5 of the Punjab Public Premi..,,, and Land
(Eviction
and
Rent Recovery)
Act
1959,
was
he'd to be invalid because of the option left to adopt ei'her t'ie
pt'O':edure
under the sectio" or the procedure under the ordioary Jaw
which lay ourside the Act. The defect or lacana in the Punjab Act which
invalidated the sect'M was tha• it did hot confaio a prohibitioo again•t
the alternative l)riredm'e and no!, that it contamed \Otnethi..g which was,
in Itself, prohibited.
The tt"ro'1!!fitu•io..alify of !he •""'io" thus really
arose from matters extraneous 10' the Act. That case laid down n·o·hiog
more than that allhaugb the more drastic procedore may be otherwiim
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ItilI SINGH V. MltlTAJ.Y ESTATE OPl'lCl!R. (Ray, /.)
517
vali4, yet it became 1111enfo<ceable in lilCJ ~tuation, eimrging from th~
totality Cif pro,jsions of law considered ther~in.
Tb~ is nothing in the
decision to justify the view that the section was per se or ab initio void..
[530 B-FJ
(3) The result of ~ 1971-Aet 'is 11<Mbing short of a re-enactment
retrospeotively so that no ground is left open for the argument that tbete
is any possibility of discrimination between different un•uthorised occupants of public premises. Siace the date from which tho 1971-Act became applicable the validity of any Pll-'t action 1111der the 1958-Aot will
have to be adjudged in the light of the provisions of the 1971-Act. If
some p~ng taken was till pendi.1g its
correctness
smd validity
would be governed by the requirem,nts laid down in the 1971-Act. because, the prorueding taken under the 1958-Act would be deemed to be
a proceeding under the 1971-Act.
The rights protected by the procedure h the 1971-AC' wete not infringed by the action taken under the
earlier Act, beoause, the procedure for eviction including the right of
appeal is identical under bo'h Acts. [530 G-H; 531 A-DJ
( 4) Even if il is case of validation and not one of re-enactment, in
substance. it also mado invalid any pOMfole d'scrimin1tory act whi;ll
may have been committed during the currency of the 1958-Act. [531 J).E]
(5) Thero is no substanc.o in Ire contention that the effect of s. 20
of the 1971-Act was really to validate whot was merely 'purported to
have been done' in the· past. and that therefore, it could not be dceired
to be action taken under the 1971-Act. The word 'purported' is uood
only to descrite .or identify the pa t action taken under the rep!a1ed Act
and has no efl'ect beyond that.
Therefore, the action taken would now
be deemed to have been taken under the 1971 Act. tS3! E----0]
(6) If at all, the drastic
procedure in the 1958-Act was
merely
under a shadow, or, in a state of sus-iension or unenforceability due tc>
reasons falling outside the Act; but once th:>se reaso'8 were elimi iated
by the new cnoc'n..rtt the shadow i removed and the procedure became
operative and eft"ective retroopectively. The elf'"'' of the 1971-Act was
that the option to proceed to evict unauthocigxJ occupants in any way
ou•side the Act was shut out retrospectively an<! it was within the legislative competence of Parliament to do so the action taken against the
ap~dlants is not invalid when tested by the provi ions ot 1911-Act.
!S32 A-Dl
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The Srate of Bombay, [1951] S.C.:R..
228, Beh..am Khurshed Pesikaka v. The Sr<h! of B'mbay, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
613. Saghir AhlTllld v. The State of U.P. cl Or1. [1955] I S.C.R. 707.
Bhikaii Nan;·in Dhakras· & Of<s. v. The Sta'e of M. P. & Ors., [1955}
2 S.C.R. 589, M. P. I'. SundaraMmi•r cl Co. v. The S•a•e of A. P. cl
Anr. [1958] S.C.R. 1422, Deep Chand v. State of U.P. cf Ors. [1959]
Sm>p. 2 S.C.R. !I. Mahen~a Lal Jaini v. The State of U.P. & Ors.,
[1%3] Supp. 1 S.C.lt:. 912, B. ShaWlll Rao v. ·r114 Union T•rritory of
Pondlche.'J; [1967] 2 S.C.R. 650; Deoufy
Commissioner cl Collector,
Kanpur & On'. v. Durga N"th SarlTlll. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 561 an'
P •
. Bhooma Reddy v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1969] 3 S.C:R. 14 refehed'
to.
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
Civil Appeal No. 493
of 1967.
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Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 6,
1966 of the Pu11j'lb High C,.,urt in Letters Patent Appeal No. 234
of 1963 and Civil Appeal No. 1456 of 1968.
.518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 1 S.C.R.
Appeal from the judgment wd order dated December 21 1967
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-of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case N~. 222
of 1966.
Rameshwar D'al, Sharda Rani and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants (in C.A No. 493 of 1967).
·
K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha, 8. 8. Sinha and S. K. Bisaria for the
B
appellants (in C.A. No. 1456 of 1967).
·
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Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, L. M. Singhvi,
P. Parameswara Rao and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1 (in
both the appeals).
·
Ravinder Narain, Bhuvnesh Kumar' and A Subba Rao for
intervener No. 1 (in C.A. No. 493 of 1967).
·
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Soli Sorabjee, Lalit Bhasin, R. N. Banerj~e. Ravinder Narain
and P. C. Bhartari, f:Jr intervener No. 2 (in C.A. No. 493 of 1967).
R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for inte·vener No. 3 (in C.A.
No. 493 of 1967) and the intervener (in C.A. No. 1456 of 1968).
A. K. Sen, S. C. Majum-lar and R. K. Ja.'n, for intervener No.
D
4 (in C.A. No. 493 of 1967).
The Judgment of S1KRI, C.J., SHELAT, RAY, DuA, PALEKAR
·and KHANNA, JJ. was delivered by RAY, J.
BEc.>, J. delivered a
.separate concurring opinion.
Ray, J. These two appeals raised originallv the constitutionality
of the Public Premis~s (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1958. The challenge was on the ground that section 5(1) of the
1958 Act viola:ed Article 14 oi the Constitution.
Section 5(1)
of the 1958 Act conferred power on the Estate Officer to make an
order of eviction aqainst persons who are in unauthorised oc;upation of public premises. The vice of section 5 ( 1) of the 1958 Act
against Article 14 of the Constitution was th·s.
The Government
had two alternative remdies of eviction of pe-sons in unauthJrised
occupation.
One was to seek the remedy in a court of law by
instituting a suit for eviction.
The other was the remedy prescribed by the 1958 Act.
The 1958 Act was attacked on the ground
that there was the unguided discretion of the authorities to either
of the remedies and to pick and choose some of them in occuTJation
of public premises for the application of the d!'astic procedure under
1.ne 1958 Act.
The 1958 Act was amended in 1968. Section lOE was introduced into the 1958 Act.
SectiJn lOE created bar of j•uisdiction
of civil court to ent~rtain any suit or proceeding in respect of the
eviction of any person who is in unauthori,sed occupation of any
~ublic premises or the recovery of the a-rears of rent payable under
section 7 (1) or damages payable under secti Jn 7 ( 2) or costs
~warded under section 9 ( 5) of the Act.
The appellants raised the
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HARi SINGH V, MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER (Ray, ].)
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contention that the amendment effected by section lOE of the Act
was not retro.;pective and therefo.e the proceedings forming subject
matter of the appeals we.e not saved by the amendment.
In the appeal filed by Harl Singh one Behari Lal obtained lease
from the President through the Military Estate Officer, Delhi Circle
of 36. 73 acres of land at Ambala Cantonment.
The lease was for
four years from 1 May, 1952. The annual rent was Rs. 3310/-.
The rent was payaMe in advance.
Behari Lal failed to pay ent.
The lease expired on 1 May, 1957. The period of the lease was
not extended.
Behari Lal failed to surrender possession.
There
was an order dated 17 :June, 1960 under the 1958 Act for eviction
of Behari Lal.
The appellants claimed to be sub-lessees of Behari
Lal.
The lease permitted subletting only with the permission of
l"'e competent autho·ity.
Notice was given under the 1958 Act
to the appellants to show cause as to why they should not be
evicted under the Act, because they were in unauthorised occupation of ihe land.
The Estate Officer found that there was no
sanction of the c0 mpe'ent authority permitting sub-lease.
On 25
July, 1961 an order was passed under section 5 of the 1958 Act
evictin~ the appellants.
The anpellants preferred on appeal to the
D'strict Judge, Ambala.
On 1"8 April, 1962 the appeal was dismissed.
Thereafter the appellants filed" a W" i• petition in the Punjab
High Court.
The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on
13 May, 1963. The appe'lants preferred Letters Patent appeal.
The Hi~h Court" dismissed the appeal on 5 Se"tember, 1966. The
appeal filed by Hari Singh and others- is by certificate against the
decision of the High Court of Punjab.
The appeal filed by Bhar•iya H1tel & Ors. is by certificate
against the judgnient dated 12 Decemter, 1967 of the High Court
at Patna.
The appellants there are partners carrying on bu<iness
under the name of Bhartiya Hotel at Ratanpu·a. One of the partners obtained lease of a plot of land at Chaora in Bihar.
Ram
Lakhan Prasad is the partner ·who obtained the lease.
The Estate
Offi0 er, No-th Eastern Railway served a notice dated 12 June, 1964
under section 4(1) of the 1958 Act on Ram Lakhan Prasad for
eviction of the apoellants on the ground that the appellants were
in unau'horised occupation.
The Esta•e Officer on 16 March,
1966 oassed an order of eviction acrainst the aTJpel'ants. The a'lnel-
}ants thereaf'er moved the Wgh Court at Patna for quashing the
order of eviction;
The Hiqh Cou-t on 21 December. 1967 dismi<sed the writ pe•ition of the anTJelhnts.
The appeal is by certificate from the decision of the High Court.
In the appeal "file<! bv Hari Sincrh and others two contentions
were ra;s~d in the High C"urt.
Fi•<!. it wa< <aid that the word
'premises' did not apply to agricultural land. Secondly, it was said
520
SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l s.c.R.
'that the legislation on agricultural land was within the exc~usive
iegis1ative neid of the State, and, therefore, the Central Act was
unconstitutional.
The High Court rejected bofh the contention.
In the appeal filed by Bbartiya Ho.tel and others the appellants
raised the principal contention that the 1958 Act violated Article
14 of the Constitu.ion.
The High Court referred to the decision
. -0f this Court in Northern India Ca erers Private Ltd. & Anr. v.
State of Punjab & Anr.( 1). The High Court held that the decisiQon
of this Court in Northern India Caterers Prfrate Ltd.( 1) case was
on the Punjab Public Premise.s and Land (Eviction and Rent
Recovery) Act, 1959 and the provisions of the 1958 Act which
formed subject matter of the decision .in the Patna High Court
contained distinguishable features.
In this context the appellants raised the constitu·ionality of the
1958 Act.
Dllring the pendency of these appeals the Public premises {Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 received
the assent of the President on 23 August, 1971. The appellants
were allowed to add a new ground.
The new ground chal!engc.d
the constitutionality of the 1971 Act.
The dechon in the present appeals turns on the que~tion as to
whether the 1 971 Act is a constitutionally valid piece of le~islation.
The 1971 Act is deemed to have come into force on 16 Sept"1ll•er.
1958 except section~ 11, 19 and 20 which came into force on 23
August, 197 J..
Section 11 of the 1971 Act speaks of offence under
the Act.
The offence is that if any person who has been evicted
from any public premises under this Act again occupie~ the P' emi•es
without authority for such occupat;on, he shall be "Unishable with
im:>ri~onroent for a term which may extend to ooe year, or wi•h fine
which may extend to one thousand ruooes, or w;th both.
Secfrm ·
19 enacts th1t the 19~8 Act is repealed.
The most important
:section is 20.
Section 20 is as follows :-
"Notwith'tandiilg any judgment. decree or oruer of
anv court, anyhting do11e or any acti 1n taken (including
rules or orde·s made, no'ices issued. evicti'cms ordered
or eff•cted, damages assessed, rentq or d~ama?,es or cos•s
recovered and procee<iing~ initiate-I) nr ou-norte1 to
have been done 0r taken under the Public Premises
(Evict;on o.f Unau•horised Occuryantq) Ad. 1958 (he•einafter in this •ecthn refe•red to -as the 1958 Act) sh"Jl
be deemed to be as valid and effective as if such th;ng
or actio., w~q tlone or t"ken under the cor-esoondino.;
provisions of this Act which. under sub-sect;on (3) of
SP.~t10,, 1 ~h'llll h~ rt"':~mer1 1" h'lve com~ into force on the
16•h day of Sentember, 1958 and accordingly-
' I ) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399.
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HARi SINGH V, MILITARY ESTATE OFFICEll (Ray, J.)
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(a) llO suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any c->11rt for tile refund of any
rent or damages or cJsts recovered under the 1958 Act
where such rcfu.nd has been claimed merely on the
ground that the said Act has been declared to be unconstitutional and void; and
(b) no court shall enforce a decree or order directing the re.fund of any rent or damages or coots recovered
under the 1958 Act mei:ely on the ground that the said
Act has been declared to be uncons.itutional and void.
Another important section of the 1971 Act is section 15.
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Broadly stated, seclion 15 speaks of bar of jurisdiction o. courts.
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Section 15 provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to ente tain
any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction Of any person who
is in unau,horised occupation of any public premises or the recovery
of the arrears of rent payable under section 7 ( 1) of the damages
payable unc!er section 7 ( 2) or the costs under section 9 ( 5).
The scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers power on Estate
Officer to Lsue notice to persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any public pcemises to show cause why a,n order of eviction
should not be made.
'Unauthorised occupation' under the Act
in rdation to any public premises means the occupation by any
person of the public premJses without authority for such occupatio;n, and i.ncludes the continuance in occupation by any pe-son of
the publ'c premises aft& the au hority ( whe•her by way of grant or
any otner mo je of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy
the premises has exoired or bas been detenni.ned for any reason
whatsoever.
'P•emhes' are defined to mean any land or any bulld-
~ng or part of a building an1 includes the garden, orounds and
ou'bouses, apoertaining to such building or part of a building and
any fittingq affixed to such building or part of a building for the
more beneficial enjoyment thereol.
'Public premises' means any
premi1e~ b~lon11;iue: to or taken on lease or -equisitbnerl by, or on
behalf of the Central Government as enumerated in section 2f e)
of the Act.
The mtice to show cause a'!ain•t o-der of eviction
shall sp~cify th~ grounds on wliich the order of eviction is ryr<J"O<P,d
to be m~de. The E'tate ('ffic 0 r1 under •he Act a·e aopo'nte-1 b'y
the Central Government.
The Estate Office·s are G~zette~ Officers
or officers of equivalent rank.
'Corporate autho•ity' under tlie
Act m~ans·any c"moany or Coroorati"n or any c"mmiftee or the
Autb'lrity as m~"ti"ne1 in the Act.
The Estate Officer sh~ll, for
the pu-po'e of holdh~ anv inquirv under this Act, h•v~ the 'ame
powerq a' are ves'ed in a civil court under the Co~e of c;vil P.rocedure. 1908 wb~n trying a suit. in resnect nf motte·s m•nt1,,ned
in section 8 of the Act.
These matters are summoning and enforc-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1973] l S.C.R
ing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
secondly, requiring the discovery and proouction of do:ument; and
thirdly, any other matter which mJy be prescribed.
Section 10 of
the Act provides for finality of orders in circumstances mentioned
in section 10 of the Act therein.
It is necessary to notice that this Court on 4 April, 1967 decided the Northern India Caterers Private Ltd.( 1) case on the
validity of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and
Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 and decla-ed sectiQ!l 5 of that Act to be
violative of Article 14. In Northern India Caterers Private Ltd.( 1)
case the State of Punjab leased the Mount View Hotel at
Chandigarh for a period of six yea•s from 24 September, 1953.
The Estate Officer gave a no:ice requiring the appellants in that
case to show cause as to why the ::· der of eviction should not be
made.
Section 5 of the 1959 Punjab Act provided that if after
consi fodng the cause and the evidence produced by any person in
unauthorised occupation of public premises and after giving him
reasonable opportunity of teing heard, the Collector is satisfied
that the public premis~s are in unauthorised occuoation he 'may
make an order of eviction'.
Section 5 of the 1959 Act was held
to leave it to the discretion of the Collector to make an order of
eviction in the case of some of the tenants and not to mako the
order in the case of others.
It was found that section 5 did 1._,t
lay down any guiding principle or policv under which the Collector
had to decide in which cases he shnuld follow one or the other
p•ocedure.
This Court found that the Government ha1 two remedies open to it.
One was under the ordinary law.
The ntht • w"S
a drastic and 'more prejudichl remedy' under the 1959 Act.
Consequently, section 5 was held to vblate Artcle 14 of the
Constitution.
The 1971 Act came into existence to velidate anything done or
any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under
the 1958 Act.
In the first place, the 1971 Act is made retrospective with effect from 16 September, 1958 except sections 11, 19
and 20.
In the sec0nd place, sec'ion 20 of the .1971 Act which
is described as the section for validation provides that anything done
or any action taken or purprirted to have been dnne or taken shall
be deemed to be as valid an<l eff~ctive as if such thing or a:t'on
was done or taken under the corresp'Jnding provisions of the 197 l
Act.
In the third ohce. the 1971 Act bv <P-ction 15 provided bar
of jurisdiction of courts in respect of eviction of any person who
is in unauthorised occuoation of anv puhlic pr•mi<es.
Jt. therefore, follows that under the orovisi 0 ns of the 1971 Act which had
retrosnective oneratinn frnm 16 Sentemb~r. 1958 there i< only one·
procedu•e evailable for eviction nf oer<o"s i11 unau•horise<i cjrcnnation of pubfo premises.
That procedure is to be found in tlte 1971
(1) f1967J 3 s.c.R. 399.
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HAlll SINGH V. MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER (Ray, /.)
523
Act.
Tho other courts have no jurisdiction in these matters.
The
vice ol Article 14 which was found by this Court in the decision of
Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. (1) no longer appears under
the 1971 Act.
. Counsel for the appellants contended that orders made or eviction ·ordered under the 1958 Act are not and cannot be validated
by section 20 of the 1971 Act.
The contention was ampfffied in
this manner.
Section 20 of the 1971 Act pre-supposes and postulates that the 1958 Act was ill operation and in existence.
The
1958 Act Wli!' violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and accordingly it never came into existence and was non-est. Accordingly
there could be no eviction order under the 1958 Act. Secondly,
Parliament cannot by ordinary legislation enact that eviction under
the unconstitutional 1958 Act shall be deemed to be a valid eviction
under the 1971 Act.
The validity of the 1971 Act depends on the legislative competence to validate anything done or any action taken or purported
to have been done or taken under the 1958 Act.
Validation is
ach'ieved b!y enacting that anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken shall be deemed to be, as valid
and effective as if such thing or action was done or taken under the
corresponding provisions of the 1971 Act.
The result is that the
1971 Act is made retrospective with eftect from16 September, 1958.
Anything done or any action taken under the 1958 Act is. to be
deemed as valid and effer,tive under the provisions of the 1971 Act.
The consequence is that the validity of action done or taken is to
be tested with reference to the provisions of the 1971 Act.
This
Court in M/s West Ramnad Eler;tric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State
of Madras(') held that it is within the competence of the
legislatu:·e to enact a law and make it retrospective in
operation.
In the West Ramnarf Electric Distribution Co. Ltd(')
case the electric company vested in the State of Madras
under an order dated 17 May, 1951 under the provisions of section
4 (1) of the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings Act, 1949.
The validity of the Act was challenged.
This Court held that the
Act of 1949 was ultra vires. After the decision was pronounced
the Madras Legislature passed the Madras Act 29 of 1954.
The
1954 Act incorporated the main provisions of the earlier Act of
1949 and validated action taken under the earlier Act.
The West
Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. cha!Jenged the 1954 Act.
It was contended that the validation section was ineffectual and
inoperative.
The submission in West Ramnad Electric Distribution
Co. Ltd.(2) case was that the notification in the year 1951
was invalid and inoperative because it contravened Article 31 ol
the Constitution.
It was therefore contended that by reason of
(I) [I967J 3 s.c.R. 399.
121 [t963J 2 s.c.R. 747.
J6-LJ286 CI/72
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l s.c f,,
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the decision of this Court that the Act of 1949 was invalid, the
notification was not supported by any authority of any pre-existing
law.
This Court did not accept that contention.
This Court said
that 'if the Act is retrospective in operation and section 24 has been
enacted for the purpose of retrospectively validating actions taken
under the provisions of the earlier Act, it must follow by the very
retrospective operation of the relevant provisions that at the time
when the impugned notification was issued, these provisions were
in existence.
That is the plain and obvious effect of the r~trospec
tive operation of. the statute. Therefore ·in considering whether
Article 31 ( 1) has been complied with or not, we must assume that
before the notification was issued, the relevant provisions of the
Act were in existence and so, Article 31 ( 1) must be held to have
been complied with in that sense".
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In West Ramnad Ecctric Distribution
Co.
Ltd. (1)
case
this Court referred io the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution to emphasise the instance where the Constitution prevented
retrospective operation of ·an, law. Accent was placed on the words
"law in force at the time" occurring in Article 20.
The words ','by
authority of law" in Article 31 ( 1 ) were distinguished from the
words occurring in Article 20.
This Court said that if subsequent
law passed by the legislature was retrospective in operation, it would
satisfy the requirement of Article 31 ( 1) and would validate the
impugned notification in the West Ramnad Electric Distribution
Co. Ltd. (1) case.
The ruling cl this Court ion West Ramnad Electric Distribution
Co. Ltd. (1) case establishes competence
of
the
legislature
to make laws retrospective in operation for the purpose of validation of action done ·under an earlier Act which has ~en declared
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by a decision of the court to be invalid. It is to be appreciated
that the validation is by virtue of the provisions of the subsequent
F
piece of legislation.
An illustration of ineffective validation may be found in the
case of A Deput.v Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup & Ors. v.
Durga Nath Sarma( 2 ). In that case, there was the
As•~:::
Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of
Erosion Act, 1955. It was passed on 11 April, 1955.
The o
Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of
Erosion (Validation) Act, 1960 was passed validating the acquisition of lands of which possession had been taken.
The Assam
Government took possession of lands in that case in 1954. There
was an order of acquisition under the 1955 Act.
The owner of
the land was asked to submit claim for compensation under the ·
1955 as well as 1960 Acts.
Sarma challenged the validity of both
H
the Acts.
The High Court held that the 1955 Act was violative
1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 747.
(2) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 561.
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525
of Article 31(2) of the <;:onstitution as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 and that the 1960 Act was
not independent of the 1955 Act.
This Court held that section 2
of the 1960 Act which validated land taken under the 1955 Act by
enacting that the same 'shall be deemed to have been validly
acquired under the provisions of' the 1955 Act failed to achieve
the· purpose of validation.
The reason is this.
The 1955 Act was
found to be violative of Article 31 ( 2) of the Constitution as it
stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955,
because it did not ensure payment of a just equivalent of the land
appropriated.
The 1955 Act was also found to be violative o.f
Article 14 of the Constitution.
There was discrimination between
owners of land similarly situated by the mere accident of some land
hieing required for the purposes mentioned in the 1955 Act and
some land being required for other purposes.
The vaFdation
clause of the 1960 Act was held by this Court to be totally ineffective.
The 1955 Act was invalid.
The 1960 Act provided for
validating acquisitions under the 1955 Act. This Court sai4 that
if the 1955 Act was invalid the deemed acquisition under the l 960
Act was equally invalid.
The ratio is that the 1900 Act had no
power to enact that an acquisition under a .constitutionally inv~lid
Act was valid.
The 1960 Act did not stand independent of the
1955 Act.
The deeming provision of the 1960 Act was that land·
was deemed to be acquired under the 1955 Act. If the 1955 Act
was unconstitutional the 1960 Act could not make the 1955 Act
constitutional.
The dis1inction between West Ramnad Electric Distribution
Co. Ltd. (1) case and Druga Nath Sarma's( 2 )
case is this.
In the
West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. case
(supra) the 1954 Act validated actions and proceedings under
the earlier AcJ by a deeming provision 1tha1 acts or things were
done by virtue of the provisions of the 1954 Act. The 1954 Act
was not found to have any constitutional infirmity.
On the other
hand Dutga Nath Sarma's(") case (supra) validated by the 1960
Act acquisition under' the 1955 Act. The acquisition was not by
or under the 1960 Act. The acquisition was under the 1955 Act.
The 1955 Act was constitutionally iilvalid. Therefore, there was
no validation of earlier acquisition.
The question of legisla!tive competence to remove discrimination by a retrospective legislation came up for consideration before this Court in State of Mysore & Anr. v. D. Achiah Chetty
etc. ( 3). There were two Acts in Mysore for acquisition of
private land for public purposes.
One was the Mysore Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. The other was the City of Bangalore
Improvement Act, 1945. A notification under the 1894 Act
(\) {1963) 2 S.C.R. 747.
(2) [l 9€8J 1 s.c.R.561.
(3) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 55
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.R.
was issued f.or acquisition of Chetty's plots in Bangalore. Chetty
challenged the acquisition on the ground that using the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act was discriminatory
because in other cases the provisions of the Improvement Act
were applied. The High Court accepted
Chetty's
contention.
During ithe pendency of appeal to this Court the Bangalore Acq\Ji,
sition of Lands (Validation) Act, 1962 was passed.
It validated all acquisitions made, proceedings held, notifications issued or
orders made under the Land Acquisition Act before the
1962
Validation Act came into force.
The 1962 Validatio)l Act was
challenged on the ground that the tw J Acts prescribed two diffe.
rent procedures.
It was also said that the Improvement Act
was a special law, and, therefore, the Acquisition Act was to give
way to the special law.
The validating section in the Mysore
case (supra) provided that every acquisition of land for the purpose of improvement, expansion or development of the City ot
Bangalore by the State acting or purporting to act under the
Mysore Land Acquisition Act shall be deemed to have
been
validly made, held or issued.
The validating section was impeached on the ground that there were still two Acts which covered the same field but prescribed two different procedures. It was
also said that the Acquisition Act was a more prejudicial proce·
dure and was discriminatory.
This Court found that the legisla·
ture retrospectively made a single law for the acquisition of these
properties.
It was contended that an acquisition hit by Article
14 or anythin~ done previously could not be validated unless the
vice of unreasonable
classification was removed.
The
1962
Validation Act was impeached on that gro1md.
This Court did
not accept the submission and said "if two procedures exist and
one is followed and ithe other discarded, there may in a given
case be found discrimination.
But the Legislature has still the
competence to put out of action retrospectively one of the procedures leaving one procedure only available, namely,
lhe one
followed and 1thus to make disappear the discrimination. In this
way a Validating Act can get over discrimination. Where, however, the legislative competence is not available, the discrimination that if there is legislative competence the legislature can put
removed by a legislature having power 1to create a single procedure out of two and· not by a legislature which has
not
that
power"
The Mysore case (supra) .is an authority for .the proposition that if there is legisla'tive competence the legislature can put
out of action retrospectively one of the procedures leaving one
procedure only available and thus removing the vice of discrimination.
That is exactly what has happened in the 1971 Act in
the present appeals. The 1958 Act was challenged on the ground
that there were two procedures and the choice of either was Teft
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to the unguided discretion of the Estate Officer.
The 1971 Act
does not leave any such discretion to the Estate Office'..
Und~r
the 1971 Act there is only one procedure. The ~eemmg pr?v1sion contained in section 20 of the 1971 Act validates actions
done by virtue of the provisions of the 1971 Act .
The meaning of a Validation Act is to remove the causes for
ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings which are
validated by a Legislative measure. This Court in ~h;i ~rithvl
Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Borough Mumczpallly &
Ors., (1970) 1 S.C.R. 388 dealt with the Gujarat Imposition
of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963. Under ~e~
tion 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 a mumc1pality could levy a rate on building or lands or both situate within
the municipality.
This Court held in Patel Gordhandas Hargo-
·vindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad, ( 1964) 2
S.C.R. 608 that the term 'rate' must be confined to an impost
on the basis of annual letting value and it could not be validly a
levy on the basis of capital value. Because of this decision
~he
Gujarat Legislature passed the Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by
Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963. The 1963 Act provided
that past assessment and collection of 'rate' on lands and buildings on the basis of capital value or a percentage of capital value
was declared valid despite any judgment of a court or Tribunal to
the contrary.
The earlier decision of this Court was applicable
to the meaning of the word 'rate' occurring in the 1925 Act. The
Validation Act gave its own meaning and interpretation . of the
law under which the tax was collected. It was also said by 1his
Court that a tax declared illegal could be validated if the ground
of illegality was
capable of being removed.
Therefore, a
validating law is upheld first by finding out whether the legislature
possesses compete11ce over the sub.iect matter, and,
secondly,
whether by validation the legislature has removed the defect which
the courts had found in' th>~ previous law.
The legislature had legislative competence to enact the 1971
Act.
It means that it could legislate on the subject of providing
a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in unauthonsed occupation of public premises.
The legislature has power to pass Jaws
with retrospective operation.
The challenge to the 1971 Act is
that the 1958 Act is unconstitutional, and, .therefore, there cannot
be validation of anything done under an unconstitutional Act.
The fallacy of the appellants' submission is in overlooking the
crucial provisions in the 1971 Act that the 1971 Act is effective
from 16 September, 1958 and the action done under the 1958
Act is deemed to be done under .the 1971 Act.
There is no vice
of discrimination under the 1971 Act.
There is only one procedure under the 1971 Act.
528
. SUPUME COURT UPOl!.TS
[1973] l S.C.R •
It wa~ clln~ tllatthe word 'premises" in the Act would not
apply to agricultural land.
The word 'premises" is defined to
mean any land.
Any land will include agricultural land.
There
is nothing in the Act to exclude the applicability of the Act to
agricultural land.
Reference was made to sections 42 and 43 of
the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. Section 42 of the 1887 Act
speaks of restriction on ejectment.
Section 43 provides for application to the Revenue Officer for ejectment.
It was said on
behalf of the appellants that Article 14 of the Constitution was
offended because of the procedure under the Punjab Tenancy Act.
1887 being available.
There is no substance· irt that contention.
Section 15 of the 1971 Act provides only one procedure for ejectment of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises.
The 1958 Act has not been declared by this Court to be unconstitutional.
Section 5 of the 1959 Punjab Act was held by
this Court in the decision in Northern India Caterers Private
Ltd. case (supra) to be an infraction of Article 14.