# BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY v. THE STATE OF MADRAS

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 425
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-05-23
- **Case number:** CRIMINAL APPELLATE JurusDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1951
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bathina-ramakrishna-reddy-v-the-state-of-madras-29
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS.
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
Muui:ERJEA,
DAs
and CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR· JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 2(3)-lndian Penal
Code (XLV of 1860), s. 499-Contempt of subordinate Court-/urisdiction of High Court to take cognisance-Contempt punishable as
defamation under Penal Code-Whether iurisdiction ousted-Scope
and object of Contempt of Courts Act.
Sub-sec. (3) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926,
excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of
a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
Court
subordinate to it only in cases
where the acts alleged to constitute contempt
are punishable as
contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not ·where these acts merely
amount to offences of other description for which punishment
has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code.
The fact that defamation of a judge of a subordinate Court
constitutes an offence under sec.
499 of the Indian Penal Code
does 11ot, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the
High Court to
take cognisance of the act as a contempt of court.
Defamatory statements about the conduct of a judge even in
respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily constitute contempt of Court.
It is only when the defamation is calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper
administration of justice that it amounts to contempt.
Kisan Krishna /i v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent
de
Paul (A.I.R. 1943
Nag. 334) disapproved.
V. M. Bason
v.
A. H. Skone (LL.R. 53 Cal. 401) explained. Subordinate fudge, First
Class Hoshangabad v. /awaharlal (A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407)> Narayan
Chandra v. Panchu Pramanick (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684), Naresh Kumar
v. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489), Kaulashia v. Emperor (I.L.R.
12 Pat. 1),
State v.
Brahma Prakash
(A.I.R. 1950 All. 556),
Emperor v. /agannath
(A.LR. 1938 All. 358), Bennet Colman v.
C. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34) approved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JurusDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 13 of 1951.
Appeal by special leave from
the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras
(Rajamannar C. J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated
10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No. IO of
1949.
1952
Feb. 14.
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
Mukheriea /.
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
S. P. Sinha
( S. S. Prakasam, with him), for the
appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent.
1952.
February
14. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MuKIIERJEA J.-This appeal has come up before
us on special leave granted
by this court on May 23,
1950, and it is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated April 1(},
1950, by which the learned Judges found the appellant
guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to serve
simple imprisonment .for three months.
The appellant is the publisher and managing editor
of a Telugu Weekly known as "Praja. Rajyam" which
is edited
and
published at Nellore in the State of
Madras. In the issue of the said paper dated 10th
February, 1949, an article appeared under the caption
"Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur, corrupt?"
The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi,
the stationary
Sub-Magistrate of
Kovvur,
was known
to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to
be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways.
He was said to have a broker, through whom negotiations in connection with these corrupt practices were
carried on.
Several specific
instances were cited of
cases tried by that officer, where it was rumoured that
he had either taken bribes or had put the parties to
undue harassment, because
they were obdurate enough
to refuse
the demands of his broker. The article,
which is a short one, concludes with the foHowing
paragraph:-
"There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur
Taluk.
Taking advantage of
those
parties
many
wealthy
persons ma

## Text

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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS.
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
Muui:ERJEA,
DAs
and CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR· JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 2(3)-lndian Penal
Code (XLV of 1860), s. 499-Contempt of subordinate Court-/urisdiction of High Court to take cognisance-Contempt punishable as
defamation under Penal Code-Whether iurisdiction ousted-Scope
and object of Contempt of Courts Act.
Sub-sec. (3) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926,
excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of
a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
Court
subordinate to it only in cases
where the acts alleged to constitute contempt
are punishable as
contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not ·where these acts merely
amount to offences of other description for which punishment
has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code.
The fact that defamation of a judge of a subordinate Court
constitutes an offence under sec.
499 of the Indian Penal Code
does 11ot, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the
High Court to
take cognisance of the act as a contempt of court.
Defamatory statements about the conduct of a judge even in
respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily constitute contempt of Court.
It is only when the defamation is calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper
administration of justice that it amounts to contempt.
Kisan Krishna /i v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent
de
Paul (A.I.R. 1943
Nag. 334) disapproved.
V. M. Bason
v.
A. H. Skone (LL.R. 53 Cal. 401) explained. Subordinate fudge, First
Class Hoshangabad v. /awaharlal (A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407)> Narayan
Chandra v. Panchu Pramanick (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684), Naresh Kumar
v. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489), Kaulashia v. Emperor (I.L.R.
12 Pat. 1),
State v.
Brahma Prakash
(A.I.R. 1950 All. 556),
Emperor v. /agannath
(A.LR. 1938 All. 358), Bennet Colman v.
C. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34) approved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JurusDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 13 of 1951.
Appeal by special leave from
the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras
(Rajamannar C. J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated
10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No. IO of
1949.
1952
Feb. 14.
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
Mukheriea /.
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
S. P. Sinha
( S. S. Prakasam, with him), for the
appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent.
1952.
February
14. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MuKIIERJEA J.-This appeal has come up before
us on special leave granted
by this court on May 23,
1950, and it is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated April 1(},
1950, by which the learned Judges found the appellant
guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to serve
simple imprisonment .for three months.
The appellant is the publisher and managing editor
of a Telugu Weekly known as "Praja. Rajyam" which
is edited
and
published at Nellore in the State of
Madras. In the issue of the said paper dated 10th
February, 1949, an article appeared under the caption
"Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur, corrupt?"
The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi,
the stationary
Sub-Magistrate of
Kovvur,
was known
to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to
be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways.
He was said to have a broker, through whom negotiations in connection with these corrupt practices were
carried on.
Several specific
instances were cited of
cases tried by that officer, where it was rumoured that
he had either taken bribes or had put the parties to
undue harassment, because
they were obdurate enough
to refuse
the demands of his broker. The article,
which is a short one, concludes with the foHowing
paragraph:-
"There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur
Taluk.
Taking advantage of
those
parties
many
wealthy
persons make attempt to get the opposite
party punished
either by
giving
bribes
or ma:king
recommendations.
To appoint
Magistrates who
run
after parties for a Taluk like this .... is to betray the
public.
It is tantamount to failure of justice. Will the
Collector enquire into the matter and allay the public
of their fears?"
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
The attention of the State Government being drawn
to this article, an application was filed by the Advocate.
General of Madras before the High Court on November
14, 1949, under section 2 of the Omtempt of Courts
Act (Act XII of
1926) praying that suitable action
might be taken against the appellant as well as three
other person~ of whom two were respectively the editor
and sub-editor of the paper, while the
third was the
owner of the Press where the paper was printed.
On receiving notice, the appellant appeared before
the High Court and filed an affidavit taking sole responsibility for
the article
objected to and asserting
that the
article was
published be~ause of his anxiety
to uphold
the highest
traditions
of
the judiciary
in the
land and
to
create
popular .confidence
in
courts,
the
duty
of
which
was
to
dispense
justice without fear or favour and without any discrimination of
caste, creed or community. It was said
that before
the article was published, numerous complaints had reached him from various quarters imputing corruption and disreputable conduct to this Magistrate and the only desire of the appellant was to draw
the attention of the higher authorities to the state of
public opinion in the
matter and to invite an enquiry
into the truth or otherwise of the allegations which
were not asserted
as facts
but were based only on
hearsay.
The High Court after hearing the parties came to the
conclusion that the publication in question did amount
to contempt of court, as it was calculated to lower the
prestige and dignity of
courts and bring into disrepute
the administration of justice. As the appellant was not
prepare8 to substantiate the allegations which he made
and which he admitted to be based on hearsay and did
not think it proper even to express any regret for what
he had done,
the court sentenced him :to simple imprisonment for three months.
The other three
respondents, through their counsel,
tendered unqualified apology to the courr and the learned Judges considered
that no further
action against
them was necessary.
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy
v.
The State af
Madras.
Mukherjea /.
1952
Bathina Ram~
krishna Reddy
v.
The Staie of
Madras.
Muk herjea /.
428
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
[19521
!
.
'
.
The propriety of the decision of the High Coun. so
far as it relates to the appellant has been challenged
before us in this appeal and Mr. Sinha, who appeared
in support of
the same, raised
before us a two.fold
contention; his first and main contention is that as the.
contempt in this case was said to have been comml.tted
in respect of a court subordinate to the High Court and
the allegations
made in the
article in question constitute an offence under section 499 of the Indian Penal
Code, the
jurisdiction
of
the
High Court to take
cognizance of
such a
case is expressly
barred under
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The other
contention advanced
by the learned counsel relates to·
the merits of the case and it is urged that in publishing the article objected to, the appellant acted in perfect good faith, and as the article amounted to nothing
else but a
demand for enquiry into the conduct of a
particular person who was believed
to be guilty of
corrupt practices in the discharge of his judicial duties,.
there was no contempt of court either intended or
committed by the appellant.
So far as the first point is concerned, the determination of
the question raised by the appellant would
.,... .
depend upon the proper interpretation to be put upon
• •
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act which runs
as follows :-
"No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
court subordinate
to it where
s_uch
contempt is an
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code."
According .to Mr .. Sinha, what the sub-section ·means
is that if the act by which a , party is alleged to have
committep contempt of a subordinate court constitutes
offence of any description whatsoever punisbable under
the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is precluded
from taking cognizance of it. It is
said that in the
present case the allegations made in t~e article in question amount to an offence of defamation as defined by
section 499 of the Indian Pelial Code . and consequently
the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred.
Reliance
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
is placed in support of this proposition upon the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kz'san Krifhna Ji v.
Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul(1).
This contention, though
somewhat plausible
at first
sight, does not
appear
to us
to be sound. In our
opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the
jurisdiction of
High Court only
in cases; where the
acts alleged to
constitute
contempt of a
subordinate
court are punishable
as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian
Penal Code but not where these
acts merely amount to offences of other description for
which punishment has been provided for in the Indian
Penal Code.
This would be clear from the language of
the sub-section
which
uses
the words
"where
such
contempt is an offence" and does not say
"where the
act alleged to constitute such
contempt is an offence".
It is argued that if such was the intention of the Legislature, it could have
expressly
said that
the
High
Court's jurisdiction will be ousted only when the contempt is
punishable
as such
under the Indian Penal
Code. J t seems to us that the reason for not using
such language in the
sub-section
may be that the expression "contempt of court" has not been used as description of any offence in the Indian Penal
Code,
though certain acts,
which
would
be punishable
as
contempt of court in England, are made offences under
it.
It may
be
pointed out in this connection that
although the powers of the High Courts in India esta·
blished under the
Letters
Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior
Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been
doubted, it was a controversial
point
prior
to
the
passing of the
Contempt of
Courts Act, 1926,
as to
whether the High Court could, like the Court of King's
Bench in
England, punish
contempt
of courts subordinate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
The doubt
has
been
removed by
Act XII of 1926
which expressly declares the right of the High Court
to protect
subordinate courtq
against
contempt,
but
(l) (1943) A.LR. 1943 Nag. 334.
5- S C. lndia/71
19.52
Batlzioa Ram11krishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
1952
Bathina RatnaJtrishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
subject to this restriction, that cases of contempt which
have already been provided for in the Indian Penal
Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High
Court.
This seems to be the principle underlying
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts
Act.
What
these cases are
need not
be exhaustively determined
for purposes of the present case, but some
light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter
by
the
provision
of section 480 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, which
empowers any
civil, criminal or revenue court to
punish summarily a person who is found
guilty
of
committing any offence under sections
176, 178, 179,
180 or section
228 of the Indian Penal Code in the
view or presence of the court. We are not prepared
to say, as has been said by the Patna High Court in
/nanendra Pro1ad v. Gopal('), that the only section of
the Indian Penal
Code which deals
with contempt
committed against a court of justice or judicial officer
is section 228. Offences under sections
175, 178,
179
and 180 may also, as section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code shows, amount to contempt of court if the
"public servant"
referred to in
these sections happen&
to be a judicial officer in a particular case. It is well
known that the aim of the contempt proceeding is "to
deter men from offering any
indignities to a court of
justice" and an essential feature of the proceeding is
the exercise of a summary power by
the court itself
in regard to the delinquent. In the
cases mentioned
in section 480 of the Indian Penal Code, the court has
been
expressly
given summary powers to punish a
person who is guilty of offending its dignity in the
manner indicated in the section. The court is competent also under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to forward any case of this description to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it, if it considers that
the offender deserves a higher punishment than what
can be inflicted under
section 480.
Again, the court
is entitled under section 484 to discharge the offender
on his submitting
an apology,
although
it
has already adjudged him to punishment under acction 480
(I) J.L.R. 12 Pat. l?l.
..
>,
S.C.R.
SUJ>REME COURT REPORTS
431
or forwarded
his case for
trial under section
482.
The mode of purging contempt by tendering apology
is a further characteristic
of a contempt
proceeding.
It seems, therefore,
that there are offences
which are
punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal
Code
and as
subordinate
courts
can
sufficiently vindicate
their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in
mch cases the legislature deemed it
proper to exclude
them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act; but it
would not be
correct to
say that the High Court's
jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act
complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt,
is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.
This view has been taken and, in our opinion quite
rightly, in a number of decisions by the
Calcutta,(1)
Patna,(2) Allahabad(3 ) and Lahore(') High Courts. The
only authority which Mr. Sinha could cite in support
of his contention is the decision of the Nagpur High
Court in Ki.ran
Krishna Ii v.
Nagpur Conference of
Society
of St.
Vincent de Pau/(6). The authority is
undoubtedly in his favour as
it proceed5
upon the
assumption that the idea underlying the provision of
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act is that if
a person can be punished by some other tribunal, then
the High Court should not entertain any proceeding
for contempt.
It is
to be
noticed that the
learned
Judge, who decided this case, himself took the opposite
view in
the case of Subordinate
fudge,
First
Class,
Hoshangabad v. fawaharla/( 8 ) and definitely held that
the prohibition contained in section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act refers to offences punishable as
contempt of court by the
Indian Penal Code and not
to offences punishable otherwise
than
as
contempt.
This decision was neither noticed nor dissented from
in the subsequent
case, and
it is quite possible that
(1) Narayan Chandra v. Panchu Pramanik (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684);
N,msh Kumar v. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489).
(2) Kaulashia v. Emperor (12 Pat. 1).
(3) State v. Brahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556); Emperor v.
fagannatll (A.I.R. 1938 All. 358).
(4) Bennett Coleman v. G. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34),
(5) A.LR. 1943 Nag. 334.
( 6) A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407.
1952
Bathina Rama·
krishna Reddy
v.
1' he State of
Madras.
Mukheriea /.
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna R<ddy
v.
Th• Stat• of
Madras.
Mukh.rj•a /.
432
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to
this earlier pronouncement of his,
in which case the
matter would certain! y have been
more fully discussed. We think further that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in V. M. Bason v. A.H. Skone,(')
which was
the basis of
the decision of the learned
Judge in the subsequent case does not
really support
the view taken in it. In the Calcutta case what happened was, that a clerk of the Attorney, who appeared
for the respondent decreeholder, went to serve a notice
under Order 21, Rule 37 ( 1), of the Civil Procedure Code
upon the
appellant judgment-debtor. The judgmentdebtor
refused
to take
the notice
and abused and
assaulted the
Attorney's clerk.
Upon
that, contempt
proceedings were started
against him and ,Mr. Justice
C. C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side of the High
Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty of contempt and fined him Rs. 200. On appeal, this judgement was affirmed by the
appellate Bench and there
was a
general
observation
made
by
Chief
Justice
Sanderson at the close of his judgment that it is not
desirable to invoke the special inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court by way of proceeding for contempt if
ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate's court are sufficient to
meet the
requirements of a case. This was
not a case under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts
Act at all and no question either arose or was decided
as to whether if an act is otherwise punishable as an
offence
under the
Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction
of the High Court' under that section would be ousted.
Undoubtedly the High Court had jurisdiction in that
· case and whether such jurisdiction, which
is certainly
of a special
character
and
is
exercised summarily,
should be called in to aid in the circumstances of a
particular case would depend upon
the discretion · of
the court. This has, however, no bearing on the point
that has arisen for consideration before us. We would
hold, therefore, that the right view was taken by
the
learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the earlier
case and not in the later one.
. ( 1) 1.L.R. 53 Cal. 40 l.
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S.C.R.
SUPRE!-.~E COURT REPORTS
433
It is
next urged by Mr. Sinha that even assuming
that this view is correct, the language of section 499
of the Indian
Penal Code is wide enough to cover a
case of contempt of court.
What is said is, that if a
libel is published against a judge in respect of his
judicial functions, that also is defamation within the
meaning of section 499 of the In~ian Penal Code and
as such libel constitutes a contempt of court, it may
be said with perfect propriety that libel on a judge is
punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code.
We do not think that this contention can be accepted
as sound.
A libellous
reflection upon the conduct of
a judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly
come under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and
it may be open to the judge to take steps against the
libeller in
the ordinary \Vay for vindication of his
character and personal dignity as a judge; but such
libel may or may not amount to contempt of court.
As
the Privy
Council
observed
in Surendra Nath
Benerjee v. Tlze
Chief Justice and Judges of the High
Court(1)
"although contempt may
include
defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something
more
than mere defamation and is of a different character."
When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or
proper administration of
law,
it
would
certainly
amount to contempt.
The
offence of
contemp~ is
really a wrong done to the'
public by weakening the
authority and influence
of courts of law which exist
for their good.
As was said by Willmot, C.J.(
2
)
"attacks upon the judges excite in the minJs of the
people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations ...... and whenever man's
allegiance to the
laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal
and dangc;:rous
obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress
than any
other
obstruction
whatsover;
not for the
sake of the judges as
private
indi1•iduals but because
they are the channels by which
the
King's justice is
conveyed to the people".
(1) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 109 at 131.
(2) Willmot's Opinions page 256: Ro: v. Davies 30 at p. 40-41.
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
Mukherjea /.
1952
Bathina Ram•·
fc.rishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
434
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952}
What is made punishable in the Indian l'enal Code
is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as
contempt of court. If the defamation of a subordinate
court amounts to contempt of court, proceedings can
certainly be taken under section 2 of the
Contempt of
Courts
Act, quite
apart
from the
fact that other
remedy
may
be
open to the aggrieved officer under
section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. But a libd
attacking the integrity of a judge may not in the cir:
cumstances of a particular case amount to a contempt
at all, although it may
be the subject-matter of a
libel proceeding. This is
clear from
the observation
of the Judicial Committee in the case of The Matter
of a Special Reference
from
the Bahama Islands(').
The first contention of Mr. Sinha, therefore, fails.
The second point raised by the learned counsel does
not appear to us to
have any real substance. The
article in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer.
Specific
instances have been given where the officer is alleged to
have
~aken. bribes or behaved with 'impropriety to the
litigants who did not satisfy his clishonest demands.
If the allegations were true, obviously it would be to
the benefit of the public to bring these matters into
light. But if they were false, they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice
and bring
judiciary into disrepute.
The
appelhnt,
though
he
took
sole
responsibility
regarding the publication of the article, was not in
a position
to substantiate by evidence any of the
allegations made therein.
He admitted that the statement was
based on
hearsay.
Rumours
may
have
reached
him
from
various sources,
but before
hr
published the article it was incumbent upon him as a
reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations
he received and ascertain, as far as he could, whether
the facts were true or mere concocted lies.
He does
not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction.
As the appellant did not act with reasonabk
care and caution, he cannot be said to have act:erl
Cl) fl 8931 A.C. 138.
..
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
bona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence
at all in a proceeding for contempt.
What is more,
he did not express any regret for what he had done
either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour
Joes not show the least trace of contrition. In these
circumstances, we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appelliant : S. Subrahmanyam.
Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.
KATHI RANING RAWAT
ti.
THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,
FAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND
~1h.IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH.,RA
A1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
Saurasiitra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Orditzanu
(LXVI of 1949), ss. 9, 10, 11-Law empowering State to constitute
Special
Court,· to
try special classe . .-
of ofjences-Constittttional
11alidity-Contraventio11 of fundamental rig/it to equal protection of
laws-Ess~ntiais of
valid
clas.<ifimtion-I>c:legation of legislative
powers--r:omritutio11 of lndia, .1rts. 13, 14.
The Saurashtra
State Public
Safety
.Measnrcs
Ordinance,
19-18, was
p~5'ed "to provide for pul1lic safety, maintenance of
public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the
State of Saurashtra."
As crimes
involving violence
such
as
dacoity and murder were increasing, this Ordinance was amended by the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, which, by secs. 9, JO and 11, empowered the State Government hy notification in the official gazette
to constitute
Special
Courts of criminal jurisdiction
for such
,1rea as may he specified in the notification, to appoint Special
fudges to prc,ide over such
Conrts and to invest
them with
jurisdiction
to try such offences
or classes of offences or such
cases or classes of cases as the Government may, by general or
special order in writing, direct.
The procedure laid down by
1952
Bathina Ramtt·
krishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras:.
1952
p,,,. 27.