# BECHAN PANDEY & ORS v. DULHIN JANKI DEVI & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 555
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-03-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1432 of 1968
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bechan-pandey-ors-v-dulhin-janki-devi-others-6785
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

555
Practice and procedure-Old Litigation-Must con1e to an end-No re1nand.
The plaintiffMappellants filed a suit against defendants for a declaration of
their title to the land in question admeasuring 142 bighas. 'Ihe trial Court
dismissed the suit in respect of land admeasuring 28 acres and decreed the suit
in respect of the remaining land. The plaintiffs' suit was held to be barred
in respect of that land on ac~ount of the doctrine of waiver and acquiescence.
The plaintiffs were also held entitled to recover mesne profits.
On an appeal filed by some of the respondents, the High Court accepted
the appeal and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The High Court held that
it was not shown that the disputed land was the same as had been purchased
by Mina Kucr in auction sale. The High Court also held that the plaintiffs'
suit for possession was barred by limitation.
The appellants contended,
( 1) The respondent did not dispute that the suit land was the same which
was purchased by Mina Kuer as per sale certificate dated 26-2-1935,
(2) In any case the matter may be remanded for determining the above
issue.
Dismissing the appeal,
A
B
c
D
l-IELD: (1) The appellants have tailed to establish that the land in dispute
is the same as has been purchased in auction by Mina Kuer as per sale
E
certificate
dated
26-2-1935. The
contention
of
the
appellant
that the respondents did not dispute that the suit land is the same
as the one purchased by Mina Kuer is not correct. The respondents did deny
this fact in their written statement. The land which is the subject matter of
the present litigation is situate in the State of Bihar on the right bank of the
Ganges.
Although the land is subject to river action, the onus to prove that
the land in dispute in Bihar State represents the land in U.P. which got subIT'.erged as t.i result of river action was upon the appellants. 'fhe appellants
F
have failed to discharge this onus.
[557F, H, 558A, El
(2) The prayer of the appellants for remand of the case is rejected because
there was no valid basis for the assumption of the appellants that the appellants
did not dispute the identity of the land. The suit was filed as long ago as in
January, 1950. During the pendency of this litigation many of the o.riginal
plaintiffs ancl defendants have died and are now represented by their legal
representatives. It is time that we draw the final curtain and put an end to
this Jong course of litigation between the parties.
If the passage of time and
G
laws of nature bring to an end the lives of men and women it \vould perhaps
be the demand of reason and dictate of prudence not to keep alive after so
many years the strife and conflict startea by the dead. To do so would in
effect be defying the laws of nature and offering a futile resistance to the
ravage of time. If human life has short span, it would be irrational to entertain
a taller claim for disputes and conflicts which are a manifestation of human
frailty. ihe Courts should be loth to entertain a plea in a case like the present
which would have the effect of condemning succeeding generation of families
•
to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. [558G-H, 559A-DJ
H
Sant Narain Mathur v. Rama Krishna Mission A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2241 reiterated.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
556
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.

## Text

I
BECHAN PANDEY & ORS.
v.
DULHIN JANKI DEVI & OTHERS
March 9, 1976
[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]
555
Practice and procedure-Old Litigation-Must con1e to an end-No re1nand.
The plaintiffMappellants filed a suit against defendants for a declaration of
their title to the land in question admeasuring 142 bighas. 'Ihe trial Court
dismissed the suit in respect of land admeasuring 28 acres and decreed the suit
in respect of the remaining land. The plaintiffs' suit was held to be barred
in respect of that land on ac~ount of the doctrine of waiver and acquiescence.
The plaintiffs were also held entitled to recover mesne profits.
On an appeal filed by some of the respondents, the High Court accepted
the appeal and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The High Court held that
it was not shown that the disputed land was the same as had been purchased
by Mina Kucr in auction sale. The High Court also held that the plaintiffs'
suit for possession was barred by limitation.
The appellants contended,
( 1) The respondent did not dispute that the suit land was the same which
was purchased by Mina Kuer as per sale certificate dated 26-2-1935,
(2) In any case the matter may be remanded for determining the above
issue.
Dismissing the appeal,
A
B
c
D
l-IELD: (1) The appellants have tailed to establish that the land in dispute
is the same as has been purchased in auction by Mina Kuer as per sale
E
certificate
dated
26-2-1935. The
contention
of
the
appellant
that the respondents did not dispute that the suit land is the same
as the one purchased by Mina Kuer is not correct. The respondents did deny
this fact in their written statement. The land which is the subject matter of
the present litigation is situate in the State of Bihar on the right bank of the
Ganges.
Although the land is subject to river action, the onus to prove that
the land in dispute in Bihar State represents the land in U.P. which got subIT'.erged as t.i result of river action was upon the appellants. 'fhe appellants
F
have failed to discharge this onus.
[557F, H, 558A, El
(2) The prayer of the appellants for remand of the case is rejected because
there was no valid basis for the assumption of the appellants that the appellants
did not dispute the identity of the land. The suit was filed as long ago as in
January, 1950. During the pendency of this litigation many of the o.riginal
plaintiffs ancl defendants have died and are now represented by their legal
representatives. It is time that we draw the final curtain and put an end to
this Jong course of litigation between the parties.
If the passage of time and
G
laws of nature bring to an end the lives of men and women it \vould perhaps
be the demand of reason and dictate of prudence not to keep alive after so
many years the strife and conflict startea by the dead. To do so would in
effect be defying the laws of nature and offering a futile resistance to the
ravage of time. If human life has short span, it would be irrational to entertain
a taller claim for disputes and conflicts which are a manifestation of human
frailty. ihe Courts should be loth to entertain a plea in a case like the present
which would have the effect of condemning succeeding generation of families
•
to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. [558G-H, 559A-DJ
H
Sant Narain Mathur v. Rama Krishna Mission A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2241 reiterated.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
556
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1432 of 1968.
(From the judgment and decree dated the 26-10-1959 of the
Patna High Court in appeal from Original decree No. 280 of 1953.)
Sarjoo Prasad with D. Goburdhun, for the appellants.
V. S. Desai with D. P. Mukherjee for respondents 3 4 5
6(a)
14 and 15.
' ' '
Ex parte, for respondents 1, 2, 6, 7 to 13 & 16-17.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHANNA, J.-The plaintiff-appellants field a suit in the Court of
Subordinate Judge Arrah against 41 defendants for a declaration of
their title to land measuring 142 bighas, 17 kathas described in the
schedule to the plaint situated in village Shivpur Diar in District Shahbad.
Prayer was also made for delivery of possession of the land and
for mesne profits amounting to Rs. 4,100.
The trial court dismissed
the suit in respect of land measuring 28.36 acres out of plot No. 3863/
41.
Suit in respect of the remaining land was decreed.
The plaintiffs
were also held entitled to recover mesne profits from defendants who
might be found in possession of the land decreed.
On appeal by
defendants 3, 7, 12 and 14 the Patna High Court acceped the appeal
and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiffs have come up in
appeal to this Court against the judgment and decree of the High Court
on certificate granted under article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
Village Shivpur Diar consists of five Mahals, Shivpuur Diar Nambari, Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Shumali,
Shivpur
Diar Gangbarar
Janubi, Shivpur Diar Sarju Barar and Shivpur Diar Naubarar.
Each
of the two Mahals, Shivpur Diar Gangbarar
Shumali
and
Shivpur Diar N ambari has 18 pattis.
Proprietorship rights in each pat ti
were calculated as 16 annas.
One Brahmdeo Singh had a share of
5 annas 4 pies in patti Bhrighunath Singh in the above Mahals.
He
also held different shares in the other pattis of the two
Mahals.
Brahmdeo Singh mortgaged with possession his share in the said lands
in favour of Sitaram Sahu and Sheogulam Sahu by means of several
mortgage deeds.
As the mortgagees were dispossessed from some of
the lands mortgaged in their favour, they filed a suit for recovery of
the mortgage amounts.
Final decree was awarded in that suit on
Jiune 13 1925. In execution of that decree proprietary interest of
Brahmd~o Singh in Mahal Shivpur Diar N ambari and Mahal Shivpur
Diar Gangbarar Shumali were auctioned on June 15, 1932 and was
purchased by Maina Kuer, "1dow of Sitar~m Sahu mortgage~. Sale
certificate was granted to Mama Kuer auctlon purchaser on February
26, 1935.
She got delivery of possession of the land sold in her
favour on March 19 and 20 1935. On November 9, 1936 Sheo
Prasad Singh who held gen~ral power of attorney from Maina Kuer,
executed a p~tta (lease) for seven years in respect of 135 bighas, 15
kathas out of the land purchased by Maina Kuer in favour of M~ha~
cteo Rai and others.
On September 27, 1940 Sheo
Prasad Smgh
\.
J
~\
•
I
)
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•
BECHAN PANDEY v. DULHIN JANK! DEVI (Khanna, J.)
557
executed on behalf of Maina Kuer a deed for perpetual lease of land
A
measuring 134 bighas, 17 kathas out of the land purchased by her in
favour of plaintiffs 1 to 9, 14, 16 to 18 and father of plaintiffs 10 to
13.
Three days later on September 30, 1940 Sheo Prasad Singh
executed another deed for perpetual lease in respect of the remaining
land measuring 8 bighas in favour of plaintiff No. 15.
On May 16,
1941 Mahadeo Rai and others, in whose favour lease deed of the land
had been executed for seven years, relinquished their rights under the
B
lease in favour of the plaintiffs. On July 13, 1942 Maina Kuer sold
her proprietary interest which she had acquired under the auction sale
to Rajendra Prasad Singh and others.
The plaintiffs in whose favour deed for perpetual lease of the land
purchased by Maina Kuer had been executed filed the present suit in
January 1950 against the defendants, on the allegation that defendants
1 to 18 had taken wrongful possession of the land. Prayer was also
made, as mentioned above, for recovery of Rs. 4,] 00 as mesne profit.
It was also mentioned by the plaintiffs that proceedings under section
145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the land in dispute had been initiated but as those proceedings were dropped the
plaintiffs had to seek redress by means of the present suit.
The suit was resisted by the defendants who denied the title of the
plaintiffs or Maina Kuer to the land in dispute.
It was also stated
that the said land had not been partitioned.
Plea was also taken that
the defendants had all along remained in possession of the land and
the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation.
The trial court dismissed the suit in respect of 28.36 acres of land
-0n the ground that the defendants had built their houses on that land.
The plaintiffs suit was held to be barred in respect of that land on
account of the doctrine of waiver and acquiescence.
The suit in respect of tho remaining land, as already mentioned, was decreed.
On appeal the High Court held that the plaintiffs had faikd to
prove their title to the land in dispute.
The land in dispute, it was
held, was not shown to be the same as had been purchased by Maina
Kuer in auction sale.
The plaintiffs suit for possession of the land
was also held to be barred by limitation.
c
0
E
F
In appeal before us Mr. Sarjoo Prasad on behalf of the appellants
had made a number of contentions, but in our opinion, it is not necessary to go into all of them for the appeal is liable to be dismissed on
the short ground that the plaintiff-appellants have failed to establish
G
that the land in dispute is the same as had been purchased in auction
by Maina Kuer as per sale certificate dated February 26, 1935 and
was thereafter leased on her behalf in favour of the appellants as per
two lease deeds dated September 27 and 30, 1940. It is not disputed
that if on the above view of the matter the appellants are found to have
not proved their title to the land in dispute, the question of going into
other contentions would not arise.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, subH
mils that the defendant-respondents did not dispute in the trial court
that the land in dispute was the same which had been purchased by
Maina Kuer in auction sale and had been leased in favour of the
558
SUPREME COURT REPO!l-TS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
A
plaintiffs.
We find it difficult to accede to this submission.
In para
15 of their written statement defendants 2, 3, 12 and 14 stated as
under:
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
"That Maina Kuer was not at all auction purchaser of
the property in dispute nor was she a proprietor nor Zamindar nor was she at any time in possession and occupation of
the lands in dispute.
The allegation of the plaintiff in respect of these facts are altogether wrong."
In the same language is couched para 15 of the written statement of
defendant No. 7 who filed a separate written statement. It was incumbent in view of the averments in para 15 of the written statements
for the plaintiff-appellants to establish by clear evidence that the land
in dispute was the same which had been purchased in auction sale by
Maina Kuer and had been subsequently leased by her in favour of the
appellants.
The learned Judges of the High Court discussed the oral
and documentary evidence which had been adduced in the case and
came to the conclusion that there was no cogent material to show that
the land in dispute was the same which had been purchased by_ Maina
Kuer and had been leased by her in favour of the appellants.
After
hearing Mr. Sarjoo Prasad we find no sufficient ground to take a different view.
The land which had been purchased by Maina Kuer in the
auction sale as per sale certificate dated February 26, 1935 was situated in Balia district in the State of Uttar Pradesh on the left bank of
the Ganges.
The land which is the subject matter of the present litigation is situated in Shahbad district in the State of Bihar on the right
bank of the Ganges.
Although the land is subject to river action, the
onus to prove that the land in dispute in Shahbad district represents
the laud which got submerged as a result of the river action in Belia
district was upon the plaintiff-appellants.
The appellants have failed,
as held by the High Court, to discharge this onus.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of Ram Pachise
Lall (DW 3) and Nanku Lall Singh (DW 5), but the evidence of
these witnesses is far from proving that the land in dispute is the same
as was purchased by Maina Kuer.
The evidence of Raghunath Prasad (PW 6), to which also passing reference was made, is not sufficient to connect the land in dispute with sale certificate dated February
26, 1935.
Prayer has also been made by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad for the remand
of the case to the trial court as the plaintiff-appellants were labouring
under the impression that the defendant-respondents had not disputed
that the land in dispute was the same as had been purchased by Maina
Kuer. It is urged that because of that impression, material which
could have clearly proved that the land in dispute was the same as had
been purchased by Maina Kuer could not be brought on the record.
We find it difficult to accede to this prayer.
As already pointed out
above, the contesting defendants clearly stated in their written statements that Maina Kner was not the auction purchaser of the land in
dispute. In view of that unequivocal averment, there was no
valid
/
•
"'
BECHAN PANDEY v. DULHIN JANK! DEVI (Khanna, J.)
55 9
basis for the assumption or the impression under which plaintiff-appelA
!ants are stated to have laboured. Apart from that we find that the
suit out of which the present appeal has arisen wa~ filed as long ago
as January 1950. From the title of the appeal we find that many of
the original plaintiffs and defendants have during this period of more
than a quarter of century departed and are no more in the land of the
living, having bowed as it were to the inexorable law of nature.
They
are now represented by their legal representatives.
To remand the
B
suit to the trial court would necessarily have the effect of keeping alive
the strife between the parties and prolonging this long drawn litigation by another round of legal battle in the trial court and thereafter
in appeal.
It is time, in our opinion, that we draw the final curtain
and put an end to this long meandering course of litigation between
the parties. If the passage of time and the laws of nature bring to an
end the lives of men and women, it would perhaps be the demand of c
reason and dictate of prudence not to keep alive after so many years
the strife and conflict started by the dead.
To do so would in effect
be defying the laws of nature and offering a futile resistance to the
ravage of time. If human life has a short span, it would be irrational
to entertain a taller claim for dispntes and conflicts which are a manifestation of human frailty.
The courts should be loth to entertain a
plea in a case like the present which would have the effect of conD
demning succeeding generation of families to spend major part of their
lives in protracted litigation. It may be appropriate in the above context to reproduce what was said in the case of Sant Narain Mathur &
Ors. v. Rama Krishna Mission & Ors.(1)
:
It is time, in our opinion, that we draw the final curtain
on this long drawn litigation and not allow its embers to
E
smoulder for a further length of time, more so when the principal contestants have all departed bowing as it were to the
inexorable law of nature.
One is tempted in this context to
refer to the observations of Chief Justice Crewe in a case
concerning peerage claim made after the dealth without issue
of the Earl of Oxford.
Said the learned Chief Justice :
'Time hath its revolutions; there must be a period and
an end to all temporal things-an end of names, and
dignities and whatsoever is terrne, and why not of De
Vere? For where is Bohun ? Where
is
Mowbray ?
Where is Mortimer ? Why, which is more and most of
all, where is Plantagenet ? They are all entombed in the
F
urns and sepulchers of mortality."
G
What was said about the inevitable end of all mortal beings,
however eminent they may be, is equally true of the affairs
of mortal beings, their disputes and conflicts, their ventures
in the field of love and sport, their achievements and failures
for essentially they \Lil have a stamp of mortality on them."
(1) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 2241.
H
A
B
560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
One feels tempeted to add that if life like a dome of many coloured
glass stains the white radiance of eternity, so do the doings and conflicts of mortal beings till death tramples them down.
The appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without
costs.
P.H.P.
Appeal dismissed.
•