# BEOHAR RAJENDRA SINHA & ORS v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 955
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-03-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 386 and 387 of 1966
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, V. Ramaswami, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/beohar-rajendra-sinha-ors-v-state-of-m-p-ors-4706
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Civil Procedure Code
1908,
S. 80-Karta of Hindu Joint fomily
giving notice of suit under section SO-Thereafter members of family
dividing on partition-Divided n1e1nbers joining
as plaintiffs
in suitWhether fresh notice necessary by divided n1e111bers or previous notice of
Karta was in representative capacity.
The appellant, who was at the time the Karta of a Hindu Joint Family,
gave notice in January, 1954, to the respondent State under section 80 of
the Civil Procedure Code. Thereafter a suit was filed in July, 1954, by
\\'bich time a partition had taken place in the family.
In view of this
the appellant's three grand·sons were joined as plaintiffs in the suit; the
plaintiffs sought a declaration that th'rec nazul plots in suit had been in
the possession of the plaintiffs and their ancestors from time immemorial
and their status was that of Raiyat Sarkar; so that an order of the State
Government in the Survey and Settlement Department refusing to recognise their possession ove'r the plots was wrong and ultra vires. Apart
from contesting the suit on the- merits, the respondent State contended
that plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 i.e. the appellant's grand-sons had no right to institute a suit because no notice under SC9tion 80 C.P.C. was given on their
behalf. The trial court dismissed the suit. In an appeal, the High Court
held that the appellant had lost the right to represent the joint family
as karta at the time of institution of the suit because their had been
sevetence of joint status and the notic1c served by him could not enure to
the benefit of other plaintiffs.
On the merits the High Court found that
the plaintiffs had shown their possession for the statutory period of 6
years.
On appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The notice given hy the ap~ellant in January, 1954, was
sufficient in law to sustain a suit brought by all the divided coparceners
who must be deemed to be as much the -nuthors- of the notice as the
Karta who was the actual signatory of the notice.
Thc'rc was suhstantial
identity bet\vcen the person giving- the notice and the persons bringing
the suit in the present case. r959 Bl
At the time of giving notice the appellt\nt was admittedly the eldest
n1cmber of the joint family and being a Karla he \Vas entitled to reprc-
-;cnt the joint family in all its affairs. The cause of action had accrued
at the time qf giving of the notice and it was not necessary to give a
sccbnd notice merely because there \vas a severence of the joint family.
before 20th July, 1954, when the suit was actuallv imtituted. [958 G-H]
Although the terms of section 80 C.P.C. must be strictly complied
... vith, that docs not mean that the terms of the notice should he scrutinised
in an artificial or pedantic manner. [960 Al
Dhian SinRh Sabha Singh & Anr. v. The Union of India, [1958) S.C.R.
781, referred to.
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
:>late of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugo/a Venkata Suryanarayan Garu,
A
!1964] 4 S.C.R. 945; Ve//ayan
Chettiar & Ors. v. Government of the
Province of Madras and Anr., A.l.R. 1947, P.C. 197; Government of the
Province of Bombay v. Peslonji Ardeshir W adia & Ors., 76 I.A. 85, distinguished.
·
(2) On the merits, the appellants had failed to produce reliable oral
or documentary evidence to prove that their ancestors had possession over
the disputed land for many years. On the contrary this land was always
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recognised as Milkiat Sarkar and the respondent State Government was
justified in holding it as such.

## Text

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BEOHAR RAJENDRA SINHA & ORS.
v.
STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
March 11, 1969
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
Civil Procedure Code
1908,
S. 80-Karta of Hindu Joint fomily
giving notice of suit under section SO-Thereafter members of family
dividing on partition-Divided n1e1nbers joining
as plaintiffs
in suitWhether fresh notice necessary by divided n1e111bers or previous notice of
Karta was in representative capacity.
The appellant, who was at the time the Karta of a Hindu Joint Family,
gave notice in January, 1954, to the respondent State under section 80 of
the Civil Procedure Code. Thereafter a suit was filed in July, 1954, by
\\'bich time a partition had taken place in the family.
In view of this
the appellant's three grand·sons were joined as plaintiffs in the suit; the
plaintiffs sought a declaration that th'rec nazul plots in suit had been in
the possession of the plaintiffs and their ancestors from time immemorial
and their status was that of Raiyat Sarkar; so that an order of the State
Government in the Survey and Settlement Department refusing to recognise their possession ove'r the plots was wrong and ultra vires. Apart
from contesting the suit on the- merits, the respondent State contended
that plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 i.e. the appellant's grand-sons had no right to institute a suit because no notice under SC9tion 80 C.P.C. was given on their
behalf. The trial court dismissed the suit. In an appeal, the High Court
held that the appellant had lost the right to represent the joint family
as karta at the time of institution of the suit because their had been
sevetence of joint status and the notic1c served by him could not enure to
the benefit of other plaintiffs.
On the merits the High Court found that
the plaintiffs had shown their possession for the statutory period of 6
years.
On appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The notice given hy the ap~ellant in January, 1954, was
sufficient in law to sustain a suit brought by all the divided coparceners
who must be deemed to be as much the -nuthors- of the notice as the
Karta who was the actual signatory of the notice.
Thc'rc was suhstantial
identity bet\vcen the person giving- the notice and the persons bringing
the suit in the present case. r959 Bl
At the time of giving notice the appellt\nt was admittedly the eldest
n1cmber of the joint family and being a Karla he \Vas entitled to reprc-
-;cnt the joint family in all its affairs. The cause of action had accrued
at the time qf giving of the notice and it was not necessary to give a
sccbnd notice merely because there \vas a severence of the joint family.
before 20th July, 1954, when the suit was actuallv imtituted. [958 G-H]
Although the terms of section 80 C.P.C. must be strictly complied
... vith, that docs not mean that the terms of the notice should he scrutinised
in an artificial or pedantic manner. [960 Al
Dhian SinRh Sabha Singh & Anr. v. The Union of India, [1958) S.C.R.
781, referred to.
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
:>late of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugo/a Venkata Suryanarayan Garu,
A
!1964] 4 S.C.R. 945; Ve//ayan
Chettiar & Ors. v. Government of the
Province of Madras and Anr., A.l.R. 1947, P.C. 197; Government of the
Province of Bombay v. Peslonji Ardeshir W adia & Ors., 76 I.A. 85, distinguished.
·
(2) On the merits, the appellants had failed to produce reliable oral
or documentary evidence to prove that their ancestors had possession over
the disputed land for many years. On the contrary this land was always
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recognised as Milkiat Sarkar and the respondent State Government was
justified in holding it as such.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 386 and
387 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and_ decree dated c
April 16, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal
No. 217 of 1959.
S. V. Gupte, P. C. Bhartari and J. B. Dadachanji, for the
appellants (in C.A. No. 386 of 1966) and the respondents (in
C.A. No. 387 of 1966).
I. N. Shroff a!lld Rama Gupta, for the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J.
These appeals are brought by special
leave from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
dated 16th April, 1963 in First Appeal No. 217 of 1959, whereby the High Court modified partly the judgment of the first Additional District Judge, Jabalpur dismissing Civil Suit No. 10-A of
1954.
The suit was instituted against the State of Madhya Pradeshby Beohar Raghubir Singh and his three grand-sons.
Beohar
Raghubir Singh's son, Beohar Rajendra Sinha, was a pro-forma
defendant.
A notice under section 80 of Civil Procedure Code
had been given by Raghubir Singh on 11th January, 1954. Plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4, his grand-sons were joined as plaintiffs because
in a partition made subsequent to the giving of the notice, they
were each entitled to 1 /5th share along with the firSt plaintiff.
Beohar Rajendra Sinha was joined as a defendant because he did
not choose to join as the plaintiff. The plaintiffs sought a declaration (1) that the three nazul plots in sujt had been in possession
of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in their own right from
time immemorial and their status was that of Raiyat Sarkar; and
(2) that the order of the State Government in the Survey and Settlement Department refusing to recognise their possession over
the plots was wrong a,nd ultra vires.
The dispute relates to
Phoota Ta! a tank situated within the town of.Jabalpur. It was
plot No. 282 in the settlement of 1863 A.D.
Its area then was
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B. R. SINHA v. M. P. STATE (Ramaswami, !.)
957
5.24 acres.
It was recorded as Malkiat Sarkar and in the last
column there was an entry showing possession of Aman Singh
Thakur Prasad.
The next settlement took place in
1890-91.
The survey number of Phoota Tai was changed to plot No. 325.
Its area remained the same, it was recorded
1as "water (pani)"
and in the last column, the entry showed
the
possession of
Beohar Narpatsingh Raghubir Singh.
The third settlement took
place in 1909-10.
The plot number of Phoota Tai was then
changed to 327. Its area remained t)Ie same, it was still recorded
as 'water", but there was no entry in favour of any one showing
possession.
The nazul settlement took place in 1922-23. In
this settlement, the tank was given numbers 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
and 171. Its area was recorded as 5 .24 acres. In this settlement
about 2 acres of land was found to be occupied by the Municipal
Committee, Jabalpur.
The land so found to be occupied was
recorded in the possession of the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur
and the remaining land was again recorded as "Milkiat Sarkar".
There was no entry regarding possession in the remarks column
so far as the remaining land was concerned. The plaintiffs
alleged that Thakur Prasad and Aman Singh were their ancestors,
that they had been in continuous possession of the disputed land
and the omission to record their possession in the last two settlements of 1909-10 and 1922-23 was due to some oversight. In
1948 the first plaintiff made an application for correction to the
Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur who made an order in his favour
E" Ex. P-5.. The order of the Deputy Commissioner was however
set aside by the State Government on 28th May, 1953 and it was
held that the plaintiffs had no title to the disputed land.
The
plaintiff therefore prayed for a declaration of the title to the disputed plots and for the correction of the entry in the settlement
record showing the status of the plaintiff as that of "Raiyat
Sarkar". The suit was contested by the State of Madhya Pradesh.
It was urged that the plaintiff had no possession over the disputed
land and the order of the State Government dated 28th May,
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1953 wa:i corr~t. . It was contended that plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4
had no nght to mstitute the suit because no notice under section
8~ of the Civil Procedure Code was given on their behalf. The
Sl!It was not. contested by the second defendant Beohar Rajendra
Sinha. By its judgment dated 24th January 1959 the trial court
held that there was no documentary evidenc~ from 1891 to 1932
~ support the possession. of the ancestors of the plaintiffs regardmg Phoot!l Tai.
The tnal court also held that in all the settlement ;,nt~1e~, the land,, was recorded as belonging to the Government Milk1at ~arkar . In ·any event, between 1891 to 1932
the~e .was no ~VIdence regarding the user of the property by the
plamt~s and m .the subsequent years a part of the property was
found 1~ P.ossessmn of the Municipal Committee. The trial
court d1snnssed the suit. Against the judgment of. the trial court
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 'S.C.R
the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court. The High
Court held in the first place the notice Ex. P-8 was not in conformity with section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. The High
Court held that Beohar Raghubir Singh had lost the right to
represent the joint family as karta at the time of institution of
the suit because there had been a severence of joint status and
the notice served by Beohar Raghubir Singh could not ensure to
the benefit of the other plaintiffs. On the merits of the case, the
High Court found that the plaintiffs had established their possession for the statutory period of 60 years. The High Court held
that the plaintiffs had acquired the right of Raiyat Sarkar and
that the order of the State Government refusing to correct the
revenue record was illegal.
On these findings the High Court
modified the judgment of the trial court to the extent that there
was a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs that they were entitled
to I/5th share of the property in dispute and the claim regarding
the 4/5th share was dismissed. The order of the State Government dated 28th May, 1953 refusing to recognise the possession
of the plaintiffs was held to be wrong and illegal.
The first question to be considered in these appeals is whether
the High Court was right in holding that the notice given under
section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code by the first plaintiff was
effective only with regard to Raghubir Singh and the notice was
ineffective with regard to the other plaintiffs and therefore
Raghubir Singh alone was entitled to a declaration as regards the
I/5th share of the dispute plot. On behalf of defendant No. 1
it was contended by Mr. Shroff that at the time of giving notice
the plaintiffs and the second defendant were joint and plaintiff
No. 1 Raghubir Singh was karta of the joint family. The notice
was given on 11th January, 1954 and the suit was instituted 011
20th July, 1954. It was admitted that between these two dates
there was a disruption of the joint family of which Raghubir
Singh was a karta. It was argued that the right of the first plaintiff to represent the family had come to an end before the institution of the suit, and hence plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 had to comply
individually with the provisions of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code before appearing as plaintiffs in the suit.
In our
opir1icn, there is no justification for this argument. We consider
that th~rc is substantial identity between the person giving the
notice and the persons filing the suit in the present case.
At
the time of giving notice the first plaintiff Beohar Raghubir Singh
was admittedly the eldest member cif the joint family and being
a karta he was entitled to represent the joint family in all its
affairs. The cause of action had accrued at the time of giving of
the notice and i,t was not necessary to give a second notice merely
because there was a severence of the joint family, before 20th
July, 1954 when the suit was actually instituted. It is obvious
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B. R .. SINHA V. M. P. STATE (Ramaswami, J.)
959
that the notice was given by Beohar Raghubir Singh as a reprc:s~n
tative of the joint family and in view of the subsequent partition
the suit had to be instituted by: ail the divided members of the
joint family.
We are of the opinion that the notice given by
Beohar Raghubir Singh on 11th January, 1954 was sufficient in
law to sustain a suit brought by ail the divided coparceners who
must be deemed to be as much the authors of the notice as the
karta who was the actual signatQIY of the notice.. There is substantial identity between the person giving the notice and the
persons bringing the suit in the present case and the argument of
defendant No. 1 on this point must be rejected.
The object of the notice under section 80, Civil Procedure
Code is to give to the Government or the public servant Goncerned
an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position and if that
CQ.UrSe is justified to make amends or settle the claim out of court.
The section is no doubt imperative; failure to serve notice complying with the requirements of the statute will entail dismissal of
the suit.
But the notice raust be reasonably construed.
Any
unimportant error or defect cannot be permitted to be treated
as an excuse for defeating a just claim. In considering whet11er
the provisions of the statute are complied with, the Court must
take into account the following matters in each case (1) whether
• the name, description and residence of the plaintiff are given so
as to enable the authorities to identify the person serving the
notice; (2) whether the cause of action and the relief which the
plaintiff claims are set out with sufficient particularity; ( 3) whether
a notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the
1ppropriate authority mentioned in the section; and ( 4) whether
the suit is instituted after the expiration of two months next after
notice has been served, and the plaint contains a statement that
sue~ a notice has been so-delivered or left. In construing the
nott17 the Court cannot ignore the object of the legislature, viz.,
to give to the Government or the public servant concerned an
opportuni~y to reconsider its or his legal position. If on a reason-
~ble rea~mg of. the notice the plaintiff is shown to have given the
information which the statute requires him to give any incidental
defects or irregularities should be ignored.
'
In the present case, the notice was served on 11th January
19~4 by ~7oh~ Raghubir Singh. The notice stated the cause of
aetion ansmg m ~avour of the joint family.
The requirements
as !O .cause of action: the !lame, description and residence of the
Pl3!11tiff were complied with and the reliefs which the plaintiff
claimed. w~e dul)'. set out in the notice. It is true that Beohar
Raghubll'; Smgh did not expressly describe himself as the karta.
~ut rea~g the contents of the notice Ex. P-8 in a reasonable
manner 1t appears to us that the claim of Beohar Raghubir Singh
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969] 3 s.c.R.
was made on behalf of the joint family. It is true that the term
of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code must be strictly complied but that does not mean that the terms of the notice should
be scrutinised in an artificial or pedantic manner. In Dhian Singh
Sobha Singh & Anr. v. The Union of India & Anr.(1) Bhagwati, J.
observed in the course of his judgment :-
"We are constrained to observe that the approach
of the High Court to this question was not well-founded. The Privy Council no doubt laid dOWlll in Bhagchand Dagadusa v.
Secretary of State(')
that the
terms of this section should be strictly complied with.
That does not however mean that the terms of the
notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner or
in a manner completely divorced from common sense.
As was stated by Pollock C. B. in Jones v. Nicholls(')
'We must import a little common sense into notices
oi this kind'. Beaumonth, C.J., ·also observed in Chandu
Lal Vadilal v. Government of Lombay(') "One must
construe section 80 with some regard to common sense
and to the object with which it appears to have been
d
"
passe ..... .
As already pointed out, the suit was instituted in the present
case by the divided members of Hindu joint family on 20th July,
1954. The notice had been given Cl!Jl 11th January, 1954 by
Beohar Raghubir Singh who was the karta of the undivided joint
family. In our opinion, there was identity between the person
giving a notice and the persons filiJng the suit because it must be
deemed in law that each of the plaintiffs had given the notice
under s. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code through the karta Beohar
Raghubir Singh. It is not disputed that the cause of action set out
in the notice remained unchanged in the suit. It is also not said that
the relief set out in the plaint is different from the relief set out in
the notice. We are accordingly of the opiinion that the notice
given by the karta was sufficient to sustain the suit brought by
the divided coparceners and the decision of the High Court on
this point must be over-ruled.
'
The view that we have expressed is borne out by the judgment of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugo/a
Venkata Suryanarayan Garu('). In that case, the Government
of Madras app.Jied the provisi ans of the Madras Estates Rent
Reduction Act, 194 7 to the lands in the village Mallindhapuram
on the ground that the grant was o.f the whole village and hence
an estate within the meaning of s. 3(2) (d) of the Madras Estates
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 781.
(Ji [1844J 13 .'Vf & W 361. 363: 153 E.R. 149. 150.
(5) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 945.
(2) [1927] L.R. 541.A . ..;JJS.
(4) l.L.R. [1943] llom. 128.
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B. R. SINHA v. M. P, STATE (Ramaswami, J.)
961
Land Act, 1908. The respQ!lldent and another person served a
notice under s. 80
of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the
Government of the State of Madras in which they challenged the
above mentioned notification and asked the Government not to
act upqn it.
Out of the two persons who gave the notice, the
respondent alone filed the suit. The trial court held that tqe
original grant was not of the entire vi1!age and was not so confirmed or recognised by the Government of Madras and
as it
was not an "Estate" withip the meaning of s. 3(2)(d) of the
Madras Estates Land Act, the Madras Rent Reduction Act, 1947
did not apply to it. But the suit was dismissed on the ground
that ,although two persons had given notice under s. 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, only one person had filed the suit. The
High Court agreed with the trial court that the grant was not
of an entire village but it also held that the notice was not
defective and the suit was maintainable ·as it was a representative
suit and the permission of the Court under 0.1, r. 8 had been
obtained in this case.
The High Court granted the respoodent
the relief prayed for by him.
Against the order of the High
Court the appellant appealed to this Court which dismissed the
appeal holding that in the circumstances of the case there was no
illegality even though the notice was given by two persons and
the suit was filed by only one. If the Court grants permission
to one person to institute a representative suit and if the person
had served the notice under s. 80, the circumstance that another
person had joined him in serving the notice but did not join
him in the suit. was not a sufficient ground for regarding the suit
as defective. At page 953 of the Report Shah, J. observed as
follows:-
"The notice in the present suit was served by the
plaintiff and Yegneswara Sastri.
They raised a grievance about the notification issued by the Government
of Madras on May 16, 1950; it was not an individual
grievance of the two persons who served the notice
but of all the Inamdars or agrahamdars. The relief for
which the suit was intended to be filed was also not
restricted to their personal claim,
The notice slated
the cause of action arising in favour of all the Inamdars, and it is not disputed that the notice set out the
relief which would be claimable by all the Inamdars or
on their behalf in default of compliance with the
requisition. The plaintiff it is true alone filed the suit,
but he was permitted to sue for and on behalf of all
the Inamdars by an order of the Court unuder 0. 1,
r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The requirements as to the cause of action. the name, description
and place of residence of the plaintiff was therefore
962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
co1:1plied with and the relief which the plaintiff claimed was duly set out in the notice. The only departure
from the notice was that two persons served a notice
under s. 80 infotmiing the Government that proceedings
would be started, in default of compliance with the requisition, for violation of the rights of the Inamdars, and
one person only out of the two instituted the suit. That
in our judgment is not a defect which brings the case
within the terms of s. 80".
On behalf of respondent No. 1 reference was made to the
two decisions of the Judicial Committee in Vellayan Chettiar &
Ors. v. Government of the Province of Madras and Anr.(') and
Government of the Provinpe of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir
Wadia & Ors.( 2 )
But the principle of these decisions has no
bearing on the question presented for determination in the present
case.
In Vellayan Chettiar's ·case(') a notice was given by one
"plaintiff stating the cause of action, his name, description and
.place of his residence and the relief which he claimed although
the suit was instituted by him and another. It was observed by
the Judicial Committee :
"The section according to its plaijn meaning requires that there should be in the language of the High
Court of Madras 'identity of the person who issues the
notice with the person who brings the suit' : See Venkata
R.angiah Appa Rao v. Secretary of State( 8 )
and on
appeal Venkata Rangiah Appa Rao v.
Secretary
of
State('). To hold otherwise would be to admit an implicatiQ!l or exception for which there is no jurisdiction".
Two persons had sued for a declaration that certain lands belonged to them, and for an order setting aside the decision of the
Appellate Survey Officer· in regard to those lands. It was found
that one alone out ,of the two persons had served the notice. The
relief claimed by the two persons was personal to them and the
right thereto arose out of their title to the land claimed by them.
It was held by the Judicial Committee that without a proper
notice under s. 80 the suit could not be instituted for to hold
otherwise would be to admit an implication or exception for
which there was no justification. In the other case, in Pestonji
Ardeshir Wadia's case(2 )
two trustees of a trust served a
notice in October; 1933 upon the Government of Bombay under
s. 80 intimating that the trustees intended to institute a suit against
the Government on the cause of action and for the relief set out
(l) A.I.R.1947 P.C.197.
(3) J.L.R. Mad 416.
(2) 76 I.A. 85.
(4) A.J.R. 1935 Mad. 389.
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903
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therein. One of the trustees died before the plaint was lodged in
court, and two more trustees were appointed in the place of the
deceased trustee. Thereafter the two new trustees and the surviving trustee filed the suit out of which the appeal arose which was
decided by the Judicial Committee. No notice was served on the
Government on behalf of the two new trustees.
The Judicial
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Committee accepted the view of the High Court that where there
were three plaintiffs, the names and addresses of all of them must
be given in the notice. Their Lordships observed that :
"the provisions of s. 80 of the Code are imperative
and should be strictly complied with before it can be
said that a notice valid in law has been served on the
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Government. In the present case it is not contended
that any notice on behalf of plaintiffs 2 and 3 was served
on the Government before ·the filirig of the suit".
It is clear that the principle of these two decisions of the Judicial
Committee has no application in the present case because the
material facts are different.
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We proceed to consider the next question arising in these
appeals viz., whether the High Court was right in holding that
the plaintiffs had established their title as raiyat sarkar with
regard to l/5th share in nazul plots Nos. 34/3, 33 and 171/l
mentioned in the .Deputy Commissioner's order dated 7th May,
1948 in Revenue Case No. 9 / 45-46. It was argued on behalf of
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defendant No. 1 that there was no evidence to show that the
plaintiffs were in possession of the land from 1909 to 1932, and
the plaintiffs had not established their title by prescription for the
statutory period of 60 years.
It was contended that the High
Court had no justification for holding that the plaintiffs had
es!ablished the title of "Raiyat Sarkar" and the finding of the
High Court was not based upon any evidence. In our opinion,
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the argument put forward on behalf of defendant No. 1 is wellfounded and must be accepted as correct. In the settlement of
1863-64 Ex. P-1 the names of Amansingh and Thakurprasad
were not~ in. the re~arks column. But the column regarding
tenancy nght 1s defirutely blank.
The owner is shown in the
Khasra as.the State "M_ilkiat Sarkar". In the settlement of 1890G
91 Amansmgh Narpatsmgh is again shown in the remarks column
o_f th~ kha1'.1·
But the column regarding any kind of tenancy
nght is agam blank. It is clear that in the settlements of 1860
and 1890-91 the ownership of the land is recorded as that of the
Government. The.possession of the plaintiffs or of their ancestors
could not be attributed to ownership or tenancy right of the
H
property. In the settlement of 1909-10, Ex.P·3 there is no entry
m the ~e~arks column showing the possession of the ancestors Gf
the plamtiffs. It was said on beh~lf of the plaintiffs that no
(I) 7o I.A. 85.
Lil Sup. C.l.{69-12
964
SUl'REME COURT· REPORTS
[1969] 3 s.c.R.
notice was given to them of the proceedings of the settlement of
1909-10. Even assuming that this allegation is
correct, the
entries of the khasra P-3 cannot be treated to be a nullity and of
no effect. In any event, it was open to the ·plaintiffs to adduce
other reliable evidence to prove their possession between the
years 1909 to 1932. But the plaintiffs have failed to produce
any such evidence. In the nazul settlement of 1922-23 the tank
was given new plot numbers 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 171 and its
area
was
recorded
as
5.24
acres.
In
this
settlement
about 2 acres of land was found to be occupied by the
Municipal Committee, Jabalpur. The land so found to be
occupied was recorded in the possession of the Municipal Committee, J abalpur and the remaining land was again recorded as
"Milkiat Sarkar". There is no entry as regards the remaining
land recording anybody's possession in the remarks column.
Actually proclamations were made during this settlement and
objections were invited as per f:x.ID-14.
A date was fixed upto
31-8-1924 but no one came forward.
The proclamation clearly
recited that the vacant sites which were not in possession of anybody were not recognised as belonging to any person. It is impossible to believe that the plaintiffs or their ancestors were unaware of such a proclamation. Had they been in possession they
would not have failed to make a claim. For the. period after
1933-34 the plaintiffs produced account books to show that they
exercised certain rights.
Certain receipts were also proved but
they also relate to a period after 1939. We have gone through
the oral evidence produced by the plaintiffs and it appears to be
unreliable. The result is that for the period 1891 till 1932 there
is no reliable oral or documentary evidence to prove that the
plaintiffs or their ancestors had any possession over the disputed
land. On the contrary the disputed land i.e. Phoota Tai was always recognised as Milkiat Sarkar and the SJate Government was
justified in holding that the order of the Deputy Commissioner
dated 7th May, 1948 should be set aside.
In the course of the argument reference was made by Mr.
Gupte to the following passage in the Central Provinces Settlement Instructions (Reprint of 1953) page 213 :
"In dealing with proposed method of the settlement
of titles it will be convenient in order to remove all
causes for misapprehension among residents,
to
lay
emphasis on the policy of Government in making these
settlements.
That policy was defined in
the Chief
Commissioner's Resolution No. 502-B-X dated
the
19th October, 1917, in the Revenue & Scarcity Department, but its maiJl principles will bear repetition.
A' it is 1wt the intcntiun of Gowrnm~nt in making
the settlement to disturb long possession, but only to
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
F
B. R. SINHA v. M. P. STATE (Ramaswami, /.)
965
obtain an accurate record of the lands which are its
property and to secure its right to any land revenue to
which it may be entitled, long possession, even without
clear proof of a definite grant from Government will be
recognised as entitled the holder to possession. In deciding what constitutes long possession in any individual town, regard will be had to the special
circumstances of the place, and while this point will .be dealt
with more particularly in the Deputy Commissioner's
report, the following general principles will ordinarily
be observed :
(I) all .occupants who are able to prove possession
to any land prior to 1891 or such later date as may be
fixed for each town, either by themselves or by a valid
title from a previous holder, and all occupants who can
prove a definite grant or lease from Government will be
recorded as entitled to hold such land as against Government (paragraph 6 of the Resolution)".
On the basis of this passage it was argued that it was the duty of
the settlement officer to treat tl1e plaintiffs as having established
their title because they were shown to be in possession in the
settlement of the year 1890-91.
We are unable to accept this
argument as correct. The passage quoted above only applies to
a case where the ownership of the land was unknown i.e. where
possession is proved for a long time, but its original title could
not be traced, and not to a case where the land is recorded as
Government land.
For the reasons expressed, we hold that the suit brought by
the plaintiffs being Civil Suit No. 10-A of 1954 should be dismissed. Civil Appeal 386 of 1966 is accordingly dismissed and
Civil Appeal 3&7 of 1966 is allowed with costs in favour of
defendant No. I i.e. State of Madhya Pradesh. There will be
one hearing. fee.
R.K.P.S.
Civil Appeal 386/66 dismissed.
Civil Appeal 387 /66 allowed.