# BHAGMAL v. CH. PARBHU RAM AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1985] 1 S.C.R. 1099
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1984-10-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1451 of 1984
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, A. Varadarajan, Sabyasachi Mukharji
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhagmal-v-ch-parbhu-ram-and-others-8667
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Representation of the People Act, 1951-S. 27 (1)-Recrimination
petition-What is the effect of omission to make recrimination petition by
A
B
returntd candidate-In absence of recrimination petition Election Tribunal
C
has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether any wrong votes were counted
in favour of election petitioner-Parties must con/orm strictly to the teller of
the law in regard to the procedure laid down under the Act and the Rules.
Representation of the People Act, 1951-Election petition-Powers
of the Election Tribunal (High Court) to decide election petition-Powers are
wholly the creature of statute-Election petition is not an action at law or a
D
suit in equity-Election of successful candidate
1101 to be lightly interfered with
-Purity of eleclion process must be safeguarded.
Reliefs as are available
according to law can only be granted
Representation of People Act, 1951-S. 97-A rule of procedureMust be so construed that it serves wi.,hes of the voters.
Interpretation of statute-Court must construe procedural provision of
law in such a manner tliat procedure does not defeat purpose or object of la'wWhere plain and literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a ma11J.
festly absurd and unjust result Court may modify language used or even do
some violence to it so as to achieve the obvious intention of th! legislature and
produce a rational construction and just result.
The appelJant was declared elected as a member of the Haryana
Legislative Assembly from the Sadbura Scheduled Caste Reserved Constituency in the election held on 19th May, 1982.
The contest was between
the appellant and 12 others including respondent 1.
The appellaot secured
20981 votes while respondent 1 secured 20971 votes, that is the appellant
secured 10 votes more than the respondent 1.
Respondent 1 filed an
election petition in the High Court challenging the election of the appellant
on the ground that the counting of votes was not proper.
Respondent 1
prayed not only for recounting of the votes but also for declaration that
he was the duly elected candidate.
Respondent 1 alleged that on his
application to which the appellant had also consented, though the Returning
Officer had initially ordered recounting of all the ballot papers, the 'ballot
papen of the appellanl aDd respongent I ouly were re~9qnteg and t4erefor e
E
F
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
1100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985) I S.C.R.
the recount was void.
The respondent 1 also alleged that in the recounting,
the Returning Officer had improperly rejtcted about 100 ballot papers said
to have been cast in favour of respondent 1 as invalid under the influence
of the Naib Tehsildar (Election).
The issue framed by the High Court
was as to whether respondent 1 was entitled to recount
The High Court
found that the discretidn of the Returning Officer in the matter of rejection
of some doubtful ballot papers had been influenced by the opinion of the
Naib Tehsildar.
In those circumstances, the High Court found a pr/ma
facie case made out for ordering rechecking and recounting of the rejected
ballot papers.
On March 15, 1983 the High Court ordered scrutiny and
recount of only the rejected ballot paper~ of the appellcnt and respondent
l by District Judge (Vigilance), Puojab.
The High Court was of the
opinion that no case had been made out for ordering recounting of all the
votes.
The appellant filed a special leave petition against the High Court~s
order dated 15.3.1983 which was distnissed by this Court.
After the
recounting it ~as found that respondent l and the appellant had
gained
14 and 8 moro votes respectively in addition -to the votes already counted
in their favour by the Returning Officer.
The High C'..ourt held that since
the appellant had not filed any recrimination application under s. 97 (1)
of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act'), the rejected votes of the appellant, the returned candidate, could not
be secrutinised and the appellant could

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'
1099
BHAGMAL
v.
CH. PARBHU RAM AND OTHERS
October 30, 1984
(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND SABYASACHI
MUKHARJI, JJ.J
Representation of the People Act, 1951-S. 27 (1)-Recrimination
petition-What is the effect of omission to make recrimination petition by
A
B
returntd candidate-In absence of recrimination petition Election Tribunal
C
has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether any wrong votes were counted
in favour of election petitioner-Parties must con/orm strictly to the teller of
the law in regard to the procedure laid down under the Act and the Rules.
Representation of the People Act, 1951-Election petition-Powers
of the Election Tribunal (High Court) to decide election petition-Powers are
wholly the creature of statute-Election petition is not an action at law or a
D
suit in equity-Election of successful candidate
1101 to be lightly interfered with
-Purity of eleclion process must be safeguarded.
Reliefs as are available
according to law can only be granted
Representation of People Act, 1951-S. 97-A rule of procedureMust be so construed that it serves wi.,hes of the voters.
Interpretation of statute-Court must construe procedural provision of
law in such a manner tliat procedure does not defeat purpose or object of la'wWhere plain and literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a ma11J.
festly absurd and unjust result Court may modify language used or even do
some violence to it so as to achieve the obvious intention of th! legislature and
produce a rational construction and just result.
The appelJant was declared elected as a member of the Haryana
Legislative Assembly from the Sadbura Scheduled Caste Reserved Constituency in the election held on 19th May, 1982.
The contest was between
the appellant and 12 others including respondent 1.
The appellaot secured
20981 votes while respondent 1 secured 20971 votes, that is the appellant
secured 10 votes more than the respondent 1.
Respondent 1 filed an
election petition in the High Court challenging the election of the appellant
on the ground that the counting of votes was not proper.
Respondent 1
prayed not only for recounting of the votes but also for declaration that
he was the duly elected candidate.
Respondent 1 alleged that on his
application to which the appellant had also consented, though the Returning
Officer had initially ordered recounting of all the ballot papers, the 'ballot
papen of the appellanl aDd respongent I ouly were re~9qnteg and t4erefor e
E
F
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
1100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985) I S.C.R.
the recount was void.
The respondent 1 also alleged that in the recounting,
the Returning Officer had improperly rejtcted about 100 ballot papers said
to have been cast in favour of respondent 1 as invalid under the influence
of the Naib Tehsildar (Election).
The issue framed by the High Court
was as to whether respondent 1 was entitled to recount
The High Court
found that the discretidn of the Returning Officer in the matter of rejection
of some doubtful ballot papers had been influenced by the opinion of the
Naib Tehsildar.
In those circumstances, the High Court found a pr/ma
facie case made out for ordering rechecking and recounting of the rejected
ballot papers.
On March 15, 1983 the High Court ordered scrutiny and
recount of only the rejected ballot paper~ of the appellcnt and respondent
l by District Judge (Vigilance), Puojab.
The High Court was of the
opinion that no case had been made out for ordering recounting of all the
votes.
The appellant filed a special leave petition against the High Court~s
order dated 15.3.1983 which was distnissed by this Court.
After the
recounting it ~as found that respondent l and the appellant had
gained
14 and 8 moro votes respectively in addition -to the votes already counted
in their favour by the Returning Officer.
The High C'..ourt held that since
the appellant had not filed any recrimination application under s. 97 (1)
of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act'), the rejected votes of the appellant, the returned candidate, could not
be secrutinised and the appellant could not have the benefit of the 8 ballot
papers found to have been wrongly rejected.
The High Court found that
the result of the returned candidate (appellant) had been materially affected
by the wrongful rejection of valid votes cast in favour of respondent i and
it accordingly allowed the election pe1ition and set aside the appellant's
e1ection and declared respolldent 1 to be duly elected.
Hence this appeaJ.
The appe1Jant contended (1) that no recounting at all should have been
ordered by the High Court and (2) that if the votes found in the recounting
by the Conrt to have. been improperly rejected were to be taken
into
account at all they must be taken into account not only in regard to res ..
pondent 1 but also in regard to the appellant.
Relying upon the dissenting view of Ayyangar, J. in the case of Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal ( 1966)
6 SCR 66, the appellant submitted that it would not be in confirmity with
!he princlples of democracy and the will of the electorate to hold, by
refusing to take into account the 8 rejected ballot papers in favour of the
appellant, that the election of the appellant had been materiaUy affected
by the improper rejection of the 14 votes· cast in favour of respondent 1
aod declare respondent 1 to have been duly elected 'merely because the
appellant had not filed
a recrimination application under s. 97 (l) of
the Act.
Dismissing the appeal by majority,
HELD : (Per S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and A. Varadarajan, JJ.)
The High Court found that the allegation of respondent t that the
Returning Officer obtained the guidance of the Naib Tebsildar in bis decision as regards the doubtful votes is probabilised by the evidence of not
ff
only the appollaQt but also of bis election agent.
The H;igh Court also
•
EHAG !.!At V. PkAAHtl RAM
found that the admission of the observer. R.W. 4 that respondent 1 toOk
objection to the presence of the Naib Tehsildar during the recounting
probabilises the contention of respondent 1 that the Naib Tehsildar was
influencing the opinion of the Returning Officer in his decision on doubtful
votes.
Admittedly, some ballot papers meant for the Kalka Constituency
bad been issued and they had been cast in favour of respondent 1 and
Were rejecled on the ground that they were not meant for use in this consti·
tuency.
We think that the rejection of these ballot papers without any
finding on the question whether the mistake in the use of the ballot papers
relating to the Kalka constituency in this constituency had beeO caused by
any mistake or failure on the part of the Returning Officer or polling
officer as required by the proviso to rule 56 (2) (g) of the Conduct of
Elections Rules, 1961 is a ground \Vhich could have been taken into consi ..
deration for ordering recount of the rejected ballot papers of respondent
J.
On a perusal of the rejected ballot papers of the appellant and resPon·
dent I. we :i.re satisfied about the correctness of the High Court~s finding
regarding the number of ballot papers improperly rejected by the Returning
Officer.
In these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that the
High Court was perfectly justified in ordering recount of the rejected ballot
papers relating to respoudent I. [1114G-H; ll!SA-B; D-E; H]
A
B'
c
We agree with respondent l's submission that after di:lmissal of the·
special leave pijtidon filed by the appellant the High court's order dated 1
D
15.3.1983 directing recount of the rejected ballot papers in so far as it is
not in excess of the jurisdiction· of the Tribunal (High Court) has become
final- and that it is not open to the appellant to reagitatO that question in
this appeal which is no doubt under s. 116 of the Act,.as tbe·principle of
construction res judicata applies. [ 1116A-B]
'
The appellant7s contention that the will of the electorate sho-uld not '
be thwarted by holding that the result of.the appellanes election is mate .. 1
rially affected by the improper rejection of some ballot papers relating to'
respondent I alone and declaring respondent 1 to be the duly elected ca.ad.(·
date has do substanc;}.
This c~lntention of the appellant bas already been
answered by this Court in P. Malaicliami v. M. Andi Ambalam and Others.
We agree with the following observations_ of th·e Court made "in that case.
Courts in general are averse to allow justice .to· be dafeated ·on· a mere
technicality.
But in deciding an election petition the High Court is merely
a Tribunal deciding an election dispute.
Its powers are wholly the creature
of the staLutc under which it is conferred the- power to bear election peti· '.
tions.
An election petition is not an action at· law or a suit in equity but '
is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common Jaw aad the
Court possesses no common -law power.
It is·aiways to·be borne in mind·
that though the election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly inter ..
fered with, or.e of the essentials of that law is also- to safegliltd the puritY
of the election process and also to see that the people do not get elected by
flagrant branches of that law or by con:upt practices.
(1121E; l122B; ll21GH; li22A)
P. Malaichami v. M. Andi An1balam and Others. (1973] 3 SCR 1026,
referred to.
E
F
0
What is the effect of the omission to make a recrimination application
ff
A
B
c
D
E
110:2
litJl>Ri!ME CoURT REPoRTS
(l!iS.5] l S.C.I\,
under s. 97 ( 1) of the Act by the returned candidate within the time
a1Jowcd by the statute in a case where the election petitioner makes a
double pra7er, namely, declaration of the returned candidate's election as
void and a further declaration that he is the duly elected candidate ?
In Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, the majority view of th is Court was that
in an election ·petitioner where the election petitioner makes a double
claim : it claims that the election of the returned candidate is void and
also asks for a declaration that the petit ioaer himself or some otner
person has
been duly ekcted
the
returned candidate must make a
recrimination petition under s. 97 (I) if he wants to raise pleas in support
of bis cause that the other person in whose favour a declaration is claimed
cannot be said to have been validly elected.
Section 97(1) undoubtedly
gives an opportunity to the returned candidate to dispute the validity of
agy of the votes cast in favour of the alternative candidate or to plead
for the validity of any vote cast in his favour which has been rejected; but
if by bis failure to make recrimination within time as required by s. 97
the returned candidate is precluded from raising any such plea at the hearing
of the election petition, there would be nothing wrong if the Tribunal
proceeds to deal with the dispute under s. 10 1 ,a) on the basis that the
other votes counted by the Returning Officer were valid votes and that votes
in favour of .be returned candidates, if any, which were rejected were invalid.
This Court in P. Malaichaml v. M. Arzdi Ambalam and Others observed that it
is oat enough to say that what ought to be looked iato is the substance and
not the form.
If a relief provided understatute could be obtained only by
following a certain procedure laid therein for that purpose, that procedure
must be followed if he is to obtain that relief.
It is not a question of mere
pleading, it is a qurstion of jurisdiction.
Tbe Election Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to go into the quostion whether any wrong votes had been
counted in favour of the election
petition~r who had claimed the seat for
himself unless the successful candidate bad filed a petition under s. 97. The
law reports are full of cases where parties have failed bec1us~ of their failure
strictly to conform to the letter of th-:: law ia regard to the procedure laid
down under the Act and the rules.
(11228-C; 1117e.c; lll8C-D; 1123G-H 1125A-A]
Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, [1964] 6 SCR 57 and P. Malaichami v.
F
M. Andi Ambalam and Othus, [1973) 3 SCR 1026, referred to.
G
The appellant's submission that the majority view in the case of
Johar Singh v. Genda Lal should be ordered to be considered by a much
larger bench in view of the dissenting judgment of Ayyang1r, J. cannot be
accepted.
Such a request ha<> al ready been considered and rejected by this
Court in P. Malaichami v. 1\1. Andi Ambalam and Others on the ground,
with which we agree, that the dissenting judgment does not throw much
light on the subject. [112tA-B]
Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, [1964] 6 SCR 57 and P. Malaichami v.
M. ·Andi Ambalam and Others, [1973] 3 SCR 1026, referred to.
There is no scope for equity since the entire gamut of the process
of c1ection is covered by statute.
Reliefs as are available according to law
H
can only be granted. [1125E]
j
Arun Kumar Bose v. Mohd. Purkan Ansari and Others1 AIR 198,3 SC,
A
1311, referred to.
In the instant case, respondent 1 has chal1enged the appellant's ,
election on the ground of improper rejection of ballot papers
whic~ is
certainly a ground for declaring an election void.
If it was the case of the
appellant that any vote validily cast in his favour had been improperly .•
rejected be could have urged it as a ground .. in a recrimination application
8
filed under s. 97 lt) of the Act against 1espondent l's prayer that he be
decla.red as the duTy elected candidate. Therefore, wC do not agree with the
appellant that s. 97 (1) will not apply to the facts of the present case and
that it will apply only to cases where the returned candidate seek to
challenge the prayer in the election petition that the election petitioner c.r
some other candidate be declared to be the duly elected candidate on some
other grounds such as corrupt pract'ice. [1128 AaC]
C ~
In the absence of a recrimii:iation application under s. 97 ( 1) of the
Act the High Court originally commited a jurisdictional error in directing
the District Judge (Vigilance), Punjab to recheck and recount the reJected
ballot papers relating to the appellant.
But that mistake has been· reCti~
tied by the High Court subsequently by not taking into account
the 8
ballot papers relating to the appellant which appear to have been wrongly
1
rejected.
In these circumstances we hold that the· High Court was justified
in directing recount of the rejected ballot papers relating to respondent 1
and declining to take into account the 8 ba1lot papers relating to the
appellant found by the District Judge (Vigilance), Punjab to have been
improperly rejected in the absence of a recrimination application under s.
97 (1) of the Act and holding that the election of the appellant had been
111aterially affected by the improper. rejection of 14 ballot pa(>ers relating
to respondent 1 and that respondent 1 is entitled to be ·declared 'to have
been duly elected. [1128 D-F)
Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, [1964] 6 SCR 57 (majority view), p. Ma/alchami v. M. Andi Ambalam and Others, [1973] 3 SCR· 1026 and Arun Ku1nar
Bose v. Mohd. Furkan Ansari am/Others, AIR 1983 SC 1311, followed.
Anirudh Prasad v. Rajeshwari Saro} Das & Others, [1976] Suppl. SCR
91 and Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, etc. v. Govindprasad Shivprasad Ch_oUdary
& Others, etc., [1979) 3 SCR 897, referred to.
.
(Per Sabyadsachi Mukharji, J.)
D
F
.1
The entire purpose of the cOnstitutional provisions as well as other
G
provisions of law is to ensure that true democracy functions in this country
and the will of the people prevails.
The purpose of the Representation
of the People Act is to safeguard that one who obtains majority of valid
votes by proper and due process of law alone should represent the consti- ,
tuency and will of the people.
All the legal provisions and the procedures.}
of the enactment should be so construed as to ensure that purpose.
It
would ·really be a mockery to the procedure of law if a situation here it
is demonstrated duly in the court that a ·person who obtained four votes
11"
B
sUPRM COURT REPORTs'
tl985] I s.c.n.
Jess than the other next C3ndid'1tc sbo~ld bC d~clared elected in. preference
to the others and J1.llowed to represent the constituency.
It is not an
appeal to any abstract justice nor it is an appeal to equity but it is to
emphasise that procedure should be so construed that these rules of procedure
such ass. 97 of the Act subserves the wishe.s. or the votCrs.
For this
reason. the Views expressed by Ayyaogar. J. in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal
appeal~ to me more reasonable though these may strain the literal provlsions
of the seC:tion a bit.
Even if the legislature has not amended the relevant
provisions after the said decision, I am of the opinion that in a matter of
this nature, this Court bas a responsibility to construe the procedural
provisions or the law in such manner that the procedure does not dereat
the purpose or object of the Act. (11l0 D·H , 113 l A] .
c
Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, (1964] 6 SCR 66 and Income-Tax (Central)
Cakutta v.
B.N. Bhattachargee and Another, 118 I.T.R. 461 at 480
referred to.
D'
A Statutory provision_ mu.st be so constmed, if it is possibld, that
absurdity : and mischief may be avoided.
Where the· plain and literal
interpretation of a· statutory provision produce.s a manifestly absurd and
unjust rcsuit, the Court might modify the language used by tho legisJa1ure
or even do some violence to it so as to achieve tho obvious intention of
the legislature and produce a rational construction and just result. [1132B-C]
K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Ojficer,Ernakul1111l and Another, 131 I.T.R.
S91, referred to.
E
I feel that in view of the lapse of time and the very convincing
arguments advanced by Ayyangar, J., Jabar Singh's case requires reconsideralion by a larger Bench. (11320]
: ···A party. cannot take. advantage of onC part or the order which is
advantageous to him and discard th·e other part of the order which may
not, be to hia advantage especieJJy' when an application tor special leave
F--~,. from that order has beeo rejected. If that order has to be given effect
tO 'as_ has been done in this case., it has been found that taking into account
thC eight baJJot papers relating to the 3ppellant which bad been improperly
rejected and also taking into account other ballC't papers which bad been
improperly rejected in favour of respondent No. I, it is manifest by mechanical
recounting that the appeJJant had secured fvur votes more than respondent
No./t. If that is the position., then in my opinion this Court cannot
G .
and _should not declare respondent No. 1 to have obtained majority of the
'! •
valid vOtes. .The order of 1 Sth March, 198 3 must stand or fall together. Jn
my opinion it cannot bC bifurcated.
It cannot be Said that the recounting
'·-·~in ·s0 far as it was directed of the rejected baJJot papers of respondent No. 1
thC High Court was within its jurisdiction and in so far as the High Court
directed recounting of the rejected bal1ot papers or appellant also it had
committed. a jurisdictional error.
This is more so after the application for
special leave was rejected by this Court.
Apart from that I am 0£ the
opinion that there was no jurisdictional error -
there was power of the High
H
Court · to order such a recount.
Even if there was no such prayer in ~
-ti>$-,
. ...
•
BHAG MAL v. PRABHU RAM
1io5
petition before the High Court, it cannot be said that the High Court
A
acted without j•1risdiction.
In such ·a situatiop, applying the princiiJle of
majority view of Jablzr Singh's case, there certain exceptions where even
without recrimination petition, a candidate like the appe1lant in the present
case can take advantage of the ballot papers which have not been properly
counted in his favour.[1132P-H; 1133A-D]
Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, Etc. v. Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhary
B
& Ors. Etc., [1979] 3 SCR 897, referred to.
I must observed that reference has been made to certain observations
in some of the decisions to the effect that in election petitions, there was
no question of importing any equitable principle or of importing any
principle of remedying injustice as such.
With respect I cannot persuade
myself to this angle of vision.
In construing both statutory provisions
as well as provisions giving remedy provided under special statute, efforts
should be made that patent injustice and inequity which repels commonsense
a~d which defeats the purpose of the statute, should be avoided.
[! 135A-B]
Io the instant ~case I find it difficult to declare respondent No. 1 who
has admittedly received less votes than the appellant to have been duly
elected. [1135C]
In view of tl.te facts and circumstances of the instant case I am of
the opinion that even proceeding on the basis that the views expresSed by
majority of the learned judges in Jabar Singh's case is correct, upon which
I must proceed for the purpose of this case but which I still feel should
be reconsidered by a larger Bench, on the analogy of the decision in the
c1se of Janardan !Jattuappa Bondre, Etc. v. Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhary
and Ors. Etc.
I would allow this appeal.
[1135D-E]
Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, Etc. v. Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhllry
and Ors. Etc., [1979] 3SCR 897, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1451 of
1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd February, 1984
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 6
of 1984.
Shanti Bhushan, N.M. Ghatate and S. V; Deshpande for the
Appellant.
Kapil Sibal, RN. Karanjawala and Mrs. Manik Karanjawala for
the Respondent.
The following Judgments were delivered
c
D
E
F
G
H
1106
S\JPkllME COURT REPORTS
[1985) 1 s.c.k.
A
VARADARAJAN, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment
6
c
D
E
F
G
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing ·Election Petition 6
of 1982 filed by respondent I.
The appellant, Bhag Mal, was declared elected as a Member
of the Haryana Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) from No. 3,
Sadhura Scheduled Caste reserved constituency in the election held
on 19.5.1982. The contest was between the appellant and 12 others
including respondent 1, Parbdu Ram, who was the election petitioner.
The appellant secured 20981 votes while respondent I
secured 20971 votes and he was declared to have been elected.
Respondent 1 challenged the election of the appellant on the ground
that the counting was not proper and invalid and he prayed not
only for recounting of the votes but also for declaration that he is
the duly elected candidate.
Respondent 1 alleged in the election petition that the Returning
Officer intially ordered the recount of the ballot papers of himself
and the appellant in respect of all the booths after a sample checking
but on the application of the appellant that the ballot papers of
all the candidates should be recounted, to which respondent I
consented, he ordered recount of all the votes.
However, it was
alleged that the Returning Officer recounted the ballot papers of
the appellant and respondent 1 alone and therefore the recount was
void. In the original counting 1277 ballot papers were rejected
as invalid but in the recounting by the Returning Officer 1377 ballot
papers were rejected on that ground. The additional :JOO ballot
papers which were alleged to have been originally accepted in
favour of respondent l were alleged to have been rejected by the
Returning Officer under the influence of the Naib Tehsildar (Election)
of Ambala who was alleged to have been favouring the appellant.
1hree ballot papers alleged to have been cast in favour of respondent I at booth No. 19 were alleged to have been rejected by the
Returning Officer on the ground that they were meant for the
Kalka constituency. Thus this ground alleged by respondent I
relates to improper rejection of about 100 ballot papers said to
have been cast in favour of respondent 1 in the recounting by the
Returning Officer.
Respondent l pleaded nine other grounds in his election
petition but did not lead any evidence or advance any argument in
respect of the same.
H
As stated already, respondent 1 prayed not only recounting
llHAG MAL v. PRABFIU RAM (Varadarajan, J.)
IH)7
and setting aside the election of the appellant but also for a declaraA
tion that he is the duly elected candidate.
The appellant alone contested the election petition. In his
counter-affidavit he raised two preliminary objections, namely, that
copies and annexures supplied to him were not duly attested to be
true copies under the signature of respondent I and th~refore the
election petition was liable to be dismissed and that the election
petition had not been properly verified. These objections were
rejected by the High Court by an order dated 4.10.1982.
On merits the appellant admitted that recount of the ballot
papers of all the candidates was ordered by Returning Officer but
denied the other allegations made in the election petition and contended that the recountfog was properly made and that there is no
ground to order recounting by the Court.
On the pleadings the material issue framed by the High Court
was as to whether respondent I is entitled to recount.
Though the Returning Officer, R.W. 3, had stated in his oral
evidence that only the ballot papers of the appellant _and respondent
I were in fact rechecked and recounted the High Court found on
the basis of his report Exh. P.W. 4/4 and the entries made in the
two forms No. 20, Exh. P.W. I/I and P.W. l/2A, that the ballot
papers of all the candidates were recounted by the Returning Officer
and that in the application Exh. P,W. 2/5 presented to the Returning
Officer by respondent I immediately after the recounting was over
no grievance was made by respondent I that the ballot papers of any
other candidate were not recounted.
The High Court found that the allegation of respondent I that
the Returning Officer obtained the guidance of the Naib Tehsildar,
Dhan Singh, in making his decision regarding doubtful votes is probablised by the evidence of the appellant, R W. 1, and his election agent
Suraj Bhan, R.W.2 who have admitted in. their evidence that the Naib
Tehsildar had not been put on any particular duty during the recounting and that he was sitting near the dais and was consulted by the
Returning Officer sometimes on the question of the doubtful nature of
some ballot papers. The observer, R.W. 4, has admitted in his evidence that respondent I took objection to the presence of the Naib
Tehsildar during the recounting by the Returning Officer. In these
circumstances the High Court found that while making his quasijudicial decision regarding the doubtful ballot papers the Returning
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Officer consulted the Naib Tehsildar and -thus allowed his opinion
to influence his own discretion in accepting or rejecting the doubtful
ballot papers.
The High Court rejected the next ground alleged by respon·
dent 1 for claiming recount, namely, that about JOO ballot papers
cast in his favour were rejected illegally because thev bore some
slight indecipherable impressions of the finger or the th~mb of the
voters on the ground that sufficient acceptable evidence was not
available to rebut the evidence of the Returning Officer. R.W. 3,
that no valid ballot paper cast in favour of respondent 1 was rejected
on any such flimsy ground. In reaching this conclusion the High
Court took note of the fact that no such grievance was made by
respondent I in his application Exh. P.W. 2/5 filed soon after the
recounting was over.
Admittedly some ballot papers meant for the Kalk.a constituency had been issued for use in this constituency and they had
been cast in favour of respondent 1 and were rejected on the growid
that those ballot papers were not meant for use in this constituency.
Under the proviso to Rule 56A (2) (g) of the Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') a ballot paper
shall not be rejected on the ground that it bears a serial number
or a design different from the serial number or design of the ballot
papers authorised for use at a particular polling station if the
Returning Officer is satisfid that such defect had been caused by
any mistake or failure on the part of the presiding officer or polling
officer. The Returning Officer, R.W. 3, when questioned in this
regard, was unable to say anything positive in regard to the matter
though he had admitted in his evinence that some ballot papers
meant for use in the Kalka constituency had been used in this consti·
tuency and were rejected.
The High Court thought that the
rejection of those ballot papers was probably due to inadvertance
to the said proviso but however, it held that it is difficult to record
a definite finding as to whether those ballot papers were rightly or
wrongly rejected.
The margin of difference between the votes polled to the
appellant and respondent 1 was 5 in the original collllting and 10 ·
in the recounting made by the Returning Officer. Out of the JOO
votes rejected by the Returning Officer in the recounting as invalid
93 related to the other candidates and only 7 related to the appellant
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and respondent I, and the reason for rejection of those 7 ballot
BRAG MAL v. PRABHU RAM (Varadarajan, J.)
'1109
papers was not quite clear to the High Court.' There is also the
doubt, according to the High Court, as to the correctness or otherwise of the rejection of the ballot papers meant for use in the Kalka
constituency but actually used in this constituency. The High Court
found, as already stated, that the discretion of the Returning Officer
in the matter of rejection of some doubtful ballot papers has been
influenced by the opinion of the Naib Tehsildar. In those circumstances, the High Court found a prima facie case made out for
ordering· rechecking and recounting of the rejected ballot papers.
Therefore, the High Court appoiqted the District Judge (Vigilance)
Punjab as the agent of the Court to scrutinise and recount the
invalid ballot papers in the presence and under the supervision of
the Court, making it .clear that the rechecking and recounting of
only the rejected ballot papers had been ordered became respondent
l's claim was confined only to that relief in the application made
before the Returning Officer and the High Court was of the opinion
that no case had been made out for ordering a recount of all the
votes. · Accordingly, the ·High Court ordered the District Election
Officer, Ambala to produce only the rejected ballot papers for
rechecking and recounting by the Court through the District Judge
(Vigilance), Punjab in its presence and under its supervision.
After the recounting was accordingly made by the District
Judge (Vigilance), Punjab under the ·supervision of the Court it
was found that respondent 1 and the
appellant~ had.: gained 14
and 8 more votes respectively in ·addition to the votes already
conuted in their favour by the Returning Officer in his recounting.
If these 8 votes are taken into account it will be clear that the
· appellant would still have a majority of 4 votes over respondent 1.
But the appellant had not filed any recrimination application under
s. 97 (1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act'~. Therefore, it was contended before the
High Court on behalf of respondent 1 that the rejected votes of
the appellant, the returned candidate, cannot be scrutinised and that
the appellant cai;mot have the benefit of the 8 ballot papers found
to have been wrongly rejected.
This was naturally opposed by
the learned counsel for the appellant before the High Court. The
High Court rejected the appellant's contention and accepted the
contention of respondent 1 and observed
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"There are,
however, cases in which the election
petition makes a double claim : it claims that the election of
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. ti on that the petitioner himself or some other person has
been duly elected. It is in regard to such a composite case
that section I 00 as well as section IOI would apply, and
it is in respect of the additional claim for a declaration that
some other candidate has been duly elected that section 97
comes into play. Section 97 (I) thus allows the returned
candidate to recriminate and raise pleas in support of his
case that the person in whose favour .a declaration is
claimed by the petition cannot be said to be validly elected
and these would be pleas of attack and it would be open
to the returned candidate to take these pleas, because when
he recriminates, he really becomes a counter-petitioner
challenging the validity of the election of the alternative candidate. The result of section 97 (I) therefore, is that in dealing with a composite election petition
the Tribunal enquires into only the case made out by the
petitioner but also the counter-claim made by the returned
candidate. That being the nature of the proceedings contemplated by section 97 (!), it is not surprising that the
.returned candidate is required to make his recrimination
and serve notice in that behalf in the manner and within
the time specified by section 97 (I) proviso and section
97 (2l. If the returned candidate does not recriminate as
required by section 97, then he cannot make any attack
against the alternative claim made by the petition. In such
a case an enquiry wonld be held under section I 00 so far as
the validity of the returned candidate's is concerned and if
as a result of the said enquiry declaration is made that the
election of the returned candidate is void, then the Tribunal will proceed to deal with the alternative claim, but
in doing so, the returned candidate will not ~be allowed to
lead any evidence because he is precluded from raising any
pleas against the validity of the claim of the alternative
candidate."
The High Court rejected the contention urged on beha If of
the appellant that the Election Tribunal cannot record the finding
that the alternative candidate (respondent I) has secured a majority
of valid votes unless all the votes cast in the election are scrutinised
and counted having regard to the fact that the appellant had not
filed any recrimination application nnder s. 97 (I) of the Representation of People Act, 19$ 1 which undoubtedly confers a right on
•
BHAG MAL v. PRABHU MM (Varadarajan, J.)
11 ll
the returned candidate to dispute the validity of any of the votes
cast in favour of the alternative candidate or to plead for the validity
of votes cast in his fav0ur wh;ch had been improperly' rejected.
The High Court thus held that the votes gain.ed by the appellant
on scrutiny arid recount by the High Court had to be ignored in
determing whether the election of the returned candidate (appellant)
had been materially affected by the improper rejection or reception
of any vote. In so doing, the High Court found that respondent 1
had secured 20985 votes and the appellant had secured 20981 votes
and that the result of the returned candidate (appellant) had been
materially affected by the wrongful rejection of valid votes cast
in favour of respondent I, and it accordingly allowed the election
petition and set aside the appellant's election and declared respondent 1 to be duly elected and directed the parties to bear their
respective costs.
·
As stated earlier, the margin of difference between the votes
polled by the appellant and respondent 1 was 5 in the original counting and 10 in the recounting made by the Returning Officer, R.W. 3,
in favour of the appellant. Although respondent 1 prayed in the
election petition for the recounting of all the votes of all the candidates the High Court ordered recounting of only the -rejected ballot
papers of all the candidates, and with regard to the appellant and
respondent I h was found by the District Judge (Vigilance), Punjab
who made the recounting of the rejected ballot papers under the
supervision of the High Court that respondent 1 had gained
14 and the appellant had gained 8 more votes in addition to
the votes already counted in their favour by the Returning Officer
in his recounting. If, as already stated, these 8 votes are taken
into account the appellant would still have a majority of 4 votes over
respondent I and his election could not be set aside and respondent
I could not be declared to have been validly elected.
Mr. Shan.ti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted(!) that no recounting at all should have been
ordered by the Court and (2) that if the votes found in the recounting by the Court to have been improperly rejected are to be taken
into account at all they mnst be taken into account not only in
regard to respondent I but also in regard to the appellant. These 8
votes found by the Court to have not been improperly rejected as
regards the appellant have been taken into . account by the High
CQurt having regard to the fact that the appellant had not flied
any recrimination application under s. 97 (I) of the Act. S. 97 (1)
and the proviso there to read thus :
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"Wljen in an election petition a declaration that any
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(1985) l S.C.R.
candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly
elected is claimed, the returned candidate or any other
pany may give evidence to prove that the election of such
candidate would have been void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in
question his election:
Provided that the returned candidate or such other party, as
aforesaid shall not be entitled to give such evidence unless he has,
within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial
given notice to the High Court of his intention to cio so and has also
given the security and the further security referred to in sections 117
and 118 respectively."
·
In regard to the secound submission the questions posed by
Mr. Shanti Bhushan are :
(i) whether the Court was justified in not counting the
votes improperly rejected qua the appellant who is the
returned candidate merely because a recrimination
application under s. 97 (!) of the Act had not been
f1!ed?; and
(ii) what is the scope of the High Court's order dated
!S.3.1983 directing recount of the rejected ballot papers
not only of respondent 1 but also of the appellant
which forms the first part of the judgment of the High
Court which pronounced its second part on 23.2 . .1984
holding that the election of the appellant is void on
account of the improper rejection of 14 valid ballot
papers relating to respondent I and that respondent 1
is duly elected from the constituency concerned ?
Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned counsel appearing for respondent 1
submitted that though respondent 1 had prayed for rccoun t of the
votes of all the candidates the High Court ordered recount of only
the rejected ballot papers of the appellant and respondent 1 and
that the High Court committed a jurisdictional error in its earlier
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order dated 15.3.1983 in directing the recount of the rejected ballot
papers of even the appellant in the absence of any recrimination
application under s. 97 (1) of the Act but that error has been
subsequently rectified in the final judgment in which the 8 ballot
papers found by the District Judge (Vigilance), Punjab to have
been improporly rejected qua the appellant had not been taken into
a
;iCCOIIJ\t. Mr. Sil)al submitt(!d t\lat tl\e Hi~h Court was justified
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BHAGMAL v. PARBHU RAM (VaradOfa}an J.)
1113
in not taking into account those 8 ballot papers having regards to
the fact that no recrimination application under s. 97(1) of the Act.
had been filed, that the appellant did not have recourse to r. 63(2)
of the Rules and that on the other hand the appellant's contention
in his written statement as well as his evidence was that the counting by the Returning Officer, R.W.3. was proper and there is no
ground for recounting.
The first contention of Mr.