# Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 970
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 271 of 1956
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendba· Gadkab, K. SuBBJ RAo, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhagubhai-dullabhabhai-bhandari-v-the-district-magistrate-2194
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

GOOflllas, Conlrol and EJtcl11si011 of-Conslil11ti-Onal validity of
enadment-Test-Central PrOl!inces and Berar G0011tlas Act, r946
(X of r946) a.s amerukd by Act XLIX of r950, ss. 4, 4-A-C011s·
litllltOfl of IM.ia, Aris. r9(r}(d) & (e), IJ.
By an order passed under s. 4-A of the Central Province.
and Berar Goondas Act, 1946 (X o! 1946), as amended by the
Madhya Pradesh Act XLIX of 1950, the State of Madhya Pra.
desh directed the respondent to leave the district of Chhindwara, which bad been specified as a proclaimed area under the
Act, and the District Magistrate by another order communicated the same to the respondent. The respondent challenged the
said orders under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the growul
that the Act violated his lundamental rights under Art. 19o)(d)
and (e) of the Constitution and was, therefore, invalidated' by
Art. 13 of the Constitution. The HigJ> Court held that ss. 4 and
4-A of the impugned Act were invalid and since they w~e the
r
..
,l/'I
-.
1 s.c.R: SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
main operative provisions of the Act, the whole Act was inI960
valid.
Ileld, that when a statute authorises preventive action
.gainst.the citizens, it is essential that it must expressly provide
tlfat the specified authorities should satisfy themselves that the
d>nditions precedent laid down by the statute existed before
they acted thereunder. If the statute fails to do so in respect
of any such condition precedent, that is an infirmity sufficient to
take the statute out of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.
Although there can be no doubt that ss. 4 an.d 4-A of the
impugned Act clearly contemplated. as the primary condition
preced~nt to any action thereunder that the person sought to be
proceeded against must be a goonda, they fail to provide that
the District Magistrate should first find that the person sought
to be proceeded against was a goonda or provide any guidance
whatsoever .in that regard 01 afford any opportunity to. the
person proceeded against to show that he was not a goonda.
The definition of a goonda laid down by the Act, which is of an
inclusive character, indicated no tests for deciding whether
the person fell within the first part of the definition.
Gurbachan Singh v. The Slate of Bombay, [1952] S.C.R. 737,
Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate,
Thana, [1956] S:C.R. 533 and Hari Khenu Gawali v. The Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Bombay, [1956] S.C.R. 506, referred to.
Although the object of the impugned Act was beyond reproach and might well attract Art. i9(5) of the Constitution,
since the Act itself failed to provide sufficient safeguards for
the protection of the fundamental rights and the operative
sections were thus rendered invalid, the entire Act must fail.

## Text

970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
196°
the appellant's right is based a.re rules or regulations
M
having the force of law the impugned executive order
adhavrao PhaJAe •
ed b
d
t l
Jd be ·
) 'd
Th
· h
1ssu
y respon en
wou
mva 1 •
e rig t
n, ;;ate of
guaranteed to the appellant by an existing law canJt.dhya Bharat not be extinguished by the issue of an executive order.
·.
-
In fact on this point there has never been a dispute
Ga1••dragadAar I between the parties in the present proceedings. That
is why the only point of controversy between the
parties was whether the Kalambandis in question
amount to an existing law .or not. Since we have
answered this question in favour of the appellant we
must allow the appeal, set a.side the order passed by
the High Court and direct that & proper writ or order
should be issued in favour of the appellant as prayed
for by him. The appellant would be entitled to his
oosts throughout.
Appeal allowed.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
AND ANOTHER
ti.
BALDEO PRASAD
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDBA·
GADKAB, K. SuBBJ RAo and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
GOOflllas, Conlrol and EJtcl11si011 of-Conslil11ti-Onal validity of
enadment-Test-Central PrOl!inces and Berar G0011tlas Act, r946
(X of r946) a.s amerukd by Act XLIX of r950, ss. 4, 4-A-C011s·
litllltOfl of IM.ia, Aris. r9(r}(d) & (e), IJ.
By an order passed under s. 4-A of the Central Province.
and Berar Goondas Act, 1946 (X o! 1946), as amended by the
Madhya Pradesh Act XLIX of 1950, the State of Madhya Pra.
desh directed the respondent to leave the district of Chhindwara, which bad been specified as a proclaimed area under the
Act, and the District Magistrate by another order communicated the same to the respondent. The respondent challenged the
said orders under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the growul
that the Act violated his lundamental rights under Art. 19o)(d)
and (e) of the Constitution and was, therefore, invalidated' by
Art. 13 of the Constitution. The HigJ> Court held that ss. 4 and
4-A of the impugned Act were invalid and since they w~e the
r
..
,l/'I
-.
1 s.c.R: SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
main operative provisions of the Act, the whole Act was inI960
valid.
Ileld, that when a statute authorises preventive action
.gainst.the citizens, it is essential that it must expressly provide
tlfat the specified authorities should satisfy themselves that the
d>nditions precedent laid down by the statute existed before
they acted thereunder. If the statute fails to do so in respect
of any such condition precedent, that is an infirmity sufficient to
take the statute out of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.
Although there can be no doubt that ss. 4 an.d 4-A of the
impugned Act clearly contemplated. as the primary condition
preced~nt to any action thereunder that the person sought to be
proceeded against must be a goonda, they fail to provide that
the District Magistrate should first find that the person sought
to be proceeded against was a goonda or provide any guidance
whatsoever .in that regard 01 afford any opportunity to. the
person proceeded against to show that he was not a goonda.
The definition of a goonda laid down by the Act, which is of an
inclusive character, indicated no tests for deciding whether
the person fell within the first part of the definition.
Gurbachan Singh v. The Slate of Bombay, [1952] S.C.R. 737,
Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate,
Thana, [1956] S:C.R. 533 and Hari Khenu Gawali v. The Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Bombay, [1956] S.C.R. 506, referred to.
Although the object of the impugned Act was beyond reproach and might well attract Art. i9(5) of the Constitution,
since the Act itself failed to provide sufficient safeguards for
the protection of the fundamental rights and the operative
sections were thus rendered invalid, the entire Act must fail.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 271 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment a.nd order dated August
2, 1955, of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc.
Petition No. 249 of 1955 .
. M. Adhikari, Advocate.General "for the State of
Madhya Prade8h, B. K. B. Naidu a.nd I. N. Shroff,
for the a.ppella.nts.
R. Patnai.k, for the respondent.
1960. October 3. The Judgment of the Court we.a
delivered by
·
The Sta.le of
Madhya Pradesh
c;. Anothet
v.
Bald10 Prasad
GAJENDBAGADKAB J.-'J;hia appeal with &. oertifi, Goj1ndra1adhr J.
ca.te iaaued by the Nagpur High Court under Art.
132(1) of the Ccnstitution raises a. question a.bout the
validity of t~e Central Provinces and. Berar Goonda.s
972
SUPRK\IE cor;gr REPORTS
[1961]
i96o
Act X of 1946 as amended by Madhya Pradesh Act
n ,
XLIX of 1950.
It appears that against the responMa;:,1~';::.;~,,, dent Ba.Iden Prasad the State of llfadhya Pradesh,
~ Ano1h"
appella.11t l, pass('d a.n u1dn ou .June 16, 19:i!i, u11dcr
v.
s. 4-A oft.he Act. Subsequently the Dist.rid :'\lagi::11Jaldeo i'>arnd trate, Ch hind II' ara, a.ppellan t 2, passed a11uthcr ord~r
G
--
dated Juno 22, 1955, communicating to the rcspona;rnd•agadka•· j.d
h fi ·
.J
l
.
.
ent t e rst. externment oruer pass(•c agarnst him.
The respondent then filet.l a writ pdition in the High
Court (No. 249 of 1955) nuder Art. 226 challenging
tho validity of the said orders, inter alia, on the
ground that the Act under which the said orders were
passed was itself ultra vire:i. The appellants disputed
the respondent's contention about the rires of the Act.
The High Court, however, has upheld tho respondent's.
plea and has held that ss. 4 and 4-A of the Act aro
invalid, and since the two sections contain the main
operative provisions of the Act, according to the High
Court, the whole Act became invalid. It is the
correctness of this conclusion whioh is challenged
before us by the appellants.
It would be convenient at this stage to refer briefly
to the scheme of the Act and its relevant provisions.
'l'he Act was passed in 1946 and came into force on
September 7, 1946. It was subsequently amended
and the a.mend~d Act came into force on X ovember
24, 1950.
As the preamble shows the Act was passed
because it was thought expedient to provide for the
control of goondas and for their removal in certain
circumstances from one place to another. Section 2
defines a goonda as meaning a hooligan, rough or a
ve.gabond and as including a person who is dangerous
to public peace or tranquillity. It would thus be seen
that the definition of the word "goonda" is an inclusive definition, and it includes even persons who may
not be hooligans, roughs or vagabonds if they aro
otherwise dangerous to public peace or tranquillity.
Section 3(1) empowers the State Government toiissue
a proclamation that distu~bed conditions exist or are
likely to arise in the areas specified in such proclamations if tho State Government is satisfied that public
pea.co or tranquillity in any area is disturl/ed or is
, -
•
•
,.
"\
<
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
likely to be disturbed. The area in respect of whieh
I96o
a proclamation is thus issued is described in the Act
Th 5 .
1
as the proclaimed area. Section 3(2) limits the operaMad:ya'~:a~esh
tion of the proclamation to three months from its
& Another
date and provides that it may be renewed by notifioav.
tion from time to time for a period of three months at Baldeo Prasad
· a time. The first step to be taken in enforcing the
--
operative provisions of the Act thus is that a procla- Gajendragadkar f.
mation has to be issued specifying the proclaimed
areas, and the limitation on the power of the State
Government to issue such a proclamation is that the
proclamation can be issued only after it i~ ,;atisfied as
required by s. 3(1); and its life will not be longer than
three months at a stretch. Section 4 reads thus:
"4(1). During the period the proclamation of
emergency issued or renewed under Section 3 is in
operation, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction
in or in any part of the proclaimed area, if satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the presence, movements or acts of any goonda in t~e
proclaimed area is prejudicial to the interests of the
general.public or that a reasonable suspicion exists
that any goonda is committing or is likely to commit
acts calculated to disturb the public peace or tranquilli~y may make an order-
(i) directing such goonda to notify his residence
and any change of or absence from sμch 1residence
during the' term specified and to report his movements
in such manner· and to such authority as may be
1! pecified ;
·
•
(ii) directing that he shall. not remain . in the
proclaimed area within his Jurisdiction or any specified part thereof and shall not enter such area ; and
(iii) directing .him. so to conduct himself during
the period specified as the District Magistrate shall
deem necessary in the interests of public order :
.
Provided 'that no order under clause (ii) which
d,ireots the exclusion of any goonda from a place in
w_hich he ordinarily resides aha.II be made. excJJpt with
the previou·s approval of the State Government :
·
Provided further that no such order shall be
l.24
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r96o
made directing exclusion of any goonde. from the dis·
T"' 51
1 trict in which he ordinarily resides.
Madhya ~;a~csh
(2) No order under sub.section (I) shall be
~ Anoth"
made by a District Me.gistrate in respect of a goonde.
v.
without giving to such goonda e. copy of the groundij
Baldeo Prasad on which the order is proposed to be me.de and with·
G .
-
,
out giving an opportunity to be heard:
4Jtndragadnar }.
p
'd d th
h
h
D"
• M
' t
'
f
rov1 e
at w ere t e
1str1ct
ag1s rate 1s o
opinion that it is necessary to make an order without
e.ny delay he may for reasons to be recorded in writ·
ing, make the order and shall, as soon as may be
within ten de.ya from tho date on which tho order is
served on the goonda concerned, give such goonda a
copy of the grounds and an opportunity to be heard.
(3) After hearing the goonda, the District Magis·
trate may cancel or modify the order as he thinks
fit ...
This section confers on the District Magistrate jurisdiction to make an order against a goonda if there are
reasonable grounds for bolioving that his presence,
movements or acts in any proclaimed e.ree. is likely to
be prejudicial to the inte.rests of the general public, or
if there is a reasonable suspicion that a goonda is
committing or is likely to commit prejudicial sots.
Sub-clauses (i), (ii) e.nd (iii) indicate the nature of the
directions and the extent of the restrictions which can
be placed upon a goonda. by an order passed under
s. 4. Sub-section (2) requires the District Ma.gistrate
to give the goonda a copy of the grounds on which an
order is proposed to be made, and to give him an
opportunity to be heard why such an order should
not be passed aga.inst him. The proviso to th" section
deals with an emergency which needs immediate
action. After hearing the goonda the District Magistrate may under sub-s. (3) either ca.nee) or modify the
order a.s he thinks fit.
Section 4-A ree.ds thus: ·
"(I) Where the District Magistrate considers
that with a. view to maintain the pee.co and tranquil·
lity of the proola.imed area in his district it is neoes·
sary to direct a. goonda to remove himself outside the
district in which the proclaimed area is compri.'6(1 C7I
•
'
'
r-
••
'
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
to require him to reside or remain in any place or
'960
within any area outside such district, the District
The Stale of
Magistrate may, after giving the goonda an opportu- Madhya Pradm
nity as required by sub-section (2) of Section 4 forward
& Anothir
to the State Government a report together with conv.
9ected papers with a recommendation in that behalf. Balde• Prasad
(2) On receipt of such report the State Govern-
-
'f 't '
t' fi d th t th
d t'
Gajendragadkar J.
ment may, 1 1 1s sa 1s e
a
e recommen a 10n
·
made by the District Magistrate is in the in~erests of
the gerieral public, make an order directing such
goonda-
.
(a) that except in so far as he may be permitted by the provisions of the order, or by such authority
or persori as may be specified therein, he shall not
remain in any such area or place in Madhya Pradesh
as may be specified in the order;
(b) to reside or remain in such place or within
such area in Madhya Pradesh as may be specified in
the order and if he is not already there to proceed to
that place or area within such time as may by specified in the order :
Provided that no order shall be made directing
the exclusion or removal from the State of any person
ordinarily resident in the State."
.
Thus an order more stringent in character can be
passed under this section. The safeguard provided by
the section, however, is that . the District . Magistrate
is rtrquired to give the· goonda an opportunity to be
hear<l and further required to make a report to the
State Government and forward to the State Govern•
ment papers connected with the recommendation
which the District. Magistrate makes. Sub-section (2)
of s. 4-A then requires the State Government to consider the matter and empowers it to make an order
either under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of the said sub-section.
The proviso to this section lays down that no order
shall be made by which the goonda would be excluded
-Or removed from the State where he ordinarily resides.
The last section tO which reference may be made is
s. 6. It gives a goonda aggrieved by an order made
against him, inter alia, under s. 4 or s. 4-A to make a
tEpresont.ation to the ·State Government within the
976
SUPREME COtTRT REPORTS
[1961]
i96o
time prescribed, &nd it requires the State Governm1mt
,
/
to consider the representation &nd make such orders
T nt SI alt o
th
"t
d
fit Tb
• b • f. b
h
I
Madhya Pradtsh
ereon as I may cem
.
at rn r1e 1st e sc eme
~
G At1other
of the Act.
·
v.
At this stage it would be material to 'state the releBaldeo Prasad vant facts leading to the writ petition filed by the
. --
respondent. Appellant 1 issued & proclamation under
Ga;emfragadkar f. s. 3 on August 10, 1954, specifying the limite of Police
Stations Par&sia and J&mai and Chhindwara Town &s
proclaimed area. This proclamation w&s renewed in
November, 1954 and February, 1955. Thereafter on
May 9, 1955, appella.nt 1 issued a fresh procla.mation
•
specifying the whole of the Chhindw&ra District as the
proclaimed &re&.
This proclamation was to remain in
force till August 8, 1955.
Whilst the second proclamation was in force the
second appellant received reports from the District
Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara, against the
respondent, and he ordered the issue of & notice to him
to show ca.use why action should not be taken against
him under s. 4 ; this notice required the respondent to
appear before the. second appellant on April 29, 1955.
The respondent, though served, did not appear before
the second &ppella.nt. Thereupon the second appellant
sent a report to a.ppella.nt 1 on April 30, 1955, and
submitted the case against him with & draft order for
the approval of the said appellant under the first· proviso to s. 4(1). In the meantime the third notification
was issued by appellant 1. The second appella.nt then
issued. a fresh notice against the respondent under s. 4
on May 24, 1955. The respondent appeared in person
on May 30, 1955, and wa.s given time to file his
written statement which he did on June 4, 1955. The
case was ·then fixed for hearing on June 22, 1955.
Mea.nwhile the State Government passed ·an order on
June 16, 1955, directing th&t the respondent shall,
except in so f&r as he ma.y be permitted by the second
appellant from time to time, not remain in a.ny pla.oe
·'
in Chhind war& District. This order wa.s to remain in
force until August 8, 1955. On June 22, 1955, the
second appellant communic~ted the 'said order ~ t~e
respondent and directed him to leave the D18tr1ct
(
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
before 10 a. m. on Jtine 23, 1955. The respondent
19
60
appealed to appellant 1 to cancel the order· passed
TM Stat• of .
against him. The first appellant treated the appeal Madhya Praderh
as a representation made by the respondent under s. _6
&- A11oth1r
and rejected it on July 9, 1955. A day before this
v.
order was passed the respondent filed his writ petition
Baldeo Praiad ·
in the High Court from which the present appeal GaienJ.-agadk~' ;.
arises.
The respondent challenged the validity of the Act
on the ground that it invades his fundamental rights
under Art. 19(l)(d) and (e) and as such it becomes
invalid having regard to the provisions of Art. 13 of
the Constitution. This plea has been upheld by the
High Court. On behalf of the appellants the learned
Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh contends that
the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the restrictions imposed by the Act did not
attract the provisions of Art. 19(5). The legislative
competence of the State Legislature to pass the Act
cannot be disputed. The Act relates to public order
which was Entry 1 in List II of the Seventh Sphedule
to the Constitution Act of 1935. There can also be no
doubt that the State Legislature would be competent
to pass an act protecting the interests of the general
public against the commission of prejudicial acts which
disturb public peace and order. Section 3 of the Act
indicates that it is only where the public peace or
tranquillity is threatened in any given a.rea of tho
State that the State Government is authorised to issue
a proclamation, and as we have already not.if;ecl, it is
in respect of such proclaimed areas and for the limited
duration prescribed by s. 3(2) that ord0rs can be
passed against goondas whose prejudicial activities
add to the disturbance in the proclaimed areas. Therefore, broadly stated the purpose of the Act is to safe-
-guard individual rights and protect innocent and
peaceful citizens against the prejudicial activities of
goondas, and in that sense the Act .may prima facie
claim the benefit of Art. 19(5). This position is not
seriously disputed.
The argument against the validity of the Act is,
'howt1ver, ha.Red on one serious infirmity in s. 4 ancl
978
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
r96o
s. 4-A which contain the operative provisions of the
Act. This infirmity is common to both the sections,
M~::,Y~t~:adesh and so what we will say abouts. 4 will apply with
& Another
equal force to s. 4-A. It is clear that s. 4 contemv.
plates preventive action being taken provided two
Baldeo Prasad conditions are satisfied ; first, that the presence,
. -
movements or acts of any person sought to be proGaJendragadkar J. ceeded against shoul~ appear to the District Magistrate to be prejudicial to the interests of the general
public, or that a reasonable suspicion should exist
that such a person is committing or is likely to commit acts calculated to disturb public peace or tranquillity; and second that the person concerned must
be a goonda. It would thus be clear that it is only
where prejudicial acts can be attributed to a goonda
that s. 4 can come into operation. In other words,
the satisfaction of the first condition alone would not
be enough ; both the conditions must be satisfied
before action can be taken against any person. That
clearly means that the primary condition precedent
for taking action under s. 4 is that the person against
whom action is proposed to be taken is a goonda; and
it is precisely in regard to this condition that the
section suffers from a serious infirmity.
The section does not provide that the District
Magistrate must first come to a decision that the
person against w horn he proposes to take action is a
goonda, and gives him no guidance or assistance in
the said matter. It is true that under s. 4 a goonda
is entitled to have an opportunity to be heard after
he is given a copy of the grounds on which the order
is proposed to be made against him ; but there is no
doubt that all that the goonda is entitled to show in
response to the notice is to challenge the correctness
of the grounds alleged against him. The enquiry
does not con tern plate an investigation into the question as to whether a person is a goonda or not. The
position, therefore, is that the District Magistrate can
proceed against a person without being required to
come to a formal decision as to whether the said
person is a goonda or not; and in any event no opportunity is intended to be given to the person to show
J-
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
that he is not a goonda. The failure of the section to
r96o
make a provision in that behalf undoubtedly consti-
. fi
·
· ·
h
The St'fl./t' of
tutes a serious m rm1ty rn its sc eme.
!ifadkya Pradt;s/,
Incidentally it would also be relevant to point out
{~ Anoth"
that the definition of the word "goonda" affords no
v.
assistance in deciding which citizen can be put under
Baideo Prasad
that category. It is an inclusive definition an<l it does
. :--
not indicate which tests have to be applied in decidingG"J'"d"•gadkae '·
whether a person falls in the first part of the definition. Recourse to the dictionary meaning of the word
would hardly be of any assistance in this matter.
After all it must be borne in mind that the Act authorises the District Magistrate to deprive a citizen of
his fundamental right under Art. 19(l)(d) and (e), and
though the object of the Act and its purpose would
undoubtedly attract the provisions of Art. 19(5) care
must always be taken in passing such acts that they
provide sufficient safeguards against casual, capricious or even malicious exercise of the powers conferred by them. It is W-iill known that the relevant
provisions of the Act are initially put in motion
against a person at a lower level than the District
Magistrate, and so it is al ways necessary that sufficient safeguards should be provided by the Act to
protect the fundamental rights of innocent citizens
and to save them from unnecessary harassment. That
is ·why we think the definition oft.he word "goonda"
should have given necessary assistance to the District
Magistrate in deciding whether a particular citizen
falls under the category of goonda or not; that is
another infirmity in the Act. As we have already
pointed out s. 4-A suffers from the same infirmities as
B. 4.
Having regard to the two infirmities in ss. 4, 4-A
respectively we do not think it would be possible to
accede to the argument of the learned Advocate.
General that the operative portion of the Act can fall
under Art. 19(5) of the Constitution. The person
against whom action· can be taken under the Act is
not entitled to know the source of the information
received by the District Magistrate ; he is only told
a.bout his prejudicial activities on which the satisfac.
tion of the District Magistrate is based that action
980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
should be ta.ken age.inst him under s. 4 or s. 4-A. In
such a ca8e it is absolutely essential that the Act must
The Stolt of
1 1 · d · W b
d fi · '
h
·
Madhya Prade.<h c ear y ID !Ca
y a proper e mt1oa or ot erw1se
.s. A,.011,,,
when a.ad under what circumstanr.es a person can be
v.
ca.lied a gooada, and it must impose an obligation on
Boldeo I..,,asad the District Magistrate to apply his mind to the ques-
-
lion as to whether the person age.inst whom comGaj .. d••c•"""' f. plaints are received is such a. goonde. or not. It has
been urged before us tha.t such an obligation is implicit in ss. 4 and 4-A.
We a.re, however, not impressed
by this argument. Where a statute empowers the
specified authorities to take preventive action age.inst
the citizens it is essential that it should expressly
make it a pa.rt of the duty of the said authorities to
satisfy themselves a.bout the exiswnce of what the
statute regards as conditions precedent to the exercise
of the said authority. If the statute is silent in respect of one of such conditions precedent it undoubted.
ly constitutes a serious infirmity which would inevitably take it out of the provisions of Art. 19(5). The
result of this infirmity is that it he.a left to the unguided and unfettered discretion of the authority
concerned to treat any citizen as a goonde.. In other
words, the restrict~uns whioh it allows to be imposed
on the exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen
guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(d) and (e) must in the oiroumate.ncea be held to be unreasonable. That is the
view ta.ken by the High Court and we see no reason
to differ from it.
In this connection we may refer to the corresponding Bombay statute the mawrie.l provisions of whioli
have been examined and upheld by this Court. Section 27 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902 (4 of
1902), which provides for the disperse.I of gangs and
bodies of persons has been upheld by this Court in
Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay(') whereas
s. 56 and s. 57 of the subsequent Bombay Police Act,
1951 (22 of 1951), have been confirmed respectively iu
Bhagubhai Dullahhabhai Bhandari v. The District
MagiBtrate, Thana (') and Hari Khemu Gawali v. The
Deputy CommiBB'ioner of Pulice, Bombay('). It wotlld be
(I) (1952] S.C.R. 737·
(•) [1956] S.C.R. 53J.
(31 [1956J s.c.a. 5o6.
'
'
(
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
noticed that the relevant provisions in the latter Act
r96o
the validity of which lras been upheld by this Court
Th st t. 1
indicate how the mischief apprehended from the Mad~y• ~:a~esh
activities of undesirable characters can be effectively
& Another
checked by me.king clear and specific provisions in
v.
that behalf, e.nd how even in meeting the challenge
Baldeo Prasad
to public peace e.nd order sufficient safeguards can be G . d-dk
included in the statute for the protection of· innocent aJe• raga
ar f.
citizens. It is not clear whether the opportunity to
be heard which is provided for by s. 4(2) would
include an opportunity to the person concerned to
lead evidence. Such e.n opportunity he.s, however,
been provided by s. 59(1) of the Bombay Act of 1951.
As we ha.ve a.lrea.dy mentioned there can be no doubt
tha.t the purpose a.nd object of the Act are above
reproach e.nd tha.t it is the duty of the State Legislature to ensure tha.t public peace and tranquillity is not
disturbe4 by the prejudicial activities of criminals
a.nd undesirable cha.ra.cters in society. Tha.t, however,
cannot help the appellants' case because, a.s we have
indice.tecl, the infirmities in the operative sections of
the Act a.re so serious tha.t· it would be impossible to
hold tha.t the Act is saved under Art. 19(5) of the
Constitution. There is no doubt tha.t if the operative
sections a.re invalid the whole Act must fall.
· In the result the order passed by the High Court is
confirmed a.nd the a.ppea.l is dismissed with costs.
Appeal diBmiBaed.
t•S