# BHAGW AN SINGH v. RAMESHW AR PRASAD SASTRI & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 535
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-01-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhagw-an-singh-v-rameshw-ar-prasad-sastri-others-1699
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Election Dispute-Disqualification for membership-Election to
State Legislature-Interest in contracts-Contract entered into as
Mukhiya of Panchayat-Representation of the People Act, r95r (43
of I95I), SS. 7(d), 8I, IOO(I)(a).
The election of the appellant as a member of the Bihar State
Assembly was challenged under s. 7(d) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, by the first respondent who was also a
candidate for election for the same constituency, on the ground
that at the date of the nomination the appellant had an interest·
in contracts for execution of works undertaken by the Bihar
Government, and that his nomination had been improperly
accepted.
The appellant's plea inter alia was that he had
executed the contracts not in his individual capacity but as the
Mukhiya of the Village Panchayat and therefore the disqualification imposed bys. 7(d) of the Act could not be invoked against
him. The contracts in question related to community projects
undertaken in pursuance of the Second Five Year Plan, under
which the execution of different works adopted under the plan was
to be by popular local agencies like Village Panchayats. The contracts were all in the prescribed form and the appellant, at the comI959
April r4.
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r959
Bhagwan Singh
mencement of the contract, described himself by his name, stating that he belonged to the village. The preamble to the contract
showed that the appellant undertook to carry out the construction of the development project under local works prov.
Rameshwar
Prasad Sastri
Gajendragadkar
gramme mentioned in the contrast as per estimate attached
thereto, that he agreed to execute the work according to and
subject to the terms and conditions contained therein and that
he undertook to contribute 50% of the cost in cash and labour.
At the end of the contract he signed as Mukhiya, giving his
address as the Gram Panchayat. The Election Tribunal found
in favour of the appellant and dismissed the election petition,
but, on appeal, the High Court took the view (1) that the description of the appellant given by him at the time when he
signed the contracts was not a term of the contract and could
not therefore support his plea that he had executed the contract
as Mukhiya of the Panchayat, and (2) that the fact that he
undertook liability to execute the contracts as required and to
become liable for payment of any fine imposed by the local
government officer in case of his default showed obligations of a
personal character inconsistent with his plea.
Held, that, on a proper construction of the contracts taking
into account all the terms and conditions as a whole and considering them in the light of the background of the Second
Five Year Plan, when the appellant signed the contracts as the
Mukhiya of the Village Panchayat he acted as its agent and not
as an individual acting in his personal capacity.

## Text

(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
occasion arises for the Election Commission to make
r959
an order about the payment of this amount to the
Shri Chandrika
successful party the use of the word "refundable" will Prasad Tripathi
cause no difficulty whatever. We hold that the secuv.
rity has been made by respondent 1 as required by Shri Siv Prasad
s. 117 of the Act and would be at the disposal of the
Chanpuria
d.
<!>- Others
Election Commission in the present procee mgs.
_
We would like to add that even s. 117 has been Gajendragadkar J.
subsequently amended by Act 58 of 1958 and the
reference to the Secretary has been deleted.
The result is the appeal fails and must be dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
BHAGW AN SINGH
v.
RAMESHW AR PRASAD SASTRI & OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and
K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Election Dispute-Disqualification for membership-Election to
State Legislature-Interest in contracts-Contract entered into as
Mukhiya of Panchayat-Representation of the People Act, r95r (43
of I95I), SS. 7(d), 8I, IOO(I)(a).
The election of the appellant as a member of the Bihar State
Assembly was challenged under s. 7(d) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, by the first respondent who was also a
candidate for election for the same constituency, on the ground
that at the date of the nomination the appellant had an interest·
in contracts for execution of works undertaken by the Bihar
Government, and that his nomination had been improperly
accepted.
The appellant's plea inter alia was that he had
executed the contracts not in his individual capacity but as the
Mukhiya of the Village Panchayat and therefore the disqualification imposed bys. 7(d) of the Act could not be invoked against
him. The contracts in question related to community projects
undertaken in pursuance of the Second Five Year Plan, under
which the execution of different works adopted under the plan was
to be by popular local agencies like Village Panchayats. The contracts were all in the prescribed form and the appellant, at the comI959
April r4.
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r959
Bhagwan Singh
mencement of the contract, described himself by his name, stating that he belonged to the village. The preamble to the contract
showed that the appellant undertook to carry out the construction of the development project under local works prov.
Rameshwar
Prasad Sastri
Gajendragadkar
gramme mentioned in the contrast as per estimate attached
thereto, that he agreed to execute the work according to and
subject to the terms and conditions contained therein and that
he undertook to contribute 50% of the cost in cash and labour.
At the end of the contract he signed as Mukhiya, giving his
address as the Gram Panchayat. The Election Tribunal found
in favour of the appellant and dismissed the election petition,
but, on appeal, the High Court took the view (1) that the description of the appellant given by him at the time when he
signed the contracts was not a term of the contract and could
not therefore support his plea that he had executed the contract
as Mukhiya of the Panchayat, and (2) that the fact that he
undertook liability to execute the contracts as required and to
become liable for payment of any fine imposed by the local
government officer in case of his default showed obligations of a
personal character inconsistent with his plea.
Held, that, on a proper construction of the contracts taking
into account all the terms and conditions as a whole and considering them in the light of the background of the Second
Five Year Plan, when the appellant signed the contracts as the
Mukhiya of the Village Panchayat he acted as its agent and not
as an individual acting in his personal capacity.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
139 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated January 8, 1959, of the Patna High Court
in Election Appeal No. 1 of 1958, arising out of the
judgment and order dated November 30, 1957, of the
Election Tribunal, Patna, in Election Petition No.
353 of 1957.
B. K. P. Sinha and D. P. Singh, for the appellant.
G. 0. Mathur and Dipak D. Ohoudhri, for respondent No. 1.
R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 3.
1959.
April .14.
The Judgment of the Court w11.s
delivered by
J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave
arises from the election petition filed by respondent,
1 (No. 353 of 1957) in which he claimed a declaration
that the election of the appellant as a member of the
•
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
Bihar Legislative Assembly
Maner Constituency
r959
should be declared to be void. In the last General
Election for the said constituency which was held in Bhagwan Singh
v.
February-March 1957, there were three candidates,
Rameshwar
the appellant, respondent 1 and respondent 2.
The Prasad Sastri
last date for filing nomination papers at the said elec-
-
tion was January 29, 1957; the said papers were Gajendragadkar J.
scrutinised on February 1, 1957. Respondent 1 had
challenged the validity of the appellant's nomination
paper at the said scrutiny but the returning officer
had overruled the objection raised by respondent I
and had accepted the nomination paper of the appellant along with those of the two other candidates.
After the counting of votes was done on March 3,
1957, the appellant was declared duly elected at the
election inasmuch as he had got 9,826 votes while respondents 1 and 2 had got 7,526 and 49 votes respectively. Thereupon respondent 1 filed his election
petition under s. 81 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act).
In his petition respondent 1 challenged the election
of the appellant on several grounds all of which were
controverted by the appellant. On the allegations of
the parties the tribunal had framed several issues and
parties had led evidence on them. At the stage of
arguments, however, only a few issues were pressed by
respondent 1 and all of them were found against him
and in favour of the appellant. In the result the tribunal dismissed the election petition on November 30,
1957.
Against the said decision of the tribunal respondent
1 preferred an appeal in the High Court of Judicature
at Patna; and in his appeal he pressed only issue No. 1.
This issue was whether the nomination of the appellant was hit by the provision of s. 7(d) of the Act and
as such whether the said nomination had been improperly accepted. On this issue the tribunal had found
in favour of the appellant but the High Court reversed the said finding and accepted the plea of respondent 1.
As a result of this finding the High Court
allowed the appeal preferred by respondent I and
68
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
1959
declared on January 8, 1959, that the election of the
appellant. was void nuder s. IOO(l){a) of the Act.
Bhagw:~ Singh
The validity of the appellant's nomination has been
Rameshwa.
challenged under s. 7(d) of the Act on the ground that
Prasad Sastd at the date of the nomination he had an interest in a
-
contract for the execution of works undertaken by the
Gajendragadkar J. Bihar Government. There is no doubt that if a person is interested in a contract for the execution of any
work undertaken by the appropriate Government he
is disqualified for membership of the State Legislature
in question. The appellant, however, denied that. the
disqualification imposed by s. 7(d) could be invoked
against him.
His case was that the contracts in question had not been undertaken by the Bihar Government but they had been undertaken by the Central
Government; and he also urged that he had not
taken the said contracts individually in his personal
capacity, but as the Mukhiya of the Jeorakhan Tola
Gram Panchayat. On both these issues the Election
Tribunal and the High Court have differed; and it is
the said two issues that arise for our decision in the
present appeal. It is clear that if the appellant succeeds
in showing t.hat he had entered into the impugned
contracts not individually but on behalf of the Panchayat of which he was the Mukhiya it would be unnecessary to consider whether the works covered by the
said contracts had been undertaken by the Government
of Bihar. Let us therefore first consider that point.
The impugned contracts are five in number. They
were for the execution of works under local develop.
ment works programme envisaged under the Second
Five Year Plan formulated by the Government of
India. These contracts are evidenced by five documents, Exs. 16-A, B, C, D & E. The first is for the
construction of Beyapore-Jeorakhan Tola Road, the
second for the construction of the Beyapore M. E.
School, the third for the construction of a Dispensary
at Jeorakhan Tola, the fourth for the construction of
the Gram Panchayat building, and the last for the
construction of a well at the said village. It is admitted by the appellant that these contracts had not been
completed at the time of his nomination.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
In considering the appellant's plea that he had exez959
outed these contracts as a Mukhiya of the Village Bhagwan Singh
Panchayat of his village, it would be necessary to
v.
bear in mind the background of the scheme in pursuRameshwar
ance of which these works were undertaken. The Prasad Sastri
Second Five Year Plan published by the Planning
.
-
·
Commission in 1956 shows that the programme ofGa;endragadkar f.
starting these works was treated as a part of the cooperative movement and the Commission had therefore recommended that the States were to sponsor
and assist actively in the organisation and development of Village Panchayats which was an important
constituent of the programme of fostering corporate
life in the rural areas as it would promote among the
rural community active interest in the development
programmes of the villages. The object of this programme which would operate in areas not yet reached
by the National Extension Service was to enable
village communities to undertake works of local benefit mainly with their own labour. The Commission realised that the resources of all the States taken together
would fall far short of the requirements of this Plan
and so it recommended large transfers of resources
from the Centre to the States. In this connection the
conclusion of the Commission was that out of Rs. 200
crores sanctioned for the year 1957-58, 12 crores
would be required for the Centre for schemes undertaken or directly sponsored by the Community Project
·Administration and 180 crores were to form part of
the balance for the ctates. Thus it is obvious that
the basic idea underlying the Plan was to ~voke popular response to the community projects undertaken in
pursuance of the Plan and to leave the execution of
different works adopted under the Plan to be fulfilled
by popular local agencies like Village Panchayats.
This policy was emphasised by the Secretary of the
Planning Commission in his communication to all
State-Oovernments, No. POf.Pub/52/53 dated August
11, 1953 (H. 1).
This communication set out the
seven categories of work which were most suitable for
assistance and it said that the local contribution in
cash or kind or through voluntary labour together
540
SUPl~EME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
'959
with any contribution that the State Government or
a local body might make should be a minimum of 50%
Bhagwan Singh of the total cost of each work.
The intention was to
v.
Rameshw••
spread the benefit over as wide an area and to as
Prasad Sastri many people as possible.
The State Governments
-
were accordingly requested to arrange for a detailed
Gajend.agadkar J. scrutiny of the schemes before they were accepted and
for making adequate provisions providing for their proper execution. They were also required to nominate a
liaison officer for each district or other suitable unit for
the purpose of checking the execution of the works and
for maintenance of such initial accounts as might be
necessary. This communication makes detailed provisions about financing and accounting procedures to
be followed and required the State Governments to
make progress reports from time to time.
It appears that the Government of India was
aware that the District Boards whose primary responsibility it was to sponsor-these undertakings would find
the project beyond their financial resources and so it
accepted the recommendation of the Planning Commission to contribute 50%. of the cost of each of the schemes on the condition that the remaining half had to
be found by the District Board or by the public to be
benefited by it in the form of cash or voluntary
labour.
·
· The five impugned contracts related to community
projects of the kind envisaged by this programme. By
its letter dated February 27, 1954 '(H. 2) the Bihar
Government had advised all the District Local Boards
, to assist the execution of such projects and to afford
all facilities to and .co-operate with the district officers
in the execution of the programmes undertaken by
these projects without charging any remuneration for
the same. The idea clearly was that if the Village
Panchayats sponsored works undertaken under these
programmes they should encourage people to contribute labour and even money. The result would be that the
works undertaken would benefit the community at large
and if any saving was made in executing the contract
it would enure for the benefit of the village Panchayats
that were usually expected to be the sponsoring units.
(2) S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
It is in the light of this background that we have to
z959
consider the question whether the contracts in quesd b
h
11
h
d. .
Bhagwan Singh
tion had been execute
y t e appe ant in is in iv1v.
dual capacity as contended by respondent 1 or in his
Rameshwa~
capacity as the Mukhiya of the Village Panchayat as
Prasad Sastri
urged by the appellant.
.
-
The four contracts evidenced by Exs. 16A, 0, D and Ga;endragadkar J.
E are all similarly executed whereas contract 16-B
which is in respect of the construction of the Beyapo:r;e M. E. School is somewhat differently worded.
With regard to this latter contract both the Election
Tribunal and the High Court are agreed that it had
been executed by the appellant as the Secretary of the
Beyapore MadhyamikVidyalaya and that in this contract the appellant was not personally interested. The
Election Tribunal took the view that the other contracts ar.e substantially of the same character whereas
the High Court has held that they are entirely different and that the appellant has personally executed
them. The question which we have now to decide is
whether this view of the High Court is right.
We would take Ex. 16-A as typical of the remaining
four contracts. The material terms of this contract
are 8 in number and they are all in the prescribed form.
At the commencement of the contract the appellant
has described himself by his name and he has stated
that he belongs to the village of Jeorakhan Tola
and that his profession is cultivation. The preamble
to the contract shows that the appellant undertook to
carry out the construction of the development project
under local works programme mentioned in the contract as per estimate attached thereto and he agreed
to execute the work according to and subject to the
terms and conditions contained therein, and he also
undertook to contribute 50% of the cost in cash and
labour. At the end the appellant has signed as Mukhiya and has given his address as Jeorakhan Tola
Gram Panchayat.
The High Court took the view
that the description of the appellant given by him at
the time when he signed the contract was not a term
of the contract and could not therefore support his
plea that he had executed the contract as Mukhiya of
1959
Bhagw.in .5ingh
v.
l~amcshwar
J'rasad Sastri
Gajendragadkar
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
the Panchayat. It is on this ground that the High
Court distinguished this and the other three allied contracts from the school contract, Ex. 16-B. In this
latter contract the appellant has described himself as
the Secretary, Madhyamik Vidyalaya, both at the
commencement of the document and at the end where
J. the appellant has signed. In our opinion, the distinction made by the High Court between the two sets of
contracts is not valid. · We do not see any reason to
take the view that the description given by the appellant about his status while he signed the contract is no
part of the contract itself. Incidentally we may observe that the contract is accepted by the officer who
signs as the S. D. 0., Dinapore. The designation of
the officer given by him while signing the acceptance
of the contract indicates the character in which the
officer has accepted the contract. Similarly. the description given by the appellant about his status and
character when he signed the contract should be
taken to denote the character in which he executed
the contract.
The High Court also thought that els. 4 and 7 by
which the appellant undertook liability to execute the
contract as required and to become liable for payment
of any fine imposed by the local government officer in
case of his default clearly showed obligations of a personal type which were inconsistent with his plea that
he had entered into the contract as the Mukhiya of
the Panchayat. We think that this argument has no
force. If the nature of the liability undertaken by
these two clauses necessarily involves the conclusion
that the execution of the contract must be by an individual person, then it is significant that the same two
clauses occur in the school contract and yet the High
Court has held .that the said contract has been executed by the appellant not in his individual capacity but
as the Secretary of the Madhyamik Vidyalaya. Therefore too much reliance cannot be placed upon these
two clauses to support the view that the contract has
been executed by the appellant personally.
Besides, the High Court has not properly considered
the term of the contract by which the contracting
•
(2) ,S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
54S
party undertakes to contribute 50% of the cost of the
x959
work in cash or labour. In other words, the contractBhagwan Singh
ing party becomes a sponsoring agent of the contract
v.
and agrees to undertake 50% of its cost. It is very
Rameshwnr
difficult to appreciate the suggestion that the appellant
Prasad Sa<tri
personally and in his individual character agreed to
.
-
contribute 50% of the cost in cash or labour. In Ga;endragadkar J.
ordinary course a person who undertakes to carry out
a building contract expects to make profit and would
never agree to contribute 50% of the cost of the contemplated work. This clause clearly indicates that
the sponsoring of the contract was really done by the
Village Panchayat which agreed through its Mukhiya
that it would contribute 50% of the cost either in cash
or in labour. Consistently with the general policy of
Plan the Village Panchayat became a sponsoring
agent and hoped and expected to obtain popular response from the villagers who would contribute their
labour and thus make up the 50% of the cost of the
intended work. Therefore, in our opinion, if the contract in question is considered in the light of the background of the Plan of which it forms one item, and
all its conditions are taken into account together, there
can be no doubt th'at the appellant as the Mukhiya of
the Village Panchayat acted as its agent when he signed the contract, and not as an individual acting in his
personal capacity.
This position is also corroborated by the record
kept by the Village Panchayat in respect of these
contracts. This record consists of the several proceedings before the Village Panchayat, the budgets adopted
by it and the resolutions passed by it from time to
time in respect of these contracts. It had been alleged
by respondent 1 that the whole of this record had
been fabricated for the purpose of the present proceedings. The Election Tribunal has made a definite
finding against respondent ·1 on this point: It has
considered the oral evidence given by the appellant
and other witnesses in proving the said record. It has
examined the entries themselves on their merits and
has taken into account the fact that some of the
exhibits showed that they had been signed and
544
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
'959
approved by the District Panchayat Officer from time
to time. The tribunal, therefore, thought that it was
Bhagwan Singh
v.
imposRible to believe that all persons who purported
Ram.,hwa.
to sign the record had helped the appellant to manuPrasad SastYi facture it simply because the appellant was the
.
-
Mukhiya of the village.
The judgment of the High
Gaymdragadkar J. Court shows that it was not prepared to reverse this
finding in terms. It has, however, made certain
observations in respect of this record which would
show that it was not prepared to attach any importance to it. "The papers", says the judgment, "do
not inspire much confidence and cannot be relied upon
in proof of the facts disclosed by them". It is unfortunate that when a serious allegation was made
against the whole of the record alleged to have been
kept by the Village Panchayat and it had been categorically rejected by the Election Tribunal, the High
Court should not have made its own finding on the
point in clear and unambiguous terms.
The oral evidence led by the appellant in support
of the record and the other material circumstances
considered by the Election Tribunal do not appear
to have been properly taken into account by the High
Court in dealing with this point. The High Court
was, however, impressed by what it called two defects
in respect of this record. It observed that the accounts
had not been audited as required by r. 20 of the Bihar
Gram Panchayat Account Rules, 1949, and that the
cash balance had not been kept by the Mukhiya in
the nearest Post Office Savings Bank or in any recognised Co.operative Bank or a Government Treasury in the name of the Panchayat as required by
r. 8.
These two defects may undoubtedly suggest
that the officers of the Panchayat including the appellant had not acted properly and had not complied
with the obligations imposed by the said rules ; but it
is difficult to understand how the said two defects can
have a material and direct bearing on the question as
to whether the record had been fabricated. If the
High Court intended to hold that the record had in
fact been fabricated it should have considered the
relevant evidence and the material circumstances
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
more carefully and should have made a definite finding
r959
in that behalf. To say that the record bore onJy the
signatures of the appellant and his clerk and to seek Bhagw~'. Singh
to draw an adverse inferen~e from that fact is, in our
Rameshwar
opinion, adopting a wrong approach to the question.
Prasad Sastri
If the appellant was the Mukhiya he was bound to
-
sign the record, and so was the clerk bound to write Gajendragadkar J.
it; that cannot therefore be treated as a suspicious
circumstance by itself.
We have carefully examined
this question and we do not see any reason why the
well-considered finding of the Election Tribunal on
this point should not have been accepted. Therefore,
we must assume that the Panchayat record produced
by the appellant is not shown to have been fabricated.
.
Besides, the High Court itself appears to have assumed that this record showed that there was an understanding between the appellant and the Village
Panchayat in regard to the financial obligations involved in the execution of the impugned contracts. "It
might well be", says the judgment," that the loss or
the ·profit was ultimately to be borne or pocketed by
the Gram Panchayat itself'.'; but that, according to
the High Court," does not take away the effect of the
contract itself which on the face of it was entered into
by the appellant himself". If the Panchayat agreed
to bear the loss or take the profit flowing from the
performance of the contract then it clearly supports
the appellant's case that he had executed the contract
as the Mukhiya of the Panchayat. The arrangement
to which the High Court refers, if genuine, would be
wholly inconsistent with the case set up by respondent
I that the contract had been executed by the appellant personally.
The High Court has also held that the appellant
had not made out this specific case either before the
returning officer when his nomination was challenged
or in the present proceedings when he filed his written
statement. The appellant had no doubt stated in
reply that he had no interest in any contract undertaken by the State Government. According to the
69
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
x959
High Court his failure to add the further particular
that the contract had been executed by him on behalf
Bhagwan Singh
f h p
h
d 1
v.
o t e anc ayat·shows that the sai pea is an afterRameshwa.
thought. We are unable to see the force of this critiP.asad Sast.i cism. But apart from it, the question raised by the
-
appellant relates to the construction of the contract
Gajendragadkar J. and we do not see how the construction of a document
can be prejudicially affected by the failure of the
party to make a more specific and more precise plea
in his written statement. We have no doubt that, if
the contract is considered as a whole, it would show
that the appellant had executed it as the Mukhiya of
the Village Panchayat and this conclusion cannot be
affected by the alleged defect in the plea taken by him
in the written statement.
The High Court has also relied on the fact that if
the contract was intended to be executed by the
'appellant on behalf of the Panchayat it should have
been executed in the name of the corporate body as
required by s. 6 of the Bihar Panehayat Raj Act
(Bihar Act 7 of 1958). It may be that the Gram
Panchayat is a body corporate by the name specified
in the notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 and has a
perpetual succession and a common seal, and so has
power to contract in the name of the body corporate;
but as the judgment of the High Court itself points
out the in validity of the contract would not affect the
merits of the issue raised under s. 7(d) of the Act.
That is the view taken by this Court in Ohatturbhuj
Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (1), and
that in fact is the point made by the High Court in
rejecting the appellant's contention that since the
contract was invalid he could not be said to be interested in it under s. 7(d) of the Act. Therefore, the invalidity of the contract cannot help us in deciding the
question as to whether, on its true construction, the
contract can be said to have been executed by the
appellant in his personal capacity or as the Milkhiya
of the Village Panchayat. Our conclusion, therefore,
is that the four impugned contracts have been executed
by the appellant as the Mukhiya of the Village
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 817.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"54:7
Panchayat just in the same way as he had executed the
z959
school contract as the Secretary of the Vidyalaya in
b
Bhagwan Singh
question. That
eing so, s. 7(d) cannot be invoked
v.
against him. In view of this conclusion it is unnecesRameshwar
sary to decide whether the works in question had Prasad Sastri
been undertaken by the Government of Bihar or by
-
the Central Government.
.
Gajendragadkar ].
The result is that the appeal must be allowed, the
order passed by the High Court set aside arid that of
the tribunal restored ; respondent 1 shall pay the.
costs of the appellant throughout; and the Election
Commission shall bear their own.
We would like to add that, after this appeal was
argued before us on April 2, 1959, we had announced
our decis!on · that the appeal would be allowed and
that the judgment would be delivered later on in due
eourse. It is in pursuance of that order that the present judgment has been delivered.
Appeal allowed.
M/S. MAHARANA MILLS (PRIVATE) LTD.
v.
THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER, PORBANDAR
(B. P. SINHA, J. L. KAPUR and
M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Income Tax-Depreciation-Written Down V alue-C amputation for prior years-Whether binding for succeeding years-Fresh
calculation for written down value by Income-tax Officer-Notice
to assessee-When essential-Indian Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of
r922), ss. ro(z)(vi), 35(r), 63,
Sub-section (r) of s. 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
provided: " .................. the Income-tax officer may ...... on his
own motion rectify any mistake apparent from the record ......
and shall ...... rectify any such mistake which has been brought
to his notice by an assessee: Provided that no such rectificatioa
shall be made, having the effect of enhancing or reducing a
I959
April I4.