# BHAGWATI PRASAD v. SURI CHANDRAMAUL

- **Citation:** [1966] 2 S.C.R. 286
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-10-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 964 and 965 of 1964
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, V. Ramaswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhagwati-prasad-v-suri-chandramaul-3537
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

~ractice & Procedure-Detajls in pleadings-When dee1ned sufficient.
Licensee-Ejected, if liable to pay 1nesne profits.
A
The respondent filed a suit alleging that he was the owner of a house
let out to the appellant 'as a tenant and claimed a decree for the appel- c
!ant's ejectmenl, arrears of rent and future mesne profits. The appellant
admitted that the land over which the house had been
constructed belonged to the respondent but pleaded that the house
had been constructed by the appellant at his own· cost on the condition that he would
continue to occupy it until the amount spent by him on the construction
was repaid to him by the respondent.
The trial court disbelieved
the
appellant's version and also disbelieved the agreement as to the rent on '
which the respondent relied and held that the
relationship of landlord
D
and tenant had been proved and that the
respondent was entitled to a
decree for ejectment as well as to a reduced amount by \vay of rent and
directed the appellant to pay damages by way of use and occupation till
the date of ejectment.
On appeal the High Court held that the appellant must be deemed to have been in possession of the house as a
licensee and treating the respondent's claim for
ejectment on the basis
that the appellant was proved to be a licensee of the premises. the High ·
Court confirmed the decree for ejectment; but it set aside the decree to
E
pay past rent and mesne profits being of the view that even if the respondent's case about the tenancy had been proved, such a tenancy would
have. been invalid because of the relevant statutory provisions then pre~
vailing in the area.
Both the appellant and respondent appealed to this
Court:
·
HELD : If a party asked for a relief on a clear and specific ground,
and in the issues or at the trial, no other ground was
covered either
directly or by necessary implication, it would not be open to the said
party to attempt to sustain the same claim· on a ground which is entirely
new.
But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both the
parties to the suit are touched.
though indirectly,
in the
issues.
and
evidence has been le<l about them, then the argument
that a particular
matter was not expressly taken _in the pleadings \Vould ·be purely form.al
and technical and cannot succeed in every case.
\Vhat the court has to
conside·r in dealing \Vith such ari objection is : did the parties kno\v that
the matter in question was involved
in the
trial,
and did
they lead
evide.nce about it?
If it appears that the parties did not know that the
matter was in i"Ssue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity
to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedlv
would be a different
mailer [290 F; 291 D-F]
'
. In the present case, having regard to all the
facts, the High Court
did not err in ~onfirming the decree for ejectment on the ground that the
appellant was 111 pos"Scssion of the suit premises as a licensee.
On
the
plea~ taken by the appellant in his written statement -in clear and unambiguous language. only two issues could arise between the partic_l : is the
F
G
H
BHAGWATI v. CHANDRAMAUL (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
287
A
appellant the tenant of the respondent or is he holding the property as
the licensee subject to the terms specified in the written statement ? In
effect, the written statement pleaded licence, subject to the condition that
the licensee was to remain in possession until the amount spent by him
was returned by the respondent. [292 G-Hl
Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar, [1953] S.C.R. 789
and Sheodhar Rai & Ors. v. Suraj Prasad Singh & Ors., A.I.R. 1954 S.C.
(
B
758, referred to.
"·
c
D
E
F
G
H
In regard to the respondent's claim for past rent, no interference was
called for with the decree passed by the High Court, but its decree in
relation to future mesne profits could not be sustained, Once it was held
that the respondent was entitled to eject the
appellant it followed that
from the date of the decree granting the r

## Text

BHAGWATI PRASAD
v.
SURI CHANDRAMAUL
October 19, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]
~ractice & Procedure-Detajls in pleadings-When dee1ned sufficient.
Licensee-Ejected, if liable to pay 1nesne profits.
A
The respondent filed a suit alleging that he was the owner of a house
let out to the appellant 'as a tenant and claimed a decree for the appel- c
!ant's ejectmenl, arrears of rent and future mesne profits. The appellant
admitted that the land over which the house had been
constructed belonged to the respondent but pleaded that the house
had been constructed by the appellant at his own· cost on the condition that he would
continue to occupy it until the amount spent by him on the construction
was repaid to him by the respondent.
The trial court disbelieved
the
appellant's version and also disbelieved the agreement as to the rent on '
which the respondent relied and held that the
relationship of landlord
D
and tenant had been proved and that the
respondent was entitled to a
decree for ejectment as well as to a reduced amount by \vay of rent and
directed the appellant to pay damages by way of use and occupation till
the date of ejectment.
On appeal the High Court held that the appellant must be deemed to have been in possession of the house as a
licensee and treating the respondent's claim for
ejectment on the basis
that the appellant was proved to be a licensee of the premises. the High ·
Court confirmed the decree for ejectment; but it set aside the decree to
E
pay past rent and mesne profits being of the view that even if the respondent's case about the tenancy had been proved, such a tenancy would
have. been invalid because of the relevant statutory provisions then pre~
vailing in the area.
Both the appellant and respondent appealed to this
Court:
·
HELD : If a party asked for a relief on a clear and specific ground,
and in the issues or at the trial, no other ground was
covered either
directly or by necessary implication, it would not be open to the said
party to attempt to sustain the same claim· on a ground which is entirely
new.
But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both the
parties to the suit are touched.
though indirectly,
in the
issues.
and
evidence has been le<l about them, then the argument
that a particular
matter was not expressly taken _in the pleadings \Vould ·be purely form.al
and technical and cannot succeed in every case.
\Vhat the court has to
conside·r in dealing \Vith such ari objection is : did the parties kno\v that
the matter in question was involved
in the
trial,
and did
they lead
evide.nce about it?
If it appears that the parties did not know that the
matter was in i"Ssue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity
to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedlv
would be a different
mailer [290 F; 291 D-F]
'
. In the present case, having regard to all the
facts, the High Court
did not err in ~onfirming the decree for ejectment on the ground that the
appellant was 111 pos"Scssion of the suit premises as a licensee.
On
the
plea~ taken by the appellant in his written statement -in clear and unambiguous language. only two issues could arise between the partic_l : is the
F
G
H
BHAGWATI v. CHANDRAMAUL (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
287
A
appellant the tenant of the respondent or is he holding the property as
the licensee subject to the terms specified in the written statement ? In
effect, the written statement pleaded licence, subject to the condition that
the licensee was to remain in possession until the amount spent by him
was returned by the respondent. [292 G-Hl
Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar, [1953] S.C.R. 789
and Sheodhar Rai & Ors. v. Suraj Prasad Singh & Ors., A.I.R. 1954 S.C.
(
B
758, referred to.
"·
c
D
E
F
G
H
In regard to the respondent's claim for past rent, no interference was
called for with the decree passed by the High Court, but its decree in
relation to future mesne profits could not be sustained, Once it was held
that the respondent was entitled to eject the
appellant it followed that
from the date of the decree granting the relief of ejectment to the respondent the appellant who remained in possession of the property despite
the decree, must pay mesne profits or damages
for use and occupation
of the said property until it was delivered to the respondent.
A decree
for ejectment in such a casei must be accompanied by a
direction for
payment of the future mesne profits or damages.
[294F-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 964
and 965 of 1964.
Appeals from the judgments and decree dated December 14,
1962 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 564 of
1958.
M. C. Setalvad, J. P. Goyal, for appellant (In C. A. No. 964
of 1964) and respondent (In C.A. No. 965 of 1964).
A. Ranganadham Chetty, E. C. Aganvala and P. C. Aganvaia,
for respondent (Jn C.A. No. 964 of 1964) and appellant (In
C.A. No. 965 of 1964).
The Judgment _of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J.
These two cross appeals arise from
a suit filed by Chandramaul (hereinafter called the plaintiff)
against Bhagwati Prasad (hereinafter called the defendant) in
the Court of the Second Civil Judge, Kanpur.
The plaintiff
alleged that he was the owner of house No. 59/8, Nachghar,
Birhana Road, Kanpur and that he had let out tl1e said house
to the defendant as his tenant.
According to the plaint, the
plaintiff and the defendant were friends and enjoyed mutual confidence.
As the house was being constructed, the defendant
wanted some premises for residence, and so, when the ground
floor was constructed he was let in as a tenant by the plaintiff on
a monthly rent of Rs. 150 in 1947. In 1948, the first floor was
completed and the defendant took that portion as well as a tenant
on an additional rent of Rs. 150 p.m.
By 1950, another floor
had been added and the defendant was given the said floor as
L2Sup.C.l./66-~ 5
288
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
well on a further additional rent of Rs. 150 p.m.
Thus, the
A
defendant was in possession of the house as a tenant of the plaintiff on the condition that he was to pay Rs. 450 p.m. as rent.
The defendant continued to pay this rent and was not in arrears
in that behalf as on the 31st March, 1954. Thereafter, he failed
to pay the rent, and so, the plaintiff terminated his tenancy and
brought the present suit on the 30th November, 1955 claiming B
ejectment against the defendant and a decree for Rs. 8,550 as
arrears of rent from the 1st April, 1954 to the end of October,
1955. Future mesne profits were also claimed.
The defendant admitted that the land over which the house
stood belonged to the plaintiff. He, however, pleaded that the C
house had been constructed by the defendant at his own cost and
that too at the request of the plaintiff, because the plaintiff had
no funds to construct the building on his own.
Having constructed the house at his own cost, the defendant went into possession
of the house on condition that the defendant would continue to
occupy the house until the amount spent by him on the construeD
tion was repaid to him by the plaintiff.
According to the defendant, he had spent Rs. 32,704-1-0 on the construction of the
house.
Basing himself on this agreement, the defendant resisted
the claim made by the plaintiff for ejectment as well as for rent.
On these pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed seven E
issues.
He disbelieved the defendant's version in regard to the
construction of the house and found that the agreement set up by
him in that behalf on the basis that he spent the money on the
construction of the house himself, had not been established. He
also disbelieved the plaintiff's case about the agreement as to rent
on which the plaintiff relied.
According to the trial Judge, the F
defendant had admitted the ownership of the plaintiff, and having
regard to the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties,
he came to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and
tenant had been proved.
Having made this specific basic finding,
the learned trial Judge held that the suit was competent and came
to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for G
ejectment as well as for rent.
In regard to the amount of rent, however, the learned trial
Judge did not accept the plaintiff's version and considered the
t<Juestion on the merits.
He held that Rs. 300 p.m. would be a
reasonable rent for
the premises in question. That is how he
H
passed a decree for Rs. 5,700 in favour of the p)aintiff as arrears
of rent from 1st April, 1954 up to the 31st October, 1955. The
"
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BHAGWATI v. CHANDRAMAUL (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
289
decree further directed the defendant to pay damages by way of
use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 300 p.m. till the date of
ejectment.
Against this decree the defendant preferred an appeal before •
the Allahabad High Court.
The High Court has agreed with
the trial Court in disbelieving the defendant's version about the
construction of the house and about the terms and conditions on
which he had been let into possession.
The High Court was also
not satisfied with the plaintiff's version about the tenancy between
him and the defendant.
Having regard to the fact that the defendant had virtually admitted the title otthe plaintiff, the High Court -
held that the defendant must be deemed to have been in possession
of the house as a licensee; and treating the plaintiff's claim for
ejectment on the basis that the defendant was proved to be a
licensee of the premises, the High Court has confirmed the decree
for ejectment passed by the trial Court.
It has, however, set aside the said decree insofar as it directed the defendant to pay past rent at the rate of Rs. 300 p.m. This
decision was the result of the fact that the High Court was not
satisfied that the plaintiff had established any of the terms of the
tenancy.
In that connection, the High Court has reforred to the
fact that even if the plaintiff's case about the tenancy had been
E
proved, such a tenancy would have been invalid because of the
relevant statutory provisions then prevailing in the
area. In
December, 1946, the State Government of U.P. had issued an
Ordinance controlling the Jetting of residential and non-residential
accommodation.
This Ordinance was later enacted as the U.P.
F
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (No. ID) of
194 7.
The material provisions of this Act as well as the previous
Ordinance require that no premises could be Jet out by the landlord without the permission of the District Magistrate or other
appropriate authorities mentioned in that behalf. Thus, the
tenancy not having been proved, the High Court came to the
G conclusion that it would be inappropriate to allow any rent to the
plaintiff at all.
That is how while confirming the decree for
ej~t~e?t passed by the trial Court, the High Court rejected the
plamtiff s case for rent or for mesne profits.
It appears that his
claim for future mesne profits was also not upheld.
H
Against this decree Civil Appeals Nos. 964 and 965 of 1964
bave been filed in tbis Court by the plaintiff and the defendant
~espectively with a certificate granted to them by the Hi.gh Court
m that behalf.
The defendant objects to the decree for eject-
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
ment, whereas the plaintiff objects to the rejection of his claim
A
for the past rent and future mesne profits.
Mr. Setalvad for the defendant contends that in confirming
1 the trial Court's decree for ejectment, the High Court has made
a new case for the plaintiff, and that, according to him, is not
permissible in law.
The plaintiff came to the Court with a clear B ,
and specific case of tenancy between him and the defendant and
that case has been rejected. by the High Court. As soon as the
plaintiff's case of tenancy was rejected, his claim for ejectment
should also have been negative. In support of this argument
Mr. Setalvad has referred us to the decision of this Court in
C
Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar('). In that
case, this Court has observed that it is well-settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings
of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. It
is necessary to remember that these observations were made in
regard to a claim made by the plaintiff for a certain sum of money D
on the ground that the defendant had sold certain shares belonging to him without his instructions, but he had failed to prove
that the sale had not been authorised by him.
The question
which the Court had to consider in the case of Trojan & Co.(1)
was that in view of the plaintiff's failure to prove his case that
the impugned sale was unauthorised, was it open to him to make
E
a claim for the same amount on the ground of failure of consideration ? And this Court held that such a claim which was
new and inconsistent with the original case could not be upheld.
There can be no doubt that if a party asks for a relief on a
clear and specific ground, and in the issues or at the trial, no F
other ground is covered either directly or by necessary implication, it would not be open to the said party to attempt to sustain
the same claim on a ground which is entirely new.
The same
principle was laid down by this Court in Sheodhar Rai & Others
v. Sura; Prasad Singh & Others('). In that case, it was held that G
where the defendant in his written statement sets up a title to the
disputed lands as the nearest reversioner, the Court cannot, on
his failure to prove the said case, permit hin1 to make out a new
case which is not only not made in the written statement, but
which is wholly inconsistent with the title set up by the defendant
in the written statement.
The new plea on which the defendant H
songht to rely in that case was that be was holding the suit property
--~--
·-----
(!) [1953] S.C.R. 789.
(2) A.l.R. 1954 S.C.R. 758.
•
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'•
•
•
.....
BHAGWATI v. CHANDRAMAUL (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
291
A under a shikmi settlement from the nearest reversioner. It would
be noticed that this new plea was in fact not made in the written
statement, had not been included in any issue and, therefore, no
evidence was or could have been led about it. In such a case
clearly a party cannot be permitted to justify its claim on a ground
B
c
which is entirely new and which is inconsistent with the ground
made by it in its pleadings .
But in considering the application of this doctrine to the facts
of the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the other prin·
ciple that considerations of form cannot over-ride the legitimate
considerations of substance. If a plea is not specifically made
and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties
knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere
fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would
not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is
satisfactorily proved by evidence.
The general rule no doubt is
D that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties.
But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both
parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscure~
ly in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the
argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the
pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot
E
succeed in every case.
What the Court has to consider in dealing
with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter
in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence
about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the
matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no
opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly
F
would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a
matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence
and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce
considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the
Court cannot do injustice to another.
G
Therefore, in dealing with Mr. Setalvad's ar•ument our
•
b
'
e11qnu;y should not be so much about the form of the pleadings
as their substance; we must find out whether the ground of licence
on which the plaintiff's claim for ejectment has been confirmed
by the Hii?11 Court was in substance the subject-matter of the trial
H
or not; did the defendant know that alternatively, the plaintiff
would rely upon the plea of licence and has evidence been oiven
about the sai~ plea b~ both the parties or not? If the an;wers
to these questions are m favour of the plaintiff, then the technical
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
objection that the plaint did not specifically make out a case for A
licence, would not avail the defendant.
Turning then to the pleadings and evidence in this case, there
can be little doubt that the defendant knew what he was specifically pleading. He had admitted the title of the plaintiff in regard
to the plot and set up a case as to the manner in which he spent his
B
own money in constructing the house.
The plaintiff Jed evidence
about the tenancy set up by him and the defendant led evidence
about the agreement on which he relied.
Both the pleas are clear
and specific and the common basis of both the pleas was that the
plaintiff was the owner and the defendant was in possession by
his permission. In such a case the relationship be<tween the C
parties would be either that of a landlord and tenant, or that of
an owner of property and a person put into possession of it by
the owner's licence.
No other alternative is logically or legitimately possible.
When parties led evidence in this case, clearly
they were conscious of this position, and so, when the High Court
came to th* conclusion that the tenancy had not been proved, but D
the defendant's agreement also had not been established, it clearly
followed that the defendant was in possession of the 5uit premises
-by the leave and licence of the plaintiff. Once this conclusion
was reached, the question as to whether any relief can be granted
to the plaintiff or not was a mere matter of law, and in deciding
thi~ point in favour of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that any E
prejudice has been caused to the defendant.
When Mr. Setalvad was pressing his point about the prejudice
to the defendant and the impropriety of the course adopted by
the High Court in confirming the decree for ejectment on the
ground of licence, we asked him whether he could suggest to us F
any other possible plea which the defendant could have taken if
a licence was expressly pleaded by the plaintiff in the alternative.
Tile only answer which Mr. Setalvad made was that in the absence
of definite instructions, it would not be possible for him to suggest
any such plea.
In our opinion, having regard to the pleas taken
by the defendant in his written statement in clear and unambiguous G
lamrnage, only two issues could arise between the parties : is the
defendant the tenant of the plaintiff, or is he holding the property
as the licensee subject to the terms specified by the written statement ? In effect, the written statement pleaded licence, subject
to the condition that the licensee was to remain in possession
until the amount spent by him was returned by the plaintiff. This
ff
latter plea has been rejected, while the admission about the permissive character of the defendant's possession remains.
That is
;
...
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BHAGWATI v. CHANDRAMAUL (Ga;endragadkar, C.J.)
293
A how the High Court has looked at the matter and we are unable
to see any error of law in the approach adopted by the High Court
in dealing with it.
In support of its conclusion that io. a case like the present a
decree for ejectment can be passed in favour of the plaintiff,
B
though the specific case of tenancy set up by him is not proved,
the High Court has relied upon two of its earlier Full Bench decisions.
In Abdul Ghani v. Musammat Babni('), the Allahabad
High Court took the view that in a case where the plaintiff asks
for the ejectment of the defendant on the ground that the defendant is a tenant of the premises, a decree for ejectment can be
c passed even though tenancy is not proved, provided it is established that the possession of the defendant is that of a licensee.
It
is true that in that case, before giving effect to the finding that
the defendant was a licensee, the High Court remanded the case,
because it appeared to the High Court that that part of the case
had not been clearly decided.
But once the finding was returned
D
that the defendant was in possession as a licensee, the High Court
did not feel any difficulty in confirming the decree for ejectment,
even though the plaintiff had originally claimed ejectment on the
ground of tenancy and not specifically on the ground of licence.
To the ~ame effect is the decision of the Allahabad High Court in
the case of Balmakund v. Dalu(2 ).
E
It is hardly necessary to emphasise that in a matter of this
kind, it is undesirable and inexpedient to lay down any general
rule. The importance of the pleadings cannot, of course, be ignored,
bec~use it is the pleadings that lead to the framing of
issues and a trial in every civil case has inevitably to be confined
F to the issues framed in the suit.
The whole object of framing
the issues would be defeated if parties are allowed to travel beyond
them and claim or oppose reliefs on grounds not made in the
pleadings and not covered by the issues.
But cases may occur
in which though a particular plea is not soecifically included in
the issues, parties might know that in substance, the said plea is
being tried and might lead evidence about it.
It is onlv in such
a case where the Court is satisfied that the ground
o~ which
.G
H
reliance is placed by one or the other of the parties, was in substance, at issue between them and that both of them have had
opportunity to lead evidence about it at the trial that the formal
requirement of pleadings can be relaxed.
In the present case,
having regard to all the facts, we are unable to hold that the Hfoh
Court erred in confirming the decree for ejectment passed by the
(I) l.L.R. 2S All. 2S6.
(2) I.L.R. 2S All. 498.
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 s.c.R.
trial Court on the ground that the defendant was in possession A
of the suit premises as a licensee. In this case, the High Court
was obviously impressed by the thought that once the defendant
was shown to be iu possession of the suit premises as a licensee,
it would be futile to require the plaintiff to file another suit against
the defendant for ejectment on that basis.
We are not prepared
to hold that in adopting this approach in the circumstances of this
B
ca~e, the High Court can bti said to have gone wrong in law.
The result is, the appeal preferred by the defendant fails and
is dismissed.
That takes us to the appeal preferred by the plaintiff.
This C
appeal is confined to the plaintiff's case for past rent and future
rnesne profits.
As we have already indicated, the judgment of
the High Court seems to suggest that the High Court set aside
the trial Court's decree for Rs. 5,700 as weU as for the payment
of future mesne profits.
It is true that the judgment is somewhat D
ambiguous 011 this point, but the decree drawn is clear and it
shows that the plaintifl'.'s claim both for past rent and future
mesne profits has been rejected by the High Court.
The application for leave to appeal to this Court presented by the plaintiff in
the High Court has expressly challenged the decree passed by the
High Court both in regard to the past rent and the future mesne
E
profits.
In fact, the valuation of the appeal has been placed at
over Rs. 20,000 on that basis.
So, there can be no doubt that
the plaintiff's appeal is directed against the refusal of the High
Court to grant past rent as well as future mesne profits.
In regard to the plaintiff's claim for past rent, we see no
F
reason to interfere with the decree passed by the High Court. But
we do not see how the High Courfs decree in relation to future
mesne profits can be sustained.
Once it is held that thti plaintiff
is entitle<! to eject the defendant, it follows that from the date of
the decree granting the relief of ejectment to the plaintiff, the
defendant who remains in possession of the property despite the G
decree, must pay mesne profits or damages for use and occupation of the said property nntil it is delivered to the plaintiff.
A
decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a
direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages.
Then as to the rate at which future mesne profits can be awarded
H
to the plaintiff, we see no reason to differ from the view taken
by the trial Court that the reasonable amount in the present case
would be Rs. 300 per month.
...
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BHAGWA,Tl v. CHANDRAMAUL (Gajendragadkar, C.l.)
295
Jn the result, the plaintiff's appeal is partly allowed and· a
decree is passed in his favour directing the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 300 p.m. from .
the date of the trial Court's decree, i.e .• 16th October, 1958, until
the date of delivery of possession of the- property in suit to the
plaintiff.
In the circumstances bf this case, we direct that parties
should bear own qosts in both the appeals.
AP.peal allowed in part.
'