# Bhaiy a Punjalal Bhagw.anddin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Pr4b/1uprasad

- **Citation:** [1963] 3 S.C.R. 331
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-12-22
- **Bench:** P.B. G.AJENDR.AGADKAR K. SuBBA. RAo, J.R. Mu:i>HOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhaiy-a-punjalal-bhagw-anddin-v-dave-bhagwatprasad-pr4b-1uprasad-2623
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Criminal .L7w -Life convict guilty of constructive murderSentence of derith-Legality-lndian Penal· Gode, 1860 (Act
45 of 1860) SS. 34, 149, 302, 303.
.
The appellant along with eleven others was charged and
tried for offences under ss. 147, 302 read with s.34 of the
Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution alleged that these
twelv~ persons fo:med thems~lves into an .unlawful assembly
and m prosecution of their common object committed the
offence of rioting armed with deadly weapons assaulted the
Cl.ief Head Warder and Watchmen and some of the member
in I?rosecution of t_he common object caused the death of the
C h1ef Warder. Smee the appellant was undergoing sentence
of imprisonmen~ for life there was. a f~rther charge under
s.303. of the Indian Penal Code agamst him. The trial court
c0 nv1cted all the accused for the ofl'ences for which they were
1962
Bhaiy a Punjalal
Bhagw.anddin
v.
Dave Bhagwatprasad
Pr4b/1uprasad
Raghubar D:zyi! J.
1962
,'\-Jay 4
1962
J..!ahabir COpe
,.
State of Bih,.r
G 1j :ndragad1'ar J.
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
charged and acting under s.303 sentenced the appellant
to death.
.
•
The appellant thereupon appealed to the High Court
and the sentence of death imposed on him was also referred
to the High Court. The High Court confirmed the sentence
of death and dismissed the appeal. The present appeal was
filed by way of special leave granted by this Court.
The main contention .in the appeal was that s.303 can
apply only to a case where a person while undergoing im·
prisonment for life himself commits a murder and becomes
liable to be convicted under s. 302 without recourse to constructive liability under s. 34.
Held, that if two~r more persons acting in concert in
pursuance of a pre.arranged plan proceed to commit an offence
s. 34 steps in and provides that for the act committed by one
)-
the other is liable in the same manner as if it had been done
by him al0ne. That being the effect of the rule prescribed
under s. 34 it is difficult to accept the argument that where
a person has been convicted under section 302/34 it cannot be
said that he has committed an offence of murder. The
po.ition would not be any different even if the appellant had
been convicted under s.302[: 49. Section 303 would apply
even in cases where a person undergoing sentence of imprisonment for 1ife is convicted either under s. 302 read with
s. 34 or under s. 302 read withs. 149.
\ _J
CRIMINAL APPELLA.TE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 76 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
December 22, 1961, of the Patna High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. ll8 of 1961 and death
Reference No. 2of1961.
M. S. K. Sastri for the appellant.
D. P. Singh and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1962. May 4. The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The appellant Mahabir
Gope along with eleven other persons was charged
before the First Additional :Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, with having committed offences under Es.147
.... ;
3 s.c.R:
SUPREME COURT REPORT8
333
a.nd 802 read withs. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution case was that on or about the 12th
day· of June, 1959, the appellant and the other
accused persons formed themselves into an unlawful assembly at Bhagalpur Special Central Jail and
in prosecution of the common object of the said
assembly, Rambilash Singh, the Chief Head Warder
Mohammed Ilyas and Panchand Panjiare, the night
Watchmen, were assaultt)d. That is how an offence
under s.147 was committed by the members of
the said unlawful assembly.
The prosecution <:a8e further wal!I that on or
about the said date and at the same place, in prosecution of the common object of.the said assembly,
the members of the assembly had committed an
offence of rioting with deadly weapons while the
Chief H~ad Warder and the two night Watchmen
were as~aulted, and thereby all the members of the
assembly rendered themselves liable to be punished
under s.148 of the Indian Penal Code.
The third charge framed against the members
of the

## Text

..._'
po:,
3 S.O.R.
SUPREME OOCJRT REPORTS
331
standard rent then due and thereafter· continues to
pay or tender in Court regularly such rent till the
sait is finally decided and also pays costs of the
suit as directed by the Court. It is clear that
where the legislature intended to give some benefit
to the tenant on account of ·the p'l.yment of the
arrears during the pen iency of the suit, it made a
specific provision. In the circumstances, we are of
opinion that the Court haa no discretion and has to
pass a. decree for eviction if the other conditions
ofsub.s. (2) of s. 12 of the Act are satisfied.
The result therefore is thalr this appeal fails,
and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
MAHABIIt GOPE
v.
ST ATE OF BIHAR
(P.B. G.AJENDR.AGADKAR K. SuBBA. RAo and
J.R. Mu:i>HOLKAR, JJ.)
Criminal .L7w -Life convict guilty of constructive murderSentence of derith-Legality-lndian Penal· Gode, 1860 (Act
45 of 1860) SS. 34, 149, 302, 303.
.
The appellant along with eleven others was charged and
tried for offences under ss. 147, 302 read with s.34 of the
Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution alleged that these
twelv~ persons fo:med thems~lves into an .unlawful assembly
and m prosecution of their common object committed the
offence of rioting armed with deadly weapons assaulted the
Cl.ief Head Warder and Watchmen and some of the member
in I?rosecution of t_he common object caused the death of the
C h1ef Warder. Smee the appellant was undergoing sentence
of imprisonmen~ for life there was. a f~rther charge under
s.303. of the Indian Penal Code agamst him. The trial court
c0 nv1cted all the accused for the ofl'ences for which they were
1962
Bhaiy a Punjalal
Bhagw.anddin
v.
Dave Bhagwatprasad
Pr4b/1uprasad
Raghubar D:zyi! J.
1962
,'\-Jay 4
1962
J..!ahabir COpe
,.
State of Bih,.r
G 1j :ndragad1'ar J.
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
charged and acting under s.303 sentenced the appellant
to death.
.
•
The appellant thereupon appealed to the High Court
and the sentence of death imposed on him was also referred
to the High Court. The High Court confirmed the sentence
of death and dismissed the appeal. The present appeal was
filed by way of special leave granted by this Court.
The main contention .in the appeal was that s.303 can
apply only to a case where a person while undergoing im·
prisonment for life himself commits a murder and becomes
liable to be convicted under s. 302 without recourse to constructive liability under s. 34.
Held, that if two~r more persons acting in concert in
pursuance of a pre.arranged plan proceed to commit an offence
s. 34 steps in and provides that for the act committed by one
)-
the other is liable in the same manner as if it had been done
by him al0ne. That being the effect of the rule prescribed
under s. 34 it is difficult to accept the argument that where
a person has been convicted under section 302/34 it cannot be
said that he has committed an offence of murder. The
po.ition would not be any different even if the appellant had
been convicted under s.302[: 49. Section 303 would apply
even in cases where a person undergoing sentence of imprisonment for 1ife is convicted either under s. 302 read with
s. 34 or under s. 302 read withs. 149.
\ _J
CRIMINAL APPELLA.TE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 76 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
December 22, 1961, of the Patna High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. ll8 of 1961 and death
Reference No. 2of1961.
M. S. K. Sastri for the appellant.
D. P. Singh and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1962. May 4. The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The appellant Mahabir
Gope along with eleven other persons was charged
before the First Additional :Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, with having committed offences under Es.147
.... ;
3 s.c.R:
SUPREME COURT REPORT8
333
a.nd 802 read withs. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution case was that on or about the 12th
day· of June, 1959, the appellant and the other
accused persons formed themselves into an unlawful assembly at Bhagalpur Special Central Jail and
in prosecution of the common object of the said
assembly, Rambilash Singh, the Chief Head Warder
Mohammed Ilyas and Panchand Panjiare, the night
Watchmen, were assaultt)d. That is how an offence
under s.147 was committed by the members of
the said unlawful assembly.
The prosecution <:a8e further wal!I that on or
about the said date and at the same place, in prosecution of the common object of.the said assembly,
the members of the assembly had committed an
offence of rioting with deadly weapons while the
Chief H~ad Warder and the two night Watchmen
were as~aulted, and thereby all the members of the
assembly rendered themselves liable to be punished
under s.148 of the Indian Penal Code.
The third charge framed against the members
of the unlawful assembly was tha.t in furtherance of
the common object of the said assembly, Rambilash
Singh was intentionally assaulted by some of the
members of the assembly with a view to cause his
death and that made all the members of the assembly liable under s.302/34 I.P.C.
Against the appellant, an additional charg~
was framed under s.303, I.P.C. Under this charge,
the prosecution case was that since the appallent
had committed a.n offence punishable under s.302/34
whilst he was undergoing sentence of imprisoment for
life, he rendered himself liable to be punished only
with death under s. 303 .
..-~
The learned trial Jm~ge has convicted the
appellant of the offences charged and acting under
s.303, has sentenced him to deatb.. _...,_For the purpose
1962
Mahabir G•pe
v.
State of Bihar
Goj1ndragadka• ,1
1961
Mahabir Oope
v.
·state of 'Bihar
Gajendrag~dkar J.
334
SUPREME COURT REPOR'ffi [1963]
of this appeal, it is unnecessary to refer to the findings made by the learned trial Judge in regard to the
prosecution case against the other members of the
unlawful assembly.
The appellant challenged the correctness of th fl
order of conviction and sentence thus passed against
him by preferring an appeal in the High Court
at Patna. The sentence of death imposed on him
was also referred to the High Court !or confirmation. The High Court has confirmed the sentence
of death and disniissed the appeal preferred by the
appellant. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and
the only point on which special leave has been
granted is in regard to the scope and. effeot of the
provisions of s.303 of the Indian Penal Code. That
is how the narrow point which arises for our decision is whether the case of the appellant who has
been convicted under s.302/34 in the present case
falls under s. 303.
Mr. M.S.K. Sastri for the appellant contends
that s .. 303 can apply only to a case where an
accused person who is already undergoing a sentence
of imprisonment for life commits murder and is
convicted of it. He emphasises the fact that s.303
can be applied only where at the. subsequent trial,
the prisoner is found to have committed another
murder. The expression "commits murder" used in
.s. 303 implies that the prisoner must have himself
committed the murder and thus became liable to be
convicted under s.302 without recourse to s.34; and.
since in the present case, the appellant has been
convicted not because it is found that he himself
committed the murder of Rambilash Singh, but
he has been found constructively guilty of murder
and is convicted under s. 302/34 on the ground that
the said murder had been committed in furtherance
of the common intention of all the accused persons.
' -
'
3 S.C.R.
Stri>R:EM1£ OOURT REPORTS
.._ It is true that the courts below have convicted the
appellant under s.302/34 and it is in the light of the
said conviction that the point raised by Mr. Sastri
has to be considered.
1961
Mahabir Qope
v.
State of BihM
---
For tne purpose of s. 303, when can it be
Gajen<Wagadior J,
said that a person has committed a murder? fa it
neceBBary that a person must be proved to have
himself committed the murder before s. 303 can
be invoked against him, or would it be enough
if it is shown that the person is constructively
guilty of murder under s.302/34 ? The appellant's
argument seeks to derive support from the fact
that both ss. 299 and 300 refer to a specific act.
Section 299, for instance, provides that whoever
causes death by doing an act with the intention
or knowledge therein specified, commits the offence
of culpable homicide. In other words, it is the act
done with the requisite intention or knowledge
that constitutes the offence of culpable homicide.
Similarly, s.300 provides that if the act by which
the death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death or with the intention or knowledge
as specified in the three clauses of s. 300, culpable
homicide is murder. That again shows that it is
the specified act which amounts to murder, and so,
unless the act which amounts to murder has been
committed by a person himself, it cannot be said
that he has committed murder under s. 303. That,
in substance, is the argument urged before us by
the appellant.
In appreciating the validity of this argument,
it is necessary to bear in mind the effect of the
provisions of s. 34. Section 34 provides that when
a criminal act is done by several persons in furthi:irance of the common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner
as if it were done by him alone. It is thus clear
that as a reimlt of the arplication of the principle
11111
Jlahtllir fiopt
"·
Slfllt• (/ Ri1'ar
336
SUPREME OOURT REPoRTS [1963j
enunciated in s. 34, when the appellant wa1 convicted under 302/34, in law it re&lly me&nt that the
appellant wa1 li1tble for the act whieh caused the
death of Rambila.sh Singh in the sam" m&nner &11
if it had been done by him a.lone.
That is the
eft'eot of the constructive li11,bility which follows
from the application of the principle la.id down in
s. 34. Section 34 embodies the c.rdinary commonsense
principle that if two or more persons intentionally commit an offence jointly, in substance, it
is just the same as if each one of them had
committed that offence. Common intention which
is the basi11 of the principle laid down by s. 34
implies action·in·concert a.nd that in its turn, post1dates the existence of a prearranged plan. Therefore, if two or more persons acting in concert in
pursuance of a pre-arranged plan proceed to commit
an offence, s. 34 steps in and provides that for the
act committed by one the other is liable in the
same manner as if it had been done by him alone.
That being the effect of the rule prescribed by
s. 34, it is difficult to accept the argument that where
a person has been convicted under s. 302/34, it
cannot be said that he has committed the offence
of murder. The act which caused the death of the
victim may have been committed by another
person, but since the ea.id act had been done by
the other person in furtherance of the common
intention shared by that person and the appellant,
in law, the act must be deemed to have been committed by the appellant alone. Therefore, where 11
person is convicted under s. 302/34, it must be held
that he has committed the murder as much as the
person by whose act the victim was killed.
The position would not be any different
even if the appellant bad been convicted under
1.302/149. Section 149 provides that if an offence is
committed by any member of an unlawful as1embly
in prosecution of the common object of that Rsembly, or such as the members of that assembly
II
-
-
3 s.C.R.
stJ1>RElm OOuRT JtEPORTS
337
knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution
of tha.t object, every person who, at the time of
the committing of that offence, is a member of the
same aHsembly, is guilty of that offence. It is true
that the basis of constructive liability imposed by
s. 149 is mere membership of the unlawful assembly,
whereas
the b!i.sis of the constructive liability
contemplated by a. 34 is participation in the same
action with the common intention of committing a
crime. '!'hat, however, does not make any difference
in the legal position that if a murder is committed
by one member of an unlawful assembly in prosecu·
tion of the common object of that assembly, all
members of the unlRwful assembly who at the time
of the commission of that offence were mem hers
of such assembly would be guilty of the offence of
murder. In such a case, again, where a person is
convicted under s.302/149, the true legal position is
that, in law, he must be deemed to have committed the murder as much aa the· actual murderer
has. Therefore, in our opinion, s. 303 cannot be
confined only to cases where a person undergoing
sentence of imprisonment for life actually and in
fact himself commits an act which results in the
death of the victim. The said section would apply
even in oases where a person undergoing senten<Je of
imprisonment for life is convicted either under
s. 302 read with s. 34 or under s. 302 read with
s. 149. That being our view, we must held that
the courts below were right in sentencing the
appellant to death under s. 303.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Al rJhabir G1;1
v.
StrJte of Bi/,a1
GaJendragadkot' J.