# BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA - **Citation:** [2009] 5 S.C.R. 256 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2009-03-31 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 415 of 2002 - **Bench:** Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Asok Kumar Gangul Y - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhaskar-ramappa-madar-and-ors-v-state-of-karnataka-25830 - **Pages:** 30 ## Headnote Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 306 and 498A - Married woman c committed suicide - Allegedly due to ill-treatment and harassment for dowry by husband and in-laws - Case of prosecution that accused persons coerced deceased to bring more dowry and accordingly mother of deceased gave cheque of Rs.10,0001- to husband of deceased, but D harassment continued - Accused in defence pleaded that ~ husband of deceased was having a truck which met with accident and mother of deceased gave the cheque for repairs of said truck and not as dowry - Trial court acquitted the accused-appellants - High Court set aside the order of E acquittal - On facts, held: From the documentary evidence on record, prima facie, the defence of accused persons appears to be more probable - At least it creates doubt regarding the case of prosecution - There was no analysis of the conclusions of trial Court by the High Court - Hence, F interference by High Court with the order of acquittal was not r correct. Criminal Law - Investigation - Conducted by complainant - Effect of- Held: Merely because the complainant conducted the investigation, that would not be sufficient to cast doubt on G the prosecution version - The matter has to be decided on case to case basis without any universal generalization. Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Power of appellate ,,_ court - Ambit and scope - Case Law discussed - On facts, H 256 __, ~ BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 257 KARNATAKA High Court set aside the order of acquittal passed by trial court A without analyzing the conclusions arrived at by it, which was not justified - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.378. Appellant No.1 's wife committed suicide. According to the prosecution, appellant no.1 and his family B members· harassed and ill-treated the deceased and coerced her to bring more dowry and accordingly PW2, ' mother of the deceased, gave a cheque of Rs.10,0001- to 't ------ appellant no.1, but the harassment continued which ultimately led to the incident. Appellants in their defence c pleaded that appellant no.1 was having a truck which -=-< met with accident and required heavy repairs and so PW2 gave the cheque for repairs of said truck and not as dowry. Appellant nos. 2 and 3 are the parents-in-law, --( appellant nos, 4 and 5 are the sisters-in-law and appellant D no.6 is the brother-in-law of the deceased. The trial court held that the Investigating officer should not have proceeded with the investigation as he was the complainant and thus the prosecution version was tainted and also that the evidence of the witnesses E did not inspire confidence and consequently acquitted the appellants. On appeal, the High Court convicted the appellants under ss. 306 and 498A. Hence the present appeal. -( , F Allowing the appeal, the Court • HELD:1. Merely because the complainant conducted , the investigation, that would not be sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution version to hold that the same makes the prosecution version vulnerable. The matter G has to be decided on case to case basis without any universal generalization. [Para 5) [263-G-H; 264-A] Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 ~CC 15 and Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709, H 258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R. A referred to. 2. As regards the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against acquittal, when su~h an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to res appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. 'However, in case of acquittal, there is a double C presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he ## Text _Characters 0–39,824 of 56,575. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39824 for what follows._ ./ '· I [2009] 5 S.C.R. 256 A BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. - STATE OF KARNATAKA (Criminal Appeal No. 415 of 2002) '»-- MARCH 31, 2009 .,, B ,.. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGUL Y, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 306 and 498A - Married woman c committed suicide - Allegedly due to ill-treatment and harassment for dowry by husband and in-laws - Case of prosecution that accused persons coerced deceased to bring more dowry and accordingly mother of deceased gave cheque of Rs.10,0001- to husband of deceased, but D harassment continued - Accused in defence pleaded that ~ husband of deceased was having a truck which met with accident and mother of deceased gave the cheque for repairs of said truck and not as dowry - Trial court acquitted the accused-appellants - High Court set aside the order of E acquittal - On facts, held: From the documentary evidence on record, prima facie, the defence of accused persons appears to be more probable - At least it creates doubt regarding the case of prosecution - There was no analysis of the conclusions of trial Court by the High Court - Hence, F interference by High Court with the order of acquittal was not r correct. Criminal Law - Investigation - Conducted by complainant - Effect of- Held: Merely because the complainant conducted the investigation, that would not be sufficient to cast doubt on G the prosecution version - The matter has to be decided on case to case basis without any universal generalization. Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Power of appellate ,,_ court - Ambit and scope - Case Law discussed - On facts, H 256 __, ~ BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 257 KARNATAKA High Court set aside the order of acquittal passed by trial court A without analyzing the conclusions arrived at by it, which was not justified - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.378. Appellant No.1 's wife committed suicide. According to the prosecution, appellant no.1 and his family B members· harassed and ill-treated the deceased and coerced her to bring more dowry and accordingly PW2, ' mother of the deceased, gave a cheque of Rs.10,0001- to 't ------ appellant no.1, but the harassment continued which ultimately led to the incident. Appellants in their defence c pleaded that appellant no.1 was having a truck which -=-< met with accident and required heavy repairs and so PW2 gave the cheque for repairs of said truck and not as dowry. Appellant nos. 2 and 3 are the parents-in-law, --( appellant nos, 4 and 5 are the sisters-in-law and appellant D no.6 is the brother-in-law of the deceased. The trial court held that the Investigating officer should not have proceeded with the investigation as he was the complainant and thus the prosecution version was tainted and also that the evidence of the witnesses E did not inspire confidence and consequently acquitted the appellants. On appeal, the High Court convicted the appellants under ss. 306 and 498A. Hence the present appeal. -( , F Allowing the appeal, the Court • HELD:1. Merely because the complainant conducted , the investigation, that would not be sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution version to hold that the same makes the prosecution version vulnerable. The matter G has to be decided on case to case basis without any universal generalization. [Para 5) [263-G-H; 264-A] Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 ~CC 15 and Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709, H 258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R. A referred to. 2. As regards the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against acquittal, when su~h an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to res appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. 'However, in case of acquittal, there is a double C presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, D the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. [Paras 10 and 11) [266-A-D] E Shea Swarup v. R. Emperor(1934) 61IA398; NurMohd. v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36; Surajpa/ Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193); Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953) SCR 418; Atley v. State of U.P. AIR (1955) SC 807; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra F (1955) 2 SCR 1285; Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793; K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355; Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of G Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3 SCC 57;Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; Harijana Thirupa/a v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2002) 6 SCC 470; Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12 SCC 606; Ka/Ju v. State of M.P. H (2006) 10 SCC 313 and Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of -- • 1 BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 259 KARNATAKA .. Kamataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, referred to . A 3. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt • .,, Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, B however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to "proof' is an exercise particular to each case. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such c' units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element,Jn tb.e evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quant~~ 'of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis; rest on a --.,· robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained D intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. [Paras 37 and 39] [281-G-H; 282-G-H; 283B] E State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal (1988) 4 SCC 302; Krishnan and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003) 7 SCC 56 and Va/son and Anr. v. State of Kera/a '( (Criminal Appeal No.572 of 2001 disposed of on August F 1, 2008), referred to. "The Mathematics of Proof //": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342), referred to. G 4. In the instant case, from the documentary evidence on record, prima facie it is clear that appellant no.1 {accused no.1) was having a truck which met with accident and defence of the accused persons appears to be more probable. At least it creates doubt regarding the H '~ • 260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R. A case of prosecution that the cheque for Rs.10 000/- was given towards the demand of dowry. PW-1's evidence is also significant. He stated his daughter and appellant no.1 came to his house and his daughter told that there is no ill-treatment by her husband but stated that there B is ill-treatment by appellant nos.4 to 6 and so, she does not want to go back and stayed there. From this evidence of PW- 1, it is clear that there was no ill-treatment by appellant Nos.1 to 3 to the deceased and ill-treatment if any, was only by appellant nos. 4 to 6. In spite of the same, c PW-1 stated that on the next day, his daughter and appellant no.1 went to their house. Another version given by this witness is that appellant No.4 had no issues and she was insisting the deceased to give her son in adoption to her, to which she refused and so appellant no.4 started ill-treating her. This version is unbelievable, ~ D simply because, appellant No.4 has no issues, it does not mean that she same will insist her brother or her brother's wife to give their only son in adoption to her. Even assuming that she has demanded so, it does not mean E that is demand of dowry so as to attract the provisions of Section 498A IPC. PWs 1, 2 and 5 i.e. father, mother and brother of the deceased did not speak of any dowry demand. The High Court's reasoning that there was nothing to show that appellant no.1 owned a truck is contrary to the evidence on record. PW-1 has accepted ..,. F the position as noticed by the trial Court. There is no analysis of the conclusions of the trial Court by the High Court. Hence, the interference by the High Court with the order of acquittal is not correct. [Paras 42, 43, 44 and 45] [284-C-E, G-H; 285-A-F] G Case Law Reference: (1976) 1 sec 15 referred to Para 5 (1996) 11 sec 109 referred to Para 5 H • BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 261 KARNATAKA (1934) 61 IA 398 referred to Para 13 A AIR 1945 PC 151 referred to Para 17 AIR 1954 SC 36 referred to Para 18 (1952 SCR 193) referred to Para 20 B ,. (1953) SCR 418 referred to Para 21 AIR (1955) SC 807 referred to Para 23 (1955) 2 SCR 1285 referred to Para 24 (1961) 3 SCR 120 referred to c Para 25 (1963) 2 SCR 405 referred to Para 26 (1973 (2) sec 793 referred to Para 27 (1979) 1 sec 355 referred to Para 29 D - (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi G Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public ..... H Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions -f ', BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 265 KARNATAKA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of A acquittal. (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case B instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High c Court. (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days D in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. (6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to app~al from an order of E acquittal Is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2). 8. Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of appeals, other sections lay down procedure to be followed by appellate courts. F 9. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judici~I Committee G of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of the power of an appellate court in an ;appeal against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal. H 266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R. A 10. Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code (appeal in case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full B power to re-appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. c 11. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved D to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. E 12. Though the above principles are well established, a differe11t note was struck in several decisions by various High Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we consider some of the leading decisions on the point. 13. The first important decision was rendered by the F Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor(1934) 61 IA 398). In Sheo Swarup the accused were acquitted by the trial court and the local Government directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code G (similar to Section 378 of the present Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an order of acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such H l BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 267 . KARNATAKA [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] findings could not have been reached by him had there not been A some perversity or incompetence on his part. The High Court, however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no condition was imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that B of the trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that conflicting views had been expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India upon the question whether in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had c the power to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal position and accordingly upon the "humble advice of their Lordships", leave was granted by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued. The Committee considered the scheme and D " interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed that there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on t.he High Court in exercise of powers as an Appellate Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as regards powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal E against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though several authorities were cited revealing different views by the High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal, the Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases. ... 14. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus: F "There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view, apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in G cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered', or has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity' reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a H - 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 5 S.C.R. A glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so as to produce a similar result." 15. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404) "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High B . Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the c Code." D E F G H 16. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts and stated: (IA p.404) "But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as ( 1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." (emphasis supplied) 17. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the Committee reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra) and held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has full powers to review and to reverse acquittal. BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 269 KARNATAKA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 18. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first A decision on the point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36) (though the case was decided on 14·3-1950, it was reported only in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by the trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal which was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences B punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain eyewitnesses. 19. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following c the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup -(supra), a six-Judge Bench held as follows: "6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot -< support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section D 417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. n (emphasis supplied) E 20. In Sur,ajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a twoJudge Bench ol;>served that it was well established that in an t appeal under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of F acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence could be reversed only for very substantial and G compelling reasons. 21. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418) the accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal filed by the H 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R. A State. The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was contended by him that there were "no compelling reasons" for setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight had not been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial court as regards the credibility of witnesses seen and B examined. It was also commented that the High Court committed an error of law in observing that "when a strong 'prima facie' case is made out against an accused person it is his duty to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him and he cannot take shelter behind the presumption c of innocence and cannot state that the law entitles him to keep D E F G H his lips sealed". 22. Upholding the contention, this Court said: "We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that the accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing against him but only for very substantial and compelling reasons. n (emphasis supplied) 23. In At/ey v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court said: "In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established .t BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 271 KARNATAKA [bR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] -i rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is A not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage -.. of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide B powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person c starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate I stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight .-j to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order :") of acquittal. ... If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those D principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."~ 'I (emphasis supplied) 24. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 E SCR 1285) the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority 1 (2:1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1) "It is, in our opinion, well settled F that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong." (emphasis supplied) G 25. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120, a three-Judge Bench considered almost all leading decisions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and H 272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R. A accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons" used in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows: B c D E 'F G "This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong." The Court concluded as follows: "9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in• disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) 'substantial and compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified." 26. Again, in M. G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra ( 1963) 2 SCR 405, the point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed H as follows: BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 273 KARNATAKA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] ' u17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, A in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, 'the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and B 1 hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpa/ Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the c order of acquittal would be justified only if there are 'very substantial and compelling reasons to do so'. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for 'good and sufficiently cogent I reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In appreciating the effect ' D _) of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should not be read to have intended to E introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of innocence in favour of the F accused 'is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression 'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent G decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1 SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court HI 274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R. A must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse." (emphasis supplied) 27. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao B Bobade v. State of Maharashtra ( 1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, C it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding D without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration." 28. Putting emp~asis on balance between importance of individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court E observed as follows: "6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at F the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrumen! has G a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The . excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand H guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer ,, --' BHASKA~ RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 275 ' KARNATAKA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the A accused. 'Jtherwise any practical system of justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one B guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. c Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice .J. may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from D the conviction of the innocent. .. .' In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to E set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probab'ility to punish marginal innocents." (emphasis supplied) 1 29. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the Court was considering the power of the High Court against F an order of acquittal under Section 378 of the present Code. After considering the relevant decisions on the point it was stated as follows: "9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was G thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for ~ 'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of H A B c D E F G H 276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R. 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120. In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court has consistently recognised the right of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup case. Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly unjust', have been used to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference. But, such expressions have been used more as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be added the further principle that 'if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as ... BHASKAR RAMAPPA MADAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF 277 KARNATAKA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the A preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of B which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable." (emphasis supplied) 30. In Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) C 9 SCC 225, this Court said: "While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, o manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed.