# BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2010] 6 S.C.R. 218
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010
- **Bench:** K.G. Balakrishnan, R.V. Raveendran, D.K. Jain, P. Sathasivam, J.M. Panchal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bhim-singh-v-union-of-india-and-ors-26825
- **Pages:** 73

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950:
Arlie/es 113, 114(3), 266(3), 282 - MPLAD scheme -
Constitutionality of - Held: Intra vires the Constitution -
Source of its power traceable to Arlicle 114(3) r. w. Arlicle
266(3) and 282 of the Constitution - Funds earmarked and
0 spent from the Consolidated Funds of Union for
implementation of scheme and thus was in accordance with
the constitutional provisions - Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha - rr.206 to 216.
Arlicle 266(3) - MPLAD scheme - Whether aparl from
E an appropriation by an Appropriation Act, an independent
substantive enactment is required for the scheme - Held:
·"Laws" mentioned in Article 282 would also include
Appropriation Acts - A specific or special law need not be
enacted by the Parliament to resorl to the provision - The
F MPLAD Scheme is valid as Appropriation Acts have been
duly passed year after year - Appropriation Act.
Arlie/es 275 and 282 - MPLAD Scheme - Held: Falls
within the meaning of "public purpose" aiming for the fulfilment
G of the development and welfare of the State as reflected in
the Directive Principles of State Policy.
H
Arlicle 282 - Scope of - Held: To be given its widest
amplitude and should be interpreted widely so that the public
218
SHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.
219
purpose enshrined therein can effectively be achieved both
A
by the Union and the States to advance Directive Principles
of State policy.
Article 282, seventh schedule - Public purpose - Power
of Union and State to make grants - Held: Indian Constitution
8
is quasi-federal - Owing to the quasi-federal nature of the
Constitution and the specific wording of Article 282, both the
Union and the State have power to make grants on subjects
irrespective of whether they lie in the 7th Schedule, provided
they are in public interest.
c
Separation of powers - MPLAD Scheme - Whether
violate the principle of Separation of powers under the
Constitution - Held: Indian Constitution does not recognize
strict separation of powers -
Constitutional principle of
separation of powers would be violated if an essential function
D
of one branch is taken over by another branch, leading to a
removal of checks and balances - Under MPLAD scheme
though MPs have been given a seemingly executive function,
their role is limited to 'recommending' works - Actual
implementation is done by the local authorities - There is no
E
removal of checks and balances since these are duly ·
provided and have to be strictly adhered to by the guidelines
of the Scheme and the Parliament - Therefore, the Scheme
does not violate separation of powers - Panchayat Raj
Institutions, Municipal as well as local bodies are also not
F
denuded of their role or jurisdiction by the Scheme as due
place has been accorded to them by the guidelines, in the
implementation of the scheme.
Accountability under the MPLAD scheme - Role of MP
in the scheme - Held: Every MP is authorised to only G
recommend such works which are of general public utility in
his own constituency - Role of MP is very limited to the initial
choice of a selection of projects subject to approval of the
District Authority/Commissioner or Municipal authority - Mere
a/legation of misuse of funds under the scheme by some MPs
H
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
A by itself may not be a ground for scrapping of the scheme as
checks and safeguards are provided therein.
Funds made available to sitting MPs for developmental
work under the MPLAD scheme - Claim that these works
8 would amount to an unfair advantage or corrupt practices
within the meaning of the Representation of the Peoples Act,
1951 - Held: Not maintainable - If funds are utilised by MPs
for development work which result in his better performance
and if that leads to people voting for the incumbent candidate,
it certainly would not violate any principle of free and fair
C elections - It cannot be claimed that these works amount to
an unfair advantage or corrupt practices - Representation of

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A
B
c
[2010] 6 S.C.R. 218
BHIM SINGH
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Writ Petition (C) No. 21 of 1999)
MAY 6, 2-010
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI., R.V. RAVEENDRAN, D.K.
JAIN, P. SATHASIVAM AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950:
Arlie/es 113, 114(3), 266(3), 282 - MPLAD scheme -
Constitutionality of - Held: Intra vires the Constitution -
Source of its power traceable to Arlicle 114(3) r. w. Arlicle
266(3) and 282 of the Constitution - Funds earmarked and
0 spent from the Consolidated Funds of Union for
implementation of scheme and thus was in accordance with
the constitutional provisions - Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha - rr.206 to 216.
Arlicle 266(3) - MPLAD scheme - Whether aparl from
E an appropriation by an Appropriation Act, an independent
substantive enactment is required for the scheme - Held:
·"Laws" mentioned in Article 282 would also include
Appropriation Acts - A specific or special law need not be
enacted by the Parliament to resorl to the provision - The
F MPLAD Scheme is valid as Appropriation Acts have been
duly passed year after year - Appropriation Act.
Arlie/es 275 and 282 - MPLAD Scheme - Held: Falls
within the meaning of "public purpose" aiming for the fulfilment
G of the development and welfare of the State as reflected in
the Directive Principles of State Policy.
H
Arlicle 282 - Scope of - Held: To be given its widest
amplitude and should be interpreted widely so that the public
218
SHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.
219
purpose enshrined therein can effectively be achieved both
A
by the Union and the States to advance Directive Principles
of State policy.
Article 282, seventh schedule - Public purpose - Power
of Union and State to make grants - Held: Indian Constitution
8
is quasi-federal - Owing to the quasi-federal nature of the
Constitution and the specific wording of Article 282, both the
Union and the State have power to make grants on subjects
irrespective of whether they lie in the 7th Schedule, provided
they are in public interest.
c
Separation of powers - MPLAD Scheme - Whether
violate the principle of Separation of powers under the
Constitution - Held: Indian Constitution does not recognize
strict separation of powers -
Constitutional principle of
separation of powers would be violated if an essential function
D
of one branch is taken over by another branch, leading to a
removal of checks and balances - Under MPLAD scheme
though MPs have been given a seemingly executive function,
their role is limited to 'recommending' works - Actual
implementation is done by the local authorities - There is no
E
removal of checks and balances since these are duly ·
provided and have to be strictly adhered to by the guidelines
of the Scheme and the Parliament - Therefore, the Scheme
does not violate separation of powers - Panchayat Raj
Institutions, Municipal as well as local bodies are also not
F
denuded of their role or jurisdiction by the Scheme as due
place has been accorded to them by the guidelines, in the
implementation of the scheme.
Accountability under the MPLAD scheme - Role of MP
in the scheme - Held: Every MP is authorised to only G
recommend such works which are of general public utility in
his own constituency - Role of MP is very limited to the initial
choice of a selection of projects subject to approval of the
District Authority/Commissioner or Municipal authority - Mere
a/legation of misuse of funds under the scheme by some MPs
H
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
A by itself may not be a ground for scrapping of the scheme as
checks and safeguards are provided therein.
Funds made available to sitting MPs for developmental
work under the MPLAD scheme - Claim that these works
8 would amount to an unfair advantage or corrupt practices
within the meaning of the Representation of the Peoples Act,
1951 - Held: Not maintainable - If funds are utilised by MPs
for development work which result in his better performance
and if that leads to people voting for the incumbent candidate,
it certainly would not violate any principle of free and fair
C elections - It cannot be claimed that these works amount to
an unfair advantage or corrupt practices - Representation of
the Peoples Act, 1951 - Unfair practice .
Interpretation of Constitution Every Article of the
D Constitution should be given not only the widest possible
interpretation, but also a flexible interpretation to meet all
possible contingencies which may arise even in the future.
Administrative law: Government action - Judicial
E interference - Held: Permissible when the action of the
government is unconstitutional and not when such action is
not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good
of the State.
F
Words and phrases:
Appropriation bill, Cut motion, money bill - Meaning of.
Expression 'public purpose - Meaning of, in the context
of Article 282 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
G
On 23.12.1993, Members of Parliament Local Area
Development (MPLAD) Scheme was formulated for
enabling the Members of Parliament to identify works of
developmental nature with creation of durab~ community
assets of national priorities such as drinking water,
H primary education, public health, sanitation and roads.
BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.
221
Petitioner filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the
A
Constitution, challenging the MPLAD Scheme as
ultravires of the Constitution and prayed for direction for
scrapping of the scheme and for impartial investigation
for the misuse of the funds allocated in the Scheme.
The questions which arose for consideration in the
writ petitions and the transferred cases were whether the
funds earmarked and spent from the Consolidated Funds
B
of Union for implementation of MPLAD scheme was in
accordance with the constitutional provisions; whether C
having regard to Article 266(3) of the Constitution apart
from an appropriation by an Appropriation Act, an
independent substantive enactment was required for the
scheme; whether the power under Article 282 was
restricted; whether the Scheme obliterates the
demarcation between the legislature and the executive by
D
making MPs virtual members of the executive without any
accountability; whether the scheme violated the principle
of Separation of powers under the Constitution; and
whether the MPLAD Scheme gave an unfair advantage
to the MPs in contesting elections by violating the
E
provisions of the Constitution.
Dismissing the writ petitions and the transferred
. cases, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Part XII Chapter I of the Constitution
relates to Finances. Article 266 of the Constitution refers
to consolidated funds and public accounts of India and
F
of the States. This Article explains what all are the
components of the consolidated funds of India. Subclause (3) of Art. 266 makes it clear that money from the
G
consolidated fund of India can be extended only in
accordance with law and for the particular purpose as
well as in the manner as provided in the Constitution.
Under Article 275 Grants-in-Aid are provided from the
Consolidated Fund of India to the States which are in
H
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A need of assistance. Article 113 make it clear that the
Union or the State is empowered to spend money from
the Consolidated Fund strictly in accordance with the
relevant provisions. [Paras 11, 13, 21] [242-B-H; 243-A,D;
252-G-H]
B
1.2. Article 107 deals with provisions as to
introduction and passing of Bills and provides that
subject to the provisions of Articles 109 and 117 with
regard to Money Bills and other Financial Bills, the Bill
C may originate in either House of the Parliament. Article 112
mandates i:hat the President shall in respect of every
financial year cause to be laid before both the Houses of
the Parliament, a statement of the estimated receipts and
expenditure of the Government of India for the year
referred to as the "Annual Financial Statement". The
D expenditures which are charged upon the Consolidated
Fund of India are set out in Article 112(3). Besides the
expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of
India under Article 112(3), the demands for grants sought
by the Union Executive are also met from the
E Consolidated Fund of India. The demands for grants are
voted in Parliament as per Article 113(2). The said subclause contains the plenary power of the House of the
People to assent or to refuse to assent to any demand
subject to a reduction of the amounts specified therein.
F Elaborate procedure has been provided in the "Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha".
Rules 206 to 217 deal with "Demands for Grants". These
Rules make it clear that the Demands for Grants are
discussed and voted upon. Motions may be moved to
G reduce any demands. These are called "Cut Motions". By
way of Cut Motions, grants may be rejected in totality or
reduced by a certain amount or reduced by a token
amount. The elaborate procedure found in these Articles
as well as the Rules of Procedure clearly shows that Lok
H Sabha controls the amount to be sanctioned out of the
BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
223
demands for grants placed by the Government. Thus, the
A
final authority to decide the quantum of monies to be
sanctioned is the Lok Sabha. After the grant is voted and
accepted by the Parliament in terms of Article 113(2), a
Bill is introduced. Under Article 114, a Bill has to be
introduced to provide for appropriation of payments out
B
of the Consolidated Fund of India. Such Bills are called
Appropriation Bills. An Appropriation Bill is a Money Bill
in terms of Article 110(1)(d), which has to be introduced
as per Article 107 and has to be dealt with under Article
109. The procedure makes it clear that the c
recommendations of the Council of States are not binding
on the House of People. The Appropriation Bill being a
Money Bill cannot be introduced in the Council of States
while the Annual Financial Statement is to be laid before
both the Houses. A Money Bill can only be introduced in
0
the House of the People in terms of Article 110. While the
Council of States has no role to play in the matter of
sanction <;>f expenditure and demand for grants, in relation
to a MoAP'Y Bill, it can only make recommendations in
terms 6f Article 109(2). This may or may not be accepted
by the House of the People. It is true that the activity of E
spending monies on various projects has to be
separately provided by a law. However, if Union
Government intends to spend money for public purpose
and for implementing various welfare schemes, the same
are permitted by presenting an Appropriation Bill which
F
is a Money Bill and by laying the same before the Houses
of Parliament and after getting the approval of the
Parliament, Lok Sabha, in particular, it becomes law and
there cannot be any impediment in implementing the
same so long as the Scheme is for the public purpose.
G
[Paras 24-26] [254-C-H; 255-A-H; 256-A-G]
1.3. The law referred to in the Constitution for
sanctifying expenditure from and out of the Consolidated
Fund of India is the Appropriation Act, as prescribed in
H
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Article 114(3) which mandates that no money shall be
withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India except
under appropriation made by law based in accordance
with the provisions of this Article. It provides that after the
estimates of expenditure laid before House of People in
B the form of 'demands of grants' has been passed, a Bill
is to be introduced to provide for the appropriation out
of the Consolidated Fund of India of all monies required
to meet the grants made by the House of People. Upon
the demand of grant having been made under Article 113,
c Appropriation Bills were introduced and enacted in each
year to appropriate moneys for the purposes of the
MPLAD Scheme. In such circumstances, it is reasonable
to accept that appropriation of public revenue for the
purposes of the MPLAD Scheme was sanctioned by the
0 Parliament by Appropriation Acts. [Para 27] [256-G-H; 257A-D]
1.4. The 'law' here is the Appropriation Act, traceable
to Article 114(3) and the purpose is for the scheme and
the moneys withdrawn for outlay for the scheme from out
E of the Consolidated Fund of India in the manner as
provided in the Constitution. All the tests laid down under
the provisions of Article 266(3) were also fully satisfied
in the implementation of the MPLAD Scheme. Further
Article 283(1) provides that 'law' made by the Parliament
F shall regulate withdrawal of money from Consolidated
Fund of India. The Appropriation Act passed as per the
provisions of Article 114 is 'law' for the purpose of the
Constitution of India and the respondents are fully
justified in claiming that no separate or independent law
G is necessary since an item of expenditure forming part
of the MPLAD Scheme or the activity on which the
expenditure is incurred also, forms part and parcel of
such Appropriation Act. It is clear that no independent
enactment is required to be passed. Neither Government
H of India nor any State is taking away the rights of anyone
BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
225
or going to set up any business or creating any A
monopoly for itself nor acquiring any property. It is only
implementing a Scheme for the welfare of the people with
the sanction and approval of the Parliament. For the
purpose of imposing restrictions on the rights conferred
under Article 19 or Article 300A, there may be requirement
B
of an independent law but not for the purposes of
satisfying the requirement of Article 14. [Paras 28, 29]
[257-E-H; 258-F-H]
2.1. Article 282 makes it clear that Indian Constitution
is not strictly federal and is only quasi-federal. Article 282
C
allows the Union to make grants on subjects irrespective
of whether they lie in the 7th Schedule, provided it is in
public interest. Every Article of the Constitution should
be given not only the widest possible interpretation, but
also a flexible interpretation to meet all possible D
contingencies which may arise even in the future. Article
282 is not an insertion by the Parliament at a later date.
The said Article was in the Constitution right from the
inception and was invoked for implementation of several
welfare measures by Central grants. Though welfare
E
, schemes may essentially fall within the legislative
· competence of the State, the said schemes are
implemented through grants out of the Consolidated
Fund of India by resorting to Article 282. [Paras 33, 37,
38] (262-8; 264-C-E; 265-8-C]
F
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab
(1955) 2 SCR 225; Ku/dip Nayar & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1; State of Karnataka v. Union of India and
Anr (1977) 4 SCC 608; S. R. Bommai a(ld Ors. v. Union of G
India and Ors. ( 1994) 3 sec 1; State of West'Bengat v. Union
'
of India (1964) 1 SCR 371; State of Rajasthan and Ors. v.
Union of India (1978) 1 SCR 1; ITC Ltd. v. Agricu[tural
Produce Market Committee (2002) 1 SCR 441; State of West
Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) 266 ITR 721(SC);
H
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212, relied on.
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
A
2.2. The expression "public purpose" under Article
282 should be widely construed and from the point of
view of the scheme, it is clear that the same was
designed to promote the purpose underlying the
Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined in Part
s IV of the Constitution of India. The implementation of the
Directive Principles is a general responsibility of the
Union and the States. The analysis of Article 282 coupled
with other provisions of the Constitution makes it clear
that no restriction can be placed on the scope and width
c of the Article by reference to other Articles or provisions
in the Constitution as the said Article is not subject to
any other Article in the Constitution. Further this Article
empowers Union and the States to exercise their
spending power to matters not limited to the legislative
0 powers conferred upon them and in the matter of
expenditure for a public purpose subject to fulfillment of
such other provisions as may be applicable to the
Constitution their powers are not restricted or
circumscribed. Article 282 can be the source of power for
E emergent transfer of funds, like the MPLAD Scheme.
Even otherwise, the MPLAD Scheme is voted upon and
sanctioned by the Parliament every year as a Scheme for
community development. The Scheme of the Constitution
of India is that the power of the Union or State Legislature
is not limited to the legislative powers to incur
F expenditure only in respect of powers conferred upon it
under the Seventh Schedule, but it can incur expenditure
on any purpose not included within its legislative powers.
However, the said purpose must be 'public purpose'.
Judicial interference is permissible when the action of the
G government is unconstitutional and not when such action •
is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the
good of the State. All such questions must be debated
and decided in the legislature and not in court. [Paras 3942] [265-C-D; 266-F-H; 267-G-H; 268-A-B]
H
SHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
227
3.1. The perusal of the guidelines of MPLAD Scheme
A
makes it clear that there has been a close coordination
between the authorities, namely, the Central Government,
State Government and the District Authorities. Every
Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha) is authorized to only
recommend such works which would be of general
B
public utility in his own constituency that too for a public
purpose. The Member of Rajya Sabha is to select work
as per the scheme in his State. The role of the Member
of Parliament is very limited to the initial choice of a
selection of projects subject to the choice of project c
being found eligible by the District Authority/
Commissioner or Municipal Authority, if found otherwise
feasible. [Para 45] [273-D-E]
3.2. There are three levels of accountability which
emerge from a study of the working of the Scheme, (1)
D
the accountability within the Parliament, (2) the
Guidelines, and (3) the steps taken which are recorded
in the Annual Reports. The Lok Sabha has set-up an Adhoc Committee to analyse the actual benefits of the
scheme realized, the deficiencies and pitfalls
E
encountered in the implementation of the scheme and the
corrective measures which could be taken for the smooth
implementation of the scheme on the basis of past
experience of over a decade. [Paras 46, 47] [273-F-H; 274-
~ ~
F
3.3. In order to bring financial discipline at the district
level and reduce the accumulation of unspent funds with
the Districts, a new condition of unspent balance for the
MP being less than rupees one crore was imposed during G
the financial year (2004-05). The release procedure was
further streamlined and strengthened by prescribing for
the original (not photo-copy) of the Monthly Progress
Report, duly signed by DC/DM under his seal. This
resulted in bringing down the unspent balance. To
H
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A reduce the accumulated funds further and to improve
accountability, some more conditions were laid down for
release of MPLADS funds in a new MPLADS funds
release and management procedure which was adopted
with effect from 1st June 2005. The District Authorities are
B required to submit Utilization Certificates and Audit
Certificates also for the earlier releases in addition to
fulfilling the said two conditions before second
installment in any given year is considered for release to
any MP. [Para 49) [274-G-H; 275-A-B]
c
3.4. Software was developed and launched on 30th
November 2004 by the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation. The same was adopted by
majority of the districts and the reports of completed and
ongoing projects in respect of 361 districts out of 428
D Nodal districts have already come on the website of the
Ministry. The Ministry nominated 78 officers of JAG and
SAG level working in the Ministry, as Nodal Officers for
the districts for entering the data in respect of the ongoing
and completed works. This facilitated substantial
E improvement in the data entry in the software. So far, data
in respect of 1,006 MPs has been uploaded. Result
oriented reviews of the Scheme were taken up by:'the
Secretary and Additional Secretary of the Ministry at AllIndia level. Beside this, the nodal District Authority has
F to coordinate with other districts falling in the same
constituency (in case of Lok Sabha constituencies) and
with all the districts in which the MP has recommended
work (in case of Rajya Sabha MPs). Thus the nature of
the Scheme is such that it requires considerable technical,
G administrative and accounting expertise, highly efficient
coordination with various agencies and organizations
and a high degree of logistic and managerial support for
its successful implementation. Barring few irregularities,
which are taken care of by the State Audit Authorities, the
H funds allocated under the MPLAD Scheme are being .
BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
229
properly monitored for better utilization to achieve the
A
objectives of the Scheme. [Paras 50, 51) [275-C-H; 276A-C]
3.5. The information furnished shows that the
Scheme has benefited the local community by meeting
8
their various developmental needs such as drinking water
facility, education, electricity, health and family welfare,
irrigation, non-conventional energy, community centres,
public libraries, bus stands, roads, pathways, bridges,
sports infrastructure etc. Mere allegation of misuse of the C
funds under the Scheme by some MPs by itself may not
be a ground for scrapping of the Scheme as checks and
safeguards have been provided. Parliament has the
power to enquire and take appropriate action against the
erring members. Both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha have
0
· set up Standing Committee to monitor the works under
the Scheme. The second level of accountability is
provided by the Guidelines themselves. These guidelines
have been continuously revised, the latest being the
fourth time resulting in the Guidelines of 2005. The
Guidelines make it clear that the MPLAD Scheme is for E
the recommendation of works of developmental nature,
especially for the creation of durable community assets
based on local needs. According to the Guidelines, these
include durable assets of national priorities like drinking
water, primary education, public health, sanitation and
F
roads. Clearly, the Scheme does not give a carte blanche
to the MPs with respect to the kind of works they can
recommend. Furthermore, under the Guidelines, once the
MP recommends any work, District Authority in whose
jurisdiction, the proposed works are to be executed, will
G
maintain proper accounts, follow proper procedure for
sanction and implementation for timely completion of
works. [Paras 52, 53, 54) [276-D-H; 277-A-B]
3.6. The Annual Reports of the Scheme provide for H
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A transparency and accountability in the working of the
Scheme. As per the Right to Information Act, 2005 and the
rules framed there under, all citizens have the right to
information on any aspect of the MPLAD Scheme
including works recommended/sanctioned/executed
B under it, costs of work sanctioned, implementing
agencies, quality of works completed, user agencies etc.;
it has been stipulated under the guidelines that for
greater public awareness, for all works executed under
MPLAD Scheme, a plaque (stone/metal) indicating the
c cost involved, the commencement, completion and
inauguration date and the name of the MP sponsoring
the project should be permanently erected. All these
information which are available through their website
clearly show that the Scheme provides various levels of
0 accountability. The argument of the petitioners that
MPLADS is inherently arbitrary is unfounded. No doubt
there may be improvements to be made. But this court
does not sit in judgment of the veracity of a scheme, but
only its legality. When there is evidence that an
E accountability mechanism is available, there is no reason
to interfere in the Scheme. Further, the Scheme only
supplements the efforts of the State and other local
Authorities and does not seek to interfere in the
functional as well as financial domain of the local planning
authorities of the State. On the other fland, it only
F strengthens the welfare measures taken by them. The
Scheme, in its present form, does not override any
powers vested in the State ·Government or the local
authority. The implementing authorities can sanction a
scheme subject to compliance with the local laws. [Paras
G 55-57] [278-E-H; 279-A-E]
4.1. Separation of Powers is an essential feature of
the Constitution. In modern governance, a strict
separation is neither possible, nor desirable.
H Nevertheless, till this principle of accountability is
SHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.
231
preserved, there is no violation of separation of powers.
A
The Constitution does not prohibit overlap of functions,
but in fact provides for some overlap as a Parliamentary
democracy. But what it prohibits is such exercise of
function of the other branch which results in wrestling .
away of the regime of constitutional accountability. A law B
would be violative of separation of powers not if it results
in some overlap of functions of different branches of the
State, but if it takes over an essential function of the other
branch leading to lapse in constitutional accountability.
[Para 59, 68] [280-C-E; 285-D]
C
1
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors. v. The State of
Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kera/a & Another (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Gandhi v. Raj
Narain AIR 1977 SC 69; Special Reference No. 1 of
1964 (1965) 1 SCR 413; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain
D
(1975) Supp SCC 1; State of Rajasthan v. Union of India
(1978) 1 SCR 1; Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India
(UO!) and Ors. ( 1980 ) 3 SCC 625; A.K. Roy v. Union of
India AIR 1982 SC 710, relied on.
E
4.2. There is no violation of concept of separation of
powers. The Member of Parliament is ultimately
responsible to Parliament for his action as an MP even
under the Scheme. All Members of Parliament be it a
Member of Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha or a nominated
F
Member of Parliament are only seeking to advance public
interest and public purpose and it is quite logical for the
Member of Parliament to carry out developmental
activities to the constituencies they represent. Major role
is played by Panchayats, Municipalities and Corporations
G
under MPLAD Scheme in execution. and implementation
of works. The Scheme concentrates on community
development and creation of assets at the grass-root
level and in such circumstances, the same cannot be
Interfered with by the courts without reasonable grounds.
H
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A The role of an MP in MPLAD Scheme is merely
recommendatory in nature and the entire execution has
been entrusted to the District/Municipal Authority which
belongs to the executive organ. It is their responsibility
to furnish completion certificate, audit certificate and
B utilization certificate for each work and if this is not done
further funds can not be released. The extracts of the
Guidelines make it clear that even though the District
Authority is given the power to identify the agency
through which a particular work recommended by the MP
c should be executed, the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRls)
would be the preferred lmpl~menting Agency in the rural
areas, through the Chief Executive of the respective PRI,
.and the Implementing Agencies in the urban areas would
be urban local bodies, through the Commissioners/Chief
D Exe<;utive Officers of Municipal Corporations,
Municipalities. [Paras 69, 70, 72) [285-E-G; 286-D-F; 287E-G]
5. MPLADS makes funds available to sitting MPs for
developmental work. If the MP utilizes the funds properly,
E it would result in his better performance. If that leads to
people voting for the incumbent candidate, it certainly
does not violate any 'principle of free and fair elections.
MPs are permitted to recommend specific kinds of works
for the welfare of the people, i.e. which relate to
F development and building of durable community assets.
These works are to be conducted after approval of
relevant authorities. In such circumstances, it cannot be
claimed that these works amount to an unfair advantage
or corrupt practices within the meaning of the
G Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951. Of course such
spending is subject to the above Act and the regulations
of the Election Commission. [Paras 74, 75] [288-B·E]
Case Law Reference:
H
(1955) 2 SCR 225
relied on
Para 28
BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.
233
(2006) 1 sec 1
relied on
Para 33
A
(1977) 4 sec 608
relied on
Para 34
(1994) 3 sec 1
relied on
Para 35
(1964) 1 SCR 371
relied on
Para 36
B
(1978) 1 SCR 1
relied on
Para 36
(2002) 1 SCR 441
relied on
Para 36
(2004) 266 ITR 721 (SC) relied on
Para 36
c
AIR 1955 SC 549
relied on
Para 60
(1973) 4 sec 225
relied on
Para 61
(1965) 1 SCR 413
relied on
Para 62
(1975) Supp sec 1
relied on
Para 63
D
(1978) 1 SCR 1
relied on
Para 65
(1980 ) 3 sec 625
relied on
Para 66
AIR 1982 SC 710
relied on
Para 67
E
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
21 of 1999.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
F
WITH
W.P. (C) No. 404 of 1999
T.C. (C) No. 22 of 2005, 105, 23, 24, 36, 37 & 38 of 2000
G
W.P.(C) No. 376 of 2003 & T.P. (C) No. 450 of 2004.
G.E. Vahanvati, Sol. Genl. of India, Mohan Parasaran,
ASG, k.K. Venugopal, Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Sparsh
Bhargava, Rohit Sharma, Uttara Babbar, Dinesh Kumar Garg,
H
234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
A Shim Singh (Petitioner-in-Person), Pramod Dayal, Prashant
Bhushan, Rohit Kr. Singh, Mayank Mishra, Sumeet Sharma,
Somesh Rattan, Ms. Aparna Bhat, D.L. Chidananda, Gaurav
Dhingra, T.A.Khan, Sudharshan Singh Rawat, D.S. Mahra, P.
Parmeswaran, B.V. Balaram Das, Anil Katiyar, Gaurav
B Aggarwal; Ashok K. Srivastava, Vikas Sharma (for Sushma
Suri), Meenakshi Arora (NP), Ashish Wad Satya Vkrim,
Jayashree Wad, Chirag S.Dave (for J.S. Wad & Co.), for the
appearing parties.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. The petitioners have filed the
above writ petitions challenging the Members of Parliament
.Local Area Development Scheme (hereinafter referred to as
the "MPLAD Scheme") as ultra vires of the Constitution of India.
D They also prayed for direction from this Court for scrapping of
the MPLAD Scheme and for impartial investigation for the
misuse of the funds allocated in the Scheme.
2. Though the challenge in the writ petitions and the
E transferred cases is to the .constitutional validity of the MP LAD
Scheme, in view of substantial question of interpretation of
Articles 275 and 282 of the Constitution of India are involved,
particularly, transfer of funds from the Union Government to the
Members of Parliament, by reference dated 12th July, 2006 a
three-Judge Bench headed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of
F India referred the same to a Constitution Bench. In this way, the
above matters are heard by this Constitution Be1ch.
3. Brief facts:
G
On 23.i2.1993, the then Prime Minister announced the
MP LAD Scheme. This scheme was formulated for enabling the•
Members of Parliament to identify small works of capital nature
based on l9cally felt rieeds in their constituencies. The
objective, as seen from the guidelines of the Scheme, is to
H enaEle the Members of Parliament to recommel)d works of
. BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS: .
235
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
developmental nature with emphasis on the creation of durable
A
community assets based on.the locally felt needs to be taken
up in their Constituencies. The guidelines prescribe that right
from inception of the Scheme, durable assets of national
priorities viz., drinking water, primary education, public health,
sanitation and roads etc. are being created. In 1993-94, when · B
the Scheme was launched, an amount of Rs.5 lakh per
Member of Parliament was allotted which became rupees one
crore per annum from 1994-95 per MP Con~tituency. This was
stepped up to rupees two crores from 1998~99. Initially the
Scheme VJas under the control of the Ministry of Rural c
· Development and Planning and thereafter in October, 1994, it
was transferred to the Ministry of Statistics & Programme
Implementation. The Scheme is governed by a set of guidelines
which were first issued by the Ministry of Rural Development
in February, 1994. After the Scheme was transferred to the
0
Ministry of Statisijcs and Programme Implementation, revised
guidelines were issued in December, 1994, February, 1997,
September, 1999, April, 2002 and November, 2005.
4. After taking us through the various constitutional
provisions, the MPLAD Scheme and its guidelines, Mr. K.K.
E
Venugopal, learned senior counsel, appearing for.the petitioner
in Writ Petition (C) No. 21 /.1999 made the following
submissions: ·
(i)
No money should be spent from the Consolidated
F
Fund of Union other than one provided under the
Constitution of India.
(ii)
Instead of decision taken by Union of India under
Article 282 of the Constitution about "public
purpose", it has given power to a Member of G
Parliament, which violates Article 282 of the
Constitution of India.
(iii)
MPLAD Scheme is Q total abdication of powers ·
and functions by the Union of India. Such· a
H
A
B
c
236
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(201 O] 6 S.C.R.
wholesale transfer of funds for the benefit of works
or projects cannot be executed under Article 275
as "grants-in-aid of the revenues of a State", without
proper recommendation of the Finance
Commission.
(iv)
The executive powers of the Union under Article 73
are co-extensive with the legislative powers of the
Parliament, hence even executive powers of the
Union cannot be exercised contrary to the entries
in the List in Schedule VII of the Constitution so as
to encroach on a subject falling in List II.
(v)
The MPLAD Scheme is contrary to the 73rd and
74th Amendments to the Constitution of India. After
the 73rd and 74th A111endments, the entire area of
D
local self-government has been entrusted to
Panchayats under Article 243G and to the
Municipalities under Articles 243W, 243ZD and
243ZE read with Schedule-XII of the Constitution.
By virtue of the said Amendments, the decision
E
making power in regard to development rests with
Panchayats and Municipalities, however, due to the
presEfnt Scheme, the works are being given to
individual MPs.
F
G
H
(vi)
The MPLAD Scheme is inconsistent with Part IX
and Part IX-A insofar as decision making process
and inconsistent with the local self-government. The
choices and functions of the Panchayats and
Municipalities being .denuded by the MPLAD
Scheme, the Scheme is rendered wholly
unconstitutional and bad.
5. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 376 of 2003, in addition
to the above submissions, highlighted the following points:
SHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
237
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
(i)
Article 280 mandates the s~tting up of the Finance
A
Commission, which would be constituted every five
years. This Article enumerates the financial power
of the Centre and the States to collect, levy
appropriate taxes and even the executive powers
are clearly spelt out in Article 73. As per Articles
B
280 and 275, it is the Finance Commission which
is an independent body has the mandate to
recommend the division of taxes between the
Centre and the States as well as the assignment
of grants-in-aid to the revenues of States. Though c
language of Article 282 appears to be wide enough
to cover all grants, it obviously cannot be construed
to mean that the Centre can give grants to States
on a regular basis. The regular grants from the
Centre to the States can be given only under Article
D
275 and that too in accordance with the Finance
Commission's recomm3ndations.
(ii)
Article 282 is not intended to be used as a second
channel of transfers from Centre to States. This
Article only allows money to be defrayed by the
E
Central Government for a particular public purpose
though they may fall under State subjects.
(iii)
Articles 112 to 114 have conferred power on the
Union Government to appropriate funds for its own
F
expenditure; however, a part of the same cannot be
used for giving discretionary grants to the State.
(iv)
The Centre by enlarging the scope of Article 282
has infringed the specific scheme designed by the
G
Constitution regarding the flow of finances from the
Centre to the States. Further, most of the centrally
sponsored schemes running in different States are
being funded through Article 282 only, which is clear
misuse of the provisions of the Constitution.
H
•·
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A
6. In reply to the above submissions, Mr. Mohan
B
c
D
E
F
Parasaran, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
the Union of India made the following submissions:
(i)
The MPLAD Scheme is intra vires of the
Constitution. The source of its power is traceable
to Article 114(3) read with Articles 266(3) and 282
of the Constitution of India.
(ii)
Article 282 has to be given its widest amplitude and
should be interpreted widely so that the public
purpose enshrined therein can effectively be
achieved both by the Union and the States to
advance Directive Principles of State policy.
(iii)
The Scheme is being implemented based on the
sanction which it receives from the Parliament on
the passing of the Appropriation Act during every
financial year. Appropriation for the Scheme is
done after resort to the special procedure as
applicable to Money Bills, as prescribed under
Article 109. Articles 112(2) and 113(2) mandate
that the expenditure proposed to be made from the
Consolidated Fund of India are bound to be laid
before both the Houses of Parliament in the form
of "Demand for Grants" and is subject to the assent
of the House of People.
(iv)
The "Law" mentioned in Article 266(3) is the
Appropriation Act traceable to Article 114(3). The
MPLAD Scheme as a whole is based upon a
policy decision and having a Parliamentary
G
sanction in its implementation in the form of
Appropriation Acts, no further enactment is
required.
H
(v)
From the date of inception of Constitution i.e. from
1950, by virtue of Article 282, the Union of India
through Planning Commission implemented
BHIM SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
239
·. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
'several welfare measures though most of the
A
subjects would fall within the State subjects. (List II
of the VII Schedule).
(vi)
Use of expressidn "Grants" in Article 282 will have
to be construed in a wider sense and it is not
8
subject to any Article especially Article 275.
(vii) The Scheme is not inconsistent with the various
other Schemes of Panchayats and Municipalities.
On the other hand, it only supplem~nts the welfare
measures taken by them.There i.s no violation of C
concept of separation of powers.
7. Mr. G.E. Vahanvati assisted this Court as amicus
curiae and submitted the following points:"
(i)
The Parliament has plenary power to sanction
D
expenditure. Besides the expenditure charged
upon the Consolidated Fund of India under Article
112(3), Demand for Grants sought by the Union
executive are also met from the Consolidated Fund
of India. The Demands for Grants are voted in
E
Parliament as per Article 113(2). The final authority
to decide the quantum of monies to be sanctioned
is the Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha has the final control
. over expenditure.
F
(ii)
The Parliament has sanctioned monies to be paid
out by the MPLAD Scheme by voting on the
demand for grant forwarded by the Union Executive
from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation.