# BIDY A DEB BARMA ETC v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TRIPURA, AGARTALA

- **Citation:** [1969] 1 S.C.R. 562
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-08-06
- **Case number:** Writ Petitions Nos. 89 to 92 and 94 of 1968
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bidy-a-deb-barma-etc-v-district-magistrate-tripura-agartala-4444
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

562
BIDY A DEB BARMA ETC.
v.
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TRIPURA, AGARTALA
August 6, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M.
SHELAT, V.
BllARGAVA,
G. K. MITTER AND C. A. VA!DIALINGAM, JJ.)
Preventive Detention Act 4 of 1950, ss. 3(3) and 3(4)-Section 3(3)
requiring District Magistrate to report order of detention to State Govcrnnzent 'fortlnvitlr'-Meaning of
'forthwith'-State
Government's
order
•vhether ntust be com1nunicated
to
detenu--Communication
under s.
3(4) by State Government to Central Government-Effect of de/ay-
'As soon as may be' ins. 3(4), meaning of-Detention whether mala
tide-Grounds whether va11ue-Grounds of detention supplied in language
not known to detenu-Effect of delay in raising ohjec1io11.
The petitioners were arrested and detained on February 11,
1968
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 bv the orders of the District
~agistratc, Tripura.
They challenged thcif dcrcntion on the following
among other grounds: (i) that the District Magistrate passed the orders
df detention on February 9. 1968 but made his report to the State Government only on February 13 and therefore the report was not made 'forthwirh' as required hy s. 3(1); (ii) that the Stale Government did not
communicate the ap-proval to 1he detcnus and without such communication the order could not be effective; (iii) that the Stale Government recorded its approval under s. 3(3) on Fch-ruary 19 but communicated it
to the Central Government only on Fchruary 22 and this was not done
'as soon as may be' within the meaning of s. 3(4); (iv) that the grounds
supplied were vague: (v) that the detention order was ma/a fide.
One of
the petitione·r.s also relied on the f<lct that the grounds were supplied to
him in English which he did not understand.
HELD: (i) The word 'forthwith' has been interpreted by this Court
in Jo;:lekar's case to mean the period during which the detainin~ authority
could not ",vithout any fault of his ov.·n" send tht' report.
In the pre<;cnt
case the order of detention passed on February 9 \Vas communicated to
the State Government on February 13 hut the District Magistrate in his
affidavit had explained that he was occupied \\rith urgent official work and
that 10th and 11th were holidays.
Thus there was delay only because the
report \\'<K not made on the 12th.
Even i'f the meaning from the ruling
in Joglekar's cao;e is applied strictly, the delay '"'as explained sufficiently.
[565 C: 566A, D]
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Keshav Nilkantlr loRlekar v, The Commissioner
of Police
Greater
Bombay. [1956] S.C.R. 653 at p. 658-60, applied.
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(ii) There is no provision in the Act that the approval under s. 3(3)
must be communicated to the clctenu. Section 3(3) docs not specify that
the order of approval is anythin~ more than an administrative aporova1
by the State Government. If this he so the nccC5sity of communication of
the approval docs not arise with that strictness as does the decio;;km under
r. JOA (8) of the Defence of India Rules.
A!thoueh it mav be fair even
under the Preventive Detention Act to inform the detenu of all the stages
throul!h v.·hich his detention passes, and it mav be desirable
to have
a
provision to that effect included in it. the existing state of the law did
not justify the imPOrtation df the strict rule to cases
under this
Act.
[566 F, 567 D, GJ
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B. D. BARMA, v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.)'
563
The scheme of the Preventiw Dotention Act is merely to
approve
the original detention by the District Magistrate and the continued detention after 12 days is not under any fresh order but the same old order
with the added approval, and what the detenu can question is the original
detention and not the approval thereof. [567 HJ
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer
& Anr., [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, Bachhittar Singh v.
State of Punjab,
[1962J Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713 and Biren Dutta & Ors. v. Chief Commissioner
of Tripura & Anr., [1964J 8 S.C.R. 295, distinguished.
(iii) The State Government havin

## Text

562
BIDY A DEB BARMA ETC.
v.
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TRIPURA, AGARTALA
August 6, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M.
SHELAT, V.
BllARGAVA,
G. K. MITTER AND C. A. VA!DIALINGAM, JJ.)
Preventive Detention Act 4 of 1950, ss. 3(3) and 3(4)-Section 3(3)
requiring District Magistrate to report order of detention to State Govcrnnzent 'fortlnvitlr'-Meaning of
'forthwith'-State
Government's
order
•vhether ntust be com1nunicated
to
detenu--Communication
under s.
3(4) by State Government to Central Government-Effect of de/ay-
'As soon as may be' ins. 3(4), meaning of-Detention whether mala
tide-Grounds whether va11ue-Grounds of detention supplied in language
not known to detenu-Effect of delay in raising ohjec1io11.
The petitioners were arrested and detained on February 11,
1968
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 bv the orders of the District
~agistratc, Tripura.
They challenged thcif dcrcntion on the following
among other grounds: (i) that the District Magistrate passed the orders
df detention on February 9. 1968 but made his report to the State Government only on February 13 and therefore the report was not made 'forthwirh' as required hy s. 3(1); (ii) that the Stale Government did not
communicate the ap-proval to 1he detcnus and without such communication the order could not be effective; (iii) that the Stale Government recorded its approval under s. 3(3) on Fch-ruary 19 but communicated it
to the Central Government only on Fchruary 22 and this was not done
'as soon as may be' within the meaning of s. 3(4); (iv) that the grounds
supplied were vague: (v) that the detention order was ma/a fide.
One of
the petitione·r.s also relied on the f<lct that the grounds were supplied to
him in English which he did not understand.
HELD: (i) The word 'forthwith' has been interpreted by this Court
in Jo;:lekar's case to mean the period during which the detainin~ authority
could not ",vithout any fault of his ov.·n" send tht' report.
In the pre<;cnt
case the order of detention passed on February 9 \Vas communicated to
the State Government on February 13 hut the District Magistrate in his
affidavit had explained that he was occupied \\rith urgent official work and
that 10th and 11th were holidays.
Thus there was delay only because the
report \\'<K not made on the 12th.
Even i'f the meaning from the ruling
in Joglekar's cao;e is applied strictly, the delay '"'as explained sufficiently.
[565 C: 566A, D]
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Keshav Nilkantlr loRlekar v, The Commissioner
of Police
Greater
Bombay. [1956] S.C.R. 653 at p. 658-60, applied.
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(ii) There is no provision in the Act that the approval under s. 3(3)
must be communicated to the clctenu. Section 3(3) docs not specify that
the order of approval is anythin~ more than an administrative aporova1
by the State Government. If this he so the nccC5sity of communication of
the approval docs not arise with that strictness as does the decio;;km under
r. JOA (8) of the Defence of India Rules.
A!thoueh it mav be fair even
under the Preventive Detention Act to inform the detenu of all the stages
throul!h v.·hich his detention passes, and it mav be desirable
to have
a
provision to that effect included in it. the existing state of the law did
not justify the imPOrtation df the strict rule to cases
under this
Act.
[566 F, 567 D, GJ
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B. D. BARMA, v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.)'
563
The scheme of the Preventiw Dotention Act is merely to
approve
the original detention by the District Magistrate and the continued detention after 12 days is not under any fresh order but the same old order
with the added approval, and what the detenu can question is the original
detention and not the approval thereof. [567 HJ
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer
& Anr., [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, Bachhittar Singh v.
State of Punjab,
[1962J Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713 and Biren Dutta & Ors. v. Chief Commissioner
of Tripura & Anr., [1964J 8 S.C.R. 295, distinguished.
(iii) The State Government having reached its decision on February
19, its communication under s. 3 ( 4) to the Central Government on
February 22 was not so delayed that it is not covered by the expression
'as early as may be' which was explained in Joglekar's case to mean 'what
is reasonably convenient'.
Various things have to be done before the
report to the Central Government can be made and a gap of 3 days is
understandable. [568 DJ
(iv) The grounds in the present case had been supplied to the detenu
with sufficient particularity to enable them to make an effective representation. The cases of Rameshwar Lal Patwari and Motilal Jain were distinguishable. [569 F-570 Al
Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar,
[1968]
2 S.C.R. 505 and
Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 587 distinguished.
(v) On the facts and circumstances of the case the allegation of
mala fides against the detaining authority could not be accepted. [570 Bl
(vi) The objection that the grounds of detention were given in a
language which the detenu did not understand was raised in this Court
for the first time.
The Court could not entertain this belated complaint
especially when th·e detenu did not seem to have suffered at all for this
reason. If there was the sli)lhtest feeling that he had been handicapped
the court would have seriously considered the matter. [572 A-BJ
Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 918,
referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 89 to 92 and 94
of 1968.
·
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental rights.
M. K. Ramamurthi, for the petitioners (in all the petitions).
G
Niren De, Solicitor-Genera/ and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in all the petitions) .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. These are five writ petitions under Article
32 of the Constitution of India by persons detained under the
H
Preventive Detention Act ( 4 of 1950) by virtue of orders passed
by the District Magistrate Tripura on February 2, 1968. These
detenus (and another since released) were arrested on February
11, 1968. State Government was infonned of the fact of detenL13Sup. Cl/68-5
564
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] I S.C.R.
tion on February 13, and the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenus on February 15. State Government gave
the awroval on February 19 and telegraphically communicated
to the Central Government the fact of the detention on February
22 under section 3 ( 4).
On March 11, the Advisory Board considered the cases.
The present petitions were filed on March 12,
1968. The Advisory Board made its report to the State Government under section IO of the Act on April 17, 1968. On April
26, 1968, the State Government made the order detaining the
petitioners for a period of one year. This detention is challenged
before us.
The petitions were argued by Mr. Ramamurthy together. The
law points raised by him in these cases were common and will be
dealt with together. Part of the facts were also common although
some special features were pointed out in some cases. We propose
to deal wilh the common points of law and facts together and then
to consider the special facts separately.
The points of law were ( n that the detention was illegal as
the report of the District Magistrate was not submitted forthwith
as required by section 3 ( 3) of the Act, (2) that the detention
was again illegal as the order of approval of State Government
under s. 3 ( 3) was not communicated to the petitioners, ( 3) that
the detention was illegal as the State Government had not reported the fact to the Central Government as soon as possible and
without avoidable delay. The common poinls of fact arc that the
grounds were vague and the detention was for a collateral purpose
and ma/a fide.
The order of detention in each case was made on the 9th of
February.
The arrest and detention commenced from the I Ith.
The communication was on February 13.
Section 3(3) of the
Act lays down :
"3. The Central Government or the State Government may
(I)
( 3) When any order is made under this section (by
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an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) he shall forthG
with report the act to the State Government to which
he is subordinate together with the grounds on which
the order has been made and such other particulars as
in his opinion (have a bearing on the matter, and no
such order made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, I 952, shall
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remain in force for more than twelve days after the
making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government)."
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The question is whether the detention became iilegal because 4
days were allowed to pass from the order of detention and 2 days
from the date of arrest.
The third sub-section quoted. above uses
the word 'forthwith'. Explaining this word Maxwell m Interpre:
talion of Statutes (Eleventh Edn.) at p. 341 observes as follows·
"When a statute requires that something shall be done
"forthwith", or "immediately"
or even "instantly", it
should probably be understood as allowing a reasonable
time for doing it."
The word 'forthwith' in section 3 (3) and the phrase 'as soon as
may be' used in the fourth sub-section were considered in Keshav
N11/kanth loglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay('). In that case the delay was of 8 days.
Giving proper
meaning to the expression it was observed :
"We agree that "forthwith" in section 3(3) cannot
mean the same thing as "as soon as may be" in section
7, and that the former is more preemptory than . the
latter. The difference between the two expressions lies,
in our opinion, in this that while under section 7 the time
that is allowed to the authority to send the conununication to the detenu is
what is reasonably convenient,
under section 3 ( 3) what is ail owed is only the period
during which he could not, without any fault of his own,
send the report."
The delay of 8 days was held explained thus :
"What happened on the 16th and the following days
are now matters of history. The great city of Bombay
was convulsed in disorders, which are among the worst
that this country has witnessed. The Bombay· police had
a most difficult task to perform in securing life and property, and the authorities must have been working at
high pressure in maintaining law and order. It is obvious that the Commissioner was not sleeping over the
orders which he had passed or lounging supinely over
them. The delay such as it is, is due to causes not of
his making, but to causes to which the activities of the
petitioners very largely contributed. We have no hesitation in accepting the affidavit, and we hold that the
delay in sending the report could not have been avoided
by the Commissioner and that when they were sent by
bun, they were sent "forthwith" within the meaning of
section 3 (3) of the Act."
H
Jn the present case the delay is much shorter.
Tbe 10th and
1 ith of February were close holidays.
The communication was
(I) [1956) S.C.R. 653 at pages 658-660.
566
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 1 S.C.R.
on the 13th.
Thus there wa' only delay because the report was
not made on the 12th.
Explaining the delay the District Magistrate in his affidavit says :
"! say that I 0th february, 1968 was a holiday,
being the second Saturday of the mon'th and 11th February, 1968 was Sunday.
I say that serious reports
about the activities of the Mizo National Front and
Sangkrak Party, which arc tribal groups of hostiles who
had set up an independent Government and were indulging in subversive acts against the local Government and were committing dacoities, murder, arson etc.
particularly aimed at non-tribals, were received at that
time which kept me extremely busy during those days.
Besides this, I also say that l was in the midst of paddy
procurements and there was very heavy rush of work
in my office in those days.
I say that I 0th and 11th
February, 1968, being holidays and order being communicated on the 13th to the State Government, was
communicated "forthwith" as required by law."
Jn our judgment even if the meaning from the ruling is applied
with strictness, the delay was explained sufficiently. The District
Magistrate was hard put to for time and the surrounding circumstances explain the very short delay.
A much larger delay wa'
held in this Court not to militate against section 3(3) and we
think there is less room for interference in this case than existed
in the former case.
We accordingly reject the first of the law
points.
The second point has no force. There is no provision in the
Act that such an approval must be communicated to the detenu.
The argument is that this must be implied from the object of the
Act. The detaining authority is answerable to the State Government. Sub-section (3) gives validity to the order for a period of
12 days even without approval., The approval was done within
the time and began to operate as soon as made.
It was contend-
, ed that the app.roval ought to have been communicated to the
detenu and without this communication the detention could not
be legal.
Reliance was placed upon certain cases to show that persons
affected by an order must be communicated that order if it is to
he effective. In Raia Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Dep11ty
Land Acquisition Officer and another(') (a case under the Land·
Acquisition Act 1894) it was held that the award of the Collector mu't be communicated, and that this was an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice .. The Court was considering
a question of limitation which ran 'from the date of the Collector's
(1) 11962] I S.C.R. 676.
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567
award' in the proviso to s. 18 and was not prepared to cons~e
those words in a literal or mechanical way.
The reason which
prevailed for making a distinction between an order passed and
an order conimunicated do not obtain here.
In Bachhittar Singh v.
The State of Punjab(') an order of
dismissal of a publiC servant passed by the Minister on the file was
not communicated and it was held that it was only provisional till
communicated.
This case is not in point. The next case Biren
Dutta and others v. Chief Commissioner of Tripura and another(
2
)
deals with detention under the Defence of India Rules 1962 rules
30(l)(b) and 30A(8). The reason of rule 30A(8) was sfate~
by this Court to be that it is in the nature of an independent decision and further detention can be justified only if the decision is
recorded as required by the rule, and it must be in writing clearly
and unambiguously to indicate the decision. It was further observed that the decision must be communicated. This case is really
no authority in the context of the present case.
Section 3 ( 3) of
the Preventive Detention Act does not specify that the order of
apP.roval is anything more than an administrative approval by the
State Government. If this be so the necessity of communication
of the approval does not arise with that strictness as does the decision under Rule 30A ( 8) of the Defence of India Rules.
The
Solicitor General on that occasion conceded this position.
The
dispute then narrowed to the question whether Art. 166 applied.
This point was not decided by this Court but basing itself on the
admission that the decision to continue the detention must be in
writing, this Court considered whether there was substantial compliance with this requirement. A brief memorandum was produced which merely recorded that a decision was reached.
This
Court held that the memorandum could not reasonably be said to
include a decision that the detention of the detenus was thought
necessary beyond six months.
Such orders were held not to
contain a written record of the decision with appropriate reasons.
In our opinion the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act
cannot be equated to those of the Defence of India Act and the
Rules.
While we are of opinion that even in detention under the
Preventive Detention Act it would be fair to inform the detenu
o_f all the stages through which his detention passes and a provis10n to that effect should be included in it, we are not satisfied
that in view of the state of the existing law we can import the strict
rule here. The scheme of the Preventive Detention Act is merely
to approve the original detention by the District Magistrate and
the continued detention after 12 days is not under any fresh order
but the same old order with the added approval and what the
detenu can question if he be so minded, is the original detention
and not the approval thereof.
(See in this connection also
(1)
[1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713.
(2)
[1964] 8 S.C.R. 295 •
566
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 1 s.c'.R.
Mohammed Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu & Kashmir('). We
A
accordingly consider the ruling inapplicable.
It is next contended that the State Government was also guilty
of undue and unreasonable delay in reporting to the Central
Government.
The State Goverrm1ent communicated the decision
on February 22.
State Government received the communication
from the District Magistrate on February 13, and approved the
action on February 19. The communication to the Central Government on February 22 was not so much delayed that it is not
covered by the expression 'as early as may be• explained by thi'
Court in Keshav Ni/kanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Po/ice
Greater Bombay's(') case.
Mr. Ramamurthy desired \Ls to calculate the time from February 9 but we do not think that is possible.
Time can only be calculated from the moment the matter
reached the State Government.
The State Government took a
week to cortsidcr these cases and it is reasonable to think that there
might be a few more cases which are not before us. Having reached the decision on the February 19, the action of the State Government in communicating the matter to the Central Government
on February 22 cannot be said to be so delayed as to render the
detention illegal.
Various things have to be done
before the
report to the Central Government can be made and a gap of 3
days is understandable.
We see no forces in this point.
This brings us to the merits of the detention. Herc the charge
is that the grounds furnished to the detenus were vaglle and the
detention it<clf ma/a fide.
The grounds arc practically the same
except for v~'ry minor changes to which attention will be drawn
when we deal with individual cases.
We may set down the
grounds of detention from Petition No. 89 of 1968 as sample.
"YOU are being detained in pursuance of the Detention order made under sub-clauses (ii)
and
(iii) of
clause (a) of sub section (I) of section 3 Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 as you have been acting in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and
supPlics essential to the community as evidenced by
the particulars given below :-
1. That you have been instigating the loyal villagers
particularly the tribals living in and around the Forest
Reserve areas to damage the forest plantation and to do
Jhuming in Reserve Forest areas in violation of forest
laws.
Towards the end. you have been attending a
number of secret meetings in which it was decided to
urge the public to start campaign against
the Forest
Department and to destroy the forest plantation.
That
you have by your activities created resentment against
·oi 195i(s.c.R.:6l.
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B. D. BARMA, v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
569
the forest departments and the Forest Laws under Teliamura P. S. thereby endangering the maintenance of
public order.
2. That you have been instigating the loyal cultivators from delivering the paddy to the Government
which has been requisitioned under the Tripura Foodgrains Requisition Order for the maintenance of supplies of foodgrains to the people in lean months. You
have been instigating and inciting the people to offer
organised and violent resistance
against the paddy
procurement staff.
Towards this. end,. you ~av~ been
attending a number of secret meetmgs m which 1t was
decided to urge the public to start campaign against
the procurement of paddy. You have been rn:ectly inciting the people in a number of mass meetmgs also.
That you have by your speeches and activities induced
the people of certain areas to offer violent resistance to
paddy procurement thereby preventing the Government
from maintaining supplies essential to the ci>=unity
during times of need.
The above reports are evident from the facts fuat
on 12-11-67 you attended a mass meeting at Kalyanpur, a secret meeting on 13-11-67 at Asha rambari,
again mass meetings at Teliamura on 28-11-67
at
Moharchhara Bazar on 16-12-67, on 6-1-68 at Teliamura and on 21-1-68 at Stable ground, Agartala.
Because of your activities and incitement, on 2-2-68
fue procurement staff were offered a strong and violent
resistance by an unruly mob at Chalitabari P. S. Teliamura."
It is submitted that the grounds do not give any details since
no particulars of time, place and circumstances have been mentioned, and relevant and irrelevant matters have been included.
Reference is made to two cases decided recently by this Court in
which the grounds were found insufficient. They are : Rameshwor
Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar(') and Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar
d: Others( 2 ).
We find no such vagueness in the grounds as was
found established in the two cases.
The grounds begin by
stating generally what the activities were. They consisted of instigation of tribal people to practise jhumlng and preventing the
authorities from delivering paddy to Government under the procurement schemes. . This instigation it is said was through mass
and secret meetings and resulted in violent resistance to Government. Having said this 1he grounds then specify the places where
and the dates on which the meetings were held and the date on
which and place at which fue resistance took place. In our judg-
(1) (1968] 2 S.C.R. 505.
(2) (1968] 3 S.C.R. 587.
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] I S.CR.
ment more detailed information was not necessary
to give the
detenus an opportunity to make their representations. The grounds
here are specific and very unlike those in the cases relied upon.
We reject the contention.
As regards ma/a {ides and collateral purpose alleged to be the
real reason, the averment is that the detention was ordered
to
prevent the detenus from actively campaigning for the Panchayat
elections that were to take plaee on the 19th and 20th February,
1968. This has been denied and- looking to the circumstances of
this area which are notorious there is no doubt in our minds that
the affidavit of the District Magistrate is reliable.
This ends the
submissions which arc common to these five cases. We now proceed to discuss individual objections.
Writ Petition 89 of 1968.
There is no special objection in
Writ Petition 89 of 1968 beyond what has been discussed above
and it is accordingly dismissed.
Writ Petition 90 of 1968 : Here too there is no special ground
urged before us and the petition is accordingly dismissed.
Writ Petition 91 of 1968 : The first objection is that there
is a mistake of identity. The petitioner claims to be Dasrath s/o
Krishna Deb whereas in the order of detention and other papers
is described as Dasrath s/ o the Late Krishna Chandra Deb Barma.
It is also submitted that Krishna Chandra Deb is alive and, therefore, the order of detention concerned some other person.
It is
denied by the District Magistrate that the order was not passed
against the presen1 detcnu
himself.
The addition of Barma is
explained by the District Magistrate as a popular suffix
to the
name.
The District Magistrate has further said that in Tripura
it is usual to have Barma in addition to Deb in the surname and
that this ground of identity has been raised for the first time in
this Court. The address of the petitioner is accurate and the
father's name is also correct.
Nothing much turns on the fact that
the father was described as dead. The petitioner has not objected
till he reached this Court and the authorities would
hardly be
expected to hold a wrong man and let the real man go free.
We
reject this contention.
A.
B
c
E
The next contention concerns the discrepancy in the dates of
g
meetings and what happened as a result of his
activities and
incitement.
The two sets of dates may be put side by side :
Meetings
Result
25-11-67
18-6-67
16-12-67
21-6-67
26-12-67
24-6-67
H
27-12-67
25-6-67
30-12-67
23-12-67
3-1-68
21-1-68
•
A
B
c
D
•
E
F
G
H
B. D. BARMA, v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
5711
It is argued that the results in all but two d~es ~oul~ not
follow activities which were later.
The explanation 1s
smple.
The results were said to be because of the activities of the peti--
tioner.
The mention of dates of meetings is merely some evidence to show the kind of activity.
We are concerned with.
preventive detention. Ordinarily what we have to satisfy ourselves
about is the satisfaction of the authority and the absence of
mala {ides and whether all the opportunities of making representation were given.
There were enough instances cited of the conduct on which detention was ordered for the petitioner to make an.
effective representation.
The situation in this area was already
bad and the later activities would not make it any better.
We do
not think that the detention suffers from any defect. The petition
will be dismissed.
Writ Petition 92 of 1968 ..
The objection here is of the same character as in Writ Petition
89 /91. An additional complaint here is that he is supposed to
have instigated people to go on strike lllld prevented the motor
drivers and rickshaw pullers from plying their vehicles on the·
roads and government employees from going to office and threat -
ened individual shop-keepers to keep their shops closed, but no
details are supplied. It is submitted that this brings the case
within the rulings of this Court.
We think this case is distinguishable from the case of a black marketer who is charged with
having sold contraband articles or at higher prices or hoarded
goods. General allegations there without concrete instances would
be difficult to represent against. Here the matter is different. It
is an integrated conduct of instigation against law and order which
is being charged.
Several aspects of it are mentioned.
They·
range from jhuming in forests and resistance to procurement to
arr~ging for strikes. Instances of mass and secret meetings are·
furmshed and the ramifications of conduct in other directions are -
mentioned. In these circumstances the petitioner is expected to
represent against the instances and if he convinces that he took
no part in the agitation, the other aspects of his activity will be
sufficiently answered. A case of this type stands on slightly different footing from the cases 'of black marketing earlier decided
by this Court. In our judgment no successful ground has been
made out and the petition must fail.
It will be dismissed.
Writ Petition 94 of 1968.
The petitioner in this case has complained that the order of
detention and the grounds supplied to him were in English and he
knows only Bengali and Tripuri.
He refers to Harikisan v. The
State of Maharashtra & Others(1 ). In that case the detenu had"
asked for a Hindi translation and had been denied that facility ..
(l) (1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 918.
._..;c.
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] / S.C.R.
We find that this objection was taken here but no request was made
A
at any earlier time.
The original petition did not contain any
such objection.
It was raised for the first time in the rejoinder.
The petitioner does not seem to have suffered at all. He has filed
the petition in English and questioned the implications of the Ian·
guage of the order and the grounds.
Of course, he had
the
assistance of the other detenus who know English.
If there had
B
been the slightest feeling that he was handicapped, we would have
seriously considered the matter but in his case it appears that this
point was presented not to start with but after everything was
over.
We cannot entertain such a belated complaint.
Th~ peti·
tion will be dL~missed.
In conclusion all the petitions fail and will be dismissed.
G.C.
Petitions dismissed.