# BIREN DUITA AND OTHERS v. CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TR.IPURA AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1964] 8 S.C.R. 295
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-01-18
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 87-91 of 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/biren-duita-and-others-v-chief-commissioner-of-tr-ipura-and-another-3264
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
295
BIREN DUITA AND OTHERS
v.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TR.IPURA AND ANOTHER
(P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
C.J., K. N.
WANCHOO, M.
HIDAYATULLAH, J. <;:. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR; JJ.)
Detention
Order-Review-Continuation
of
dettntfon
beyond
1iz
months-Order, if must be recorded in writing and communicated
to the deten,,-Defence of India Rules, 1962, RR. 30 (l)(b),
30A(8).
The Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura passed orders
detaining 68 persons, including the appellants and the petitioners, under
R. 30(I)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. While gradually
releasing 45 of them be purported to detain the appellants and tho
petitioners under R. 30A(8) of the said Rules, The appellants moved
the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution and their
case was that the decision to continue them in detention was J?Ot recorded
in writing nor was it communicated to them and was, therefore, invalid
in law. The Judicial Commissioner dismissed the said application!. The
petitioners moved this Court under Att. 32 of the Constitution and
their case was also the same. The first review held on February 1 S,
1963, in respect of all the 68 detenus was reoorded as follows.-
"On review of the detention order in respect of all the detenus
CC. decided to cailcel orders in respect of detent11 at
S. Nos. l, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13."
It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the order by implication
continued the detention of the appellants and the petitioners and. such
detention was confirmed by subsequent orders.
Held: (i) The order did not comply with the provisiot11 of R. 30A(8)
of the Defence of India Rules and the detenus before this Court mmt
be set at liberty.
Decision to continue a detenu in detention must not only be recorded
in wNting but such writing must clearly and unambiguously indicate
that decision.
Subsequent reviews under the Rule could not validate the illegal
continuance of the detention after the expiry of six months from the
date of the original order of delenlion.
Decision recorded under R. 30A(8) is in tho nature of an independent
decision and further detention can be justified only if the doci1ion Is
recorded u required by it
1964
July, 23
1964
Biren Dutta
v.
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Even assuming that an order passed under R. 30A(8) could in a
proper case imply the decision to• continue the detention of some of
the detenus, the present case could not be said to be one 1uch.
C.C. of Tripura
(ii) Assuming, though not deciding, that a decision recorded under
R. 30A(8) of the Rules was not in law required to be communicated
to the detenue, it was just and proper that the decision should in every
case be communicated to the detenu.

## Text

8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
295
BIREN DUITA AND OTHERS
v.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TR.IPURA AND ANOTHER
(P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
C.J., K. N.
WANCHOO, M.
HIDAYATULLAH, J. <;:. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR; JJ.)
Detention
Order-Review-Continuation
of
dettntfon
beyond
1iz
months-Order, if must be recorded in writing and communicated
to the deten,,-Defence of India Rules, 1962, RR. 30 (l)(b),
30A(8).
The Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura passed orders
detaining 68 persons, including the appellants and the petitioners, under
R. 30(I)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. While gradually
releasing 45 of them be purported to detain the appellants and tho
petitioners under R. 30A(8) of the said Rules, The appellants moved
the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution and their
case was that the decision to continue them in detention was J?Ot recorded
in writing nor was it communicated to them and was, therefore, invalid
in law. The Judicial Commissioner dismissed the said application!. The
petitioners moved this Court under Att. 32 of the Constitution and
their case was also the same. The first review held on February 1 S,
1963, in respect of all the 68 detenus was reoorded as follows.-
"On review of the detention order in respect of all the detenus
CC. decided to cailcel orders in respect of detent11 at
S. Nos. l, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13."
It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the order by implication
continued the detention of the appellants and the petitioners and. such
detention was confirmed by subsequent orders.
Held: (i) The order did not comply with the provisiot11 of R. 30A(8)
of the Defence of India Rules and the detenus before this Court mmt
be set at liberty.
Decision to continue a detenu in detention must not only be recorded
in wNting but such writing must clearly and unambiguously indicate
that decision.
Subsequent reviews under the Rule could not validate the illegal
continuance of the detention after the expiry of six months from the
date of the original order of delenlion.
Decision recorded under R. 30A(8) is in tho nature of an independent
decision and further detention can be justified only if the doci1ion Is
recorded u required by it
1964
July, 23
1964
Biren Dutta
v.
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Even assuming that an order passed under R. 30A(8) could in a
proper case imply the decision to• continue the detention of some of
the detenus, the present case could not be said to be one 1uch.
C.C. of Tripura
(ii) Assuming, though not deciding, that a decision recorded under
R. 30A(8) of the Rules was not in law required to be communicated
to the detenue, it was just and proper that the decision should in every
case be communicated to the detenu.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 87-91 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated January 18, 1964, of the Judicial Commissioner's
Court for Tripura in Criminal Misc. (Habeas Corpus)
Petitions Nos. )5, 20, 25, 26 and 28 of 1963, and Habeas
Corpus Petitions Nos. 24 and 27 of 1963.
AND
Writ Petitions Nos. 43, 42, 40, 41, 65 and 80 of 1964.
Petition Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of the fundamental rights.
R. K. Garg, S. C.
Agarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.
Ramamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all.
H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R. H.
Dhebar, for the respondents (Except Respondent No. 2 in
W.P. 43 of 1964).
D. Goburdhun, for respondent No. 2 (in W.P. 43 of
1964).
July 23, 1964, The
Judgment of the
Court
was
delivered by
Gajendragadkar
'GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These Criminal Appeals and
c. I.
Writ Petitions have been placed for hearing together in a
group because they raise common questions of law.
As is well-known, after
the Chinese
attacked
the
northern border of India on the 8th September, 1962, the
President issued a Proclamation under
Art. 3 5 2 of the
Constitution on the 26th October, 1962.
This proclamation declared that a grave emergency existed which posed a
threat to the security of India.
On the same day, an Ordi-
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
nance was promulgated by the President. This Ordinance
was subsequently modified by Ordinance No. 6 of 1962 on
the 3rd of November, 1962. The President also issued an
Order under Art. 359 ( 1) suspending the rights of citizens
to mow any court for the enforcement. of the rights conferred by Articles 21 and 22 during the pendency of the
emergency proclamation.
On the 26th October,
1962,
the Rules framed by the Central Govern:nent under
the
Defence of India Act (hereinafter called 'the Rules') were
published. Rule 30 of the Rules as originally framed was
subsequently modified on the
6th December, 1962
and
Rule 30-A was added.
Later, an Act was passed on the
12th D1~cember, 1962, and s. 48(1) of this Act provided
for the repeal of the earlier Ordinances. Even so, s. 48 (2)
provided for the continuance of the Rules framed under the
Ordinall!ces, so that the relevant Rules framed under the
Ordinances have to be taken as Rules framed under
the
latter Act.
It appears that Mr. Mukerjee who was
the Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura at the relevant
time, cons.idered the material placed before him as
such
Administrator and was satisfied that
a group of Communists had· been agitating amongst the tribals residing in
the area and inciting them
against the Government, and
he cairu! to the conclusion that their activities were likely
to endanger the security of the State. Acting on this view,
he directed that 68 persons should be detained under Rule
30 (1) ( b) and passed appropriate orders in that behalf.
Later, Le was satisfied that 45 out of these 68 persons need
not be detained any longer; and so, he ordered their release
from, time to time.
That left 23 persons under detention
and it is with the cases of .these :p persons that we are
concerned in the present group of criminal appeals
and
writ petitions.
12 out of these 23 persons moved the Judicial Commissioner of Tripura under Art. 226 of the Constitution and
prayed that the orders of detention under which they continued to be detained at the time of their petitions were illegal
and .should be set aside and they should be ordered to be
released
forthwith.
These
applications
were
heard
1964
Biren Dutta
v.
C.C. of Tripurt
Gajendragadkar
C.J.
Biren Dutta
v.
:.c. of Tripura
Gajend1·agadkar
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64j
together by the learned Judicial Commisioner and were
ultimately dismissed.
Against
his
decision,
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 87-91 of 1964, and 106 and 107 of 1964
have been filed by the detenues, with special leave granted
to them by this Court on petitions made by them in that
behalf.
It appears that the detenues
Mohan Chaudhury
and Jagabrata Sen
Gupta who have joined in Cr. As.
Nos. 87-91/1964, have also preferred separate criminal
appeals Nos. 106 and 107/1964 indiviaually. That is how
this group of appeals is concerned with the cases of
12
detenues who had moved the Judicial Commissioner under
Art. 226; and their grievance is that the view taken by the
Judicial Commissioner in regard to the points of law raised
by them before him, is not correct,
The Writ Petitions deal with cases of
11
remaining
detenues and they joined the detenues who have preferred
appeals before us by special leave in contending that the
continuance of their detention is invalid and that a similar
plea raised by the appellants before the Judicial Commissioner should have been upheld by him.
That is how the
criminal appeals and the writ petitions between them raise
common questions of law.
Mr. Garg who appeared for the appellants
and the
petitioners, as well as the learned Solicitor-General
who
appeared for the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of
Tripura, agreed that it would not be necessary to consider
the facts in each individual case for the purpose of deciding the common questions of law raised by them. It would
be enough if we refer to the facts in one case, because facts
in other cases are exaotly similar and there would be no
point of distinction on facts as such. We would, therefore,
refer to the faciS relevant to the case of the detenu Biren
Dutta.
Biren Dutta was detained on the 25th. December, 1962,
and an order issued in that behalf was duly served on him.
On the 26th December, 1962, he was transferred to the
Hazaribagh Jail. The respondent's case is that on the 15th
February, 1963, the case of Biren Duitta was reviewed
under R. 30A(8) and it was decided to continue his deten-
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
1964
Birtn Dutta
v.
tion. Subsequently, his case was .reviewed on the 3rd July,
1963, 5th September, 1963, and 11th March, 1964, and on
each occasion, it was decided to continue his detention.
C.C. of Tripw
On the other hand, Biren Dutta's contention before the
Judicial Commissioner was that an order of review had not
been passect as required by R. 30A( 8) and had not been
communicated to him.
It was urged on his behalf that
Rule 30A ( 8) requires that the decision to continue the
detention of a detenu must be reduc~d to writing and must
be communicated to the detenu, and the argument was that
since these two conditions prescri~ed by the relevant Rule
had not been complied with, the continuance of the detenu's
detention was invalid in law.
The Judicial Commissioner has negatived
the contentions thus raised by the detenu.
He has found that the
decision to continue the detenu's detention reached by the
respondent under R. 30A ( 8) had in fact been reduced to
writing, and in support of this contention, he bas referred
to the fact that the original file containing a record of the
decision bad been produced on behalf of the respondent
before the Judicial Commissioner, but since the respondent's
learned Advocate was apparently not prepared to allow
the lawyer of the detenu inspection of the said record, the
rourt did not consider the evidence supplied by it.
'IJie
argument urged by the d1ttenu that the said record may have
been subsequently manufactured,
was reje,cted
by
the
Judicial Commissioner.
The Judicia1
Commissioner also
considered the fact that the affidavit made on behalf of the
respondent showed that when the cas,ps of the detenues were
considered by him from time to time, he actually ordered
the release of some of them. This fact, according to the
Judicial Commissioner, showed that the respondent had
applied his mind to the cases of all the detenues and since
he released some of them, it followed that in regard to the
rest he was satisfied that their detention should be continued.
'The Judicial Commissioner was apparently inclined to take
the view that the relevant Rule did not seem clearly to
require that the decision reached by the appropriate
authority under R. 30A ( 8) should be reduced to writing,
but he thought it unnecessary to make a definite finding
Gajendragadlu.
C.J.
1964
Birtn Dutta
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64]
• C. of Tripura
on this issue, because he was satisfied that in the case of
Biren Dutta, the decision in question had been reduced to
writing.
The arg=nt that R. 3,0A ( 8) requires that the
said decision should be communicated to the detenu was
rejected by the learned Judicial Commissioner. It is on
---.
Ja/endragadkar
C.J.
these findings that he rejected the petition filed by Biren
Dutta and 11 other detenues and held that the continuance
of their detention was justified in law.
When these matters were argued before this Court on
the 6th May, 1964, an interim order was passed directing
that the Chief Secretary to the Tripura Administration
should forthwith transmit to this Court the original files in
respect of the detenues concerned and that the Minister, or
the Secretary or the Administrator who reviewed the cases
of the detenues and had arrived at a decision that their
detention should be continued, should file an affidavit
in
this Court on or before the 8th June, 1964, and that the
affidavit should state all material facts and should indicate
whether the decision arrived at was duly communicated to
the detenues or not.
Accordingly, the original files have
been produced before us and additional affidavits
have
been filed.
The learned Solicitor-General fairly conceded
that he would allow Mr. Garg for the appellants an opportunity to inspect the files inasmuch as he was not going to
raise any question of priVI1ege in respect of them. It is
in the light of the minutes made on these files that the
principal points raised before us now fall to be considered.
Mr. Garg contends that the scheme of the Rules clearly
shows that the original order of detention passed under
R. 30(1)(b), as well as the decision
to continue the
detention of the detenues reached
by
the appropriate
authority under R. 30A(8) must be recorded in writing
and must comply with the provisions of Art. 166 of the
Constitution.
He also urges
that R. 30A( 8)
further
requires that the relevant decision reached by the appropriate authority must be communicated to the detenu. In
support of his argument that the relevant decision under
R 30A(8) must comply with _Art. 166 and must be communicated to the detenu, Mr. Garg has relied on the
decision of this Court in Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar
8 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
v. The State of Bombay('), and Bachhittar Singh v. State
of Punjab('). He has also invited our attention to the
observations made by Raghubar
Dayal J. in
S.
Partap
v. State of Punjab(").
The learned Solicitor-General has conceded that the
order directing the detention of a citizen under R. 30( 1)
( b), as well as the order incorporating the
decision
to
continue the detention under R. 30A(8) must be in writing.
He, however, challenges the correctness of Mr. Garg's contention that these orders must comply with Art. 166, and
he disputes his case that the decision reached under R. 30A
( 8) must be communicated to the detenu.
In support of
his case he has referred us to the decision of this Court in
Mohammad Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu and Kashmir('),
as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in
Pralhad Krishna Kurne v.
The State of Bombay(')
and
that of the Allahabad High Court in Nandan Singh Bhist v.
State of U.P.(').
We do not think it necessary to consider the question
as to whether the orders .passed under R. 30 (1 )(b) and the
record of the decision reached under R.30A ( 8) should
comply with Art. 166 of the Constitution or not. It also
appears to us to be unnecessary to decide in the present
group of cases
whether the
decision
recorded
under
R. 30A(8) should be communicated to the detenu. We are
satisfied that the decision to continue the detention of the
detenues which, it is urged on behalf of the respondent, was
reached by him under R. 30A(8), has not been recorded
in writing as required by the said Rule; and there is
no
other evidence on record to show that such a decision had
then been reached and reduced
to writing. It will
be
recalled that in the present proceedings, it is common
ground between the parties that there has to be an order in
writing indicating the decision of the appropriate authority
reached by him after reviewing the case of the detenu that
the continuance of his detention should be ordered. Rule
30A ( 8) provides that every detention order made by
an
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 612
(3) A.I.R. 1964 S .C. 72
S I.L.R. 1952 Born. 134
(2) [19621Supp.3 S.C.R. 713
(4) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 173
(6) A.l.R. 1964 All. 327
1964
Biren Dutta
v.
C.C. of Tripurlb
GajendragadkarC. J.
1964
Binn Dutta
...
C.C. of Tripura
Gaiendragadl<ar
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
officer empowered by the Administrator and confirmed by
him under clause (b) of the sub-rule ( 6) and every det~n
tion order made by the Administrator himself shall be
reviewed at intervals of not more than six months by the
Administrator who shall decide upon such review whether
the order should be continued or cancelled. The question
which we have to decide is whether it is shown by the
minutes made on the file produced before us by the respondent that he did decide that it was necessary to continue
the detention of the detenues before us. The minutes made
on the file are no doubt a written record of his decision,
and so, the requirement that whatever is decided under R.
30A(8) should be reduced to writing is satisfied; but the
question is do these minutes show that the cases of
the
detenues before us
were considered and a decision
to
continue their detention was reached by the respondent on
the relevant occasion, and that presents a very
narrow
problem for our decision in relation to the construction of
the said minutes.
The first occasion on which the respondent claims
to
have reviewed the cases of the detenues before us was on
the 15th February, 1963. On that date,
he made the
following order:-
"On review of the detention order in respect of all
detenus CC decided to cancel detention orders
in respect of detenues at S. No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 12 and 13."
It is urged by the learned Solicitor-General that this order
shows that the appropriate authority considered the cases of
all the detenues and decided to cancel the detention of some
of them, and that, he suggests, should be construed to mean
that he decided to continue the detention of detenues other
than those whose release he ordered. There is no doubt
that this order makes a reference to the review of all
detenues and, prima facie, it would be open to the SolicitorGeneral to contend that this part of the order shows that
the cases of all the 68 detenues must have been considered
by the appropriate authority. In this connection. we would
like to emphasise the fact that in exercising its power under
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
R. 30A ( 8), the appropriate authority should record its
decision clearly and unambiguously.
After all, the libe~ty
<>f the citizen is in question and if the detention of the
detenue is intended to be continued as a result of the
decision reached by the appropriate authority, it should say
so in clear and unambiguous terms. But assuming that an
order passed by the appropriate authmity under R. 30A ( 8)
can in a proper case be construed to mean his implied
decision to continue the detention of some detenues, while
releasing some others, we find it difficult to hold that such an
implied decision can be inferred from the present order. It
is relevant to remember that this order was passed on the
15th February, 1963, and the six months' period within
which review had to be made under R. 30A(8) would have
expired on the 25th June, 1963. It is quite likely that even
before the six months' period eXpired, the authority considered the matter and came to the conclusion
that any
further detention of the detenues specified in the order was
not justified, and so, even before thr. six months' period expired, he directed that they should be released. That
undoubtedly shows that the authority was considering the
question very carefully and as soon as he felt satisfied that
further detention of the said detenues would
be unnecessary, he ordered their release forthwith; but this very consideration suggests that he may have considered the cases of
only such detenues
as
should be released forthwith.
Besides, there is nothing to show that after the 15th February, 1963, and before the 25th June, J 963, he considered
the matter in respect of the detenues before us and held that
the continuance of their detention was justified after the
expiration of six months. It is necessary to emphasise that
the decision recorded under R. 30A ( 8) is in the nature of
an independent decision which authorises the further detention of the detenu for a period of six months. In other
words. the initial order of detention is valid for siit months
and the detention of the detenu thereafter can be justified
only if a decision
is recorded under R. 30A ( 8). That
being the nature of the decision which is required to be
recorded under R. 30A(8), we are unable to hold that the
memorandum in question can be reasonably said to include
a decision that the continuance of the detention of the
1964
Biren. Dutla
.,,
C.C. of Tripura
Gajendragadkar
C.I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64]
1964
detenues before us was thought to be necessary by the approBiren Dutta
priate authority after the expiry of the period of six months.
"·
C.C. of Tripura
It is true that in the additional affidavit filed by the
Gai•ndragadkar respondent it has been stated as a submission by him that
C.J.
"as a result of the said review (15/2/63) the detention of
Biren Dutta as well as others whose detention orders were
not cancelled, continued." This undoubtedly is a matter
of argument; it being the respondent's contention that since
the order detaining some detenues was cancelled, logically
it follows that the detention of the others was ordered to
continue.
But even assuming that the respondent had
stated in his additional affidavit clearly and unambiguously
that he had decided on the 15th February, 1963, that the
detention of the detenues before us should be continued, we
would not have attached much significance to such a statement, because what we have to consider is the order passed
on the 15th February, 1963. and not what the authority
making the order thought it meant or intended it to mean;
and so, it comes back to the question of the construction of
the order itself.
We have carefully considered the arguments urged before us by the Solicitor-General, but we are
unable to hold that this order can be said to satisfy the
requirements of R. 30A(8) at all.
We are satisfied
that
this order cannot be construed to contain a written record
of the decision of the respondent that the detention of the
detenues before us should be continued after the expiry of
six months from the date of the original order of detention.
Then as to the next order passed on the 3rd July, 1963,
the position is still worse.
It appears that on ihe 15th
May, 1963, the Superintendent of Police, Tripura recommended that some of the detenues should be released,
because he thought there was no longer any justification for
their continued detention.
This matter was
discussed
between the Superintendent of Police and the Chief Secretary on the 6th June, 1963, and eventually as a result of
the conference held between the Chief Minister and the
Chief Commissioner an order was passed on the 3rd July,
1963. This order shows that the cases of the persons
whose release had been recommended by the Superintendent
of Police were considered. These detenues were 25
in
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
number. During the course of the discussion between the
Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner,
the Chief
Minister appears to have suggested that instead of releasing
all the aforesaid 25 detenues together it would be better if
they were released in batches, but ultimately, the order
passed by the Chief Minister which was assented to by the
Chief Commissioner was that all of them may be released
at the sarue time on the 6th July, 1963. In other words,
reading the letter written by the Superinteudent of Police to
the Chief Commissioner on the 15th May, 1963, and the
record of the discussion that took place between the Chief
Secretary, the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner
on the 3rd July, 1963, it is clear that the only cases which
the , authorities considered were the cases of 25 detenues
whose release had been recommended by the Superintendent of Police.
It is common_ ground that the detenues
before us were not included in the said list of 25 detenues,
and so, there is no scope for suggesting that at this time the
cases of the detenues other than th~se who were released
were concerned. That being so, we must hold that like the
earlier order passed on the 15th February, 1963, the order
passed on the 3rd July, 1963, is also of no assistance to
the respondent, because neither
order can be reasonably
construed as
containing a decision
of the appropriate
authority reached under R. 30A(8) to continue the detention of the detenues before us.
This conclusion necessarily
means that the requirement of R. 30A(8) has not been
complied with and that inevitably makes the continuance of
the detention of the detenues before invalid in law.
The
fact that those cases were reviewed subsequently
on the
25th September, 1963 and
11th March. 1964, and
the
decision of the authority was in fac,t communicated to them,
would not validate the illegal continuance of the detention
of the detenues after six months had expired from the date
of their original detention.
We have already indicated that we do not propose to
consider in these proceedings the two other points ofJaw
urged by Mr. Garg; but before we part with these matters,
we would like to emphasise that even assuming that the
decision recorded by
the
appropriate
authority
under
51 S.C.-20.
1961
Biren Dutta
v.
C.C. of Tripura
Gajendragadkar
C.1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1961
Biren Dutl'1
v.
C.C. of Tripura
R. 30A( 8) is not, as a matter of law, required to be communicated to the detenu, it is desirable and it would be fair
and jusit that such a decision should in every case be communicated te> the detenu.
If the
appropriate authority
ronsiders the question about the continuance of the detentfon of a particular detenu and decides that such continuance is justified, we see ne> justification for failing to communicate the said decision to the detenu concerned. If the
requirement as to such communication were held te>
be
necessary as a matter of law,
ne>n-communicatie>n would
render the continuance of the detention invalid; but that is
a matter which we are ne>t deciding in these cases. We are
only emphasising the fact that it would be fair that such a
decisie>n should be communicated to the detenu.
Ga/mdragadkar
C.J.
1964
Jaly, 24
In the result, the appeals and writ petitions are allowed
and the detenues ce>ncemed ordered to be set at liberty at
once.
Appeals and Writ Petitions allowed.
K. HUTCH! GOWDER
v
RICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\ND COMPANY
(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll., JJ.)
Madras Agriculturis's Relief Act-D!bt incurred after commencement of
Act-Final Decree-Scaling dow~Madras Agriculturists .'?elief Act,
1938 (Mad. 4 of 1938), rs. 13, 19.
The respondent, who was the assignee-mortgagee of a
mortgage
deed executed on February 15, 1945 by the appellant for a certain sum
payable with interest, filed a suit for the recovery of the sum with
Interest. The suit ended in a compromise under which a decree was
passed and certain payments were made towards the decree.
In due
course the respondent moved for the passing of a final decree. The
appellant applied for scaling down of the debt under the Madras
Agriculturists Relief Act. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his
objections filed against this application that as the debt sought to be
scaled down was incurred subsequent to the date of commencement
of the Act, the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the