# BISHAMBAR NATH KOHLI AND OTHERS v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1966] 2 S.C.R. 158
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-10-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1964
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah, S. M. Sikri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bishambar-nath-kohli-and-others-v-state-of-utiar-pradesh-and-others-3690
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Administration of Evacuee Property Act (31 of 1950) ss. 27 and
58(3)-0rder passed by Deputy Custodian under repealed OrdinanceJurlsdlctil>n of Custodian-Genera/ to revise-Procedure to be followed in
disposal of revision.
Under s. 6 of-Ordinance 12 of 1949, the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee
Property notified certain property to be evacuee property in October 1949.
No claim was preferred by any one in pursuance of the notification and
the Central Government acquired the property under the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and put it up for sale by
public auction in 1957.
The predecessor in title of the appellants purchased the property. In 1961, the State of Uttar Pradesh applied under
&. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, invoking the
revisional jurisdiction of the Custodian-General, claiming that the property
belonged to the State and not to the evacuee and that therefore, the Deputy
Custodian had no power to declare it as evru:uee property_ The Custodian
General upheld the plea of tho State.
In appeal to this Court, the jurisdiction of the Custodian-General to
entertain the petition was questioned.
·
HELD : (i) The Custodian-General had the power to entertain the
revision application filed by the State.
By Ordinance 27 of 1949, which repealed Ordinance 12 of 1949, a
proceeding commenced or anything done or action taken under the earlier
Ordinance was to be deemed a proceeding commenced, thing done and
action taken under the later Ordinance, as if it were in force on the
date on which the proceeding was commenced, thing was dC>ne or action
was taken. Sec. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which
repealed Ordinance 27 of 1949, contained a similar deeming provision that
anything done or action ta.ken in· exercise of the power conferred under
Ordinance 27 of 1949 is to be deemed to have been done or taken in
exercise of the power conferred by or under the Act, as if the Act were
in force on the day on which such thing was done or action
was taken. By this chain of fictions, things done and actions taken under
Ordinance 12 of 1949 are to be deemed to have been done or taken in
exercise of the powers conferred under the Act, as if the Act were in
force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken.
[164 B-EJ
B
c
D
E
F
G
By the first part of s. 58(3) of the Act, the previous operation of
the repealed statutes survi,.es the repeal. Thereby matters and transaction.
past and closed remain operative. But the·saving of the previous operation of the repealed law is not to be read, as saving the future operation
of the previous law.
The previous law stands repealed and it has not
H
for the future the partial operation as is prescribed by s. 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. The rule contained in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
applies only if a different intention does not appear and
by enacting
158
•
•
B. N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, /.)
159
/I.
s. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act Parliament has
expressed a different intention.
Under s. 58(3), all things done and
actions taken under the repealed statute are deemed to be done or taken
in exercise of the powers conferred by or under the repealing Act, as if
that Act were in force on the day on which the thing was done or action
was taken. [168 C; 167 H; 168 BJ
B
c
£
G
The order made by .the Deputy Custodian was d·xlared final by
s. 30(6) of Ordinance 12 of 1949. If fictionally lhe order is deemed to
have been passed under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, as
if the Act were in operation in October, 1949, it i• difficult to escape the
conclusion that the order would be subject to the appellate and revisional
jurisdiction of the authorities who have the appellate or revisional power
by virtue of the provisions conferring those powers and which must also
be deemed to have been in force on the date when the impugned order was
passed.
The use of the expression "subject thereto" in s. 58(3)

## Text

BISHAMBAR NATH KOHLI AND OTHERS
v.
STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
October 11, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
Administration of Evacuee Property Act (31 of 1950) ss. 27 and
58(3)-0rder passed by Deputy Custodian under repealed OrdinanceJurlsdlctil>n of Custodian-Genera/ to revise-Procedure to be followed in
disposal of revision.
Under s. 6 of-Ordinance 12 of 1949, the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee
Property notified certain property to be evacuee property in October 1949.
No claim was preferred by any one in pursuance of the notification and
the Central Government acquired the property under the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and put it up for sale by
public auction in 1957.
The predecessor in title of the appellants purchased the property. In 1961, the State of Uttar Pradesh applied under
&. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, invoking the
revisional jurisdiction of the Custodian-General, claiming that the property
belonged to the State and not to the evacuee and that therefore, the Deputy
Custodian had no power to declare it as evru:uee property_ The Custodian
General upheld the plea of tho State.
In appeal to this Court, the jurisdiction of the Custodian-General to
entertain the petition was questioned.
·
HELD : (i) The Custodian-General had the power to entertain the
revision application filed by the State.
By Ordinance 27 of 1949, which repealed Ordinance 12 of 1949, a
proceeding commenced or anything done or action taken under the earlier
Ordinance was to be deemed a proceeding commenced, thing done and
action taken under the later Ordinance, as if it were in force on the
date on which the proceeding was commenced, thing was dC>ne or action
was taken. Sec. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which
repealed Ordinance 27 of 1949, contained a similar deeming provision that
anything done or action ta.ken in· exercise of the power conferred under
Ordinance 27 of 1949 is to be deemed to have been done or taken in
exercise of the power conferred by or under the Act, as if the Act were
in force on the day on which such thing was done or action
was taken. By this chain of fictions, things done and actions taken under
Ordinance 12 of 1949 are to be deemed to have been done or taken in
exercise of the powers conferred under the Act, as if the Act were in
force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken.
[164 B-EJ
B
c
D
E
F
G
By the first part of s. 58(3) of the Act, the previous operation of
the repealed statutes survi,.es the repeal. Thereby matters and transaction.
past and closed remain operative. But the·saving of the previous operation of the repealed law is not to be read, as saving the future operation
of the previous law.
The previous law stands repealed and it has not
H
for the future the partial operation as is prescribed by s. 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. The rule contained in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
applies only if a different intention does not appear and
by enacting
158
•
•
B. N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, /.)
159
/I.
s. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act Parliament has
expressed a different intention.
Under s. 58(3), all things done and
actions taken under the repealed statute are deemed to be done or taken
in exercise of the powers conferred by or under the repealing Act, as if
that Act were in force on the day on which the thing was done or action
was taken. [168 C; 167 H; 168 BJ
B
c
£
G
The order made by .the Deputy Custodian was d·xlared final by
s. 30(6) of Ordinance 12 of 1949. If fictionally lhe order is deemed to
have been passed under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, as
if the Act were in operation in October, 1949, it i• difficult to escape the
conclusion that the order would be subject to the appellate and revisional
jurisdiction of the authorities who have the appellate or revisional power
by virtue of the provisions conferring those powers and which must also
be deemed to have been in force on the date when the impugned order was
passed.
The use of the expression "subject thereto" in s. 58(3) cannot
attribute to the pre,·ious operation of the repealed statute an overriding
effect so as to deprive the authorities constituted under the repealing Act
of their power to entertain appeals or revision applications, which they
possess by the express enactment. [169 A-C; 168 F]
Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1117
and Dafidar Niranjan Singh v. Custodian Evacuee Property, [1962] J S.C.R.
214, explained.
(ii) The procedure followed by the Custodian-General was however
open to grave objection, because, he relied upon copies of documents on
which the title of the State was founded without giving an opportunity to
the appellants to lead evidence in rejoinder, and therefore the order of
the Custodian-General should be set aside and the matter remanded to him
for fresh disposal accordinz to law. [170 Fl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 659 of
1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated
the September 11, 1962 of the Custodian General of Evacuee
Property, Department of Rehabilitation,
Ministry
of
Works
Housing and Supply, New Delhi in Revision Petition No. 1209-R/
UP/1961.
Gopa/ Singh,~for the appellants.
S. T. Desai and 0. P. Rana, for respondent No. 1.
N. S. Bindra, K. S. Chawla and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J.
House No. 11, Kaiserbagh at Lucknow, was since
1918 in the occupation of one Chowdhry Akbar Hussrun. After
H
the partition of India, Chowdhry Akbar Hussain migrated to
Pakistan. By order dated October 12, 1949 the Deputy Custodian
of Evacuee Property, Lucknow, in exercise of power "under s. 6
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
of the U. P. Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1 of A
1949 as continued in force by Central Ordinances 12 and 20 of
1949" declared No. 11, Kaiserbagh as "evacuee property''.
No
claim was preferred by any person in pursuance of this notification, and management of the property continued with the Custodian of Evacuee Property. Acting under s. 12 of the Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 44 of 1954, the B
Central Government by a notification dated May
27,
1955
acquired the property for the Central pool constituted under that
Act.
On June 7, 1957 the property was put up for sale by
"""
public auction and was purchased by one Ram Chand Kohli.
On September 27, 1961 the State of Uttar Pradesh applied
C
under s. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31 of
1950 invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Custodian-General
against the order of the Deputy Custodian notifying the property
as evacuee property.
The State of Uttar Pradesh claimed that
the property belonged to the State and Chowdhry Akbar Hussain
had no proprietary interest in the property and accordingly the
D
Deputy Custodian had no power to declare it "evacuee property".
It was submitted that the State of Uttar Pradesh was not aware
of the notification declaring the property to be evacuee property,
nor of the subsequent proceedings and of the sale to Ram Chand
Kohli. The appellants who are the legal representatives of Ram E
Chand Kohli contended, inter alia, that the petition was belated,
and that in any event the property being of the ownership of
°"'
Chowdhry Akbar Hussain it was lawfully declared evacuee property.
The Custodian-General upheld the plea of the State of
Uttar Pradesh, and set aside the order of the Deputy Custodian.
With special leave, the heirs and legal representatives of Ram y
Chand Kohli have appealed to this Court.
We propose in this appeal only to deal with the plea of the
appellants that the Custodian-General had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. If the appellants fail to establish that plea, the case must be remanded to
the Custodian-General for retrial, because we are of the view that
G
the trial of the petition is vitiated by gross irregularities and breach
of the rules of natural justice.
Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31
of 1950 authorises the Custodian-General at any time, either on
his own motion or on applicaiion made to him in that behalf,
H
to ·call for the record of any proceeding in which any Custodian
has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself a& to
A
B. N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, /.)
161
the legality or propriety of any such order, and to pass such order
in relation thereto as he thinks fit. Section 27 does not prescribe
any limit of time within which the power in revision may be
exercised. The Custodian-General may call for the record of any
proceedings of a subordinate officer at any time, and pass such
order in relation thereto as may be called for to do justice to the
B
parties affected by the proceeding. The powers of the CustodianGeneral are unquestionably judicial and normally he may not be
justified in entertaining a petition in revision which has been
instituted after great delay, especially when titles of persons other
than those directly concerned in the order sought to be revised,
c
D
E
have intervened.
There was in this case great delay in lodging
the petition by the State of Uttar Pradesh invoking the jurisdiction
of the Custodian-General. Notice of the order made on October
12, 1949, was issued and thereafter also there were several proceedings before the Custpdian and the Settlement Commissioner
in regard to the property. The authorities of the State appear to
have betrayed gross negligence in protecting the public interest,
if their case about the title of the State be true. But the CustodianGeneral appears to have been of the view that in exercise of
jurisdiction conferred by statute the petition should be entertained
and power under the Act be exercised. Whether in a given case,
the Custodian-General may entertain a petition against an order
passed by a subordinate authority, notwithstanding gross delay in
instituting the proceeding is a matter within his discretion. We
do not think that in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, we would be justified
in interfering with the order of the Custodian-General in a matter
which is essentially within his competence and relates to the
F
exercise of his discretion, however much we may disagree with
him.
The question which then must be considered is whether the
Custodian-General had the power to entertain the petition under
s. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31 of 1950,
G challenging the order passed by the Deputy Custodian on October
12, 1949. It may at once be observed that the reference in the
notification issued by the Deputy Custodian to U .P. Ordinance 1 of ·
1949 has been made on account of some inadvertence. The notification was issued after the U.P. Ordinance expired and when
H
Central Ordinance 12 of 1949 was applied to the United Provinces
by Ordinance 20 of 1949. The U.P. Ordinance 1 of 1949 was
promulgated by the Governor of the United Provinces on June
22, 1949. Shortly before the promulgation of that Ordinance, the
162
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1966] 2 S.C.R.
Governor-General had in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 42
A
<>f the Government of India Act 1935 issued Central Ordinance
12 of 1949 called "The Administration of Evacuee Property
(Chief Commissioners' Provinces) Ordinance, 1949".
This
Ordinance was applicable in the first instance to the Chief Commissioners' Provinces of Ajmer-Merwara and Delhi and it would be
extended to any other Province by notification issued by the
B
Central Government.
The Governor-General issued on August
23, 1949 Ordinance 20 of 1949, by s. 4 whereof Ordinance 12
of 1949 was applted to the Provinces of Madras and the United
Provinces. Bys. 6 of Ordinance 12 of 1949 the Deputy Custodian
was authorised to notify evacuee properties which had vested
C
in him under s. 5 of the Ordinance. A person claiming any right
to or interest in any property notified under s. 6 could prefer a
·claim within 30 days, or such extended time as the Deputy Custodian allowed, that the property is not evacuee property or that his
interest in the property is not affected by the provisions of the
Ordinance.
The Deputy Custodian was thereupon required to
D
hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner, and after taking such
evidence as may be produced, to pass an appropriate order. An
order passed by a Deputy Custodian on inquiry in the prescribed
manner was appealable to the Custodian at the instance of a party
aggrieved thereby : s. 30 (I). The Custodian had also the power
to call for the record of any proceeding which was pending or E
had been disposed of, by an officer subordinate to him .. for the
purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the
·Order passed therein, and to pass such order in relation thereto
as he deemed fit. By sub-s. (6) of s. 30, subject to the provisions
of sub-ss. (1) to (5) of s. 30, any order passed by the Custodian,
Deputy Custodian, Additional Custodian, Assistant Custodian or F
Authorised Deputy Custodian was declared final and not liable to
be called in question in any court by way of appeal or revision
-0r in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.
On October 18, 1949 the Governor-General issued Ordinance
27 of 1949 called "The Administration of Evacuee Property OrdiG
nance, 1949". Under that Ordinance the Custodian could under
s. 7, after notice to the persons interested and after holding such
inquiry into the matter as the circumstances of the case permitted,
pass an order declaring any property to be evacuee property, and
on such declaratiol\ the property vested in the Custodian.
By
s. 24, any person aggrieved by an order made, amongst other
H
sections, under s. 7, could prefer an appeal to the authority specified in the section. Section 27 invested the Custodian-General with
..
::
B. N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, J.)
163
A power at any time to call for the record of any proceeding in
which any custodian had passed an order in appeal under the
provisions of Ch. V for the purpose of satisfying himself as to
the legality or propriety of any such order and to pass such order
in relation thereto as he thought fit, and every order made by the
Custodian-General, Custodian, Additional Custodian or Assistant
B Custodian was by s. 28 declared final and not liable to be called
in question in any court by way of appeal or revision or in any
original suit, application or execution proceeding. By sub-s. (!)
of s. 55 Ordinance 12 of 1949 was repealed, and by sub-s. (3) it
was provided that notwithstanding the repeal of Ordinance 12 of
1949 or of any corresponding law, anything done or any action
C
taken in the exercise of any power conferred by that Ordinance
or law shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise
of the powers conferred by Ordinance 27 of 1949, and any penalty
incurred or proceeding commenced under that Ordinance or law
shall be deemed to be a penalty incurred or proceeding comD
menced under Ordinance 27 of 1949 as if Ordinance 27 of 1949
were in force on the day on which such thing was done, action
taken, penalty incurred or proceeding commenced.
This Ordinance 27 of 1949 was repealed by the Administration of Evacuee
Property Act 31 of 1950. The scheme of this Act was identical
with the scheme of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 27 of 1949. Section 7 conferred power upon the Custodian
E
to notify any property, after holding an inquiry, to be evacuee
property.
Any person aggrieved by an order under s. 7, could
under s. 24 prefer an appeal to the specified authority. By s. 27
revisional jurisdiction was conferred upon the Custodian-General
in terms similar to s. 27 of Ordinance 27 of 1949, and by s. 28
F
every order made by the Custodian-General, Custodian, Additional
Custodian, Authorised Deputy Custodian, Deputy Custodian or
Assistant Custodian was, save as otherwise expressly provided in
Ch. V, declared final and not liable to be called in question in
any court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit,
application or execution proceeding. By sub-s. (1) of s. 5 8, the
G
Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 27 of 1949 was
repealed. Sub-section (3) of s. 58 read as follows :
H
"The repeal by this Act of the Administration of
Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 or the Hyderabad
Administration of Evacuee Property Regulation or of
~y corresponding law shall not affect the previous opera-
!Ion of that Ordinance, Regulation or corresponding law,
and subject thereto, anything done or any action taken
in the exercise of any power conferred by or under that
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
Ordinance, Regulation or corresponding law, shall be
A
deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the
powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act were
in force on the day on which such thing was done or
action was taken."
By Ordinance 27 of 1949 a proceeding commenced under Ordi- a
nance 12 of 1949 or anything done or action taken in the exercise
of the powrrs conferred under that Ordinance was to be deemed
a proceeding commenced, thing done and action taken under the
former Ordinance as if that Ordinance were in force on the date
on which the proceeding was commenced, thing was done or action
was taken.
Section 58(3) of Act 31of1950 contained a similar
C
deeming provision that anything done or action taken in exercise
of the power conferred under Ordinance 27 of 1949 is to be
deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the power
conferred by or under Act 31 of 1950, as if the Act were in force
on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken.
By this chain of fictions, things done and actions taken under
I>
Ordinance 12 of 1949 are to be deemed to have been .done or
taken in exercise of the powers conferred under Act 31 of 1950,
as if that Act were in force on the day on which such thing was
done or action taken. The order passed by the Deputy Custodian
under s. 6 of Ordinance 12 of 1949 was, therefore, for the pur- a
pose of this proceeding, to be deemed an order made in exercise
of the power conferred by Act 31 of 1950 as if that Act were in
force on the day on which the order was passed.
But it was urged by counsel for the appellants that this chain
of fictions did not assist the State of Uttar Pradesh, because by
each of the successive statutes the operation of the fiction was
F
subject to the finality of the orders made under the earlier Ordinance. It was claimed that the repeal of Ordinance 12 of 1949
by Ordinance 27 of 1949 did not affect the previous operation of
the repealed Ordinance, including the finality of orders made under
that Ordinance and bys. 55(3) of Ordinance 27 of 1949 the
finality of the order of the Deputy Custodian under sub-s. (6) of
G
s. 30 of Ordinance 12 of 1949 was preserved. Similarly under
Act 31 of 1950 things done or actions taken under Ordinance
27 of 1949 were to be deemed to have done or taken under the
Act, but thereby finality of orders declared by s. 28 of the Ordinance was not trenched upon. It was submitted, that bys. 58(3)
H
in a technical sense things done and actions taken or deemed to
be done or taken under Ordinance 27 of 1949 were to be deemed
to have been done or taken under Act 31 of 1950, but finality of
-
. ' ..
B, N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, J.)
165
A the orders declared bys. 30(6) of Ordinance 12 of 1949 was not
affected, and the orders of the Deputy Custodian could not be set
aside by the Custodian-General in exercise of the power under
s. 27 of Act 31 of 1950. In support of this contention reliance
was placed upon certain dicta in two decisions of this Court :
Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property,
Delhi &
B Others(') and Dafadar Niranjan Singh and Another v. Custodian,
Evacuee Property (Pb.) and Another(2 ). In our view no support
is to be derived from those cases for the· claim made by counsel
for the appellants. In Indira Sohanlafs case(') an application to
sanction an exchange made under s. 5-A of the East Punjab
Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 194 7, as amended
C in 1948, was decided on March 30, 1952 by the Additional Custodian after Act 31 of 1950 was brought into force.
Exercising
power under s. 27 of Act 31 of 1950 the Custodian-General set
aside the order of confirmation and remanded the case to be
reconsidered by the Custodian. In appeal to this Court against
that order, it was submitted that the order of the Additional CusD todian was not open to revision by the Custodian-General, because
the appellant had a vested right to have the application for confirmation determined under s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees'
(Administration of Pr.operty) Act, and finality under s. 5-B attached
. to such determination, repeal and re-enactment of those provisions
E notwithstanding.
This Court held that the application for confirmation of exchange was pending on the date on which Act 31
of 1950 came into force and had to be dealt with and disposed
of under that Act; the order of confirmation passed in 1952 was
therefore subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the CustodianGeneral under s. 27 of the Act. That decision can have no applicaF tion to· this case.
But counsel relied upon certain observations
made by Jagannadhadas, J., at, p. 1136 :
G
H
"Without attempting to be myticulously accurate, it
may be stated in general terms, that the scheme underlying section 58 (3) appears to be that every matter to
which the new Act applies has to be treated as arising,
and to be dealt with, under the new law except insofar
as certain consequences have ali:eady ensued or acts have
been completed prior thereto, to which it is the old law
that will apply."
Thelie observations, in our judgment, lend no support to the contention that the finality declared under s. 30 of the Ordinance 1
of 1949 in respect of the orders passed or proceedings taken
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1117.
(2} [1962] I S.C.R. 214.
166
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
remains attached to the order of the Deputy Custodian so as to
A
prevent the Custodian-General from exercising his power under
s. 27 of Act 31 of 1950.
In Dafadar Niranjan Singh's case('), the Custodian of Evacuee
Property, Patiala, had taken possession of two houses acting under
the Patiala Evacuee (Administration of Property) Ordinance of B
Samvat 2004. On a claim made by the appellant that the houses
belonged to him, the Custodian by his order dated June 6, 1949
released the houses.
Thereafter several Ordthinancehs relatingd' to
1
evacuee property were passed one after ano er, t e succee mg
Ordinance repealing the previous one and creating, except in the
case of repeal of Ordinance 9 of Samvat 2004, a chain of fictions c
by which certain provisions of the repealed Ordinance were deemed
to continue under the repealing Ordinance. The last Ordinance
was replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31
of 1950. The Custodian-General exercising powers under s. 27
of that Act set aside the order of the Custodian which released
the property in favour of the appellant.
In appeal against the
D
order of the Custodian-General, it was held that the order
dated June 6, 1949 passed by the Custodian under Ordinance 9
of Samvat 2004 could not be deemed to be an order passed under
Act 3.1 of 1950 as the chain of fictions was broken, when Ordinance 13 of Samvat 2006 repealing the previous Ordinance 9 of
Samvat 2004 was issued, and there was no scope for the exercise
E
of his power by the Custodian-General under s. 27 of Act 31 of
1950. The Court then proceeded to interprets. 58(3) of Act 31
-of 1951 on the assumption that the order of the Custodian dated
June 6, 1949, by a chain of fictions was to be deemed an order
made by the Custodian in exercise of the powers conferred on
.him by Act 31 of 1950, and observed :
F
"Sub-section (3) of s. 58 .... is in two parts. The
first part says that the repeal by the Act of the said Ordinance shall not affect the previous operation of the said
Ordinance; and the second part says that anything done
-or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by or under that Ordinance shall be deemed to
have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
·conferred by or under this Act as if this Act were in
force on the day on which such thing was done or action
taken. The second part is expressly made subject to the
first part. If a case falls under the first part, the second
part does not apply to it. In the present case under the
(I) [1962] I S.C.R. 214.
G
H
•
•
B. N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, J.)
A
previous operation of the Ordinance the order of the Custodian had become final. If so, the fiction introduced in
the second part could only operate on that order subject to the finality it had acquired under that Ordinance."
16 7
In our view, the decision of the Court on the principal ground
B
that the chain of fictions was broken, and the impugned order
was not one which was to be deemed to have been made under
Act 31 of 1950, rendered consideration of all other questions
unnecessary. If by the observations set out, it was intended to
lay down that the legal fiction introduced bys. 58(3) of Act 31
of 1950 by which anything done or action taken in exercise of
c the powers conferred by the earlier Ordinance was to be deemed
to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers by or
under the Act applies only if under the earlier Ordinance anything
done or action taken had not become final by virtue of the provisions of that Ordinance, we are unable, with respect, to accept
that interpretation. By the first part of s. 58(3) repeal of the
D
statutes mentioned therein did not operate to vacate things done
or actions taken under those statutes. This provision appears to
have been enacted with a view to avoid the possible application
of the rule of interpretation that where a statute expires or is
repealed, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, it is
regarded as having never existed except as to matters and ti:ansacE tions past and closed: see Surtees v. Ellison('). This rule was
altered by an omnibus provision in the General Clauses Act, 1897,
relating to the effect of repeal of statutes by any Central Act or
Regulation. By s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, it is provided,
insofar as it is material, that any Central Act or Regulation made·
after the commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any
F enactment, the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of
any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed, or affect
any investigation_ legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any
such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
G punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, any
such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the
Repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. But the rule
contained in s. 6 applies only if a different intention does not
H
appear, and by enacting s. 58(3) the Parliament has expressed
a different intention, for whereas the General Clauses Act keeps
alive the previous operation of the enactment repealed, and things.
(I} (1829) 9 B. & c. 752 .
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C R.
done and duly suffered, the rights, privileges, obligations or liabiA
lilies acquired or incurred, and authorises the investigation, legal
proceeding and remedies in respect of rights, privileges, obligations, liabilities, penalties, forfeiture and punishment, as if the
repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed, s. 58 (3) of
Act 31 of 1950 directs that things done or actions taken in exercise of the power conferred by the repealed statutes shall be deemed
to be done or taken under the repealing Act as if that latter Act
were in force on the day on which such thing was done, or action
was taken. The rule so enunciated makes a clear departure from
the rule enunciated in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
B
By the first part of s. 58 ( 3) which is in terms negative, the previous operation of the repealed statutes survives the repeal. Thereby
C
matters and transactions past and closed remain operative : so
does the previous operation of the repealed statute. But as pointed
out by this Court in Indira Sohanlal's case(') at p. 1133, the saving of the previous operation of the repealed law is not to be read,
as saving the future operation of the previous law. The previotts
law stands repealed, and it has not for the future the partial operaD
tion as is prescribed by s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. All things
done and actions taken under the repealed statute are deemed to
be done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under
the repealing Act, as if that Act were in force on the day on which
that thing was done or action was taken. It was clearly the intention of the Parliament that matters and transactions past and closed
were not to be deemed vacated by the repeal of the statute under
which they were done. The previous operation of the statute repealed
was also affirmed expressly but things done or actions taken under
the repealed statute are to be deemed by fiction to have been done
E
<Jr taken under the repealing Act.
The use of the expression
F
"subject thereto" in the commencement of the positive part of
s. 58 (3) cannot attribute to the previous operation of the repealed
statute an overriding effect so as to deprive the authorities .constituted under the repealing Act of their power to entertain appeals or
revision applications, which they possess by the express enactment
that the acts done or actions taken are deemed to have been done
under the statute.
To attribute to the positive part of s. 58 (3)
the meaning contended for by the appellants would result in denying to the repealing statute the full effect of the fiction introduced
by the Parliament that is, acts done or actions taken since the
repealing Act would be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the
authority having power under the Act, but not the acts deemed
to be done or actions deemed to be taken. There is no warrant
(I) (1955] 2 S.C.R. 1117.
•
•
•
B, N. KOHLI v. STATE (Shah, J.)
16 9
A for attributing to the fiction this qualified operation. The Legislature has not expressed such a reservation in the application of the
fiction, and none can be implied. The order made by the Deputy
Custodian was declared final by sub-s. (6) of s. 30 of Ordinance 12
of 1949, but the finality was subject to the provisions of sub-ss.
(1) to (5) of s. 30. If, fictionally, the order is to be deemed to
B have been passed under Act 31 of 1950 as if the Act were in
operation on October 12, 1949, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the order would be subject to the appellate and revisional jurisdiction of the authorities who have the appellate or
revisional power by virtue of the provisions conferring those powers
and which must also be deemed to have been in force at the date
C
when the impugned order was passed.
In the present case, it is said on behalf of the State of Uttar
Pradesh, that they were not aware of any proceeding taken with
regard to No. 11, Kaiserbagh, by the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee
Property and therefore they could raise no objection. The order
D notifying the property was made under the Central Ordinance 12
of 1949. If the notification be deemed an order within the meaning of s. 30(6), the order having been declared fictionally made
under Act 31 of 1950, remained subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Custodian. If any other view is taken, some startling
results may follow : for instance, if under an order passed by the
E Custodian or action taken by him, the rights of a person are
infringed, and before he files an appeal or the revising authority is
moved, the Ordinance or the Act is repealed and is substituted by
a new Act or Ordinance, the' person aggrieved would, if the view
contended for by the appellants were to prevail, have no remedy
F
at all, because the finality of orders declared by the repealed statute
would operate. It may be noted that under s. 27 of Act 31 of
1950 which invests the Custodian-General with powers of revision,
an Explanation is incorporated by Act 1 of 1960 that the power
conferred on the Custodian-General under s. 27 may be exercised
by him in relation to any property, notwithstanding that such proG perty has been acquired under s. 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. This also indicates that
even if the evacuee property has been acquired under s. 12 of Act
44 of 1954, it is still open to the Custodian-General in appropriate
cases to exercise his power in revision. We are therefore of the
view that the Custodian-General had the power to entertain the
H
revision application filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh.
On the merits of the order, not much need be said. The procedure followed by the Custodian-General is in gross violation of
170
SUPREME COURT J.EPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
the rules of natural justice. As we have already observed, acting
A
under the powers conferred upon him by s. 6 of Ordinance 12 of
1949, the Deputy Custodian had notified No. 11, Kaiserbagh,
as evacuee property. What the evidence before the Deputy Custodian in that behalf was, has not been disclosed. Nearly twelve
years after that order was passed, the State of Uttar Pradesh moved
the Custodian-General in revision. The petition invoking the revi8
sional jurisdiction was competent, but the Custodian-General was
not justified in acting upon evidence which was sought to be brought
on the record for the first time before him without affording to
the persons affected thereby an opportunity of meeting that evidence.
It appears that in the petition filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh
many new facts which were not on the record were set out. The
C
Custodian-General has in appropriate cases the power to admit
additional evidence and to consider the same : Rule 31 (9) of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Central Rules, 1950.
But
no party has a right to tender additional evidence in appeal or
before a revising authority : it is for the revising authority to decide
whether having regard to all the circumstances and in the interest
I>
of justice, additional evidence tendered by a party should be
admitted. It is unfortunate that the Custodian-General did not
recorcl a formal order admitting adilitional evidence tendered by
the State of Uttar Pradesh with its petition. But we would not be
justified in the circumstances of this case in assuming that the
Custodian-General was oblivious of the nature and extent of his
E.
powers and restrictions thereon.
The procedure followed by the Custodian-General is however
open to grave objection, because he did not even give an opportnnity to the legal representatives of Ram Chand Kohli to lead
evidence in rejoinder to the evidence relied upon by the State. It F
appears that only copies of documents on which the title of the
State of Uttar Pradesh was founded were filled in the proceeding
before the Custodian-General.
The revision petition was heard
by the Custodian-General on August 4, 1962, and thereafter the
proceeding stood adjourned till August 14, 1962 for further hearing.
On August 6, 1962, counsel for the appellants served a
G
notice upon counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh calling upon
him to give inspection of the documents referred to in the notice.
No inspection was given, and the hearing took place on August 14,
1962. It is true that counsel for the appellants did attempt to meetthe case sought to be raised by the State of Uttar Pradesh on the
merits and submitted that the property in dispute was owned by
H
Chowdhry Akbar Hussain. That, however, would not justify the
procedure followed by the Custodian-General, nor would it lead to
•
•
•
A
B
•
c
D
B. N, KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, J.)
J 71
the inference that the appellants had, in the circumstances of this
case. waived the irregularity in the trial.
It is common ground
before us that at no stage, origmals of a large number of docu·
ments, on which reliance was placed by the State of Uttar Pradesh,
and on which the Custodian-General founded bis conclusion. we~e
produced before the Custodian-General. The Custodian-General
does not appear to have even told the appellants that he had
admitted copies of those documents on the record.
Nor did he
give to the appellants an opportunity to meet the case which the
State of Uttar Pradesh sought to make out. Tn our view the proceedings of the Custodian-General were so wholly inconsistent with
the procedure which may be followed in a judicial trial, that his
order must be set aside and the proceedings remanded to the Custodian-General with a direction that he do call npon the State of
Uttar Pradesh to formally tender in evidence such of the documents
on which they rely, and that he do give an opportunity to the
appe:Jants in this appeal to tender such evidence as they desire to
tender in support of their case. Thereafter the Custodian-General
shall hear both the parties on the evidence properly brought on
the record.
The appeal is allowed and the case is remanded to the
Custodian-General for disposal according to law. The appell:mts
will be entitled to their costs in this Court.
Appeal allowed.
LlSup.C.f.,'66~12